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COMMENTARY

ON

ST. PAUL'S

FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS.

BY

F. GODET,

DOCTOR OF THEOLOGY, PROFESSOR OF THE FACULTY OF THE INDEPENDENT CHURCH OF NEUCHATEL.

Translated from the French

BY REV. A. CUSIN, M.A., EDINBURGH.

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NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR.

THE reader will take note that the contractions used for Uncial and Cursive manuscripts respectively are Mjj. and Mnn.

It has been thought better to retain these contractions, as in the French, for *Majusculi* and *Minusculi*, than to express the distinction merely to the eye by the usual MSS. and mss.

A. CUSIN.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

PAGE

BODY OF THE EPISTLE—*continued.*

VI. The Use of Meats offered to Idols—*continued*, . . . 1

VII. The Demeanour of Women in Public Worship (chap. xi. 2–16), 103

VIII. Disorders in the Celebration of the Lord's Supper (chap. xi. 17–34), ... 133

IX. On Spiritual Gifts (chaps. xii.–xiv.), ... 172–321

I. General Survey of the Domain of Spiritual Gifts (chap. xii.), ... 177

1. The Limits of the Christian Pneumatical Domain (vers. 1–3), ... 177

2. The Unity of Spiritual Forces in their Diversity (vers. 4–13[a]), ... 189

3. The Diversity of Gifts in the Unity of the Body (vers. 13[b]–30), ... 210

II. The Way *par excellence* (chap. xiii.), . . . 234

III. Practical Rules for the Exercise of Gifts (chap. xiv.), . 263

X. The Resurrection of the Body (chap. xv.), . . . 321–450

I. With the Fact of the Resurrection of the Body Christian Salvation rises or falls (vers. 1–34), . . . 325

II. The Mode of the Resurrection of the Body (vers. 35–58), 401

CONCLUSION (chap. xvi.), ... 451–474

The Collection (vers. 1–4), ... 451

His Approaching Visit to Corinth (vers. 5–9), . . . 458

Timothy's Visit to Corinth.—Apollos (vers. 10–12), . . 461

Last Recommendations (vers. 13–18), ... 464

Salutations (vers. 19–24), ... 468

CONCLUSIONS.

I. In regard to the Historical Result, ... 475

II. In regard to Ecclesiastical Offices, ... 477

III. In regard to Criticism of the Text, ... 483

IV In regard to the Epistolary Work of the Apostle, . . 491

COMMENTARY.

CHAPTERS IX.–XVI.

The Use of Meats offered to Idols—*continued.*

3. *The example of abnegation given by Paul* (ix. 1–22).

It is easy, from what we have just said, to understand the link which connects the following passage with the question treated by the apostle. It is nevertheless true that the subject which he proceeds to handle receives so considerable a development, that it is difficult to resist the idea that he had special reasons for expounding it here with so many details. This supposition is confirmed by the allusions to a secret hostility against his apostleship, which occur in abundance in the first three verses of the chapter, and still more clearly by a passage in the Second Epistle, where the odious accusations of his adversaries, in regard to this disinterested conduct on the part of the apostle, are dragged to the light of day. We see, in fact, from 2 Cor. xii. 11–18, that instead of admiring St. Paul's abnegation, his enemies at Corinth turned it into a weapon against him, alleging that if he did not make his Churches maintain him, it was because he did not feel himself to be the equal of the true apostles, and that, moreover, he found other ways of indemnifying himself for the self-denial which he seemed to exercise.

Our First Epistle to the Corinthians already assumes all this; but for prudential reasons Paul as yet lets it barely appear. In vers. 1–3 he establishes the reality of his apostleship; then he deduces from it, vers. 4–14, his apostolical right to maintenance. He afterwards explains, vers. 15–18, the real motive which had led him to decline the exercise of this right; finally, in vers. 19–22, he shows how the principle of abnegation which he has just professed extends to his whole mode of acting in the exercise of his ministry.

Chap. IX. 1–3.

Ver. 1. "Am I not free?[1] am I not an apostle? have I not seen Jesus[2] our Lord? are not ye my work in the Lord?"—These accumulated questions betray the emotion which seizes the apostle as he approaches this delicate subject. Before showing why he has renounced his rights, he must prove that those rights exist, and, to this end, that he is truly an apostle. If, with the T. R., we begin with the question: *Am I not an apostle?* it can only signify: "Am I not free to use the rights which this office confers on me?" But this question would come rather abruptly after the preceding verse, and the two last questions of the verse connect themselves much more directly with the idea of apostleship than with that of liberty. We must therefore begin with the latter, according to the Alex.: "*Am I not free?*" This question is also more naturally connected with the last idea of the previous chapter.

[1] T. R. with D E F G K L It., etc., places these two questions in inverse order; we have followed the order of ℵ A B P, several Mnn. Syr^{sch} Cop.

[2] T. R. with D E K L P Syr. Cop. reads Ιησουν Χριστον.

We shall find the apostle closing (vers. 19–22) with the same idea of Christian liberty with which he had begun. This liberty of Paul's is liberty to eat sacrificed meats, and in general to free himself wholly, when he thinks good, from Jewish usages (vers. 19, 20).—From his liberty as a Christian, Paul passes, in the second question, to his apostolic dignity and to the rights which he possesses as an apostle. The verb οὐκ εἰμί, *am I not*, is placed before the predicate in the two questions, because it is on the idea of *being* that the emphasis lies: "Am I not *really?*" An *apostle* is one sent immediately by the Lord, who alone can confer such a mandate. But the call to the apostleship implies a personal meeting with Christ, and hence the third question: *Have I not seen . . . ?* When, at Jerusalem, it was wished to elect an apostle to take the place of Judas, the two candidates were chosen among those who had companied with Jesus, "from the baptism of John to the ascension, to be witnesses of His resurrection" (Acts i. 22). If Paul had merely heard the good news, like all other believers, from the lips of the Twelve, whatever might have been his gifts, he could never have claimed the title of an apostle. And hence the term: *I have seen*, in this context, cannot refer either to any instance in which Paul might have seen Jesus at Jerusalem during His earthly ministry, or to a simple vision which the Lord might have granted him. This term can only designate the positive historical fact of the appearing of Jesus on the way to Damascus. It was never believed in the primitive Church that an accidental meeting with Jesus, or a vision, such as that of the dying Stephen, could

give a right to the title of apostle; comp. xv. 8 and Acts xxii. 14.—The Alex. reject the word *Christ* to retain only the word *Jesus*, and rightly; for we have to do here with the historical personage who appeared to Paul, with Him who said to him: "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest." The title *our Lord* denotes this Jesus as Head of the Church, who alone is entitled to confer the apostleship; comp. Gal. i. 1 and Acts i. 26.—But the Lord's appearing to Paul was known mainly, if not exclusively, from his own account; to deny it his adversaries had only therefore to cast doubt on his sound sense or good faith. Hence the apostle adds a new proof of his apostleship, borrowed from the experience of the Corinthians themselves, the founding of their Church by him, Paul; this is the subject of the fourth question. The force of this argument is less in the fact itself of the founding of the Church than in the Lord's co-operation powerfully manifested in the course of this work. The words ἐν κυρίῳ, *in the Lord*, bear on the whole question, and not only on the words ἔργον μου, *my work;* they are the true point of support for the conclusion to be drawn. We know from the passage ii. 1–5 the weak, unarmed, trembling condition in which the apostle felt himself when he founded this Church. So this work could be attributed only to Christ's power acting through his weakness and itself touching hearts. It is to this experience of Christ's co-operation in the work of His servant that Paul appeals in the two following verses, which are specially connected with this last question, and state the conclusion of it.

Vers. 2, 3. "If I be not an apostle unto others, yet doubtless I am to you: for the seal of mine apostle-

ship[1] are ye in the Lord; this is my answer to them that do examine me."—The datives *unto others* and *to you* are not only datives of appreciation (in the judgment of), but also datives of relation, as Rückert observes. Though Paul had not been related as an apostle to any other Church, yet as truly as the Church of Corinth was a Church founded by him, he possessed in his relation to it this title of apostle. It was the *seal* officially put by the Lord Himself on his apostolic mission, and it would have been somewhat strange if those who were themselves the living proof of his apostleship should put Paul in the position of proving it to them.

The asyndeton between vers. 2 and 3 announces a reaffirmation under strong feeling of the idea of ver. 2. The emotion is explained by the last words: *them that examine.* Paul's apostleship is the subject of an examination at Corinth! At Corinth a discussion is raised regarding the nature of the appearance whereby Christ conferred on him the apostleship! There is a tendency, perhaps, to represent him, even as in Galatia, as a disciple of the apostles who has revolted against his masters! It is allowable to suppose that these words do not apply to the members of the Church themselves, those of whom Paul has just said that they are his living defence, but to the foreign emissaries who have arrived at Corinth. Comp. Gal. i., where Paul replies to similar accusations.—The pronoun *αὕτη* brings into bold relief this idea of defence: "As to *this* defence, it is yourselves, you, the work of the Lord by me." After having thus established the reality of his apostleship, at least in relation to this Church, he draws

[1] T. R. with D E F G K L reads της εμης; ℵ B P: μου της.

the inference from it: his right is to be maintained by the Church of Corinth and the others which he has founded.

Vers. 4–14.

Vers. 4–6. "Have we not right to eat and to drink?[1] 5. Have we not right to lead about a sister as wife, as well as the other apostles and the brethren of the Lord and Cephas? 6. Or I only and Barnabas, have not we power to forbear[2] working?"—Paul uses the plural (*we have*), because he is thinking also of Barnabas, who acted in this respect in the same way as himself (ver. 6); perhaps he means also to include Silas and Timothy, who had laboured with him in founding the Church of Corinth, joining him in his mode of living; comp. ver. 11: "*If we have sown* among you spiritual things. . . ." The terms *eat* and *drink* receive from the context this special meaning: to eat and drink at the Church's expense. The eating of sacrificed meats is no longer in question. The interrogative μή assumes the negative answer: "It is *not however* (μή) possible that we have *not* (οὐκ) the right. . . .?"

Ver. 5. The right of Paul and Barnabas, as apostles of the Lord, is demonstrated down to ver. 14 by a series of arguments, the first of which, vers. 5, 6, is taken from the example *of the other apostles* and of the *Lord's brothers*. Not only were these personally maintained by the Churches they visited, but each of them had his wife with him, who shared in this

[1] T. R. with A E K L P: πιειν (*drink*); B: πειν; ℵ D F G: πιν.

[2] T. R. with E K L reads του before μη εργαζεσθαι, which is omitted by all the rest.—Vulg. Tert. Hil. Ambros. omit μη (*to act thus*).

advantage. The Greek text signifies: "a sister as wife." The Vulgate translates: "a wife as sister;" it is obvious in what interest. "Clement of Alexandria, at the end of the second century, makes no difficulty about recognising the fact that all the apostles were married (*Strom.* iii. p. 448); Ambrosiaster (probably the Roman deacon Hilary in the fourth century) declares (2 Cor. xi. 2) that all the apostles, except John and Paul, had wives" (see Heinrici, p. 240).—The term *περιάγειν, to lead about*, can apply only to habitual missionary journeys. This little word dissipates to some extent the obscurity in which the book of Acts leaves the career of most of the Twelve. It reveals to us also what an important part the brothers of Jesus played in the early propagation of Christianity. They must have occupied the first rank among the evangelists, who came immediately after the apostles (Eph. iv. 11). These brothers of Jesus were, according to the Gospels, four in number: James, Joses, Simon, and Jude (Matt. xiii. 55 and parallels). An ancient tradition makes them elder brothers of Jesus, the issue of a first marriage of Joseph. Later it was sought to identify two or even three of them with the apostles of the same name; they were held to be cousins of Jesus, sons of a brother of Joseph, called Alphæus. After his death, Joseph and Mary took them into their house to bring them up with Jesus; this is what led to their being called His brothers. The eldest, James, was the Apostle James, son of Alphæus (Matt. x. 3); Simon, the last but one, was the Apostle Simon Zelotes (Matt. x. 4; Luke vi. 15); and the youngest, Jude, was the Apostle Jude Lebbæus, or Thaddæus (Matt. x.

3; Luke vi. 16). This ingenious combination falls to pieces before the two sayings, John vii. 5, where, some months before the Passion, it is said of the brothers of Jesus, "that they did not believe in Him,"—they were not therefore of the number of the Twelve,—and Acts i. 13, 14, where, even after the Ascension, they are still placed outside the circle of the apostles. Our passage, too, has been relied on to identify them with the Twelve. For, it is said, since Peter is mentioned along with the apostles, though he was one of them, it may well be so with the brothers of Jesus. But it is not necessary to give to the two καί, *and*, in our verse an identical meaning. We may explain it: "the other apostles, *as well as* (first καί) the brothers of Jesus, *and specially* (second καί) Cephas." As to the brothers of Jesus, therefore, there are only two suppositions possible: either that they were, according to a tradition already quoted, brothers of Jesus by the father, or that they were his later-born brothers. It is well known what an ascendancy in the Church was given to the eldest of them, James, by the fact of his being the Lord's brother; comp. Gal. i. 19, and ii. 1–10; Acts xv.—The Gospels positively inform us that Peter was married (Matt. viii. 14). Tradition calls his wife sometimes Concordia, sometimes Perpetua. Peter is expressly mentioned, because he occupied the first rank among the apostles and evangelists; his was the example *par excellence*.

Ver. 6. The conj. ἤ, *or*, has here the meaning which it so frequently has in Paul's writings: "*Or indeed* in the opposite case would it happen that . . .?"—No doubt Barnabas had not been called to the apostleship

by the Lord, in the same way as Paul (ver. 1); but, by his co-operation in the work of the apostle of the Gentiles, he was included, as it were, in his apostleship. Yet there remains an important difference between him and Paul, a difference which comes out in a characteristic way, by the application of the adjective μόνος, *only*, exclusively to Paul. It is exactly the same relation as is supposed by Gal. ii. (comparing especially vers. 8, 9).—The term *working* receives a determinate sense from the context: gaining one's livelihood by his work. Some Latin authorities omit the negative μή and translate: *to do so*, that is to say, to live at your cost. This meaning of the word ἐργάζεσθαι is impossible.

To this historical argument, taken from the *example* of the apostles, Paul adds a second, borrowed from *common right*.

Ver. 7. "Who goeth a warfare at his own charges? who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not the fruit[1] thereof? or[2] who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?"—The gospel is profoundly human; it welcomes all that is in conformity with nature in its normal state. Thus Paul appropriates without hesitation the principle contained in the three examples quoted, which he takes from common life. The principle is this: The man who consecrates his labour to a work, ought to be able to live by that work. The soldier leaves his trade for war; his support is due to him from the man in whose service he fights; ὀψώνια, *pay*, strictly the cooked meats taken along with

[1] T. R. with E K L Syr. Cop. reads εκ του καρπου (*of its fruit*); the eight other Mjj.: του καρπου (*the fruit*).

[2] B D E F G Sah. omit η (*or*).

bread; hence: pay in kind, then also in money.—The vine-dresser bestows all his life on the care of the vine of his employer (Matt. xx. 1-7); he ought to partake of its fruit. The reading of T. R.: *of its fruit* (ἐκ τοῦ καρποῦ), is more exact in point of sense; but it is probably a correction of the other better supported reading, τὸν καρπόν, *its fruit*, an expression which does not necessarily signify that the whole of the fruit comes to him, as if he were proprietor. The three examples, of the soldier, the vine-dresser, and the shepherd, present themselves all the more naturally to the apostle's mind, because the people of God are often described in the prophets as an army, a vine, a flock.—Next, Paul corroborates this argument taken from human right by a third, which he borrows from *Divine right.*

Vers. 8, 9. "Say[1] I these things as a man? or saith not the law the same[2] also? 9. For it is written in the law of Moses, Thou shalt not muzzle[3] the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God take care for oxen?"—God had commanded the Jews, Deut. xxv. 4, that when harvest came, the ox, while treading the corn which it had contributed to produce by the painful labour of ploughing, should not be muzzled, and thereby prevented from enjoying, conjointly with man, the fruit of its toil. Among the heathen no scruple was felt about acting differently, and hence God expressly forbids this practice to His people.

[1] D E F G It. Vulg. read λεγω, instead of λαλω, which is read by T. R. with all the rest.

[2] T. R. with A L P reads η ουχι και ο νομος ταυτα λεγει; ℵ A B C D E Cop.: η και ο νομος ταυτα ου λεγει; F G: η ει και ο νομος ταυτα λεγει.

[3] T. R. with ℵ A C E K L P: φιμωσεις; B D F G: κημωσεις.

God's object in acting thus was evidently to cultivate in the hearts of His people feelings of justice and equity. This moral object appears not only from the prohibition in itself, but also from all the other injunctions which accompany it in chaps. xxiv. and xxv. of Deuteronomy: the command to restore to the poor man his garment, taken as a pledge, immediately after sunset (xxiv. 10–13); to pay to the poor labourer his wages on the same evening (vers. 14, 15); not to put the child to death with the guilty father (vers. 16–18); always to leave, when gathering the harvest, a gleaning for widows and strangers (vers. 19–22); not to subject the criminal to more than forty stripes (xxv. 1-3), etc. Does not this whole context show clearly enough what was the object of the prohibition quoted here? It was not from solicitude for oxen that God made this prohibition; there were other ways of providing for the nourishment of these animals. By calling on the Israelites to exercise gentleness and gratitude, even toward a poor animal, it is clear that God desired to inculcate on them, with stronger reason, the same way of acting toward the human workmen whose help they engaged in their labour. It was the duties of *moral beings* to one another, that God wished to impress by this precept.—The expression: *according to* [as a] *man*, is opposed to the law, which possesses a Divine authority. Here the apostle employs the term λέγω, *to declare, ordain*, whereas in speaking of his own saying, he had simply used the word λαλῶ, *to express*.

Ver. 9. We ought probably to prefer the reading of the *Vaticanus*, κημώσεις, to that of the T. R., φιμώσεις. The meaning is the same, but the second reading is no

doubt derived from the LXX. The verb κημοῦν signifies more specially to close the mouth *by a muzzle*, while φιμοῦν signifies to close the mouth in general, by any means whatever.—The mode of treading out corn in the East is this: over the ears spread out on the threshing-floor there are made to pass horses or oxen, or sometimes a small wain drawn by these animals, and on which the driver stands.—When Paul asks if God *takes care for oxen*, it is clear that he is not speaking of God as Creator, but of God as giving the law (ver. 8), *in ferendâ lege*, as Calvin says; for in the domain of creation and Providence "He does not neglect even the smallest sparrow" (Calvin). As we have seen, it was on the heart of the Israelite that He sought to impress this prohibition.

Ver. 10. "Or saith He it not altogether for our sakes? Yea, for our sakes, no doubt, this is written: that he that plougheth should plough in hope; and that he that thresheth should partake of the object hoped for."[1]—The meaning of the ἤ, *or*, is this: "Or, if it cannot be for the sake of oxen that God has spoken thus, is it not absolutely for us, that is to say, with a view to man's heart to train it to generous feelings?" The πάντως may signify *entirely*, *absolutely* (not at all on account of oxen); but it may also, as in Luke iv. 13, have the meaning of *certainly*.—The sequel shows that the understood answer is strongly affirmative: "Yea, absolutely for us! for it is for us that it was written

[1] There are three readings: 1. The Western or Greco-Latins D F G It.: της ελπιδος αυτου μετεχειν (*to partake of his hope*). 2. The Alexandrine in ℵ A B C P Syr. Sah. Cop.: επ' ελπιδι του μετεχειν (*in the hope of partaking*). 3. The Byzantine in T. R. with E K L: της ελπιδος αυτου μετεχειν επ' ελπιδι (*with the hope of partaking of his hope*).

that . . ." The δι' ἡμᾶς, *for us*, signifies that in thus legislating, it was man's moral good, and not the satisfying of oxen, that God had in view. The ἡμᾶς, *us*, has sometimes been taken as referring to the ministers of the gospel. There is nothing to justify this restricted application. In this case we should have required ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, *in our favour*. The opposite of oxen is men, and not apostles. Paul does not, therefore, in the least suppress the historical and natural meaning of the precept, as is thought by de Wette, Rückert, Meyer, Reuss, Edwards, and so many others. He recognises it fully, and it is precisely by starting from this sense that he rises to a higher application. In the conduct which God prescribes to man toward this animal, which serves him as a faithful worker, Paul finds the proof of the conduct which man should with stronger reason observe toward his human servants, and with still stronger reason the Church toward its ministers. This entire gradation would crumble instantly were the lowest step of the scale suppressed, that which was directly present to the mind of Moses; a fact which was understood by the apostle as well as by those who criticize him. Far from arbitrarily allegorizing, he applies, by a well-founded *a fortiori*, to a higher relation what God had prescribed with reference to a lower relation.—The *for* [yea] bears, as it does so often, on the understood affirmative answer. And the reasoning is this: "The precept has not its full sense except when applied to a reasonable being. For it is not oxen that can be encouraged during the toil of ploughing by foreseeing the joy of harvest. The human workman, on the contrary, can calculate beforehand

the share in the result of his labour which will be granted to him, and be sustained by this hope. This is what God would have His people understand by forbidding them to deprive the ox of enjoying the result of his labour on the happy day of harvest."—It is possible, as many do, to explain the ὅτι in the sense of *because* : "It was written, because this is how it is just that the case should be in all relations;" or we may translate by the simple *that*, which makes the following clause the subject of ἐγράφη, *it was written.* In this sense Paul would regard the clause dependent on ὅτι as the simple paraphrase of the word: *Thou shalt not muzzle* . . ., in Deuteronomy; but this, ver. 10, contains a wholly new idea. In any case, it would be very forced to give to this ὅτι the meaning of: "to demonstrate that . . .," as Edwards proposes.

This apostolic paraphrase of the Mosaic command is generally ill understood, and that because the two acts of *ploughing* and *treading out* are regarded as two parallel examples; they are taken to mean two works, of which Paul declares that both should be done with the expectation of recompense. With such an idea it becomes impossible to understand the words and reasoning of the apostle. According to a view common in the Scriptures, the act of ploughing is a hard and painful labour, and consequently the man who gives himself to it needs encouragement. This encouragement is the hope that he shall one day participate in the produce of harvest. There is nothing painful, on the contrary, in the act of treading out; it belongs to the harvest day, and consequently to the hour of joy, to the festival by which the ploughman is recompensed

for his toil. On this entire order of ideas, comp. Ps. cxxvi. 5, 6: "They that sow in tears shall reap in joy. He that goeth forth and weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves." And if this is true in regard to man, it ought to be so also in regard to the being of an inferior order who shares his labour and pain. But it cannot be so with the ox which has ploughed with him, except on condition that no muzzle is applied to deprive it of its portion at the time of the festival, hindering it from tasting the fruit which it has contributed to produce.

The two acts, then, of ploughing and treading out are so far from being related as two examples in juxtaposition, though they are constantly regarded in this light, that the former alone is considered as a labour; the latter is the recompense rightly expected by the workman who has done the former. The understanding of this suffices to make it plain that the reading preserved by the Greco-Latin Mjj. is the only one which corresponds to the apostle's thought: "He that plougheth should plough with hope (this is what sustains him in his painful toil), and (when the day of harvest has come) at the time when he treads out, he ought not to be cheated of the hoped-for boon (as would be the case if he were muzzled on that day)." Having been at the toil, he ought also to be at the recompense, enjoying the harvest. The Alexandrine copyists having, like the commentators in general, understood the two acts of ploughing and treading as two equally painful labours, which are both entitled to the expected recompense, thought that they should apply the notion of hope also to the act of treading,

whereas it applied only to ploughing; hence their reading: "And he that treadeth out [should tread], *with the hope of partaking.*" The Byzantines, after beginning like the Westerns, were led astray by the already corrupted Alexandrine text, and added, like them, to the end of the second proposition the words: ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, *in hope*, which, as we have seen, have no meaning when applied to him who threshes. The application to the relation between the apostle and the Church which he founded is thus perfectly clear. The time comes when the apostle, after painfully ploughing and sowing, is entitled to partake of the harvest, by receiving from the community once formed what is needful for his maintenance. To refuse him this fruit of his painful labour at this time would be to act contrary to the spirit of the Mosaic precept, to convert the rightful expectation of the faithful workman into a deception.

This passage rightly understood is singularly instructive. It is difficult to suppress a smile when listening to the declamations of our moderns against the allegorizing mania of the Apostle Paul, or when we find even an Edwards imagining that he who ploughs is the labourer who founds a church, and he who threshes represents the subsequent labourers who build it up! Paul does not in the least allegorize either in the sense of Edwards or in any other. From the literal and natural meaning of the precept he disentangles a profound moral truth, a law of humanity and equity, and drawing from its temporary wrapping this permanent lesson, he applies it with admirable exactness to the case in hand.—Moreover, we have to gather from the

study of this passage a very important lesson as to the preservation of the text. All our great modern critics, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Westcott and Hort, think the preference should be given as a rule to the readings of the ancient Alex. Mjj., and one is thought lagging behind the age if he does not follow them with docility in this path. Now here is a case where the corruption of the text in these documents is patent, and where it is easy to discover the false idea which produced the corruption. Is exegesis to be held bound, as Westcott and Hort would demand, to close its eyes to the light, and hold by a decidedly corrupt text, because it has on its side the *Vaticanus* and the *Sinaïticus?* The interpreter of the Holy Scriptures is not at liberty to subordinate his common sense to the arbitrariness, the ignorance, or the negligence of the ancient copyists.

The two following verses do not so much contain new arguments in favour of the apostolic right established by Paul, as subsidiary reflections, intended to show better how the precept founded on human analogies (ver. 7) and on biblical right (8–10) applies still more rigorously to the apostle and his fellow-labourers than would at first sight appear.

Ver. 11. "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we should reap[1] your carnal things?" — When the vine-dresser and the shepherd partake of the fruit of their labour, when the ox eats the corn while treading it out, the part thus allowed to the worker is taken from the very produce of his labour, and consequently his part is of the same nature as that

[1] T. R. with ℵ A B K: θερισομεν; C D E F G L P It.: θερισωμεν.

produce. It is not so with the wages of the preacher. What he receives is greatly inferior in value to what he has given. It follows that his right to be supported is still more indisputable than would appear if we held to the preceding examples.—The plural: *we have sown*, can refer only to the three founders of the Church of Corinth, Paul, Silas, and Timothy (2 Cor. i. 19).—The dative ὑμῖν, *for you*, is the dative of favour; they are the soil which has benefited by the seed scattered with so much labour. To this dative corresponds the genitive ὑμῶν, *of you*, on your part, which indicates the origin of the wages. It seems to us that we must read with the Alex. the subjunctive θερίσωμεν, rather than the indicative θερίσομεν. The Greco-Lats. have substituted the latter for the former because of the εἰ, *if*, which did not seem to be in keeping with the subjunctive mood. But it is precisely the opposite which is true, for the harvest in question exists only in thought, according to Paul, and he does not in the least ask that it should be realized.—To this first *à fortiori* the apostle adds a second.

Ver. 12. "If others be partakers of this right over you, are not we rather? Nevertheless we have not used this right; but suffer all things, lest we should hinder[1] the gospel of Christ."—As to this right of support the Corinthians granted it to others, after Paul left them; how would they deny it to him and to those (*us*) who were the first to bring them salvation? —The apostle alludes to workers who came afterwards, and when the Church was already founded. They were either Corinthian teachers or Judaizing intruders. The

[1] ℵ D L: εκκοπη; all the rest: εγκοπη.

passage 2 Cor. xi. 20 leaves no doubt as to the manner in which the latter turned their ministry in the Church to advantage: "If any man bring you into bondage, if he devour you, if he take of you, . . . ye bear it." These strangers, then, fleeced the Corinthians at will, and Paul and his companions did not possess the right which they declined to exercise! Hofmann thus establishes the contrast, rather, it is true, according to the apostle's thought than his words: "We have the right, and we do not use it; they have not the right, and they use it."—The expression τῆς ἐξουσίας ὑμῶν has been variously understood. Some have given the word the meaning of οὐσία, *possessions*, goods: "If others share *your possessions*." But the term has never this meaning in the New Testament, and it has a wholly different one in the second part of this same verse. Ewald and Holsten reach the same meaning, but by another way: they understand by ἐξουσία ὑμῶν the full liberty which the Corinthians have to dispose of their earthly goods. This meaning is equally inapplicable in the second part of the verse. We must simply, with de Wette and Meyer, make ὑμῶν the genitive of the object (as in Matt. x. 1): "the right or power *over you*;" that is to say, the right of having ourselves supported by you. Olearius had conjectured the reading ἡμῶν: "*our* right over you." Rückert was disposed to accept this correction. But it is not necessary, and xi. 10 shows with what liberty Paul uses this term ἐξουσία.—The second part of the verse is strictly speaking an anticipation; for Paul has not yet closed his exposition of the reasons on which his apostolic right rests (see vers. 13, 14); and it is not till ver. 15 that he develops

the idea, enunciated here in advance, of his renunciation of his right. But the eagerness of his adversaries to secure payment of their ministry, would seem to lead him immediately to contrast with their love of comfort his own disinterestedness.—The apostle, in consequence of his renunciation of all payment, had to suffer, not only every kind of privations (nakedness, hunger, thirst), but also all kinds of labours and watchings; see the description 2 Cor. xi. 24–27, where he contrasts his kind of life with that of the Judaizing emissaries. The verb στέγω, strictly *to cover*, and that so as to receive the blows intended for another, consequently signifies also *to bear*. Holsten well: "I bear all the labours of life without having recourse to your help." Heinrici gives to this word the meaning of *self-restraining*, patiently keeping silence; but this meaning seems to us less natural than the preceding.—Of the two readings ἐκκοπή (mutilation, cutting off) and ἐγκοπή (notch, hindrance), the second is preferable; the first term would be too strong. In speaking of a hindrance to be removed, Paul is thinking, no doubt, of the false judgments which might be called forth, especially in Greece, by a preaching of the gospel, which, like the teaching of itinerant philosophers and rhetoricians, should be recompensed with payment in any form whatever. He was concerned to exalt the dignity of his message by making it gratuitous. The term εὐαγγέλιον has here, as most frequently in the New Testament, the verbal sense: the *act* of preaching.—After this anticipation, called forth by the contrast he presented to his adversaries, he resumes the demonstration he had begun, and closes it with the two most decisive arguments.

Ver. 13. "Do ye not know that they which minister about holy things live of the temple? and they which wait[1] at the altar are partakers with the altar?"—In heathen as well as in Jewish worship, it was customary for those who were employed in the sacred ceremonies, to live on the product of these rites. This was a matter so thoroughly received, that Rückert thinks he can apply the two terms used in ver. 13 (*minister, wait upon*) to those heathen and Jewish worships, and that Hilary (Ambrosiaster) has applied the first to heathen and the second to Jewish worship. But by the expression: *Do ye not know?* Paul seems to appeal to a Divine authority; he means probably, therefore, to speak only of Jewish worship. The term *temple,* also, can hardly refer to any other edifice than the only one which in Paul's eyes deserved the name, the temple of Jerusalem; see on viii. 10. Finally, in this sense the expression: *even so,* ver. 14, would become somewhat unsuitable; for the apostle could not put on the same level the authority of heathen customs and that of the Lord. It is therefore with reason that most commentators refer these two examples to Jewish worship, with this difference only, that according to Meyer and others, the two propositions refer to the priests, while according to others, —Chrysostom, for example,—the first refers to the Levites, the second to the priests; or finally, according to a third class, the first denotes the Levitical order as a whole (Levites and priests together), and the second, the priests only. This last meaning seems to me the only admissible one. *To minister about holy things,*

[1] T. R. with A L: προσεδρευοντες; the other nine: παρεδρευοντες.

in the first proposition, is a very general expression comprehending all the acts and all the individuals devoted to the temple service; whereas *serving at the altar* applies to none but to priests, who alone offered the victims on the altar. It is well known that the Levites lived by their employment by means of the tithes and offerings paid by the people, and that in like manner the priests lived by the altar, first by means of the tithe which the Levites paid to them, and then specially by the portion of the victims which was reserved for them. It is this last custom which explains the term *συμμερίζεσθαι, to partake with* the altar. Finally, the apostle reaches the unanswerable argument: the positive order of the Lord Himself.

Ver. 14. "Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel."—Rückert does not think that we have here a new argument; he regards it as only the application to the Christian Church of what was common among Jews and Gentiles (ver. 13). But the apostle could not possibly have presented the consequence of a Jewish or Gentile usage as a positive command of the Lord. We must therefore understand the *οὕτω καί* in the sense of: *And so also.* This is the last fact which completes the proof of the apostles' right. When Paul says: *hath ordained*, he is thinking of a saying of Jesus; it is that of Matt. x. 10 and Luke x. 7. He knew it from apostolic tradition, as he did that which he has already quoted vii. 10. It is somewhat remarkable that in 1 Tim. v. 18 this command of Jesus is connected, as in our passage, with that of Deuteronomy cited in ver. 10.—By the dative *τοῖς καταγγέλλουσιν, to*

them who preach, Paul does not mean that it is *to the* preachers the command is given; it is the dative of favour: *for them.* The expression: *live of the gospel*, may apply, according to time or place, to free gifts or to a regular salary. It is only the principle which is of importance.—According to St. Paul, the Lord has established in His Church a class of members occupying a particular position. While other believers realize the new life in the exercise of a secular profession which affords them a livelihood, they renounce every secular occupation to consecrate all their time and powers to the development of the spiritual life in others; and consequently the Church to which they thus consecrate their life is bound to provide for their material support, as Jesus provided for the maintenance of His disciples from the day when He commanded them to leave their nets, and said to them: "I will make you fishers of men." Such is the foundation of the institution of the Christian ministry. The object of Jesus in establishing it was not to institute a new priesthood, a human mediatorship between God and the Church; but neither did He wish to abandon the development of His work to the spontaneous zeal of the faithful. He has avoided these two opposite rocks, and confined Himself to instituting a *ministry* to preach and have the cure of souls, the members of which live *for* the gospel, and consequently ought also to live *of* the gospel. But woe to the man who claims to live *of* the gospel without living at the same time *for* the gospel!—Paul has reminded his readers that he was really an apostle (vers. 1–3), and then demonstrated by five arguments of increasing force the right which

therefore belongs to him and his fellow-labourers (vers. 4–14). He now reaches the idea which he had in view from the beginning: that of the voluntary sacrifice which he has made of this right (vers. 15–17). In ver. 15 he expresses the fact of the sacrifice itself; in vers. 16–18, the reason which impels him to act thus.

Vers. 15–18.

Ver. 15. "But I have used[1] none of these things: neither have I written these things, that it should be so done unto me: for it were better for me to die, than that any man[2] should make my glorying void."[3]—Paul contrasts the sacrifice which he has made of his right, and consequently of his well-being and ease, with the selfishness of those of the Corinthians who, without any self-restraint, used their liberty in regard to sacrificed meats.—The aorist ἐχρησάμην, in the T. R., would refer to the initial act of renunciation; the perfect κέχρημαι, in almost all the Mjj., denotes the permanent state of privation founded on the act. This reading is preferable.—The expression: *these things*, may refer to the manifold *rights* which are comprehended in that of being supported (comp. vers. 4, 5), or to all the numerous *reasons* alleged, from ver. 4 onwards, to justify this right. "I have used none of them," signifies in this second case: "I have not made them good." After such an enumeration, the second

[1] T. R. with K: εχρησαμην; all the rest: κεχρημαι.

[2] T. R. with C K L P reads ινα τις (*that any one*); F G: τις (*any one*); ℵ B D: ουδεις (*no one*).

[3] T. R. with K: κενωση (*should make void*); all the rest: κενωσει (*shall make void*)

meaning is more natural.—It is remarkable that Paul, after speaking in the first person plural, vers. 4–6, here passes to the first person singular. This is because in what follows, the matter in question, as we shall see, is a fact absolutely personal, the consequences of which do not concern the others except as his fellow-labourers in the work of the apostleship among the Gentiles. —But Paul will not have it supposed that he has written all this long demonstration, that in the future a different treatment should be observed toward him than that which has hitherto prevailed. The word οὕτω, *so*, signifies in the context: "*As I might be entitled to require*, and as in fact is done for others;" comp. the similar elliptical οὕτω, vii. 26 and 40. The ἐν ἐμοί here signifies, as often: *in regard to me* (Matt. xvii. 12). It is so far from being the desire of the apostle to induce the Church to make a change in this respect, that he would rather be deprived of his ministry by death, than discharge it on any other condition than its being gratuitous. The reading of the T. R. is simple, provided we allow a very common inversion in the words τὸ καύχημά μου, which belong to the proposition of ἵνα; comp. iii. 5, and 2 Cor. ii. 4. Thus the meaning is: "Than the fact that as to my cause of glorying, any one should deprive me of it." This cause of glorying is certainly the fact of preaching the gospel gratuitously. "I should like rather to be taken from my work by death, than to do it without having this cause of glorying." But there exist two readings different from this; and first that of the two ancient Alex. (*Vatic.* and *Sinaït.*) and of the *Cantabr.*; see the critical note. Those who bind themselves to

the readings of these MSS. are greatly embarrassed by such a text. Meyer, in his second edition, explained the ἤ in the sense of *than*, and held an aposiopesis: "Than this that as to my cause of glorying. . . . No! no man shall make it void." This construction is excessively forced. Edwards, without being disposed to justify it, accepts it from want of having anything better to propose. Meyer himself, since the date of his fourth edition, no longer gives to the ἤ the sense of *than*, but that of *or*, and he thus explains: "It is better for me to die (than to preach the gospel without having this ground of boasting); *or*, if I must still live, no one shall make void my ground of glorying (by preventing me from continuing to act as I have hitherto done)." Every one must feel how wire-drawn this meaning is in comparison with the simple sense expressed by the received reading; and in any case, after the comparative μᾶλλον, *rather*, it is unnatural to give to the conjunction ἤ any other meaning than that of *than*. The other divergent reading from that of the T. R. is that of the two Greco-Lats., F G: "Or, as to my ground of glorying, who shall be able to make it void?" But this question does not logically agree either with the preceding or the following sentence; then the order of the words would be far from natural in this sense; finally, the ἤ ought after μᾶλλον to signify *than*, rather than *or*. Lachmann puts a period after ἀποθανεῖν, as Ambrosiaster had already done: . . . *magis mori. Nemo gloriam meam evacuabit.* Then, himself perceiving the impossibility of this interpretation, he proposes to read νή, instead of ἤ, in the sense of a solemn affirmation: "By my ground of glorying, no one will

make it void," a sense more impossible still. Holsten, after proposing some conjectures (κενῶσαι or ἐξουδενῶσαι), despairs of restoring the authentic text. Rückert likewise concludes his excellent discussion by saying: "The result to which I come, therefore, is that we do not know what Paul himself wrote, but that of all proposed to us, the best is the received reading." Klosterman (*Probleme im Apostoltexte*, 1883) concludes for the meaning of the text F G, but by putting the following verse in the mouth of one who he supposes attempts to make void the apostle's ground of glorying by alleging that he preaches, not from moral motives, but from constraint. Such interpretations do not call for discussion. In my view, it was evidently the Greco-Latin documents which in ver. 10 had preserved the true reading, and it is no less clear that here it is the Byzantines (supported in this case by Cod. *Ephrem* and by the *Peschito*) which we ought to follow. There is nothing impossible in admitting the required inversion. Only it is better to read the future κενώσει, *shall make void*, than the subjunctive κενώσῃ. The copyists finding that the indicative did not agree with the ἵνα, replaced this conjunction either by the interrogative pronoun τίς (F G) or by the pronoun οὐδείς (Alex.). Others (Byz.) transformed the indicative into the subjunctive. As to the ἵνα, *in order that*, it does not lose its signification of an end to be reached. This end is, making void the subject of Paul's glorying, an end which he ascribes to the man who should wish to induce him to accept a salary.

And why would the apostle prefer no longer to preach at all, and even *to die*, to exercising a paid

ministry of the gospel? It is because the act of preaching in itself contains nothing which furnishes him with a ground of glorying. For to fill this office is with him a matter of necessity; it is an: I must!

Ver. 16. "For though I preach the gospel, I have nothing to glory of:[1] for necessity is laid upon me; for[2] woe is unto me, if I preach not the gospel!"— Many have taken the first proposition as a general maxim. Paul would say, that in itself the act of preaching is not a cause of glorying to the preacher, whoever he may be. But why not, if he discharges this task with all his heart and in love to his Lord? For we shall immediately see what in Paul's sense is to be understood by a ground of glorying. Besides, in a passage of so personal a character as this, the first person singular can only designate Paul himself. If to him personally the act of preaching the gospel is not a ground of glorying, it is because this is a task which he is *forced* to discharge. In fact, if he does not do it, the threatening of a terrible condemnation hangs over his head. When dictating these words: "Woe to me if I do not . . .," the apostle is no doubt thinking of the Lord's threatening: "It would be hard for thee (it would cost thee dear) to kick against the pricks" (Acts ix. 5). What a difference between an apostleship thus conferred and that of the Twelve, who had become attached to Christ by an act of free faith! Their call, with such a preparation and ground, and the ministry which followed it, were a work of free will; while he,

[1] ℵ D E F G read χαρις (*grace*), instead of καυχημα (*ground of glorying*), which T. R. reads with A B C K L P Syr. Cop.

[2] T. R. reads δε (*then*) with K L Syr., instead of γαρ (*for*), which is the reading of all the rest.

Paul, had been, as it were, seized with living force in the way of obstinate unbelief, and constrained by threatening to obey the call. Such an apostleship in itself offers nothing satisfying to the heart of him who is invested with it. By *καύχημα*, *a cause of glorying*, we are not here to understand a cause of boasting; such a thought would belie the apostle's entire evangelical conception. The word is well explained by Heinrici: "the joyous feeling of the moral worth of one's own action." This is not the Pharisaical pride of *merit* connected with the work. It is the grateful heart which needs to feel that it is doing something *freely* to correspond to the love of which it has been the object. The reading *χάρις*, *favour*, in the Greco-Lat. and the *Sinaït.*, would only have meaning if we understood it in the same sense as Luke vi. 32, 33: a *title* to Divine favour. But the close relation between this verse and the preceding speaks for the received reading and demands the term *καύχημα*.—Though the *δέ* after *οὐαί* ("*but* woe . . .") may be logically defended, the *γάρ*, *for*, being better supported and offering a simpler logical connection, should be preferred: No ground of glorying, for there is constraint; and there is constraint, *for* damnation awaits me if I withdraw from the task.

Ver. 17. "For if I do this thing willingly, I have a reward: but if against my will, it is a dispensation which is committed unto me."—The *γάρ*, *for*, signifies that the second part of ver. 16 really proves the affirmation enunciated in the first, to wit, that Paul has no cause of glorying in the act of preaching, if he does so by constraint.—The first of the two propositions

contains a simple supposition, stated in passing to form a contrast with the second, which alone expresses the real fact. As Heinrici well says: "If I preach the gospel willingly—*which is not the case*—I have a reward." The second proposition signifies, on the contrary: "But if I do so by constraint—*as is really the case*—it is a dispensation committed . . ." In the first proposition the apostle could have used the optative πράσσοιμι ἄν: If *I should do so* of good-will . . . He has preferred the indicative πράσσω, *if I do so*, probably because he knows that this case, denied so far as he is concerned, is in fact realized in the case of others: "If, like those who freely became preachers (the Twelve, ver. 5), I preach of my own good-will." The words μισθὸν ἔχω signify: "I have right in this case to a recompense." This term *recompense*, μισθός, is correlative to καύχημα, cause of glorying. The second denotes Paul's action, whereby he can give to his work a character of freedom; the other, the advantage which should accrue to him from it. We shall see in ver. 18 what this advantage is.—The two terms ἑκών and ἄκων (*willing* and *unwilling*) do not refer, as some have thought, to the subjective disposition with which the apostle usually filled this ministry: "If I preach with ardour . . . or if I preach against my will." Thus understood, the two propositions of the verse would not fall into the context where the subject is preaching gratuitously. Paul is speaking of the manner in which he was *charged* with the apostleship. As the term ἑκών alludes to an apostleship freely accepted, the term ἄκων refers to the constraint which characterized the origin of his, the ἀνάγκη of ver. 16.

The last words, *οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι*, literally: *it is a stewardship with which I am charged*, signify: I must by all means fulfil it. The construction is the same as Rom. iii. 2. These words contrast the situation of a slave with that of the freeman. Among the ancients, stewards belonged to the class of slaves (Luke xii. 42, 43). Now a slave, after completing his task, has no recompense to expect; he would simply have been punished had he not done it. The sense is therefore: "I do slave's work, nothing more." Such was the position made for Paul by the mode of his calling to the apostleship; and it would remain what it is, servile, if he were content to preach the gospel like the other apostles. But this is precisely the position which he will not have, and to which he would prefer death itself. He would feel himself related to his Lord, not as a slave, but as a freeman, a friend; and hence it is that because this element of free-will had been lacking in the origin of his apostleship, he introduces it afterwards; how? This is what is explained in ver. 18.

Ver. 18. "What is[1] my[2] reward then? [It is] that, when I preach the gospel, I may make the gospel[3] without charge, that I use not the right which belongs to me in my preaching."—According to Meyer, the understood answer to the question: "What is my reward?" is negative: "I have none; I receive no reward." And the sequel signifies, according to him: "And it is so willed of God that I may render the preaching of the gospel free of charge, which alone can

[1] D F G It.: *εσται* (*shall be*), instead of *εστι* (*is*).
[2] T. R. with B D F G L P It. reads *μοι*; ℵ A C K: *μου*.
[3] T. R. with F G K L P Syr. here adds *του Χριστου* (*of the Christ*).

procure me a true recompense." Idea and construction, all is forced in this explanation. That of Hofmann is equally far-fetched. All of his explanation I can understand is, that he continues the question to the end of the verse: "What is the reward which could lead me to make the preaching of the gospel free of charge?" But the meaning which he gives to this question is beyond my comprehension. Paul's question after what precedes has a very simple meaning: "If the apostleship in itself gives me no ground of glorying because it is forced upon me, and if consequently it does not assure me of any reward, what shall I do after all to obtain that reward without the hope of which it would be impossible for me to labour?" The answer follows: "The way which presents itself to me, is to make the preaching of the gospel without charge. Thereby I do at least something which was not imposed on me; I introduce into my apostleship that element of freedom which was wanting at its origin, and I thus establish, as far as in me lies, a sort of equality between me and the apostles who attached themselves freely to Christ." We have here a feeling of exquisite delicacy, and, if one may so speak, of transcendent modesty, which is far from having been always understood. Baur, especially, has thought that there is here the idea of the merit of works, which Paul had cherished during the time of his former Pharisaism. The apostle imagines, he thinks, that he can do more than is strictly obligatory, and thereby procure supererogatory merit before God. But Paul wishes simply to escape from the position "of the unprofitable servant who does only what he is obliged to do" (Luke xvii. 10).

He wishes at any price to pass from the servile state to that of a freeman acting from gratitude. The apostle does not for a moment suppose, when he thus speaks, that love goes beyond moral obligation rightly understood, but only that love is more than the legal and purely external fulfilment of duty. This latter secures against punishment; but it does not introduce the servant into his master's intimacy. It is strange to hear the apostle accused of going back to his old Pharisaic viewpoint in the very passage where he expresses most forcibly the insufficiency of the external work, and the imperious need of a spiritual relation to his God. The proposition beginning with the ἵνα, *in order that*, is the grammatical subject of the understood proposition containing the answer to the question: "What, then, is my reward?"—"It is that *I may make* without charge . . ." This ἵνα, *in order that*, is not altogether equivalent to a simple ὅτι, *that;* it indicates the aim as ever requiring to be attained anew. —The word μισθός, *reward*, denotes, as is shown by the end of the verse, the advantage which Paul gains for the preaching of the gospel by the gratuitousness with which he follows it. This useful result for the kingdom of Christ is the *reward* which corresponds to the internal feeling of elevation (καύχημα) which is imparted to him by the position as a free servant, thus acquired.—The form εἰς τὸ μὴ καταχρήσασθαι, *so as not to use* . . ., is almost equivalent to a Latin gerund: in not using. We need not here, any more than in the passage vii. 31, give to καταχρῆσθαι the sense of *abuse*. The κατά simply strengthens the notion of *using:* to use to the utmost. Paul means that there remains of

his right a portion which he does not use, that this remnant, which he declines to use, may impress on his ministry the character of free-will which is wanting to it by nature (from the mode of its origin).

There is, perhaps, no passage in the apostle's letters where there are more admirably revealed at once the nobility, delicacy, profound humility, dignity, and legitimate pride of his Christian character. Serving Christ cannot give him matter of joy except in so far as he has the consciousness of doing so in a condition of freedom. And this condition he must gain by imposing on himself a mode of following the apostleship more laborious for himself, but more favourable to the propagation of the gospel, than that used by the other apostles, on whom the office of preacher was not imposed. But for this very reason we also understand how personal and exceptional this renunciation was which the apostle practised, and that it would be unjust to set it up as a model for the ordinary preachers of the gospel. Finally, let us call to mind that we have not here to do with an arbitrary renunciation imposed by Paul on himself with the view of inflicting meritorious and, in a sense, expiatory suffering. Paul had discerned how useful and even indispensable to the honour of the gospel this mode of acting was, especially in Greece. It was the one way of distinguishing the preaching of salvation from that venal eloquence and wisdom on which the rhetoricians lived.

With ver. 18 Paul has closed the digression relative to apostolic payment. But his abnegation is not confined to that; it extends to his entire conduct in his ministry. In all respects he acts on this principle:

to give up his liberty from regard to others, so far as it can contribute to save them.

Vers. 19–22.

Ver. 19. "For though I be free from all, I made myself servant to all, that I might gain the more."—Paul formulates the general principle on which is founded the particular self-denial of which he has just spoken, and which guides all his conduct. Thus the *for* finds its natural explanation. By the term *free*, Paul returns to the question of the first verse, the theme of the whole passage.—Most commentators of our day take πάντων in the masculine sense: *from all men.* But the preposition ἐκ, *out from*, is not very suitable in this sense; it would rather require ἀπό. Ἐκ supposes a domain from which one goes forth. Paul has therefore in view all the legal prescriptions relating to meats, days, forbidden touchings, and in general everything in religion and morals which belongs only to the external form. As to himself, he felt that he was no longer subject to any restriction of the kind. Yet he consented to accommodate himself to the prejudices of any man, rich or poor, great or small, who held to any of these observances, and that for the very reason that in his eyes they were indifferent; he was infinitely less afraid of sacrificing his liberty than of using it so as to compromise the salvation of one of his brethren. We must therefore take πᾶσιν, *to all*, in the masculine sense as certainly as we take πάντων in the neuter sense (see on ver. 22).—The pronoun ἐμαυτόν, *myself*, indicates the apostle's action on himself, necessary to effect this deliberate subjection. — The words

τοὺς πλείονας, *the more*, have been variously explained. Rückert: as many as possible; Neander, Edwards: more than I should have gained without that; de Wette, Meyer, Holsten: the greater number of those to whom I preach; Heinrici: more than those whom I had gained by acting otherwise; Hofmann, Alford: in greater number than those who have been converted by others. The most natural meaning seems to me to be: to gain *them* (these πάντες) *in greater number* than I should have done by acting otherwise. Account is thus taken both of the article and of the comparative.—The word *gain* should not be taken in the sense which has become almost technical, in which we say: to gain one to the faith or to the gospel. The term is taken in its purely natural meaning. The apostle regards the salvation of a soul converted by him as a personal gain; for he identifies his possessions with those of Christ. What he gains for Christ is a part of his μισθός, his reward.—The following verses are the development of the word ἐδούλωσα, *I made myself servant.*

Vers. 20–22. "And unto the Jews I became as[1] a Jew, that I might gain Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law, though myself not under the law,[2] that I might gain them that are under the law; 21. To them that are without law, as without law, being not without law to God, but under the law through Christ,[3] that I might gain them[4] that are without law;

[1] F C omit ὡς.

[2] This clause is omitted by T. R. with Dgr. K the most of the Mnn. Syrsch. It is found in ℵ A B C E F G P It. Vg. Sah.

[3] T. R. with K L: θεῳ, Χριστῳ (*in relation to God, to Christ*); ℵ A B C D F G P It.: θεου, Χριστου (*of God, of Christ*).

[4] T. R. omits τους with F G K L.

22. To the weak became I as weak,[1] that I might gain the weak: I am made all[2] things to all, that I might by all means save some."[3]—We might regard *the Jews* and *those who are under the law* as forming only one class of persons, under two different aspects: first in their national, and then in their religious relation. The first term would refer to their language, dress, etc.; the second, to their dependence on the law. But this distinction is somewhat far-fetched. Is it not better to understand by the first term those who were Jews by origin, and to include in the second, with those same Jews, all the proselytes of Gentile origin who accepted the yoke of the Mosaic law?—While, on the one hand, the apostle inflexibly refused every concession in favour of the law, to which an obligatory character could be attached (Gal. ii. 3–5), he was, on the other hand, equally pliable and accommodating toward any one who might be scandalized by entire independence of legal observances. Thus are explained the circumcision of Timothy (Acts xvi. 3), the vow of Cenchrea (xviii. 18), and the docility of the apostle in regard to the request of James relative to the Nazarite vow at Jerusalem (xxi. 26). The absence of the article before *Ἰουδαίους* arises from the fact that Paul wishes to designate not the individuals, but the category: Jews. The word *νόμος*, *law*, is without article, because what is expressed here, as Holsten says, is the notion of the genus or kind. The omission of the words: *though not without law*, in the Byz., arises probably from the

[1] T. R. with C D E F G K L Syr. omits *ὡς* (*as*), which ℵ A B read before *ασθενης*.

[2] T. R. with E K L P reads *τα* before *παντα*.

[3] Instead of *παντας τινας*, D E F G It. read *παντας*.

mistake of a copyist whose eye passed on from the second ὑπὸ νόμον to the third. The proselytes to whom, as well as Jewish Christians, the second part of the verse relates, forms the transition to the Gentiles, ἄνομοι, *without law* (ver. 21).

Ver. 21. The term: *them that are without law*, is not taken in the sense: rebels to law, as in 2 Thess. ii. 8. Its meaning is simply privative: those who are not subject to a law. Paul has made himself like them by taking the freedom secured by Christ from all legal observances which do not come under the permanent moral law. But, while affirming this, he declares himself subject, in his inmost life, to the true law, the Divine will which has become through Christ his personal will. The T. R. reads with K L the datives θεῷ and Χριστῷ, while the Alex. and Greco-Lats. read the genitives θεοῦ and Χριστοῦ. By the dative, Paul says that he is not without law *relatively to* God in virtue of the inner law, according to which he lives by the fact of his union with Christ. The genitive rather indicates a relation of possession, which in this case cannot well apply to anything except to the law itself. "Not without feeling myself bound by a *law of God*, seeing that, on the contrary, as Christ's possession, I carry the law in me." It must be confessed that the meaning of the first reading is much simpler and more normal. But to explain the two readings one might conjecture an intermediate one: θεοῦ in the first clause, Χριστῷ in the second. In any case, Paul distinguishes three moral states: a life *without* law, that of the Gentile; a life *under* the law, that of the Jew (Rom. vii.); and a life *in* the law, that of the believer (Rom.

viii.). In the first state the will is given up to its natural tendencies; in the second, it is subject to a rule which controls it from without, and which it obeys only by constraint; in the third, the human will is identified by the Spirit of Christ with the Divine law; comp. Jer. xxxi. 33.—For the absence of the article (if we reject τούς with the T. R.), see on ver. 20.

Ver. 22. I think with most commentators, that *the weak* in this verse denotes Christians who are yet slenderly confirmed, such as those mentioned in chap. viii. No doubt the term *gain* does not apply to them in the same sense as to the Jews and Gentiles of whom Paul has been speaking; but the consequence of their weakness, if one should scandalize them, by making them return to their Gentile or Jewish life, might yet be to *destroy* them, as is shown by passages of the Epistles to the Corinthians and to the Hebrews. Paul did not regard them as gained till they were secured against such relapses. Edwards rightly remarks, that we have here exactly the three categories of persons whom Paul mentions in concluding this part, x. 32: "Jews, Greeks, and the Church of God."—The ὡς, *as*, before ἀσθενής, is probably an addition. The apostle may well say that he became weak when he adopted a line of conduct resting on scruples which he did not share.

The last words of the verse sum up the entire passage; they correspond to the first of ver. 19. Not being able to cite all the particular subjects of accommodation, Paul comprehends them in a general expression: τὰ πάντα, *all things*. Here we have very certainly the neuter employed side by side with the

masculine τοῖς πᾶσιν, *to all*, confirming our interpretation of the πάντων, ver. 19. The words πάντως τινάς, *absolutely some*, signify: "in any case some at least of the mass," that is to say, of the multitude of the unbelieving or indifferent whom he met in the capitals of the heathen world where he proclaimed the gospel. No observance appeared to him too irksome, no requirement too stupid, no prejudice too absurd, to prevent his dealing tenderly with it in the view of saving souls.—The word *save*, which he here substitutes for *gain*, clearly shows what he understood by this gain; the salvation of his brethren, this formed his riches!

Thus Paul's conduct was as far removed from the licence or insolent superiority of the liberals of Corinth as from the timorous servility of the weak Christians. Free in respect of everything, he made himself the slave of all from love. What firmness of principle, and at the same time delicacy of conduct, what a combination of strength and gentleness, elevation and humility! How had this fiery steed been tamed and trained by his skilful rider! While preserving his nobility and high spirit, he had acquired the most admirable adaptability. It seems to me difficult to believe that when thus describing his conduct, Paul had not in view the charge of versatility which his adversaries brought against him (2 Cor. i.). As in the previous passage he had indirectly rectified the consequences which his adversaries drew from his refusal of payment, he wishes here to explain to the Church the alleged inconsistencies with which he was charged in his conduct as to Mosaic observances. It was no matter of inconstancy or guile (1 Cor. ii. 15 seq.), but of love.

Thus far the apostle has claimed of believers the renunciation of their rights from regard to the salvation of their neighbour. Now he presses the proud and intractable Corinthians more forcibly, by showing them that it is not their neighbour's salvation only that is at stake in this matter, but also their own. This new and more pressing consideration is developed on to x. 22.

II. The Question considered from the Viewpoint of the Salvation of the Strong themselves (IX. 23–X. 22).

As Paul concluded the preceding development by giving his own example, he introduces the following in the same way. In vers. 23–27 he shows the danger which he himself ran, if he ventured to deviate from the austere path of voluntary renunciation. Then, in chap. x. 1–11, he presents a second example to the Corinthians, that of the people of Israel when they had come out of Egypt, whose numerous chastisements in the wilderness were called forth by their loose abandonment to their lusts. Finally, vers. 12–22, he applies these examples to the present situation of the Corinthians.

1. *The example of the apostle* (vers. 23–27).

Ver. 23. "Now then I do all things[1] for the gospel's sake, that I might be partaker thereof also."—The δέ, *then*, is progressive; it marks the transition from

[1] T. R. with K L Syr. reads τουτο (*this*); all the rest, παντα (*all things*).

interest taken in the salvation of our brethren to care for our own. To understand this verse, we need not construe it in the way in which it is usually done, as if the verb *I do* had two regimens; the first, *for the gospel*, and the second, *that I might . . .*, the latter being regarded as explaining the former. The explanation would not square sufficiently with the term to be explained. There is, it seems to me, only one motive, that which is indicated by the *that*, the salvation of Paul himself. This will appear if we paraphrase as follows: "If I act thus for the gospel, it is that I myself might be partaker thereof." Those sacrifices which he makes for the preaching of the gospel (διὰ τὸ εὐαγγ.), he makes that he may himself share in the salvation which he preaches; comp. ver. 27, which is the key of all that precedes. This life of self-denial, then, is the only condition on which Paul founds the hope that he may one day be welcomed by the Judge and receive the crown from His hand.—If we read τοῦτο, *this*, with T. R., the reference is to the general principle of conduct expounded above. If, with the Alex. and the Greco-Lats., we read πάντα, *all things*, the word refers to the various applications of the principle which have been enumerated. The last reading seems preferable. — The Greek expression literally means: *fellow-partaker of the gospel.* The apostle means: partaking with all other believers in the blessings which it confers, and in those which it promises. Paul would not at any price be deprived of the salvation and glory made sure to other preachers by the freedom with which they perform their task. These words should open the eyes of the Corinthians, who

will deny themselves nothing, to the danger to which they thus expose themselves. Edwards explains Paul's phrase in the sense: "to be a partaker of the *spirit* of the gospel." Certainly Paul does not think that the reward promised to the faithful can be separated from the possession of the evangelical spirit. But ver. 27 constrains us to think specially of salvation, and of the salvation, present or final, which the gospel promises. Ver. 19 expresses in a positive form the same idea as ver. 27 does negatively.

To illustrate this terrible thought, the apostle borrows a figure from the most exciting spectacle which Greek life presented. Every two years there were celebrated near Corinth the Isthmian games, which, like the other public games of Greece, such as the Olympic and Nemæan games, included the five exercises of leaping, throwing the discus, racing, boxing, and wrestling. All Greece witnessed these competitions with the warmest interest, and the athlete who was proclaimed the victor received the admiration and homage of the whole nation; see the description given by Beet, p. 157 seq. It is quite probable, as the same author says, that, during the two years Paul had passed at Corinth, he had himself witnessed the Isthmian games, at least once.—Paul makes use here only of the two exercises of racing and boxing.

Ver. 24. "Know ye not that they which run in a race, run all, but one receiveth the prize? So run, that ye may obtain."—In the application, the *goal* is no more identical with the *prize*, than in the actual case. The goal is perfect holiness; the prize is glory, the crown of holiness. Of course, in mentioning the fact that

out of a number of runners only one reaches the goal first, and obtains the prize, the apostle does not mean, that of the multitude of Christians only one will be saved. What he desires to inculcate by the figure is, that to succeed in the Christian race, one must labour for his salvation with the same energy and the same resolution to reach the goal of holiness, as this one victor to reach the goal of the race. Like him, the Christian must learn to forget everything else, that he may see only the goal to be reached. They are not very many, Paul means, who, while calling themselves Christians, run after this manner! The word οὕτω, *so*, may be regarded as a particle of inference: "*so then* run, that ye may obtain." But it may also be made the antecedent of the conjunction ἵνα: "Run *in such a way that* . . ." There is more vivacity in this second meaning of οὕτω. This little word, rightly understood, seems intended to cheer and stimulate the runners. It is objected, that instead of the ἵνα, *that*, a ὥστε, *so that*, would have been needed. But the ἵνα brings out better the aspiration of the runner after victory.—When the apostle speaks of this *one*, does he allude to his own mode of acting? Possibly (vers. 26, 27). In any case they ought to beware, those Corinthians — fond of their ease and obstinately attached to their rights and liberties—lest they be in the end like those slack runners who lose the prize. To win, it is not enough to run, it is needed to run *well* (Rückert). This idea is the transition to the following verse.

Ver. 25. "Now, whoever strives for the mastery abstains from everything: they to obtain a corruptible

crown; but we an incorruptible."—Edwards rightly says: "This verse reminds the Corinthians of two things: first, the difficulty of winning, and next, the infinite value of victory." The participle *every man striving* relates, not to the time when the athlete is already in the lists, but to the time when he enrols himself among those who are to take part in the competition. During the ten months before the day of the games, the competitors lived in sustained exercises and with special self-denial, abstaining from everything that could exhaust or weight the body. For the Christian, whose conflict is a matter, not of a day, but of the whole life, abstinence, the condition of progress in sanctification, is consequently an exercise to be renewed daily.—The abstinence of the athletes did not relate only to criminal enjoyments, but also to gratifications in themselves lawful; so the Christian's self-denial should bear, not only on guilty pleasures, but on every habit, on every enjoyment which, without being vicious, may involve a loss of time or a diminution of moral force.

Should any complain of this condition of final triumph, Paul reminds them that the athletes make such sacrifices with a view to a passing honour, whereas they have in prospect eternal glory. The pine crown which the judge put on the victor's head in the Isthmian games, while it was the emblem of glory, was at the same time the emblem of the transitory character of that glory. For the spiritual victor there is reserved an unfading crown!

Vers. 26, 27. "I therefore so run, not as uncertainly; so fight I, not as one that beateth the air: 27. But I

buffet [1] my body, and lead it captive: lest, when I have preached to others, I myself should be rejected."—The particle τοίνυν, *conformably thereto*, does not occur elsewhere in Paul's writings; it forcibly expresses a consequence inevitably resulting from what precedes: "In virtue, then, of this state of things in which there is nothing to be changed."—The word *run* denotes the progress made in Christian sanctification; comp. Phil. iii. 13, 14.—As to the οὕτω, it is evidently here the antecedent of ὡς.—The adverb ἀδήλως has sometimes been taken in the passive sense: "Without being seen, remarked," like a runner who is lost in the crowd of other athletes. The apostle would thus expressly designate himself here as the *one* who attracts the attention of the spectators, by outstripping the other runners. This meaning would be admissible if such an expression were not rather pretentious. It is better to give the adverb the active sense: "Without seeing the goal, and consequently the course, clearly, as when one walks in the dark; so: deviating to right and left." This meaning is more in keeping, as we shall see, with that of the following figure: *beating the air*, which has an analogous signification, as is proved by the parallelism of the two propositions. Paul alludes to that sterile activity of the sages and orators of Corinth, who neglect the true end of Christian life, sanctification and final salvation, and are concerned only to charm their hearers, to enjoy themselves with them, and to lord it over them. As for him, he runs with his eye

[1] T. R. with ℵ A B C D reads υπωπιαζω (*I buffet*); F G K L P read υποπιαζω (*I su'ject*); and D^{c} with several Fathers: υποπιεζω (the same meaning).

firmly fixed on the goal. — Next, to bring home this obligation still more forcibly to his readers, he refers to a second and more formidable kind of contest, boxing. Here there is not only running, but striking and being struck. And the blows, to be effective, must not be lost on the air; they must fall on the adversary. The term *beat the air* has sometimes been taken as an allusion to the kind of gymnastics in which the athletes engaged to prepare themselves for the contest, and which was called *sciomachy*. But we are here in the heat of the contest itself. The allusion therefore, if there was one, could only in any case be very indirect.

Ver. 27. The apostle explains by his own example who the adversary is on whom these redoubled and redoubtable blows are to fall; it is his own body. He does not say his flesh, as if he wished here to lay stress on the characteristic of sin in the body; no, it is the organism, as such, that he curbs and bends by all sorts of exercises and austerities to make it a pliable instrument. There is room for hesitation between the two readings ὑπωπιάζω, *I buffet* (the verb strictly signifies: to strike under the eyes, so as to make blue wounds), and ὑποπιάζω or ὑποπιέζω, to grip so as to put under. This second reading would suit the following verb: to lead captive; but the first agrees better with the foregoing verb: *to give blows with the fist.* By this figure the apostle describes all the privations which he imposes on his body, all the labours to which he condemns it throughout the entire course of his life, and that especially in consequence of his refusing all payment and obliging himself to provide with his hands for his maintenance; comp. 2 Cor. vi. 4, 5, xi. 23-27; Acts xx. 34, 35.—

The word δουλαγώγω, *to lead captive*, continues the figure. As the victor led the vanquished round the arena, amid the plaudits of the spectators, so Paul, after breaking the opposition of his body, leads it like a submissive servant before the face of the world in the labours of the apostleship.

And let not this be taken as a work of supererogation, fitted to confer on him some peculiar merit and a higher degree of glory! In his eyes, there is no luxury in the question, it is a simple necessary. Were he to act otherwise, he should be afraid, he who has stimulated others, of being himself finally rejected. One can hardly avoid seeing in the term κηρύσσειν, to fill the office of herald, to publish, an allusion to the function of the man whose duty it was to sound the trumpet and so summon the athletes to begin the contest. Such is the figure of what the apostle was doing for the Gentile peoples by the preaching of the gospel. Rückert, it is true, objects, that, in the public games, the herald himself did not enter the lists. Comparisons always halt somewhere; otherwise they would imply not comparison, but identity. The Christian ministry presents this exceptional character, that he who fills it has two tasks to perform simultaneously: that of calling others to salvation, and that of securing his own. Heinrici has thought that the point here was the approbation or disapprobation which the herald might deserve by the way in which he proclaimed the name and eulogy of the victors, after the combat. This is to press the figure beyond all measure.—The term ἀδόκιμος, *non-acceptable*, to be rejected, comes, grammarians say, from δέχομαι, *to receive*. This term

also belonged to the language of the public games. Before admitting candidates to the honour of competing in the circus, they were subjected to a preparatory trial, called δοκιμασία, by means of which there were set aside all those who were not fit to enter the lists. Could Paul be alluding to this custom? It seems to me improbable. His concern is not about the trial for *entrance* into the contest, but about the exit trial. The terms δόκιμος and δοκιμή are so frequently used by the apostle, that it is unnecessary to explain the use of them here by an allusion which would be so far from appropriate. It is his salvation, the welcome to be received by himself from the Judge, which the apostle sees to be at stake, and with a view to which he thinks it his duty to use such severity toward his own body.

Such is the mode in which the apostle seeks to awake feelings of salutary fear and serious watchfulness in those self-infatuated Corinthians, who, on the ground of their superior knowledge and alleged emancipation, forgot the regard which they owed to the salvation of their brethren, without imagining that by this conduct they were compromising their own.

The better to inculcate the manner in which they should act, he seeks at that very moment to make himself a Greek to the Grecks, borrowing from their national life the figures most fitted to strike their imagination.—It has often and justly been remarked, how frequent these figures, borrowed from the contests of the stadium, are in the authors of the New Testament Epistles (Phil. iii.; 2 Tim. iv.; Heb. xii., etc.), while they are wholly strange to the discourses of Jesus in the Gospels. Have we not here a proof of the fidelity with

which the original form of the latter has been preserved to us? Why, if they had been composed later, and after the Gospel had penetrated into the Greek world, should not such figures so familiar to Greek thought appear in them?

2. *The example of the Israelites* (x. 1–11).

This passage is the continuation of the foregoing. What the apostle has just indicated as a possibility for himself, he now points out as a reality in the history of the Jewish people. In them we have a nation who, after having been the object of the most ample favours from God, favours even which were perfectly analogous to those we enjoy as Christians, nevertheless perished because of its failure in self-renunciation. In fact: 1, the Israelites having come out of Egypt had all participated in the extraordinary favours which accompanied this deliverance, vers. 1–4, 2, and yet they almost all perished in the wilderness, ver. 5; 3, such is the image of the lot which threatens the Corinthians if they act in the same manner, vers. 6–11.

The analogy between this passage and the preceding is striking: this nation, that had come out of Egypt to get to Canaan, corresponds to the runner who, after starting in the race, misses the prize, for want of perseverance in self-sacrifice. The one runner whom the judge of the contest crowns is the counterpart of the two faithful Israelites, to whom alone it was given to enter the Promised Land.

But in the following passage we have no longer to do with a simple comparison; it is more serious; we

enter into the realities of history. The apostle, as has been remarked here, becomes a Jew to the Jews, as he had formerly become a Greek to the Greeks.—Vers. 1–4. He begins by recalling the favours bestowed on the Jews in and after their deliverance from the Egyptian captivity, and he compares these favours with those enjoyed by Christians. For the salvation founded by the ministry of Moses in Israel is one and the same work with the salvation brought in by Christ; and the laws of Divine action, which directed the former of these deliverances, are exactly the same as those to which final salvation is subject.

Vers. 1, 2. "Indeed,[1] brethren, I would not that ye should be ignorant, how that all our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; and were all baptized[2] into Moses in the cloud and in the sea."—The connecting particle δέ, *then*, in the T. R. would indicate a gradation which the preceding remarks easily explain: "And there is more here than a simple figure, such as that of the games." This reading is therefore quite suitable; the other, found in the Alex. and Greco-Latins, γάρ, *for*, is also suitable; the *for* bears especially on the last idea of the foregoing verse, the being found worthy of rejection. "And *indeed* the danger exists; what happened to our fathers is the proof of it." This second connection is simpler.—In saying: *I would not that ye should be ignorant*, the apostle would not insinuate that they do not know the account of the exodus from Egypt; he means that he is afraid they

[1] T. R. with K L Syr. reads δε (*then*), instead of γαρ (*indeed*), which is the reading of the nine other Mjj.

[2] T. R. with B K L P: εβαπτισαντο; ℵ A C D E F G: εβαπτισθησαν.

do not sufficiently understand the meaning and bearing of the events to which he here refers.—Meyer has concluded from the expression: *our fathers*, that Paul is here speaking as a Jew, and in the name of Jewish Christians. But by the address: *brethren*, he has just comprehended the whole Church in one and the same body. He therefore sees in the Christian Church the outgrowth of the ancient Israelitish community. Indeed, according to Romans, chaps. iv. and xi., the Church is grafted on the patriarchal trunk; and, in virtue of this spiritual relation, the fathers of the Jewish people are also those of the Christian household. —The prominent place which he gives to the word πάντες, *all*, as well as its repetition in vers. 2, 3, and 4 (five times), show that we have here the essential idea of the passage: "Those people who *almost all* perished, began with being *all* blessed of the Lord." This is the counterpart of ix. 24: "All run, but one obtains the prize."—The verb in the imperfect, ἦσαν, *were*, denotes a state which is prolonged, while the crossing of the Red Sea having been an event of the day is denoted by the aorist (διῆλθον).—The preposition ὑπό, *under*, is construed with the accusative, because it has not merely a local sense here, but expresses the moral notion of protection: they were *under the shelter* of the Divine presence manifested by the cloud.

Ver. 2. After stating the fact, this verse indicates its religious signification and bearing; it was a true *baptism* which was conferred on them all. As the baptized person enters the water and receives the sprinkling on his head, and as this water by the sacramental words becomes to him the pledge of salva-

tion, so the Israelites, placed under the cloud and crossing the sea, possessed the visible pledge of Divine blessing and salvation. This miraculous crossing separated them thenceforth from Egypt, the place of bondage and idolatry, exactly as the believer's baptism separates him from his former life of condemnation and sin. In this parallel there is no petty and Rabbinical typology; everything is well grounded from the moral point of view. The material water did not play any part in the passage of the Red Sea: it is not said either that it rained from the cloud on the Israelites, or that they had their feet plunged in the water. The crossing was to them as baptism is to the believer, the threshold of salvation. This spiritual analogy is expressed by Paul in the words: *and were all baptized into Moses.* By following their God-given leader with confidence at that critical moment, they were closely united to, and, as it were, incorporated with Moses to become his people, in the same way as Christians in being baptized on the ground of faith in Christ become part of the same plant with Him (Rom. vi. 3–5); they are thenceforth His body.—There is room for hesitation between the two readings ἐβαπτίσαντο (the middle), *they had themselves baptized*, and the passive ἐβαπτίσθησαν, *they were baptized.* In favour of the middle form, it can be said that the copyists could easily have substituted for it the passive form, which is more generally used in the New Testament in speaking of Christian baptism. Then the apostle required to bring out in this context the idea of faith in Moses as the *active* principle of the conduct of the Israelites.—Here, probably, with the words of

the Old Testament, of which the apostle is thinking, we have the only passage of Scripture in which a man is presented as the object of faith; comp. Ex. xiv. 31: "And they believed the Lord, and His servant Moses." No doubt faith, according to the scriptural view, can only have a Divine object, God Himself, His word, His promises, His work; but when a servant of God is absolutely identified with the Divine will and work, as Moses was, then the absolute confidence which attaches to that which is Divine may also be extended to him. Without faith in the *Divine* mission of Moses, Israel would not have followed him to the wilderness.—The preposition ἐν has rather the instrumental sense (*by*) than the local (*in*).

But the Jews not only received a baptism, they partook also of a Holy Supper:

Vers. 3, 4. "And did all eat the same spiritual meat; 4. And did all drink the same spiritual drink; for they drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them; and that Rock was Christ."—As the Holy Supper serves to maintain in salvation those who have entered into it by the faith professed in baptism, so the Israelites also received, after the initial deliverance, the favours necessary to their preservation. These benefits, corresponding to the bread and wine of the Supper, were the *manna* daily received, and the *water* which God caused to issue from a rock in two cases of exceptional distress. The epithet πνευματικός, *spiritual*, cannot refer to the *nature* of these two Divine gifts; for they were material in substance. We may interpret it in two ways: either in the sense of *typical*, if we regard the material gift as the figure of a higher and future one;

or in the sense of *supernatural*, in so far as these gifts were the immediate products of creative energy, regarded as proceeding from the Divine Spirit (Gen. i. 2; Ps. xxxiii. 6). I doubt whether examples can be quoted sufficient to establish the first of these two meanings; Rev. xi. 8, the only passage adduced by Edwards, is not convincing. The second meaning, on the contrary, is in harmony with biblical language in general and with that of the apostle in particular, though Holsten alleges the contrary; comp. Gal. iv. 29. Moreover, it must be considered that the first meaning, by lowering the gifts made to the Israelites to the level of mere figures, would so far diminish the force of the argument; while the second, by representing them as miraculous gifts, gives it additional solidity: Heavenly food, and He did not save them! Supernatural water, and those who drank it perished under condemnation! — The pronoun τὸ αὐτό, *the same* (food), does not refer, as is thought by Calvin and Heinrici, to the identity of these gifts with those bestowed on Christians. The one point in question is the relation of the Israelites to one another. *All* partook *equally* of this miraculous nourishment; and two were saved!

Ver. 4. Paul here refers to the two events related Ex. xvii. 6 and Num. xx. 11. The miraculous character of the water which came from the rock is explained by the following proposition (*for*); it follows from the spiritual nature of the rock whence it flowed. The word *spiritual* cannot therefore have here a meaning exactly similar to that which it had in the foregoing propositions. There this epithet denoted the super-

natural origin of the material gifts. Applied, as it is here, to the *source* of the miraculous water, it can only designate the *nature* of the rock; for it is this nature which explains the creative energy that was inherent in it and the supernatural effects it could produce. To produce this supernatural water, there was needed a rock Divine in its nature. — Several commentators, Rückert, Baur, de Wette, Meyer (1st edns.), have thought that Paul was here appropriating the Rabbinical fable, according to which a material rock rolled over hill and dale across the desert beside the camp of the Israelites, so as to supply them with the water they needed; it was Miriam, Moses' sister, who above all was said to possess the secret of getting this water. But how can we imagine for a moment the most spiritual of the apostles holding and teaching the Churches such puerilities? In any case, even if he meant to allude to so ridiculous a fable, which we greatly doubt, he has done so in such a way as to make palpable the wide divergence between the Rabbinical opinion and his own. In fact, the object of the two epithets ἀκολουθούσης and πνευματικῆς, *accompanying* and *spiritual*, is certainly to distinguish exactly the invisible and spiritual Rock of which he himself speaks, from the material rock spoken of in Exodus, that of which the Lord said to Moses the first time: "I will stand before thee there upon the rock in Horeb, and thou shalt smite the rock, and there shall come water out of it," and the second time in the wilderness of Sin: "Take the rod . . . and speak to the rock . . ., and thou shalt bring forth water from the rock." These two rocks already stood there when Israel arrived in these

localities, and they remained there when Israel left them. Paul, therefore, can only mean one thing: that behind these material and immoveable rocks, there was one invisible and moveable, the true giver of the water, to wit, the Christ Himself. If anyhow such is the meaning of the narrative of Exodus, in Paul's view, where is place left for a third sort of rock at once spiritual and material and of a nature wholly incomprehensible? The imperfect ἔπινον, *drank*, indicates duration, a repetition of similar cases; and this because the spiritual Rock was always present in the mysterious cloud which accompanied Israel. This is what the apostle expresses when he adds: *and that Rock was Christ.* Meyer, after abandoning his first explanation, adopts the view, since his 4th ed., that these words constrain us to hold that Paul regarded the Rock as a visible and real manifestation of the Christ, who accompanied Israel in the cloud, according to the words of the Targum of Isaiah (xvi. 1) and of Philo, who say that "the rock was *wisdom.*" But the idea of the incarnation of the Christ in a rock is so contrary to the spirit of St. Paul, that one cannot entertain it seriously, and ver. 9 represents the Christ in the wilderness acting as the representative of Jehovah, from the midst of the cloud! Is it not perfectly simple to explain this figure of which Paul makes use, by the numerous sayings of Deuteronomy, in which the Lord is called the Rock of Israel: "The Rock, His work is perfect" (xxxii. 4); "Israel lightly esteemed the Rock of his salvation" (ver. 15); "Of the Rock that begat thee thou art unmindful" (ver. 18), etc., and by all those similar ones of Isaiah: "Thou hast not been

mindful of the Rock of thy strength" (xvii. 10); "in the Lord is the Rock of ages" (xxvi. 4)? Only, what is special in the passage of Paul is, that this title of Rock of Israel, during the wilderness history, is ascribed here, not to Jehovah, but to the Christ. The passage forms an analogy to the words John xii. 41, where the apostle applies to Jesus the vision in which Isaiah beholds Adonai, the Lord, in the temple of His glory (ch. vi.). Christ is represented in these passages, by Paul and John, as pre-existent before His coming to the earth, and presiding over the theocratic history. In ch. viii. ver. 6, Paul had designated Christ as the Being *by whom* God created all things. Here he represents Him as the Divine Being who accompanied God's people in the cloud through the wilderness, and who gave them the deliverances which they needed. We have the same view here as appears in the *angel of the Lord*, so often identified in Genesis with the Lord Himself, and yet distinct from Him, in the Being who is called in Isaiah the *angel of His presence* (lxiii. 9), and in Malachi the *angel of the covenant, Adonai* (iii. 1), the Mediator between God and the world, specially with a view to the work of salvation. It is easy to understand the relation there is between the mention of this great theocratic fact and the idea which the apostle wishes to express in our passage. The spiritual homogeneity of the two covenants, and of the gifts accompanying them, rests on this identity of the Divine head of both. The practical consequence is obvious at a glance: Christ lived in the midst of the ancient people, and the people perished! How can you think yourselves, you Christians, secure from the

same lot!—It is clear that there is no good ground for holding, as Holsten does, the second part of this verse to be interpolated. It enters perfectly into the course of the argument.—Reuss alleges that with such a conception of history as the apostle here expresses, "one comes very near seeing nothing more in it than pure allegories, and not realities." It seems as if this critic would like to make St. Paul the forerunner of his own critical system. He forgets that it is one thing to derive a moral application from an accomplished fact, and another to assert that the fact itself is only an illustration of the moral idea.

It has been justly observed that in this passage we find for the first time the combination of the two sacred acts of baptism and the Lord's Supper, as forming a complete whole: the one representing the grace of entrance into the new life, the other the grace by which we are maintained and strengthened in it. The combination of these two acts, under the particular name of *sacraments*, is not therefore an arbitrary invention of dogmatic.

The Israelites, after their exodus from Egypt, all received Divine favours analogous though inferior to those which Christians themselves enjoy; and, notwithstanding, what a judgment!

Ver. 5. "But with most of them God was not well pleased: for they were overthrown in the wilderness." —Ἀλλά: notwithstanding so great favours. — *They were overthrown* . . ., an allusion to Num. xiv. 29: "Your carcases shall fall in the wilderness." What a spectacle is that which is called up by the apostle before the eyes of the self-satisfied Corinthians: all

those bodies, sated with miraculous food and drink, strewing the soil of the desert!

Vers. 6–11. From these facts the apostle derives this lesson: The greatest blessings may issue in the greatest judgments.

Ver. 6. "Now these things were our examples, to the intent we should not lust after evil things, as they also lusted."—*These things:* this rejection, this curse after such blessings. — *Examples for us;* strictly: *examples of us*, that is to say, of what will happen to ourselves if we follow their example. — The use of the plural (ἐγενήθησαν) follows by attraction from the predicate τύποι. — The word τύπος, *type*, which comes from τύπτω, *to strike*, strictly denotes an impression in which an already existing image is reproduced. But, strange to say, in the history of the kingdom of God, the figure which serves to produce the impression does not appear till after the impression itself; it has indeed a pre-existence relatively to it, but only in the Divine mind. In history, the derived impression appears first, on one of the lower stages of revelation, and the model figure does not appear till a more advanced epoch of the kingdom of God.— *That we should not lust after . . .* Literally: "that we should not be *lusters* of evil things." The noun (ἐπιθυμητής) denotes the permanent disposition, the inward vice, while the particular acts are denoted by the verb in the aorist (ἐπεθύμησαν).—The word ἐπιθυμία, *lust*, expresses, as is shown by its composition, the motion of the soul (θυμός) toward (ἐπί) a good thing which God does not give, egoistical and discontented aspiration.—By *evil things* are to be understood the

enjoyments which God does not grant, either because they are evil in themselves, or because, perfectly legitimate as they are, God requires them to be sacrificed in the service of love or for the sake of watchfulness. The phrase: *desirous of evil things*, includes all the following *sins*, and reveals their common cause, just as the phrase *to be overthrown* sums up all the *judgments* which are about to be enumerated. —These examples are four in number; two refer to pleasures which God refuses, vers. 7, 8; two to the feelings of irritation and rebellion excited by this refusal, vers. 8, 9.

Vers. 7, 8. "Neither be ye idolaters, as were some of them; as[1] it is written, The people sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play. 8. Neither let us commit fornication, as some of them committed, and fell in one day three and twenty thousand."[2]—The μηδέ, *neither*, connects this proposition closely with the preceding; we pass from lust to the acts in which it seeks its satisfaction.—The example quoted is that of the worship of the golden calf, and of the profane feast which followed it, Ex. xxxii. The verb παίζειν, strictly: *to play*, is specially used of dancing.

Ver. 8. The danger of fornication was always connected with idolatry. At Corinth, therefore, it might easily follow participation in the sacrificial feasts.—The example quoted is that mentioned in Num. xxv., where, according to Balaam's treacherous advice, the Israelites were enticed to a sacrifice offered by the Midianites to the god Baal-Peor, and where they let

[1] T. R. with C D K P: ως; the rest: ωσπερ.

[2] Two Mnn. Syr. Armen.: εικοσι τεσσαρες (*twenty-four thousand*).

themselves be drawn into this sin.—The Old Testament relates (ver. 9) that 24,000 perished of the plague, inflicted by the wrath of the Lord. St. Paul speaks only of 23,000. We might admit a slip of memory. But the figure 24,000 is exactly reproduced in Philo and Josephus and the Rabbins. Are we to suppose that Paul did not know his sacred history so well as they? The same fact prevents us from supposing a variant in the text of the Old Testament. May we not here suspect a piece of Rabbinical refinement, similar to the: *forty stripes save one*, spoken of in 2 Cor. xi. 24? To avoid the risk of exaggeration, it had become the habit, in oral teaching we may suppose, to speak of 23,000 instead of 24,000 (see Calvin).—The transition from the second person (*that ye become not*, ver. 7) to the first (*that we commit not*) seems to arise from the fact that the second danger was much more common than the first, and might apply to Christians in general.

Vers. 9, 10. "Neither let us tempt the Christ[1] as[2] some of them tempted Him, and were destroyed[3] of serpents; 10. Neither[4] murmur ye as[5] some of them murmured, and were destroyed of the destroyer."—The first of the two sins against which the Corinthians are indirectly put on their guard in these verses, is evidently the discontent which they feel on account of

[1] T. R. with D E F G It. Syr^{sch} Sah. reads τον Χριστον (*the Christ*); ℵ B C P: τον κυριον (*the Lord*); A: τον θεον (*God*).

[2] T. R. with E K L adds και (*also*).

[3] T. R. with Greco-Lat. and Byz.: απωλοντο (*perished*); A B: απωλλυντο (*were perishing*).

[4] T. R. with A B C K L P Syr.: γογγυζετε (*murmur*); ℵ D E F G: γογγυζωμεν (*let us murmur*).

[5] ℵ B P: καθαπερ (*absolutely as*), instead of καθως (*as*).—T. R. with B L reads και after καθως or καθαπερ.

the self-denial required by their Christian call. The example quoted is that of the Israelites dissatisfied with the food to which they are reduced in the wilderness, and who are punished by the scourge of the fiery serpents (Num. xxi. 5 seq.).—The expression *to tempt God*, so often used in Scripture, signifies : to put God to the proof, to try whether He will manifest His goodness, power, and wisdom either by succouring us from a danger to which we have rashly exposed ourselves, or by extricating us from a difficulty which we have ourselves wilfully created while reckoning on Him, or by pardoning a sin for which we had beforehand discounted His grace. This, according to the biblical view, is one of the greatest sins man can commit. The Jews committed it in the wilderness by their murmurs, because they sought thereby to challenge the display of Divine power in the service of their lusts. The Corinthians in their turn committed it by pushing to its utmost limits the use of their Christian liberty in regard to heathen feasts. Could our Christianity, said they, really forbid to us those pleasures? Is not God able to keep us from falling even in such circumstances? And even if we should fall, would not His grace be ready to pardon and raise us again? They thus claimed to make God move at their pleasure, even should it be necessary to work miracles of power or mercy to save them.—Of the three readings τὸν κύριον, *the Lord*, τὸν Χριστόν, *the Christ*, and τὸν θεόν, *God*, the last should be set aside without hesitation; it has only the Alexandrinus in its favour; it is a correction following the usual biblical phrase *to tempt God*. The other two come to

the same thing in point of sense; for the term *the Lord* always denotes Christ in the New Testament when it is not found in a quotation from the Old. It might be said in favour of the reading *the Lord*, that it explains more easily the other two; but in favour of *the Christ*, we have, first, the agreement of the two Greco-Latin and Byzantine families, then the more extraordinary form and the greater difficulty of the expression, finally, its appropriateness in the application of the saying to the Corinthians and the comparison of ver. 4. This reading is also preferred by Osiander, Reuss, Heinrici, Hofmann, etc. For the meaning of it, see on ver. 4.

Ver. 10. Here is the fourth trespass of which St. Paul speaks: the murmuring against Moses and Aaron. The fact which he cites is that related Num. xvi.; the revolt of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, in consequence of which a sudden plague destroyed the despisers of the servants of the Lord. Some have thought of the event related Num. xiv., where, in consequence of the report of the spies sent to Canaan, the people murmured and rebelled. But this sin was not followed by any immediate judgment; it became the occasion of the sentence pronounced on those who were more than twenty years of age when they came out of Egypt, a sentence which was executed only slowly during their whole journeying in the wilderness. The intervention of the destroying angel indicates a sudden and mortal plague; this circumstance is certainly not mentioned in the narrative of the punishment of Korah and his companions; but it is supposed by the term *maggēpha, the plague*, ver. 48 (Hebrew text, xvii. 13), which

St. Paul interprets by Ex. xii. 23. In quoting this example, he certainly has in view the irritation felt by a party among the Corinthians against himself, his fellow-labourers, and those of the leaders of the flock who along with them disapprove of taking part in heathen rejoicings. This party chafed at their severity, which gave rise to so painful a situation for Christians in relation to their friends, and they asked, as Korah and his followers did in respect of Moses and Aaron, Whether the authority they exercised over the Church was not a usurpation?—Of the two readings *murmur* and *let us murmur*, the first ought to be preferred, in the first place, because the second probably arises from an assimilation of this verb to the verbs of vers. 8 and 9; and next, because we have here an admonition altogether special, applicable only to the Church of Corinth, like that of ver. 7, where already the second person was used. — The imperfect ἀπώλλυντο, *were perishing*, is preferable to the aor. ἀπώλοντο, *perished*; it makes us witnesses, as it were, of the mournful scene.

Ver. 11. "Now all[1] these things happened[2] unto them for ensamples:[3] and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the end of the world is come."[4]—This verse is the summary of all the foregoing examples; a fact which leads us to prefer the reading of the *Sinaït.* and of the Greco-Lats., which preserves and even places foremost the word πάντα, *all.* —The two readings τύποι, "as *types*," and τυπικῶς,

[1] T. R. with C K L P Syr. reads: ταυτα δε παντα; ℵ D E F G: παντα δε ταυτα; A B: ταυτα δε.

[2] Two readings: συνεβαινεν and συνεβαινον.

[3] T. R. with D E F G L: τυποι; ℵ A B C K P: τυπικως.

[4] T. R. with A C K L: κατηντησεν; ℵ B D F G: κατηντηκεν.

typically, have the same meaning; but the second is to be preferred, first, because it is read in MSS. of the three families; and next because the word τυπικῶς occurs nowhere else. The substantive τύποι has probably come from ver. 6.—Of the two readings συνέβαινον and συνέβαινεν, the first goes better with τύποι, the second with τυπικῶς.—The apostle does not mean that these facts did not really happen, as has been insinuated, but that they had a bearing beyond their immediate signification. The Scripture compilation of the facts of sacred history has the same end as the history itself. The same God who directed the latter willed that it should be committed to writing with a view to those who should live in the final epoch of the world, and for whom those facts, without Scripture, would be as though they were not.—The word νουθεσία signifies: *rebuke*, *correction*, 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17. This is what the Corinthians needed at that time.—*Τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων*, literally *the ends of the ages*, is a term corresponding to the *acharith hajjamim*, *the end of the days*, in the prophets; comp. the expressions *the last times* (1 Pet. i. 20), and *the last hour* (1 John ii. 18). It is the dispensation of the Messiah which for us falls into two periods, confounded in one in the view of the prophets, that of His purely spiritual kingdom and that of His kingdom of glory. Paul is here speaking of the former. *The ages*, αἰῶνες, denote the whole series of historical periods, and the term "*the ends* of the ages," shows that the Messianic period itself will contain a series of phases.—The verb καταντᾶν, *to meet*, represents the ages which follow one another in the final dispensation, as coming to meet

the living. We must prefer the perfect κατήντηκεν of the Alex. reading to the aorist of the T. R.; Paul does not mean to speak of the meeting itself, but of the whole state of things constituted by this constant approach of the end. This final period is the most solemn of all, for it is during its course that the laws of the Divine kingdom, imperfectly manifested in former periods, display their conclusive effects. Formerly blessings and judgments, all have only a provisional and figurative character. With the final period of history, everything, whether for weal or woe, takes a decisive, eternal value. This is why everything which happened in former times took place with a view to us to whose lot it has fallen to live at this last hour (ἡμῶν εἰς οὕς).—The apostle did not himself know the duration of this final period, which in his mind coincided with the development of the Church; but the phrase: *the ends of the ages*, shows that he did not regard it as so short as is commonly alleged; see on vii. 29.

3. *The application of these examples to the Church of Corinth* (vers. 12–22).

The parallel which the apostle had proposed to draw between the Israelites and Christians is closed. He now makes the practical application of it to the spiritual state of the Corinthians, an application which has, in the first place, a general character (vers. 12, 13), but which soon passes more specially to the important point which Paul has in view from ix. 23, participation in the sacrificial banquets (vers. 14–22).

Vers. 12, 13. "Thus, then, let him that thinketh he

standeth take heed lest he fall! 13. There hath no temptation taken you but such as is common to man: but God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye[1] may be able to bear it."—The ὥστε, *so that*, which we render by *thus then*, indicates that this exhortation to watchfulness is the inference to be drawn from the foregoing examples. There is here in the term δοκεῖν, *to think*, a notion, not of illusion, but of presumption. Paul allows indeed that the person addressed by him *is standing*, for he afterwards speaks of the danger he is in of falling; but the very claim to be standing may lead to neglect of vigilance, and thereby to a fall.—Ἑστάναι, perfect infinitive contracted for ἑστακέναι or ἑστηκέναι. The two figures *to be standing* and *to fall* do not represent the state of grace or condemnation, but the state of fidelity or sin; comp. Rom. xiv. 4.

Ver. 13. This verse is undoubtedly one of the most difficult of the whole Epistle, at least as to the logical connection joining it to what precedes and to what follows. This is very apparent when we study the commentaries. Many commentators (Meyer, Heinrici, Holsten, Beet) find here an encouragement fitted to soften the severity of the warning of ver. 12, in this sense: "And it is easy for you with watchfulness not to fall; for your previous temptations have not hitherto exceeded your strength, and should they be even greater, the faithfulness of God is a pledge to you that they will not go beyond it in the future." The absence of the particle δέ at the beginning of the verse seems

[1] The ὑμᾶς, *you*, in the T. R. is only found in K.

to me incompatible with this meaning. Besides, the Corinthians had more need of being admonished than tranquillized. Finally, and above all, the asyndeton with the preceding context leads us rather to expect an emphatic reaffirmation of the need of vigilance, than an encouragement. This has been felt by the ancient Greek commentators, Chrysostom, etc., and several moderns, such as Bengel, Olshausen, Rückert, Neander, and, to a certain extent, Edwards. The meaning, according to them, is this: "Take so much the more heed as you are not yet out of danger. Up till now you have not been very greatly tempted" (Edwards: "It has not yet gone" the length of blood, of persecution; Heb. xii. 4); "but how will it be if there should come on you stronger temptations than the former? God no doubt will still protect you, but on condition that you watch." But is not this whole series of ideas very complicated? Then the force with which the faithfulness of God is expressed in the second part of the verse is not in keeping with so threatening a sense. The following, as it seems to me, is the true order of the apostle's thoughts: "If you should fall thus (ver. 13), you would be without excuse; for the temptations which have met you hitherto have not been of an irresistible nature, and as to those which may come on you in the future, God is always ready to sustain you and to save you in time from peril." The conclusion is drawn in ver. 14: "Wherefore beware of throwing yourselves into temptations to which you are not exposed by God Himself, and to which you would certainly succumb." This meaning seems to me to be nearly that of Hofmann. The Corinthians must be

made to understand that they run no risk of sinning and falling away from faith, if they have only to encounter the temptations which God allots to them, but that they have no pledge of victory whatever in the case of temptations into which they throw themselves with light-heartedness. The passage is therefore at once an encouragement in respect of the former, and a grave warning in respect of the latter.

The term πειρασμός, *proof, temptation*, comprehends all that puts moral fidelity to the proof, whether this proof have for its end to manifest and strengthen the fidelity—it is in this sense that God can tempt, Gen. xxii. 1; Deut. xiii. 3;—or whether it seeks to make man fall into sin—it is in this sense that God cannot tempt, James i. 13, and that the devil always tempts. It may also happen that the same fact falls at once into these two categories, as for example, the temptation of Job, which on the part of Satan had for its end to make him fall, and which God, on the contrary, permitted with the view of bringing out into clear manifestation the fidelity of His servant, and of raising him to a higher degree of holiness and of knowledge. There are even cases in which God permits Satan to tempt, not without consenting to his attaining his end of bringing into sin. So in the case of David, 1 Chron. xxi. 1; comp. with 2 Sam. xxiv. 1. This is when the pride of man has reached a point such that it is a greater obstacle to salvation than the commission of a sin; God then makes use of a fall to break this proud heart by the humbling experience of its weakness. Such undoubtedly is the meaning in which we are to say: "Lead us not into temptation." These remarks will

find their application in the immediate sequel.—It is possible to refer the term ἀνθρώπινος, *human*, to the *origin* of the temptation. There is not one of your temptations which did not proceed from man, either from the evil heart and its natural lusts, or from the example of other sinners. The temptations of which Paul thus speaks, would be opposed either to those which come from God, or rather to those which have Satan for their author. And indeed the context might lead us to think of the diabolical temptations to which the Corinthians did not fear to expose themselves when they took part in those feasts where the breath of Satan diffused an atmosphere all impregnated with idolatry and sensuality; "God has never put you into positions so diabolical; it is yourselves who seek them." This meaning would be natural enough in the context; but the following words of the verse would in this case seem intended to encourage the Corinthians to brave such dangers by the promise of Divine succour, which it is impossible to hold. It is better, therefore, with most commentators, to apply the epithet *human* to the *nature* of the temptation: "A temptation proportioned to the strength of man;" but without isolating man from God, for God only can give man victory even in the slightest temptation. And to account more fully for this unprecedented expression, must we not contrast it with an *angelic* temptation? Suppose the Corinthians, impatient of the apostle's exactions, should in their ill-humour express themselves thus: "We should require to be angels to live as he demands!" "No," Paul would answer; "I do not ask of you superhuman sacrifices in the name of your Christian profession.

Your faith has not put you into a situation which a weak man cannot bear; but God is faithful, and He measures the temptation to the amount of strength." Then the apostle adds, that if the situation became difficult to such a degree as to appear utterly intolerable, the faithfulness of God would show itself by putting an end to such a situation. Thus everything seems to me to find its natural connection.—The words ὑπὲρ ὃ δύνασθε, *beyond what ye are able*, come as a surprise. Has man then some power? And, if the matter in question is what man can do with the Divine help, is not the power of this help without limit? But it must not be forgotten, that if the power of God is infinite, the receptivity of the believer is limited: limited by the measure of spiritual development which he has reached, by the degree of his love for holiness and of his zeal in prayer, etc. God knows this measure, Paul means to say, and he proportions the intensity of the temptation to the degree of power which the believer is capable of receiving from Him, as the mechanician, if we may be allowed such a comparison, proportions the heat of the furnace to the resisting power of the boiler. It is evident from the words: *with the temptation*, that God co-operates with it in the sense we have spoken of above, and this is precisely the reason why He can also bring it to an end at any moment He chooses.—The *issue*, ἔκβασις, may be obtained in two ways. Either God by His providence can put an end to the situation itself, or by a ray of light from on high He can rid the believer's heart of the fascinating charm exercised over him by the tempting object, and change into disgust the seduc-

tive attraction which it exercised. Of the two ways, the struggle to the death between inclination and duty issues in the victory of the believer. The conclusion is this: "Victory being assured over the temptations which God sends you, seek not to throw yourselves into those which He does not send" (ver. 14).

Hofmann rightly observes, that nothing rendered the breach of the converted heathen with his past and with his surroundings so conspicuous as his refusal to take part in the sacrificial feasts. And so, many Corinthians sought to persuade themselves that they might harmonize this participation with their Christian profession. Had they not declared the nothingness of idols? Such a feast, therefore, had no longer for them the character of a sacrifice; it was a purely social act, to which the great maxim of Christian liberty in regard to external things applied: "All things are lawful for me." Paul well knew that here was the most difficult sacrifice to be obtained. Accordingly with what prudence does he proceed! His whole handling of the question is a masterpiece of strategy. In chaps. viii. and ix. he treats the Corinthians as *strong;* only for the sake of their brethren does he ask them to deny themselves meats offered to idols; he encourages them by describing the sacrifices which he has made and is daily making for the Churches and the gospel. Then suddenly (ix. 23) he passes to an entirely new order of considerations: "And if I act thus," he adds, "it is also for the sake of my own salvation, which I should certainly compromise by acting otherwise." Then he demonstrates the reality of this danger by the

case of the Israelites who drew down on themselves the Divine condemnation by revolting against the self-denial which the wilderness life imposed on them. "Do ye also, therefore, fear to fall by refusing to God the sacrifices which He asks of you!" At this point, after having gradually enclosed them in his net, he all at once ties the knot so long prepared for, and finally pronounces in ver. 14 the decisive word:

Vers. 14, 15. "Wherefore, my dearly beloved, flee far from idolatry. 15. I speak as to wise men; judge ye what I say."—The address so full of tenderness: *my dearly beloved*, expresses how much it costs him to be obliged to impose on them a sacrifice which he knows to be so painful.—*Διόπερ, precisely on this account:* because you can reckon on God's help in the temptations which He appoints to you Himself, but not in others.—The expression: *flee far from*, is certainly used designedly. In a similar passage, vi. 18, Paul had used the verb *flee* simply with the substantive as its object. If he here interposes the preposition *ἀπό*, *far from*, it is to tell them, not only to flee idolatry itself (that would have been superfluous), but to flee far from all that approaches it or might lead them into it. The sacrificial feasts were not quite idolatry, but they bordered on it and might lead to a fall into it.

Ver. 15. Then he appeals to their own judgment. For he would have the decision to proceed from their conscience. The Corinthians boast of wisdom; he appeals to this very wisdom. The second proposition of this verse has sometimes been taken as the object of the verb of the first: "I pray you as intelligent people to judge what I say." But it is much more natural to

take as the object of the verb *I say* the whole argument which follows in the passage, vers. 16–22: "I proceed to expound my thought to you; judge yourselves what I advance." On the term *φημί*, see on vii. 29. He would impose nothing on them; but he proceeds to submit to them certain premisses which they cannot gainsay, and from which there will follow a consequence, which they cannot refuse, without rejecting those premisses themselves.

The following passage rests on these principles: that any religious act whatever brings us into communication with the spiritual world, that this exercises a power, and that the nature of the influence thus exercised depends each time on the character of the invisible Being to which the worship is thus addressed. Thus the Holy Supper brings the believer under the influence of Christ (vers. 16, 17); the Jewish sacrifice brings the Israelite into contact with the altar of Jehovah (ver. 18); and the heathen sacrificial feast brings man under the influence of the demons whose arts have given birth to idolatry.

Vers. 16, 17. "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?[1] 17. Seeing that there is only one bread, we, being many, are one body: for we are all partakers of one bread."[2] — The Holy Supper is, in the New Testament, the corresponding action to the feast which completed the peace-offering in the Old. The sacrifice once offered, the Jewish wor-

[1] D F G read: *κυριου* (*of the Lord*), instead of Χριστου.

[2] D E F G It. here add *και του ενος ποτηριου* (*and of the one cup*).

shipper with his family celebrated a sacred feast in the temple court, in which the priest participated, and in which the part of the victim not consumed on the altar was eaten in common. It was in a manner the pledge of reconciliation which the Lord gave to the sinner on his restoration to grace. So the victim sacrificed is eaten by the believer in the Lord's Supper in token of reconciliation, and the result of this act is the formation of a real communion on the part of the worshipper, first with the victim (ver. 16), then also with all the other worshippers (ver. 17).

As in the second proposition of ver. 16 the accusative ἄρτον, *the bread*, is an attraction arising from the following ὅν, Meyer, Hofmann, Holsten, etc., have thought that it must be so also with τὸ ποτήριον, *the cup*, in the first proposition. But this reason would only be valid if the proposition relative to the bread was placed first; reading the text as it stands, it is impossible to take τὸ ποτήριον otherwise than as a nominative.—The genitive εὐλογίας, *of blessing*, must contain an allusion to the famous cup of the Paschal feast, which bore the name of *cos habberakia*, the *cup of blessing;* it was the third which the father of the family circulated in the course of the feast; he did so while pronouncing over it a thanksgiving prayer for all God's benefits in nature and toward Israel. Jesus had reproduced this rite in the institution of the Holy Supper, but substituting, no doubt, for the Israelitish thanksgiving a prayer of gratitude for the salvation, higher than the deliverance from Egypt, which He was about to effect by His death, the foundation of the new covenant. The meaning therefore is: "The cup over which the Lord uttered

the thanksgiving which we repeat when we celebrate this ceremony." Some give the genitive εὐλογίας an active meaning: "The cup which produces blessing." Heinrici compares, in an analogous sense, Ps. cxvi. 13: "the cup of salvation," and Isa. li. 17: "the cup of fury;" he thus explains this complement: "The cup which contains the blessing of Christ." This meaning is less natural in itself; and next, it does not answer to the meaning of the corresponding Hebrew expression. There is only one reason that might lead us to accept it, the desire to escape a tautology with the following phrase: *which we bless.* We could not escape from this awkwardness if, with Meyer, we regarded this last expression as only the explanatory paraphrase of the τῆς εὐλογίας, *of blessing.* Such a repetition would be superfluous. Besides, Paul would have required to say in this case ὑπὲρ οὗ (*for which*), and not ὅ, "*which* we bless." This pronoun in the accusative shows precisely that these words contain a new idea. It was not only God that was blessed *for* this cup, the symbol of salvation; but the cup itself was blessed as representing that which Christ had held in His hand when He instituted the Supper and said, "This cup is the new covenant in My blood." The complement: *of blessing*, expresses the idea: "May God be blessed for this cup!" and the words: *which we bless*, this: "May this cup be blessed to us!" Comp. the phrase Luke ix. 16: *He blessed the loaves.* It was by this blessing or consecration of the cup as a figurative sign of the blood of redemption that the cup became to the consciousness of the Church the means of participation in the blood of Christ.—The plural: *we bless*, alludes

to the *amen* whereby the Church appropriated the formula of consecration. In the age of Justin (middle of the second century), it was the presbyter, presiding over the assembly, who performed this act; we cannot say whether it was so already in the apostle's time. The *Didache* (*Διδαχή*) *of the Twelve Apostles*, describing the ceremony of the Supper (chap. ix.), tells us nothing on this head.

In the principal proposition, the notion of *being* (*ἐστί*) is certainly not the essential idea in Paul's view, as if he wished to insist and to say: "is *really*." In this sense the word *ἐστί* would have required to be placed first both times, before the predicate *κοινωνία*, *the communion*. The emphasis is on the predicate: *the communion*. By this term *κοινωνία*, does the apostle mean to designate a material participation in the blood of Christ, or a moral participation in its beneficent and salutary efficacy for the expiation of sins? In the former case we must hold, that as the instantaneous effect of the consecration, a physical act is wrought, either in the form of a transubstantiation, which makes wine the very blood of Christ, or in that of a conjunction of the blood with the wine of the Supper. But if the real blood of Christ was in one of these two forms offered to the communicant, this so essential element of the rite would certainly have been wanting the first time it was celebrated when Jesus instituted it; for His blood being not yet shed could not be communicated to the apostles. The reference, therefore, could only be to the blood of His glorified body. But the Apostle Paul expressly teaches that blood, as a corruptible principle, does not enter as

an element into the glorified body (xv. 50). The two theories, Catholic and Lutheran, seem to us to be overturned by this simple observation. — On the other hand, the apostle's words cannot merely denote, as some commentators have supposed, the profession of faith made by the communicant in the expiatory virtue of Christ's blood, and the thanksgiving with which he accompanies this profession. What does Paul wish to prove by appealing here to the analogy of the Holy Supper? He wishes to demonstrate, by the salutary influence which the communion exercises over the believer's heart, that demons exercise a pernicious one over him who takes part in the heathen sacrificial feasts. The Holy Supper is not, therefore, according to the apostle's view, a simple act of profession and thanksgiving on the believer's part. It is, at the same time, a real partaking of the grace purchased by Christ, and which He communicates to the devout soul of the communicant. This conception is a sort of intermediate one between the two opposite views which we have just set aside, a conception of the kind which Calvin sought to formulate. Especially as to the cup, the communion is an effectual partaking in the expiation accomplished by the blood of Christ and in the reconciliation to God which is thus assured to us; it is our taking in possession that remission of sins, of which Jesus Himself spoke when handing the cup, and by which we are placed in the pure and luminous atmosphere of Divine adoption.

The accusative τὸν ἄρτον, *the bread*, is explained by attraction of the following pronoun ὅν (Matt. xxi. 42). It is occasioned by the fact that the bread is here con-

templated in its close relation to the act as a whole; the bread only appears as broken.—The words are not used in connection with the bread, nor with the thanksgiving, nor with the act of consecration, but solely with the breaking of it. It is so, undoubtedly, to avoid repetition; for the bread also was consecrated with thanksgiving. This appears from the passage of Justin in which he calls the Holy Supper: ἡ εὐχαριστηθεῖσα τροφή, the Eucharistic nourishment, for which thanks are given, as well as at a yet earlier period, from the *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles*, in which there is express mention of the double thanksgiving for the cup and the bread in the primitive Jewish Christian Churches.—The plural κλῶμεν, *we break*, either suggests the moral participation of the whole church in this act which the president performed in memory of Jesus breaking the bread for the disciples, or it supposes a form such as prevails in the Churches where every communicant himself breaks off a piece of the bread which passes from one to another. The term κοινωνία, *communion*, is repeated in connection with the bread; it is, in fact, the notion which unites the two acts in one, and from which has arisen the ordinary name of the sacrament, the *communion*.—Holsten thinks he can apply this word to the relation formed between believers by participation in the Supper. This is to do violence to the term which denotes the inner side of the participation of believers in the sacrament; comp. i. 9. The idea of the relation between communicants will not come till ver. 17, as a corollary from the idea of their union with Christ. It is to get at the same meaning of κοινωνία that some com-

mentators, such as Erasmus, Zwingle, etc., have here applied the term σῶμα Χριστοῦ, *the body of Christ*, to the Church, the community of those who believe in Christ. This explanation is as untenable as Holsten's. It is incompatible with the parallel proposition relative to the *blood* of Christ; in this connection it is quite certain that the body of Christ can only denote the physical organism which Christ possessed here below, an organism represented by the bread broken in the Supper, and of which the blood, taken literally, was the life. The believer's communion with the body of the Lord adds a new element to communion with Christ, founded on participation in His blood; the latter is participation in a benefit purchased *by* Him, that of reconciliation; the former is participation in His person, the assimilation of the very substance of His being. In the blood, represented by the cup, we contemplate and apply to ourselves *Christ dead for us;* in the body, represented by the bread, we appropriate *Christ living in us.* Our communion with this body broken for us, and then glorified, is therefore of a more intimate, more direct, more living nature than communion with the blood. St. Paul himself has expressed this profound fact in all its force and reality in the words: "It is no more I that live, but Christ that liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20). No doubt this fact is above all of a spiritual nature; it is His holy person whom His Spirit makes to live in us; but this spiritually holy person is at the same time a corporeally glorified person, and Paul himself teaches us that we are in a living relation to it, similar to that by which our natural

descent unites us to the first Adam (xv. 48, 49). Participation in His glorified body thus follows from communion with His holy person by the power of the Spirit. If it is so, we find here, though Holsten seeks to show the contrary, the same group of thoughts as in John, when, in chap. vi., Jesus speaks of the necessity of eating His flesh and drinking His blood to have life and *to be raised again at the last day* (vers. 39, 40, 44, 54). It is true, John uses the word *flesh* rather than body. But this is because he means to designate the substance as related to the idea of *eating*, which is naturally the dominant one in the context (following the multiplication of the loaves); whereas Paul speaks of the *body*, as an organism, and that in relation to the notion of *breaking*, which is particularly prominent both in this passage and in xi. 24. This shows no difference of view, but only of relation.—It has been asked why in our passage the cup is placed before the bread, while in chap. xi., and in the institution of the Holy Supper, we find the opposite order. Meyer answers: Because the idea of bread afforded a transition to that of the flesh of the Jewish and heathen sacrifices, immediately to be spoken of; Hofmann: Because wine played the principal part in heathen feasts, and so required to be put first. Edwards, nearly the same: Perhaps because the sacrificial meals were rather *συμπόσια* than *συσσίτια*. I incline to think that Paul, speaking here in name of the Christian consciousness, puts the blood first, because it is expiation which faith appropriates in the first place; while the bread is placed second, because it represents the communication of Christ's power and

life, which follows faith in reconciliation by His death. The opposite order was required by the circumstances of the institution of the Supper; see on chap. xi. 24 seq.

Ver. 17. From the communion of every believer with the Lord, Paul deduces the communion of believers with one another; we shall see with what view. This verse may be construed grammatically in three ways. The first and most obvious would be to make the ὅτι, *seeing that*, relate to the preceding verse, while understanding the verb ἐστί in the first proposition: ". . . is the communion of the body of Christ, seeing that there is only one bread." Then, taking this construction as granted, it might be applied also to what follows: "(and) seeing that therefore we are one body, we who are many." So Meyer, Osiander, etc. According to this interpretation, the communion of Christians with one another would be here alleged to prove the communion of Christians with their Head in the Holy Supper. The construction is not tenable: 1, because the existence of two parallel propositions not connected by καί, *and*, would be without example in Paul's writings; 2, because the verb ἐστί, *is*, could not be understood in the first proposition; it would require to be expressed as corresponding to the ἐσμέν, *we are*, in the second; 3, because the proof would be defective. The communion of Christians with Christ in the Holy Supper cannot be demonstrated by the communion of Christians with one another, because this second fact is much less evident to the Christian consciousness.—The second construction also makes the ὅτι, *seeing that*, dependent on ver. 16, but makes the

two substantives *one bread* and *one body* two co-ordinate predicates of *the many*: "seeing that we, *the many*, are one bread, one body;" so Holsten. What a strange mode of expression: *we are one bread!* The more so, as Meyer observes, that the term *bread* can only be taken here in a figurative sense; otherwise there would be a tautology with the following proposition: "We are all partakers of one bread." But if the word *bread* is taken the first time in its mystical sense, why add to it the expression: *one body?* In no sense can the apostle conclude from the fact that all communicants partake of one bread, that they all become that bread!—We must therefore have recourse to a third construction, the only admissible one, as it seems to us; it is that followed by the Vulgate, Calvin, Beza, Rückert, Hofmann, Heinrici, etc. The conjunction ὅτι, *seeing that*, is the beginning of a new sentence; and the subordinate proposition: "*seeing that* there is one bread," is regarded as dependent on the following proposition, which is the principal: "Seeing that there is one bread, we, being many, are one body." The logical nexus which unites these two propositions is explained by the following sentence: *For we are all partakers of the same bread.* The communicants, by all receiving a piece of the same bread, are thereby bound, morally speaking, however numerous they may be, into one spiritual body; for this bread of which they all partake has been solemnly consecrated to represent one and the same object, the body of Jesus. The bond which thus unites them to Jesus as their common Head, unites them also to one another as members of the same

body. Here is a subsidiary consideration which the apostle adds to the main argument, indicated in ver. 16. And indeed, by taking part in the heathen sacrificial feasts, the Corinthians would not only separate themselves from Christ, to whom they were united in the Supper; they would also break the bond formed by this same ceremony between them and the Church, the body of Christ.—In the use of this term σῶμα, *body*, Paul passes from the literal sense (the Lord's body), ver. 16, to the figurative sense (the Church), ver. 17; this passage is natural because of the close relation between the two notions. If we become one and the same spiritual body with one another, it is because we all participate by faith in that one and the same body of Christ, with which we enter into relation in the Supper. —The verb μετέχειν, *to partake*, is usually construed with a simple genitive; it takes here the preposition ἐκ, *of, from:* "We all receive (a piece which comes) *from* the same bread." This term differs from the more inward expression κοινωνία, *communion*, in that it denotes external participation in the bread of the Supper. It is obvious that we cannot, with Rodatz and Heinrici, understand the words *one body* in the sense of: "one body *with Christ.*" For the matter in question in ver. 17 is the breaking of the bond which unites believers to the Church as a whole.

The apostle quotes as a second example the Jewish sacrificial feasts.

Ver. 18. "Behold Israel after the flesh: are not they which eat of the sacrifices in communion with the altar?"—Israel is placed here by way of transition

from the Church to the heathen. There were also among the Jews sacrificial feasts celebrated in the temple precincts, over which God Himself was held to preside, in consequence of the communion established with Him by the expiatory sacrifice; comp. Lev. viii. and Deut. xii., where are found the prescriptions regarding the peace offerings. — The special call for the attention of the readers contained in the imperative βλέπετε, *behold*, arises from the fact that a usage is in question which is stranger to their sphere than the preceding. By the qualifying κατὰ σάρκα, *after the flesh*, Paul means to bring out the external character of the Israelitish worship, in opposition to the spiritual worship of the true Israel, the Church.—It is no doubt under the influence of the same thought that he says: "In communion with the *altar*," rather than in communion with Jehovah. By sacrifice the guilty Israelite was replaced within the theocratic organization, of which the altar was the centre, rather than in communion with God Himself. As an analogous expression, Heinrici quotes the description of Philo, who calls the Israelitish priest κοινωνὸς τοῦ βώμου. The Epistle to the Hebrews shows why the blood of the victims could do no more.—It is evident that an Israelite who had eaten his part of the victim at Jehovah's table, and had thus made fast the bond which united him to the theocracy, could not thereafter take part in a heathen ceremony without committing a moral enormity. In the following verses the apostle gives the application of these examples.

Vers. 19, 20. "What say I then? that the meat offered to the idol is anything? Or that an idol is

anything?[1] . . . 20. But the things which they sacrifice,[2] they sacrifice to demons, and not to God. Now I would not that ye should be in communion with demons."—The way in which Paul had just cited the two previous examples evidently assumed that he ascribed a diabolical influence to the sacrificial feasts of the heathen; now this idea seemed to be in contradiction to chap. viii. 4, 6, where it had been declared that the gods of the heathen are not real divinities, and that the meat offered on their altar is consequently neither more nor less than simple meat, like any other. Paul therefore anticipates the objection which he foresees: "Art thou not now, contrary to thy previous declarations, allowing a disturbing influence to meats devoted to idols, and consequently, a Divine reality to the idols themselves?" In the order of questions, I follow the reading of the *Vatic.* and the *Cantabrig.*, for it seems to me logical that Paul should begin with the question relating to the meat offered, to ascend therefrom to the question relating to the idol. I admit, however, that the opposite order may also be justified.—The omission of the question relating to the idol in the *Sinaït.*, etc., is one of those many lacunæ, especially in this MS., which are caused by the recurrence of the same letters at the distance of a few words. In the first question: *That the meat offered to the idol is anything?* the word *anything*

[1] The T. R. with K L Syr. reverses the order of the two questions.—The MSS. ℵ A C read only the second, that relative to the idol.—The MSS. B D F P It. Cop. present the text reproduced in the translation.—F G have a peculiar and absolutely inadmissible text.

[2] T. R. with C L reads both times θυει, instead of θυουσιν, and adds with ℵ A C K Syr. τα εθνη (*the Gentiles*), which is omitted by all the rest.

signifies anything exceptional, having power to exercise a particular influence. In the second question: *That an idol is anything?* the *anything* signifies anything real. Sometimes the word τί has been taken as an adjective: "That any idol *whatever* is, that is to say exists" (εἴδωλόν τι ἔστιν, instead of εἴδωλόν τί ἐστιν). But the τί would be superfluous in this sense. It is more natural to take it as the predicate in the two questions.

Ver. 20. The apostle does not even take the trouble of stating the negative answer which he gives to these two questions; he passes directly to the affirmation which concerns him: Jupiter, Apollo, Venus, certainly, are not real beings; but Satan is something. Behind all that mythological phantasmagoria there lie concealed malignant powers, which, without being divinities, are nevertheless very real, and very active, and which have succeeded in fascinating the human imagination, and in turning aside the religious sentiment of the heathen nations to beings of the fancy; hence the idolatrous worships, worships addressed to those diabolical powers and not to God.—The subst. τὰ ἔθνη, *the Gentiles*, is omitted by the *Vatic.* and the Greco-Lats.; it is certainly an explanatory addition. This neuter substantive, once introduced, dragged into the T. R. the singular θύει, instead of the plural θύουσιν.—The subject of this latter verb is understood; it is self-evident.—The term δαιμόνιον, *demon*, which occurs nowhere else in Paul's writings except in 1 Tim. iv. 1, has quite another meaning in the New Testament than in the classics. In the latter it is synonymous with θεῖον, something Divine. Plato in the *Symposium*, says that "demon is something intermediate between God and

mortals;" and, in another passage: "That the demons interpret to the gods the things of men, and to men the things of the gods." Imported into biblical language by the version of the LXX., the word there denotes the fallen angels, so often spoken of in Scripture. Thus Deut. xxxii. 17, the LXX. translate the words: *jizebekou laschschédim* . . ., ἔθυσαν δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ (*sched* probably denoting in Hebrew idols, from *schad*, to rule). The Jews identified heathen divinities with the demons themselves; thus it is that the LXX. translate in Isa. lxv. 11, the phrase: "to prepare a table for the host of heaven," by: "to prepare a table for the demon." The pagan Plutarch (*De defectu orac.*, chap. xiii.) ascribes to wicked spirits all that was barbarous and cruel, for example, human sacrifices in heathen religions. We may compare also Ps. xcvi. 5: "For all the gods of the heathen are demons" (in Hebrew *idols*), and Baruch, chap. iv.: "They sacrifice to demons, not to God." It is in this Jewish acceptation that the term is used here. But the words of the apostle do not imply the idea that every false god worshipped by the heathen corresponds to a particular demon; they signify merely that heathen religions emanate from those malignant spirits, and that consequently the man who takes part in such worship puts himself under their influence. "How was it possible," says Heinrici, "to sit at such a feast, to be sprinkled with the holy water, to obey the prescription of sacred silence, to take part in the joy of the hymns and dances which filled the interval between the sacrifice and the banquet, and finally to be given up to the joy of the feast which crowned the festive day to the

glory of the false god, without acting as a worshipper of the heathen divinity?" The diabolical character of idolatry could be masked to a certain extent in Greek heathenism by the charm or majesty of the forms; but is it not clearly unveiled in modern heathen religions, particularly in Hindoo and African forms of worship, in which God's holy image has come at last to give place completely to hideous and ignoble figures? Besides, the inspiring sentiment of these worships is solely that of fear.

The δέ is progressive: "*Now* I would not." This authoritative form is accounted for by the solicitude of love. A father cannot allow his children to deliver themselves into bad hands.

Vers. 21, 22. "Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of demons: ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and of the table of demons; 22. or do we provoke the Lord to jealousy? are we stronger than He?"—Edwards thinks that the matter in question here is an impossibility in point of *fact.* The heart cannot at the same time receive the holy inspirations of Christ and the impure influences of demons. But in that case the apostle would have used words of a more inward and spiritual character than *cup* and *table.* The impossibility is rather one of *right:* "You cannot morally, that is to say, without self-contradiction, and drawing down on you a terrible judgment, take part at the same time in two worships so opposite to one another." *The cup of demons* is an expression easily understood, when we remember that in the solemn feasts of the ancients the consecration of the banquet took place with that of the cup, accompanied

by the libation in honour of the gods. The first cup was offered to Jupiter; the second to Jupiter and the Nymphs; the third to Jupiter Soter. To participate in these three cups which circulated among the guests, was not this to do an act of idolatry, and to put oneself under the power of the spirit of evil, as really as the Jew by sacrificing put himself under the influence of Jehovah, and the Christian by communicating under that of Christ? Materially, no doubt, it was possible to act thus, but not without criminal inconsistency. And what proves that this is the meaning of the: *Ye cannot*, is the fact that, in the sequel, Paul expressly states that the Corinthians already venture to act thus; for he declares the fate which awaits them if they persist (ver. 22).

Ver. 22. The ἤ is taken in its usual sense in Paul's writings: "*Or* if, notwithstanding." In other words: "Or if you will persist in acting thus, do you know what you are doing, and to what you expose yourselves? You provoke in the heart of God that more terrible fire than the fire of wrath, which is called jealousy!" What is the hatred vowed against a declared enemy in comparison with the fury which falls on an unfaithful spouse? The term παραζηλοῦν, *to excite to jealousy*, is taken from Deut. xxxii. 21: "They have provoked me to jealousy by that which is not God" (idols put in the place of God). The text says briefly: "Do we provoke to jealousy?" Holsten regards this indicative as inadmissible, and thinks the meaning of the subjunctive to be indispensable: "Would we provoke (παραζηλῶμεν)?" He therefore takes the termination ουμεν to be an irregular subjunctive form, like that

which is supposed to be found in iv. 6 and Gal. iv. 17 (see on the first of these passages). But the supposition seems to me unnecessary. The indicative signifies: "Are we truly acting thus?" The form supposes that it was really being done; and this is certainly what is proved by the saying viii. 10, which has by no means the effect of a supposition without reality.—The apostle alludes to the maxim whereby the strong Corinthians justified their carnal conduct: "All things are lawful for us." — The communicative form: *Do we go the length of . . . ?* Are we . . . ? serves to soften the severity of the merciless irony: *stronger than God . . . ?* The term κύριος, *Lord*, might be applied to God, as is usually the case in passages quoted from the Old Testament. But I rather think, with de Wette, Meyer, Hofmann, following the vers. 4, 9, and 21, that in this case Paul applies it to Christ.

And now, after having adjusted this burning question, the apostle reverts in a calmer tone to the less difficult one, of the use of offered meats, giving a few very simple and precise practical rules on the subject, which flow from the principles laid down in the foregoing chapters. Vers. 23 and 24, 32 and 33, prove that these injunctions are specially addressed to the strong (see Heinrici and Holsten).

III. Rules for the use of those who eat Meats offered to Idols (Ver. 23–XI. 1).

Ver. 23 forms the transition to this third passage, which is, as it were, the recapitulation of the whole matter treated in these three chapters.

Ver. 23. "All things[1] are lawful, but all things are not expedient: all things[1] are lawful, but all things edify not."—The apostle here repeats the adage already enunciated, vi. 12, applying it, however, to a wholly different matter. We must beware of concluding from this repetition, as has been done, that the whole intermediate part has only been a digression. Such a subordinate position would not be in keeping with the gravity of the subjects treated. What meets us in these words is simply a sort of dictum which had come to be used at Corinth on all occasions, without discernment and without taking sufficient account of the limitations enjoined by watchfulness and charity. The logical bond between this rash affirmation of Christian liberty and the thought of ver. 22 is obvious.—The term *all things* applies to external acts, in themselves indifferent, such as using this or that kind of food. The pronoun μοι, *for me*, ought probably to be omitted in this sentence, as well as in the following, with the majority of authorities, not, however, without remarking that this pronoun is read in the two propositions of the verse, not only in K L and the *Peschito*, but also in the *Coislinianus* (H), a MS. of the sixth century, transcribed from the autograph MS. of Pamphilus of Cæsarea.—The same meaning is usually given to the two verbs συμφέρει, *is expedient*, and οἰκοδομεῖ, *edifies*. But this would be a pure tautology. It seems to me probable, from ver. 33, that the former applies to spiritual good in general, including our own (comp. ix. 23–xi. 22), and the second more specially to our

[1] T. R. with K L Syr. reads μοι (*for me*) after παντα in both propositions.

neighbour's (comp. viii. 1–ix. 22).—Such is the general principle; it will be repeated at the close (ver. 31) in different terms. Ver. 24 reproduces it immediately in a negative form, in order to exclude the great obstacle to its realization.

Ver. 24. "Let no man seek his own, but each[1] his neighbour's good."—It is the idea of *οἰκοδομεῖν, edifying*, which rules in this verse. It is not necessary to understand the adverb *μόνον*: "Let no man seek *only* . . ." The exclusion is absolute, because it condemns every pursuit of self-interest which is inspired by egoism: "Let no man seek his own enjoyment or advantage; but let him in his conduct always take account of the interest of others."—In the application of this rule to the particular subject with which Paul is dealing, two cases might present themselves to the Christian: that of a meal in his own house (vers. 25, 26), or that of a meal in a strange house (vers. 27–30).

Vers. 25, 26. "Whatsoever is sold in the shambles, eat, asking no question for conscience sake: 26. for the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof."—A Christian whose conscience is free from every scruple as to the eating of offered meats, sends and buys meat at the shambles; he has not to ask whether it is or is not sacrificial meat; it is pure in itself, like everything God has created. The term *μάκελλον, shambles*, is connected with the Latin *macellum*, and with the old French word *mazel*. The proper Greek word would have been *κρεοπώλιον*. — The last words, *διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν, for conscience sake*, are naturally connected with *μηδὲν*

[1] The word *ἕκαστος, each*, in the T. R. is read only in E K L Syr.

ἀνακρίνοντες. Edwards also explains it in this way, applying it, however, to a strong conscience: an enlightened and firm conscience is a reason *for* abstaining from all inquiry. Holsten, on the contrary, alleges that the conscience here, as in the rest of the passage, can only be that of the weak Christian, of which the strong Christian needs not take account when he is eating alone at his own house. But, in these two senses, Paul would have added, as in ver. 29, some qualification or other to indicate of which conscience he meant to speak. The simplest view is to hold that he is thinking of *conscience*, absolutely speaking, as in our expression: for conscience sake. The falsest interpretation is that of Chrysostom, Erasmus, etc.: "Making no inquiry, and that in order that, if you come to learn that it is meat which has been offered to idols, you may not have the burden of it on your conscience." This meaning would suppose that the direction is addressed to the weak.

Ver. 26. This is a quotation from Ps. xxiv. 1, a passage which, by proclaiming that all that fills the world comes from God and belongs to Him, saps the prejudice of the weak at Corinth at the root. By quoting this saying from the Old Testament, Paul wished to raise the weak to the height of the strong. Heinrici makes the interesting remark that these words of the Psalmist are used among the Jews as a thanksgiving at table.

The second case, that of an invitation to the house of a heathen: vers. 27–30. Again, two alternatives must be distinguished; in the first place, the case of a feast at which no observation is made by

any of the guests regarding the meats which are presented.

Ver. 27. "If[1] any of them that believe not bid[2] you, and ye be disposed to go; whatsoever is set before you, eat, asking no question for conscience sake." — The reading δέ, *but*, may be supported as contrasting this new case with the foregoing; but the two cases may also be simply put in juxtaposition without particle, according to the reading of the Alex.—There is much delicacy in the: *and ye be disposed* . . . Paul does not forbid acceptance of the invitation; for family bonds ought to be respected; they may even become, in the case of the believer, a means of advancing God's kingdom. But, while speaking as he does, and expressly referring the decision to the Christian's conscience, he yet makes him feel the need of reflection; for many dangers might accompany such invitations to heathen houses, even in a private dwelling, where the meal was always accompanied with certain religious ceremonies. The words εἰς δεῖπνον, *to a feast*, in the Greco-Lat. reading, are certainly a gloss. For the διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν, see on ver. 25. Holsten gives to these words the meaning: "The strong believer need not make inquiry, and that because of the conscience of the weak brother, present or not present, who might be offended if it turned out as the result of the inquiry that the meat had been offered to idols." The same reasons as we have given at ver. 25 seem to us to exclude this meaning.

The second alternative, vers. 28–30: the case in

[1] T. R. with C E H K L Syr. reads δε (*but*) after ει (*but if*).
[2] D E F G It. read εις δειπνον (*to a supper*) after των απιστων.

which the question is raised as to the origin of the meats offered at a feast.

Vers. 28, 29. "But if any man say unto you, This is offered[1] in sacrifice, eat not, for his sake that showed it, and for conscience[2] sake. 29. Conscience, I say, not thine own, but of the other: for to what purpose can my liberty be judged by another's conscience?"—The τίς, *any one*, of ver. 28 cannot, as Grotius thinks, denote the same person as the τίς of the foregoing verse, the heathen who invited the Christian. He would not be designated by an indefinite pronoun. It must therefore be one of the guests. Are we to suppose him, as has been thought by Chrysostom, de Wette, etc., a malicious heathen, who wishes by the remark to embarrass the Christian, or a serious heathen wishing to call his attention to the mistake he is about to commit without knowing it (Ewald)? But in these two cases the duty of the believer would have been, not to abstain, but, on the contrary, to partake of the meat while stating the motive of his conduct, and justifying his freedom from all scruple in regard to idols in which he does not believe; it was an excellent opportunity for expounding his faith. The person in question, therefore, is a sincere Christian, whose conscience is still hampered with scruples, and whom his strong brother is bound to treat with consideration. In this way, the following words: *For his sake that showed it, and for conscience*, are easily explained. The two motives refer to the same person, remaining,

[1] T. R. with C D E F G K L P ειδωλοθυτον; but ℵ A B Syrsch Sah. read ιεροθυτον.

[2] T. R. with K L here repeats the words of ver. 24: του γαρ κυριου η γη και το πληρωμα αυτης.

however, distinct. The first is directed against the influence which the example might exercise over the weak Christian, by leading him to eat against his conscience; the second, to the shock which his conscience will infallibly undergo on seeing the strong believer eat, even supposing he should resist the example which is set him. The repetition of the quotation from Ps. xxiv. at the end of ver. 28, in the T. R., is evidently due to an interpolation. The only meaning which could be given to the words here would be this: "There is on the table plenty of other meats which thou mayest use." But such a reflection is far from natural.

Ver. 29. The apostle expressly declares that such a sacrifice by no means implies that the strong believer renounces his conviction and right; his conscience remains independent of his brother's, though he voluntarily subordinates his conduct to the other's scruple. —The reason which the apostle gives for this conduct has been differently understood. Meyer and de Wette think that Paul means: "For on what ground should I subject your conscience to the judgment of your neighbour's? You preserve, therefore, so far as you are yourselves concerned, your entire liberty." But the conjunction ἱνατί does not signify: For what reason, with what right? This compound conjunction, after which we must understand γένηται, literally signifies: *that what good may come about?* The meaning is therefore: "For what advantage can there be in my liberty being condemned . . .?" We have in the parallel discussion of Rom. xiv. a perfectly similar saying, which leaves no doubt as to the meaning of this. Paul there says, ver. 16: "That your good be not evil

spoken of (blasphemed)!" This good is the liberty of the strong, and Paul asks of them not to make such a use of it as will provoke the disapproving judgment of the weak. Here he asks, besides, what advantage such a judgment, imprudently provoked, can have; what edification it can afford either to the Christians present, or to the non-Christians, who become witnesses of the mutual contradictions between believers, and of the condemnations which they pass on one another. The question put in ver. 29 is reproduced still more clearly in ver. 30.

Ver. 30. "If[1] I with thanksgiving be a partaker, why am I evil spoken of for that for which I give thanks?"—The asyndeton of itself proves that this verse reaffirms and explains the idea of the foregoing. It brings out still more forcibly the absurdity of the strong Christian's conduct by the revolting contradiction which would arise between the thanksgiving with which he partakes of the food offered to him, and the wounding of the conscience testified by the blame of the weak. What! that for which a believer gives thanks, the other converts into a ground of defamation against him! This is what is expressed by the word *βλασφημεῖν*. "What sort of religion is that?" the heathen would say, who were witnesses of both actions. The apostle concludes by stating generally the principle which, in such matters of Christian liberty, ought to be the supreme guide of the believer's conduct:

Vers. 31, 32. "Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God. 32. Give none offence neither to the Jews, nor to the

[1] T. R. adds δέ (*but*), with some Mnn. only

Greeks, nor to the Church of God;"—Here again we have both the *συμφέρειν* and the *οἰκοδομεῖν* (the promotion of good in general, and our neighbour's edification in particular), which Paul had recommended, ver. 23; only he here expresses himself in a more concrete way; first positively, ver. 31, then negatively, ver. 32. In questions which are not in themselves questions of good or evil, and which may remain undecided for the Christian conscience, the believer ought to ask himself, not: What will be most agreeable to me, or what will best suit my interest? but: What will contribute most to promote God's glory and the salvation of my brethren?—God's glory is the splendour of His perfections, particularly of His holiness and love, manifested in the midst of His creatures. The question for the Christian is therefore translated into this: What will best make my brethren understand the love and holiness of my heavenly Father?

Ver. 32. To this positive criterion another of a negative character is added. Will not my brother's conscience be shocked by the use I make of my liberty, if I act in this or that way? The apostle mentions the three circles of persons of which the Christians of Corinth ought to think in a case of uncertainty: first, the *Greeks*, who are here put for the heathen in general; next, the *Jews*, who are intentionally placed between the heathen and the Church; and, finally, Christians, whom he calls the *Church of God*, to emphasize the preciousness of the least of the members of such a body, in virtue of his being God's property. The believer should avoid both what may prevent those

without from entering and what may alienate and drive out those who are already saved.

Paul concludes by reminding them how this principle guides all his conduct.

Ver. 33–xi. 1. "even as I please all men in all things, not seeking mine own profit, but the profit of the many, that they may be saved. XI. 1. Become imitators of me, as I am of Christ."—In chap. ix. the apostle had developed at length the example of self-denial, which he was constantly giving to the Church by submitting to the necessity of earning a livelihood for himself, and in general, by becoming subject, when it was necessary, to the legal observances, from which he felt himself set free by faith in Christ. In concluding this whole passage, in which he has asked the Corinthians to make many sacrifices which are painful to them, he once more refers to his example, because he knows that we are not at liberty to ask sacrifices from others except in proportion to those which we make ourselves.—The phrase *to please others* may denote a vice or a virtue. That depends on the object proposed, whether to gain our neighbour's good graces selfishly, or to gain the attachment of our neighbour so as to win him for God. These are the two cases Paul contrasts with one another in this verse, in order to exclude the first, in so far as his own conduct is concerned; comp. Gal. i. 10. The: *in all things*, comprehends of course only the things which belong to the province of Christian liberty. — The *many* is opposed to Paul as an individual, and their salvation to his individual interest (ἐμαυτοῦ, *of myself*).

XI. 1. Christ alone is the perfect model; each

believer is a model to his brethren only in so far as he is a copy in relation to Christ.—Paul has in mind especially the absolute self-denial which was the basis of our Lord's earthly life, Rom. xv. 1–3.—It is only the fact expressed in the second part of the verse which gives the apostle the right and liberty to write the first. To be quite exact, we must understand in the second proposition not the verb *be*, but the verb *become*, used in the first.—The imitation in question is not a slavish one. As Paul was not in circumstances identical with those of Christ, so the Corinthians were not in circumstances altogether analogous to those of Paul. What he asks of the Church is, that it allow itself to be guided by the spirit of self-denial which animates himself, as he is guided by the spirit of self-sacrifice which was the soul of Christ's life.

We have already cast a glance over the course followed by the apostle in treating this delicate subject. It was needful to limit the use made of their liberty by many of the Corinthian Christians, and among them no doubt, by those who directed the opinion of the Church, without placing them again under the yoke of an external law, and while bringing them to understand themselves the necessity of the sacrifice. This sacrifice wounded their vanity as much as their love of pleasure. It is easy to see the extreme prudence with which the apostle required to conduct this discussion. He begins by stating the point about which all are agreed, the monotheism which excludes the reality of idols. He leaves aside for the moment the frequenting of idolatrous feasts, appealing only to charity for weak brethren. He encourages the

strong by his example, deters them by that of the Israelites. After this preparation, he strikes the great blow. Then he concludes calmly with some simple and practical rules in regard to the eating of meats, rules which admirably establish harmony between the rights of liberty and the obligations of charity.—Justly does Rückert exclaim, as he closes the analysis of the passage: "Truly I could not conceive a more prudent or better calculated course; we have here a masterpiece of true eloquence." Pity, only, that this eminent exegete does not stop there, but thinks he must ascribe to the apostle's eloquence, in this case, a certain character of craftiness. Evidently in the course followed by the apostle we are bound to recognise the wisdom of the serpent; but it does not for a moment exclude the simplicity of the dove. For prudence is throughout ever in the service of the love of truth and of zeal for the good of individuals and of the Church.

VII.

The Demeanour of Women in Public Worship (Chap. XI. 2–16).

The apostle has just treated a series of subjects belonging to the domain of the Church's moral life, especially in connection with Christian liberty (chaps. vi.–x.). He now passes to various subjects relating to *public worship*, beginning with that which lies nearest the domain of liberty: the external demeanour of women in public worship. Then will follow the disorders which have crept into the celebration of the

Holy Supper and into the administration of spiritual gifts. Such are the three subjects Paul conjoins in the closely connected chaps. xi.–xiv.

The ancients in general laid down a difference between the bearing of men and that of women in their appearances in public. Plutarch (*Quæst. Rom.* xiv.) relates that at the funeral ceremony of parents, the sons appeared with their heads covered, the daughters with their heads uncovered and their hair flowing. This author adds by way of explanation: "To mourning belongs the extraordinary," that is to say, what is done on this occasion, is the opposite of what is done in general. What would be improper at an ordinary time becomes proper then. Plutarch also relates that among the Greeks it was customary for the women in circumstances of distress to cut off their hair, whereas the men allowed it to grow; why so? Because the custom of the latter is to cut it, and of the former to let it grow (see Heinrici, pp. 300, 301). According to several passages from ancient authors, while the long hair of the woman was regarded as her best ornament, the man who, by the care he bestowed on his hair, effaced the difference of the sexes, was despised as a voluptuary. The Greek slave had her head shaved in token of her servitude; the same was done among the Hebrews to the adulteress (Num. v. 18; comp. Isa. iii. 17). In regard to acts of public worship there existed a remarkable difference between the Greeks and the Romans. The Greek prayed with his head uncovered, whereas the Roman veiled his head. The ancients explain these opposite usages in various ways. Probably in the Roman rite there was

expressed the idea of the scrupulous reverence which should be brought into the service of the deity, while the Greek rite bespoke the feeling of liberty with which man should appear before the gods of Olympus. The Jewish high priest officiated with his mitre on his head, and the Jew of the present day prays with his head covered, no doubt in token of reverence and submission. It appears from all these facts what an intimate relation the feeling of the ancients established between the worshipper's demeanour, as regards the noblest part of his being, the head, and his moral and social position. "The point here was not only," as Heinrici well says, "a matter of decorum." His conduct in this respect corresponded to a profound religious feeling.

This is the point of view at which we must place ourselves to understand the following discussion. St. Paul was accustomed to say: "In Christ all things are made new; there is neither male nor female, neither bond nor free, neither Greek nor Jew." How easy was it from this to jump to the conclusion: Then there is no longer any difference, especially in worship, where we are all before God, between the demeanour of the male and that of the female. If the male speaks to his brethren or to God with his head uncovered, why should not the female do so also? And with the spirit of freedom which animated the Church of Corinth, it is not probable that they had stopped short at theory. They had already gone the length of practice; this seems to be implied by vers. 15, 16. The apostle had learned it, not from the letter of the Corinthians, to which he does not here make any allusion (as in viii. 1), but probably from the deputies of the Church.

He begins with a general commendation in regard to the manner in which the Church remains faithful to the ecclesiastical institutions he had established among them.

Ver. 2. "Now I praise[1] you, that ye remember me in all things, and keep the ordinances, as I delivered them to you."—The *now* is progressive; it is the transition to the new subject. Edwards takes it adversatively (in contrast to the expression *imitators of me*): "*But*, if you do not imitate me in everything, I acknowledge that in these things you observe my instructions." This connection does not seem to me natural.—The word παραδόσεις here certainly denotes the traditions relating to ecclesiastical customs, and not doctrinal instructions; these will come to be treated xv. 3.—The μου, *me*, seems to me to be the complement of the μέμνησθε, *ye remember*; the πάντα is in that case an adverbial qualification: *in all things*, on all points. Rückert thinks he can make πάντα the direct object of the verb, and μου the complement of πάντα: "You remember all that proceeds from me." But, not to speak of the usual construction of the verb (with the genitive), there would be something harsh in the expression πάντα μου (*all things of me*). Finally, the other construction more delicately expresses the personal remembrance of which Paul feels himself to be the object on their part.—But there was a point on which the apostle had not expressly pronounced in his oral teaching, probably because the occasion had not occurred, no woman having made trial in his presence of the right of speaking, and that with her head uncovered. Things had changed since his departure.

[1] T. R. with D E F G K L It. Syr. here reads ἀδελφοί (*brethren*).

VERS. 3–6.

Ver. 3. "But I would have you know, that the head of every man is the[1] Christ; and the man is [the] head of the woman; and God [the] head of the[2] Christ."—The δέ is adversative: *but;* Paul proceeds to a point to which the eulogy he has just passed does not apply. —One is tempted to ask, as he reads the following sentences, why the apostle thinks it necessary to take things on so high a level, and to connect what is apparently so secondary a matter with relations so exalted as those of man with Christ, and of Christ with God. To explain his method, we must bear in mind the pride of the Corinthians, who thought they knew everything, and whom the apostle wishes, no doubt, to teach that they have yet something to learn: "*I would have you know.*" It is likely enough, from ver. 16, that the ultra-liberals of Corinth spoke with a certain disdain of the ecclesiastical prescriptions left by the apostle, and that in the name of the Spirit some claimed to throw his rules overboard. Paul would give them to understand that everything hangs together in one, both in good and in evil; that unfaithfulness to the Divine order, even in things most external, may involve an assault on the most sublime relations, and that the pious keeping up of proprieties, even in these things, is an element of Christian holiness. Hence he begins with placing this special point in the life of the Church under the light of the two holiest analogies that can be conceived, and in which he shows the revelation

[1] ℵ B D F G omit ο (*the*) before Χριστος.
[2] T. R. with C F G K L P omits του (*of the*) before Χριστου.

of a Divine order. Those who criticise him presumptuously will thus be able to understand whence he derives the rules which he lays down in the Church.

There exist three relations, which together form a sort of hierarchy: lowest in the scale, the purely human relation between man and woman; higher, the Divine-human relation between Christ and man; highest in the scale, the purely Divine relation between God and Christ. The common term whereby Paul characterizes these three relations is κεφαλή (hence our word *chief*), *head*. This figurative term includes two ideas: community of life, and inequality within this community. So between the man and the woman: by the bond of marriage there is formed between them the bond of a common life, but in such a way that the one is the strong and directing element, the other the receptive and dependent element. The same is the case in the relation between Christ and the man. Formed by the bond of faith, it also establishes a community of life, in which there are distinguished an active and directing principle, and a receptive and directed factor. An analogous relation appears higher still in the mystery of the Divine essence. By the bond of filiation, there is between Christ and God communiön of Divine life, but such that impulse proceeds from the Father, and that "the Son does nothing but what he sees the Father do" (John v. 19).—The relation between Christ and the man is put first. It is, so to speak, the link of union between the other two, reflecting the sublimity of the one and marking the other with a sacred character, which should secure it from the violence with which it is threatened. The

only question is whether, as has been thought by Hofmann, Holsten, etc., the point in question is the natural relation between Christ and man, due to the dignity of the pre-existing Christ as creator (Hofmann), or as the heavenly Man, the prototype of earthly humanity (Holsten),—or whether, as is held by Meyer, Heinrici, etc., Paul means to describe the relation between Christ and men by redemption. The expression: *every man*, seems to speak in favour of the first sense; and the passages viii. 6 and x. 4 might serve to confirm this meaning. Christ as having been the organ of creation, is the head of every man created in His image, believing or unbelieving. But vers. 4 and 5 seem to me to prove that Paul is thinking not of man in general, but of the Christian husband. "Every man . . ., every woman who prays, who prophesies . . .," this can only apply to believers. It is from ver. 7 that Paul passes from the spiritual order to the domain of creation in general. What is true in the first sense, is that every man is ordained to believe in Christ and to take Him for his head, that is to say, to become a *Christian* husband.—The article ἡ is to be remarked with κεφαλή in the first proposition (it is wanting in the other two). This arises, no doubt, from the fact that the man may have many other heads than Christ; the article serves to point out Christ as the only normal head. In the other two relations, this was understood of itself.

This relation belonging to the kingdom of God has for its counterpart in the family the relation between husband and wife. Paul is here thinking chiefly of the natural and social relation, in virtue of which the

husband directs and the wife is in a position of subordination. But this natural relation is not abolished by the life of faith; on the contrary, it takes hold of it and sanctifies it. Must we conclude, from the term used by Paul, that the Christian wife has not also Christ for her head, in respect of her eternal personality? By no means; salvation in Christ is the same for the wife as for the husband, and the bond by which she is united to Christ does not differ from that which unites the man to the Lord. The saying: "Ye are branches, I am the vine," applies to the one sex as much as to the other. But from the standpoint of the earthly manifestation and of social position, the woman, even under the gospel economy, preserves her subordinate position. There will come a day when the distinction between the sexes will cease (Luke xx. 34–36). But that day does not belong to the terrestrial form of the kingdom of God. As long as the present physical constitution of humanity lasts, the subordinate position of the woman will remain, even in the Christian woman. As the child realizes its communion with the Lord in the form of filial obedience to its parents, the Christian mother realizes her communion with the Lord in the form of subordination to her husband, without her communion being thereby less direct and close than his. The husband is not between her and the Lord; she is subject to him *in the Lord;* it is *in Him* that she loves him, and it is by aiding him that she lives for the Lord. If from the social standpoint she is his wife, from the standpoint of redemption she is his sister. Thus are harmonized these two sayings proceeding from the same pen: "In Christ there is neither male

nor female," and: "The husband is the head of the wife."

These two relations, that of Christ to the man, and that of the man to his wife, rest on a law which flows from the nature of God Himself. In the oneness of the Divine essence there are found these two poles, the one directive, the other dependent: God and Christ. Paul evidently desires to rise to the highest point, above which we can conceive nothing. Some, like Heinrici, Edwards, etc., think that this expression: *the head of Christ*, can only apply to the Christ incarnate. But if the relation were thus understood, one of the two essential features would be wanting, indicated by the term head, and which characterize the two preceding relations: *community* of life and nature. We cannot, therefore, confine this saying to the Lord's human nature, and we think there is no ground for shrinking from the notion of subordination applied to the Divine being of Christ; see on iii. 23. This idea of the subordination of Christ, conceived as a pre-existent being (viii. 6, x. 4), springs out of the terms *Son* and *Word*, by which He is designated, as well as from the very passages where the divinity of Christ is most clearly affirmed (Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 2, 3; John i. 1, 18; Rev. i. 1). Holsten thinks that he escapes all difficulty by bringing in here the idea of Christ as the heavenly *Man*, according to the discovery made by Baur by means of the passage xv. 45 seq. It is very certain that had it not been found in that passage, nobody would have extracted it from the one we are explaining. For the examination of this conception ascribed to Paul, we shall therefore refer to the passage quoted.

Thus, then, in the apostle's view, the relation between husband and wife in marriage is a reflection of that which unites Christ and the believer, as this again reproduces the still more sublime relation which exists between God and His manifestation in the person of Christ. Paul certainly could not say more in the Epistle to the Ephesians to express a higher notion of marriage than these words. M. Sabatier, expounding the idea of marriage in the Epistle to the Ephesians, says: "Husband and wife form an indissoluble organic unity." Exactly; but can this "indissoluble unity" be more forcibly expressed than by comparing it, as Paul does in our passage, to the unity of Christ with the believer and of God with Christ? M. Sabatier adds, still expounding the contents of Ephesians: "The one does not reach the fulness of existence without the other." Certainly; but is not this exactly what Paul teaches here in vers. 11, 12: "The man is not without the woman in the Lord, nor the woman without the man." And on such grounds a progress is alleged as having taken place in Paul's ideas on marriage, in the interval between the Epistle to the Corinthians and that to the Ephesians!

After recognising, as a principle which controls all community of life, Divine and human, that duality of factors, the one active, the other receptive, which forms the basis of marriage, the apostle passes by an asyndeton to the application which he wishes to make of it to the case in question at Corinth.

Vers. 4–6. "Every man praying or prophesying, having his head covered, dishonoureth his head. 5. But every woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her

head uncovered dishonoureth her head: for that is even all one as if she were shaven. 6. For if the woman be not covered, let her also be shorn: but if it be a shame for a woman to be shorn or shaven, let her be covered." — Chrysostom has concluded from ver. 4, as Edwards also does, that the men too, at Corinth, did violence to their proper dignity by being covered. But it is not probable that abuses arose in that direction, especially in Greece (see above, p. 104). The demeanour which becomes the man is only mentioned to bring out by contrast that which alone is becoming in the woman.—The two acts of *prophesying* and *praying* will be again brought together in chap. xiv., where we shall speak of them more specially. Let us only say here, that in chap. xiv. (comp. especially vers. 14–17) prayer is more or less identified with *speaking in a tongue*, a gift which is treated conjointly with prophecy. This observation leads us to suppose, as Baur has already done, that by the prayer of which Paul speaks, in our vers. 4, 5, he means chiefly a prayer *in a tongue*, that is to say, in ecstatic language. The phrase κατὰ κεφ. ἔχειν is elliptical: "having down from the head," that is to say, wearing a kerchief in the form of a veil coming down from the head over the shoulders.—In the last words: *dishonoureth her head*, the word *head* has often been understood literally (Erasmus, Beza, Bengel, Neander, Meyer, etc.): By veiling the head made to appear uncovered, he covers it with shame. But why in this case prefix to ver. 4 the reflection of ver. 3: "The head of every man is Christ"? If this remark had a purpose, it should be to prepare for the idea of ver. 4, and consequently to

justify the application of the term *head* to Christ Himself; which does not prevent us from holding, with many critics, that there is here a delicately intended play on words: "By dishonouring his own head, the believer, who covers himself, dishonours Christ also, whose glory he ought to be." Indeed, as Holsten says, every man who, in performing a religious act, covers his head, thereby acknowledges himself dependent on some earthly head other than his heavenly head, and thereby takes from the latter the honour which accrues to Him as the head of man. The head uncovered, the brow open and radiant, the look uplifted and confident, the noble covering of hair, like, as some one has said, "to a crown of extinct rays,"[1] such are the insignia of the king of nature, who has no other head in the universe than the invisible Lord of all. If, then, he is not to impair the honour of his Lord, he must respect himself by not covering his head.

Ver. 5. But precisely because the woman is in a position contrasted with that of the man, in so far as she has *here below* a visible head, she would dishonour this head by affecting a costume which would be a symbol of independence. And since the woman does not naturally belong to public life, if it happen that in the spiritual domain she has to exercise a function which brings her into prominence, she ought to strive the more to put herself out of view by covering herself with the veil, which declares the dependence in which she remains relatively to her husband. As Heinrici says, it can only be to the shame of her husband if a wife present herself in a dress which belongs to the

[1] "A une couronne de rayons éteints."

man. By uncovering her head (in the literal sense) she dishonours her head (in the figurative sense).— Here a difficulty arises. The apostle, by laying down for the woman the condition of wearing the veil, seems decidedly to authorize the act to which this condition applies, that is to say, he permits the woman to pray and to prophesy in public. Now in chap. xiv. 34 he says, absolutely and without restriction: "Let your women keep silence in the Churches." This apparent contradiction has led Hofmann, Meyer, Beet, and others to the idea, that, in our chapter, Paul had in view only gatherings for family worship (Hofmann) or private meetings (Meyer), composed exclusively of women (Beet). But it is impossible to hold that the apostle would have imposed the obligation of the veil on a mother praying while surrounded by her husband and children. Neither is it possible to see how the idea of Meyer and of Beet could be reconciled with ver. 10 of our chapter (*because of the angels*). Besides, ver. 16 naturally implies that Paul is thinking of public worship (*the Churches of God*). Finally, in vers. 34 and 35 of chap. xiv., he is not distinguishing between different kinds of assemblies; but he is contrasting assemblies in general with the time when husband and wife find themselves alone together at home: "Let the women keep silence in the Churches . . ." (ver. 34), "let them ask their husbands at home" (ver. 35).— Heinrici proposes to restrict the prohibition laid on women, in chap. xiv., to the tokens of admiration which they liked to give to those who spoke in tongues, or also to the curious questions which they put to the prophets, thus of course disturbing the decorum of the

assemblies. Some writers in England have even supposed that in chap. xiv. Paul simply means to forbid women to indulge in the whisperings and private conversations which would break the stillness of worship. But it is impossible so to restrict the meaning of the word λαλεῖν, *to speak*, in chap. xiv., applied as it is in that chapter to all the forms of public speaking. Besides, the prohibition, if it had one of these meanings, should have been addressed to men as much as to women. What the passage in chap. xiv. forbids to women, is not ill-speaking or ill-timed speaking, it is *speaking;* and what Paul contrasts with the term speaking, is *keeping silence* or asking *at home.* —It might be supposed that the apostle meant to let the speaking of women in the form of prophesying or praying pass for the moment only, contemplating returning to it afterwards to forbid it altogether, when he should have laid down the principles necessary to justify this complete prohibition. So it was that he proceeded in chap. vi., in regard to lawsuits between Christians, beginning by laying down a simple restriction in ver. 4, to condemn them afterwards altogether in ver. 7. We have also observed the use of a similar method in the discussion regarding the participation of the Corinthians in idolatrous feasts; the passage, viii. 10, seemed first to authorize it; then, afterwards, when the time has come, he forbids it absolutely (x. 21, 22), because he then judges that the minds of his readers are better prepared to accept such a decision. But this solution is unsatisfactory, because it remains true that one does not lay down a condition to the doing of a thing which he intends afterwards to forbid

absolutely.—It has also been thought that the term λαλεῖν, *speaking*, should be taken in chap. xiv. solely in the sense of *teaching*. Thus the woman might prophesy or pray in an unknown tongue; but she must never indulge in teaching. But it is impossible to accept so limited a meaning of the word λαλεῖν in a chapter where it is used all through to denote both prophetical speaking and speaking in tongues. This solution is not, perhaps, radically false, but it is impossible to deduce it from the word *speaking* in chap. xiv. in contrast to the terms *prophesying* and *praying* in chap. xi.—I rather think, therefore, that while rejecting, as a rule, the speaking of women in Churches, Paul yet meant to leave them a certain degree of liberty for the exceptional case in which, in consequence of a sudden revelation (*prophesying*), or under the influence of a strong inspiration of prayer and thanksgiving (*speaking in tongues*), the woman should feel herself constrained to give utterance to this extraordinary impulse of the Spirit. Only at the time when she thus went out of her natural position of reserve and dependence, he insisted the more that she should not forget, nor the Church with her, the abnormal character of the action; and this was the end which the veil was intended to serve. Moreover, Paul does not seem to think that such cases could be frequent. For in chap. xiv. *prophetesses* are not once mentioned along with prophets, and yet the name προφῆτις was familiar in the Old Testament, and is not wanting in the New (Luke ii. 36; Rev. ii. 20). Probably in making the concession which we find in this passage, the apostle was thinking only of married women. The

question could hardly have been even raised as to young women. Reuss says: "In Greece a woman of character did not appear in public without a veil." How much more must it have been so with unmarried persons! And if Paul had extended to the latter the permission implied in his words, he would still less have suppressed in their case the condition of the veil imposed on the former.

In the last words of ver. 5, Paul likens the woman who appears in public with her head uncovered to one who has her head shaven. This was never found among the Greeks, except in the case of women who were slaves; among the Jews, only in the case of the woman accused of adultery by her husband (Num. v. 18). A similar usage seems to have prevailed among other nations besides. — The subject of the proposition, according to most, is understood: *every woman that speaketh with her head uncovered* (see Meyer). But is it not simpler to make ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό, *one and the same thing*, the subject of ἐστί: "One and the same [condition] is the woman's who is shaven [as hers who is not veiled]." The verb ξυρέω, or ξυράω, or ξύρω, signifies *to shave* to the skin.

Ver. 6. To impress the revolting character of such a course, the apostle supposes it pushed to extremity. There is something of indignation in his words: "If this woman has effrontery enough to do the first of these acts, well and good, better also do the second!" The repulsive character of the one should make that of the other felt. The word ξυρασθαι is usually accented, as if it were the present infinitive passive of ξυράω (ξυρᾶσθαι). But why should it not be regarded as the

aorist infinitive middle, like κείρασθαι, of the form ξύρω (ξύρασθαι)? See Passow. There is a gradation from the one of these verbs to the other: To cut the hair or even to shave the head.—The word αἰσχρόν, *shameful*, includes the two notions of physical ugliness and moral indecency.

Vers. 7–12.

Thus far the apostle has been arguing from the parallel between the subordinate position which Christian principle ascribes to the woman (ver. 3), and the receptive position of the man relatively to Christ, and of Christ Himself relatively to God. Now he shows that the conclusion he has drawn from this double analogy is confirmed by the mode of the woman's creation. For in the apostle's eyes the kingdom of nature does not proceed from another God than that of grace. On the contrary, it is in the sphere of redemption that the Divine thoughts, which are only sketched in the kingdom of nature, reach perfection.

Vers. 7–9. "The man indeed, being the image and glory of God, ought not to cover his head: but the[1] woman is the glory of the man. 8. For the man is not taken from the woman; but the woman from the man. 9. And the man indeed was not created for the woman; but the woman for the man."—The γάρ, *for*, leads us to expect a confirmation drawn from a domain other than the preceding. The omission of the article before the words εἰκών, *image*, and δόξα, *glory*, gives these two substantives a qualitative significance.—The meaning of the first is that man, by his sovereignty over the terrestrial creation, visibly reflects the sovereignty

[1] T. R. with ℵ C E K L omits the article ἡ.

of the invisible Creator over all things. We here find the idea of man's lordly position in nature, as it is expressed Gen. i. 26–28, and celebrated in Ps. viii.—The second, *glory of God*, expresses the honour which is shed on God Himself from this visible image which He has formed here below, especially when man, carrying out his destiny, voluntarily renders Him homage for his high position, and adoringly casts at His feet the crown which God has put on his head. Analogous to this is the meaning in 2 Cor. viii. 23, where the deputies of the Churches are called *the glory of Christ*, because they make the Lord's work, in the Churches they represent, shine before the eyes of those to whom they are delegated.—The man existing in this double character (*ὑπάρχων*), as image and glory of God, ought not to veil this dignity by covering himself when he acts publicly. This would be in a way to tarnish the reflection of the Divine brightness with which God has adorned him, and which ought at such a time to shine forth in his person. But in virtue of the very same law, the woman ought to act in an opposite way. If, in the discharge of such an office, the veil is opposed to the man's sovereignty, it is from that very fact in keeping with the woman's condition. She, indeed, was created as the *glory of the man*, because, as is said in the following verses, she was taken *from* him and formed *for* him (vers. 8, 9). It is an honour, the highest of all undoubtedly, for one being to become the object of another's love and devotion; and the more the being who loves and is self-devoted is exalted in talent and beauty, the more is this honour increased. Can there therefore be a greater glory to man than to

possess, as a loving and devoted helpmeet, a being so admirably endowed as woman! All the perfection that belongs to her is homage rendered to the man, from whom and for whom she was made, especially when she consecrates herself freely to him in the devotion of love. Critics have been exercised, and justly, about the reason why the apostle has not in the second case repeated the term *image*. De Wette has thought that had he made woman the image of man, the apostle would have denied to her the possession of God's image. Meyer thinks that this expression would wrongly imply, on the part of the woman, a certain participation in the sovereignty of the man. The second ground seems to me truer and more in keeping with the context. The *image* of the husband in the family is not the wife, but the son. It is he who is heir of the paternal sovereignty.—The inference from this relation in regard to the woman's demeanour will be drawn in ver. 10.

Vers. 8, 9 serve to prove the expression: *glory of the man*. In ver. 8 the narrative of Genesis (ii. 22, 23) is referred to, according to which the man did not appear as proceeding from the woman; but inversely. And why so? For a reason (γάρ) which is at the same time a new proof (καί) of the expression: *glory of man*, in ver. 7. The woman proceeded from the man because she was intended to serve as his helper, and to complete his existence.—The διά, *on account of*, alludes to the saying of Genesis (ii. 18): "It is not good for man to be alone: let us make a helpmeet for him."—The practical conclusion, ver. 10:

Ver. 10. "For this cause ought the woman to have

a sign of power on her head because of the angels."—*For this cause:* because she was formed *from* him and *for* him.—Literally it is: "the woman ought to have on her head *a power.*" This term *power* has been understood in many ways; but they are not worth the trouble of enumeration, the meaning is so clear and simple. *Power* is put here for a *sign of power*, and of power not exercised, but submitted to. The woman ought to wear on her head the sign of the power under which she has been placed. It is a frequent way of speaking in all languages, to use the sign of a thing to denote the thing itself, for example the sword for war, the crown for sovereignty. But it is rarer to find, as here, the thing itself put for the sign; but examples are also found of this other form of metonymy; thus when Diodorus, describing the statue of the mother of the Egyptian king Osimandias, says that she has three kingships on her head, he means, evidently: three diadems, symbols of three kingships; or when the same historian gives the name ἀλήθεια, *truth*, to the ornament which the Egyptian priests wore to symbolize their possession of this highest good. —The difficulty of the verse lies in the last words: *because of the angels.* Have we here a second reason? In that case it would require to be connected with the preceding (as was indicated by the word *for this cause*) by some such particle as: *and*, *and also*, or *and besides.* Is it, on the contrary, the same reason presented in another form? But in that case it is difficult to understand the relation between such different modes of expression to convey the same idea. Heinrici, who has thoroughly felt this difficulty, seeks to resolve it

by maintaining that the angels are here mentioned because they were God's agents in the work of creation, of which mention was made vers. 8, 9, and therefore sure to be particularly offended by a mode of acting opposed to the normal relation established in the beginning between man and woman. This solution is certainly not far from the truth. Only it seems to us that we must set aside the idea of the intervention of angels in the work of creation. They no doubt beheld that work, according to Job xxxviii. 7, with songs of joy, but without any co-operation on their part being indicated. We are called rather to bear in mind, that, according to Luke xv. 7, 10, the angels in heaven hail the conversion of every sinner; that, according to Eph. iii. 10, they behold with adoration the infinitely diversified wonders which the Divine Spirit works within the Church; that, according to 1 Tim. v. 21, they are, as well as God and Jesus Christ, witnesses of the ministry of Christ's servants; finally, that, in this very Epistle (iv. 9), they form along with men that intelligent universe which is the spectator of the apostolical struggles and sufferings. Why, then, should they not be invisibly present at the worship of the Church in which are wrought so large a number of those works of grace? How could an action contrary to the Divine order, and offending that supreme decorum of which the angels are the perfect representatives, fail to sadden them? And how, finally, could the pain and shame felt by these invisible witnesses fail to spread a sombre shade over the serenity of the worship? In Christ heaven and earth are brought together (John i. 52). As there is henceforth community of joy, there is also

community of sorrow between the inhabitants of these two spheres. The Jews had already a similar sentiment in their worship. This is what has led the Greek translators to say (Ps. cxxxviii. 1): "I will praise Thee before the angels," instead of: "I will praise Thee before Elohim." This explanation is more or less that of Chrysostom and Augustine; it is that of Grotius and of most of the moderns (Rückert, de Wette, Meyer, Osiander, etc.). Edwards thinks it is as models of humility in general life, and not only in worship, that the angels are here proposed as an example to Christian women; but the preposition διά, *because of*, expresses a different relation from that of example. It is rather to the presence of the angels that it calls our attention. — There has often been reproduced, in recent times, an idea which occurs so early as in Tertullian: Paul is held to be speaking here of the evil angels whose passions might be excited by the view of unveiled women. Or, thinking of angels in general, there has been found in our passage an allusion to Gen. vi. 1-4 (Kurtz, Hofmann, Hilgenfeld). But if good angels are in question, they have many other opportunities of seeing woman unveiled than in Christian worship; and if evil angels, this temptation makes no change in their state. Besides, there is no special indication leading us to find here an allusion to Gen. vi.—Storr, Flatt, etc., have taken the ἄγγελοι to be *spies* sent by the heathen to watch Christian worship (Jas. ii. 25); Clement of Alexandria: *the most pious* members; Beza: the *prophets* of the Church; Ambrose: the *pastors* (Rev. i. 20). Such significations are now only mentioned as matters of history.

Baur and Neander, finding it impossible to connect with the reason indicated by the words: *for this cause*, the reason contained in these: *because of the angels*, have proposed to suppress the last words as a later interpolation. Holsten goes further; he extends this supposition to the whole of ver. 10, but for a different reason. Giving to this verse a meaning almost the same as that of Hofmann (allusion to Gen. vi.), he concludes therefrom, very logically, as it seems to me, that such a saying cannot be ascribed to the apostle. Only the premiss (the meaning ascribed by him to the verse) is false, consequently also the conclusion which he draws from it. As the documents present no variants, the authenticity of the verse may be regarded as certain.

After having thus declared the natural dependence of woman in relation to man, the apostle yet feels the need of completing the exposition of this relation by exhibiting the other side of the truth; this he does in vers. 11, 12.

Vers. 11, 12. "If, however, the woman is not without the man, neither is the man without the woman,[1] in the Lord; 12. for as the woman is of the man, even so is the man also by the woman; and all things of God." —The subordination of the wife to her husband is tempered in Christ by the oneness of the spiritual life which they both draw from the Lord. The one is not without the other, and that evidently as believers; there is community of prayer between them, the constant exchange of spiritual aid and active co-operation.

[1] T. R. with A L Syr. reverses the order of the two parallel propositions.

The words *in the Lord* refer not to God, but, as usual in the New Testament, to Christ; the mention of God only comes later, in ver. 12. It does not seem to me that there is sufficient reason for finding here, with Holsten, an allusion to the softening which the gospel has introduced into the wife's subordination, as it was laid down in Genesis; the reason alleged in ver. 10 rather carries us back to the order of nature which is recognised and sanctioned by the gospel.—The order of the propositions followed by the T. R., contrary to the great majority of the Mjj., is evidently mistaken.

Ver. 12. The *for* indicates that the relative equality of the two sexes in Christ was already prefigured, so to speak, by a fact belonging to the order of natural life. So it was that the *for* of ver. 7 served to give a reason for the wife's moral subordination by a fact drawn from the inferior domain. If, so far as creation goes, the woman is of the man,—this is the proof of her dependence (ver. 8),—on the other hand, as to the conservation of the race, the man is of the woman, and this decisive fact in the life of humanity, restores equality to a certain extent between the two sexes. The natural order makes woman not only man's spouse, but also his mother; therewith all is said. We see here with what wisdom the apostle could apply to the domain of spiritual life, not only the scriptural types, but also the hieroglyphics of nature. And thus are explained to us the last words of the verse: "*And all things are of God.*" He is the Author of nature as well as of grace, and He has laid in the first the outlines, so to speak, of the Divine thoughts, which he realizes perfectly in the second.

Vers. 13–16.

The apostle concludes by appealing to the natural impression which ought to follow from a particular feature in the physical conformation of the man and the woman. This last argument is strictly connected with the last words of ver. 12.

Vers. 13–15. "Judge in yourselves: Is it comely that a woman pray unto God uncovered? 14. Doth not[1] nature itself[2] teach you, that, if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him? 15. but if a woman have long hair, it is a glory to her: for her hair is given her[3] for a covering."—After appealing to the sacred analogies mentioned in vers. 3-6, and to the relation established by creation between the sexes (vers. 7–12), Paul finally takes to witness a fact nearer to us, inherent in the human person itself. We here come to a formula similar to that with which he had closed the previous discussion x. 15: "Judge of yourselves!" These words appeal to the instinct of truth which ought to exist in his readers themselves.—The following question finds its solution in vers. 14, 15, where the fact is stated which should serve as the basis of their judgment.—The addition of the words τῷ Θεῷ, *to God*, is difficult to explain; for it appears as if it were precisely in speaking to God that the woman could speak without impropriety unveiled. But let us remember that we are here in full public worship, and that it is at the moment when the woman's voice is uttering the

[1] T. R. with E K L reads, before ουδε, η (*or*), which is omitted by all the rest.

[2] T. R. with C L reads αυτη η φυσις; all the rest: η φυσις αυτη.

[3] T. R. with ℵ A B reads αυτη (*to her*) after δεδοται; the rest omit it.

deepest impressions and the holiest emotions of adoration and love, that a feeling of holy modesty ought to constrain her to secure herself from every indiscreet and profane look. For the very reason that she is speaking *to God*, she ought in this sacred act to veil her figure from the eyes of men. These words: *to God*, are therefore, whatever Holsten may say, perfectly in place.

Ver. 14. The ἤ, *or*, of the T. R. might be suitable so far as the sense goes: "*Or indeed*, if you answer my question in the negative, does not nature teach you . . . ?" This use of the ἤ is frequent in Paul. But for this very reason the particle might easily have been introduced; the authorities in its favour are weak.

Ver. 14 must therefore be regarded as directly answering the question put in ver. 13: "After all I have said to resolve the question, is there not another master whose voice you ought of yourselves to hear, and who will teach you that . . . ?" This master is *nature*, ἡ φύσις, a word which here can neither signify moral instinct nor established usage. It follows indeed from ver. 15 that Paul is thinking of the physical organization of woman. If we receive the reading of the T. R., αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις, *even nature*, the idea is: "That which seemed unable to teach us anything in such a domain." But if we follow the other reading, ἡ φύσις αὐτή, *nature itself*, the meaning is rather: "itself, without me, without my teaching."—Hofmann and Heinrici understand the following ὅτι in the sense of *because*, and make the διδάσκει an intransitive verb: "Does not nature itself instruct you?" But the ὅτι

after such a verb as διδάσκειν naturally signifies *that*, and all the more because the ὅτι at the end of ver. 15 really signifies *because*, and serves to explain the bearing of the two preceding ὅτι: "Does not nature itself show you *that* . . . and *that* . . ., *seeing that* . . . ?" By not giving the man long hair, like the woman's, nature itself has shown that an uncovered head, and an open brow, suit his dignity as king of creation. The hair of the man is a crown, while, as the following verse adds, that of the woman is a veil.

Ver. 15. By giving to the woman a covering of hair, which envelopes her, in a manner, from head to foot, nature itself has shown that it is suitable to her to withdraw as much as possible from view, and to remain concealed. This long and rich hair is given to her ἀντὶ περιβολαίου, *in place of a veil.* This substantive does not merely denote, as κάλυμμα would do, an ornament for the head; it is a vestment enveloping the whole body, a sort of peplum. It is a natural symbol of reserve and modesty, woman's most beautiful ornament. —It has been objected, not without a touch of irony, that for the very reason that nature has endowed woman with such a covering, she does not need to add a second and artificial one (Holsten). But this is to mistake the real bearing of the apostle's argument. All is spiritual in his view. He means that nature, by constituting as it has done each of the two sexes, has given both to understand the manner in which they will fulfil their destiny; for man, it will be public and independent action; for woman, life in domestic retirement and silence. Whoever has the least appreciation of the things of nature, will recognise the pro-

found truth of this symbolism.—The Greco-Lat. and Byz. reading omits the *αὐτῇ* at the end of the verse. The meaning is not affected by the omission (contrary to Holsten).

Notwithstanding the unanimity of the Mjj. and Vss. in favour of the text of this passage, Holsten has thought right to propose a whole list of rejections; that, for example, of vers. 5^b and 6, of ver. 10, and even of vers. 13–15. We have refuted this critic's objections when it seemed to us necessary. They arise from certain general ideas about the passage, which we think false; the first: that Paul has in view only husbands and wives who are *Christians;* the second: that if the wife is bound to speak veiled it is only in presence of *her own* husband, to whom she ought to show, that while fulfilling this function, she does not forget her dependence on him; the third: that on reaching the last section (vers. 13–15), the text passes, in a far from logical way, from the domain of moral obligation—which is Paul's true standpoint —to that of social propriety, which, according to Holsten, is the interpolator's standpoint. But (1) from the outset, and even in ver. 3, it is of the difference of the sexes as such that the apostle is thinking. He is speaking of man and woman in general, regarding young men and young women as naturally destined for marriage. The whole female sex is in his eyes created with a view to its subordination to the male sex, as Tertullian well says (see Heinrici): "*Si caput mulieris vir est, utique et virginis, de quâ fit mulier quæ nupsit.*" (2) It is not because of her husband only that the woman who speaks in public ought to continue veiled; it is as a woman, and to maintain in her own consciousness and in that of the Church her permanent character of dependence. (3) The passage vers. 13–15 does not give a reason which lies outside of moral obligation. Woman's physical constitution is a revelation of the Creator's will regarding her. Not to conform to this indication, is not merely to offend social propriety, it is to transgress the will of the Creator. Thus fall all Holsten's objections against the authenticity of the text of our passage.

The apostle closes with a sentence which seems to say: Now, enough of discussion; let us have done with it.

Ver. 16. "But if any man seem to be contentious . . . we have no such custom, neither the Churches of God."—Holsten and others regard this saying as a kind of confession that the apostle feels the insufficiency of the proofs which he has just alleged. But such a supposition would do violence to his moral character, and Paul's words do not really signify anything of the kind. They simply prove that there are at Corinth controversial spirits, who, on such a subject, will never tire of arguing and raising objections indefinitely. That does not mean that, as to himself, he does not regard the question as solved and well solved. — The word δοκεῖν is used here in the same sense as iii. 18, x. 12, Gal. vi. 3, to denote a vain pretence. Undoubtedly nobody takes glory from a fault, such as love of disputation (φιλόνεικος); but Paul means to say: "If any one wishes to play the part of a man whom it is impossible to reduce to silence, who has always something to answer . . ." This was one of the natural features of the Greek character.—The principal proposition does not correspond logically to the subordinate one beginning with *if;* we must understand a clause such as this: "Let him know that . . ." or: "I have only one thing to say to him, namely, that . . ." I cannot understand how eminent critics, such as the old Greek expositors, then Calvin, de Wette, Meyer, Kling, Reuss, Edwards, could imagine that the custom of which the apostle speaks is that of disputing! The love of disputation is a fault, a bad habit, but not

a custom. To call the habit of discussion an ecclesiastical usage! No. The only custom of which there can be any question here is that on which the whole passage has turned: women speaking without being veiled. Paul means that neither he, nor the Christians formed by him, nor in general any of the Churches of God, either those which he has not founded or those properly his own, allow such procedure in their ecclesiastical usages; comp. xiv. 36, 37, where the idea simply indicated here is developed.—The material proof of this assertion of Paul's is found in the Christian representations which have been discovered in the Catacombs, where the men always wear their hair cut short, and the women the palla, a kerchief falling over the shoulders, and which can be raised so as to conceal the face (Heinrici, p. 324).—The complement *of God* is intended to bring out the dignity and holiness of all these Churches, and consequently the respect due to their religious sentiment, which contrasts with the presumptuous levity of the Corinthians.

We hope we have justified the thought expressed by the apostle regarding the social position of woman, as well as the particular application which he deduces from it. Holsten thinks that whatever may be said, the apostle thereby puts himself in contradiction to the principle so often enunciated by him: "In Christ there is neither male nor female," and on this account when he came to the end of the passage, he felt, as it were, the ground going from under him. But the apostle's personal conviction, as he expresses it here, was certainly very deliberate; the loyalty of his character forbids us to doubt it. Was this convic-

tion solely a matter of time and place, so that it is possible to suppose, that if he lived now, and in the West, the apostle would express himself differently? This supposition is not admissible; for the reasons which he alleges are taken, not from contemporary usages, but from permanent facts, which will last as long as the present earthly economy. The physical constitution of woman (vers. 13–15) is still the same as it was when Paul wrote, and will continue so till the renewing of all things. The history of creation, to which he appeals (vers. 8–12), remains the principle of the social state now as in the time of the apostle; and the sublime analogies between the relations of God to Christ, Christ to man, and man to woman, have not changed to this hour, so that it must be said either that the apostle was wholly wrong in his reasoning, or that his reasons, if they were true for his time, are still so for ours, and will be so to the end. As to the parity of man and woman in Christ, it is clear, and that from this very passage, that Paul means to speak of their relation to Christ in redemption, and not of the social part they are called to play.

VIII.

Disorders in the Celebration of the Lord's Supper (XI. 17–34).

The disorder which Paul has just described and combated was a small matter in comparison with that to which he now passes. The style of his language, too, becomes more severe. The apostle begins by applying

to the assemblies for worship what he said about the prevailing discussions at Corinth, in the first four chapters (vers. 17–19); then he passes to the principal ground of rebuke, that which refers to the celebration of the Holy Supper (vers. 20–34).

Vers. 17–19.

Ver. 17. "Now in this that I command[1] you I praise[1] you not, that ye come together, not for the better, but for the worse."—There is evidently a contrast between this preface and the preamble to the foregoing passage (ver. 2). There the apostle praised the Corinthians for their general fidelity to the ecclesiastical institutions he had transmitted to them; there was, however, an exception to be made of the special subject which he was about to treat, vers. 4–16. Here the tone becomes that of positive blame. This blame is not in contradiction to the preceding eulogium; for it does not bear on their neglect or corruption of an institution, but on the profane spirit brought to the celebration of one of the most important acts of worship. — Of the four readings given in the note, two may be set aside without hesitation, that of B, which puts the two verbs in the participle, and that of D, which puts them both in the indicative; these readings have no meaning. That of four Mjj.: "This I command you while not praising you for that . . .," can only be maintained by referring τοῦτο, *this*, to what follows, and in particular, as Heinrici thinks, to the

[1] T. R. with ℵ E K L P reads παραγγελλων ουκ επαινω; A C F G Syr^{sch}: παραγγελλω ουκ επαινων; B: παραγγελλων ουκ επαινων; D: παραγγελλω ουκ επαινω.

historical proof which is about to be given of the importance of the Holy Supper (vers. 23, 24). But the principal idea is the contrast between the blame now expressed and the eulogium of ver. 2, and this contrast leads us more naturally to make the verb *praise* the principal verb (*οὐκ ἐπαινῶ, I do not praise*), and the verb *command* the secondary verb (participle *παραγγέλλων, commanding you*); thus the meaning is: "While simply recommending you to take account of the direction I have just given (vers. 1–16), I cannot praise you in the matter of which I am about to speak." Holsten objects that we should in this case require the aor. *παραγγείλας, after having enjoined this on you;* and he is disposed to make the word *παραγγέλλων* an interpolation, which is wholly arbitrary, for all the MSS. read the two verbs. And why could not Paul use the present when speaking of the injunction which he has just given at that very time? Does it not remain in his letter for the moment when it shall be read at Corinth? We must therefore also refer *τοῦτο, this*, not to ver. 16, as Edwards will have it, but to the important command contained in the preceding passage, in regard to women, and to translate nearly as Reuss does: "While giving you this warning, I cannot praise you in the matter of which I now proceed to speak."—The apostle thus characterizes the transition from a simple recommendation to positive blame: *I do not praise you.* This is an evident litotes, as in ver. 22.—Then comes a rebuke which relates to all the meetings for worship held by the Church of Corinth: "In general your assemblies are not blessed; from the way in which you hold them, they throw you back

rather than help you forward; they are the opposite of what they should be."

Vers. 18, 19. "For first of all, when ye come together in[1] the Church, I hear that there be divisions among you; and I partly believe it. 19. For there must even be sects among you,[2] that[3] they which are approved may be made manifest among you."—The apostle now gives the reason for the severe words: "I do not praise you." The: *for first of all*, announces a first rebuke in regard to the divisions in their assemblies (vers. 18, 19), and leads us to expect a second to be indicated by a: *then again;* but this formula, corresponding to the *first of all*, is found nowhere in the sequel. Where does this second rebuke begin? Meyer, Osiander, Heinrici think that it points to the abuses in the exercise of spiritual gifts treated in chaps. xii.–xiv.; that if there is not found at the beginning of chap. xii. the ἔπειτα δέ, *then again*, which should correspond to our πρῶτον μέν of ver. 18, this may arise from the fact that the long development of chap. xi. had made the apostle forget the form used at the beginning of the passage (ver. 18). Edwards prefers to place the expected *secondly* in ver. 34, where, according to him, it is logically implied in the τὰ δὲ λοιπά, *the rest.* Hofmann thinks that there is no *secondly* to be sought in the sequel, since πρῶτον signifies here, as often, not *firstly*, but *principally;* comp. Rom. iii. 2. This last assertion might be established if πρῶτον stood alone; with the μέν it is less easily

[1] T. R. reads with some Mnn. only τῃ (*the*).
[2] D F G It. here omit ἐν ὑμῖν (*among you*).
[3] B D read καὶ (*also*) after ἵνα (*in order that*).

admissible. And how should the *divisions* be represented as the essential point in what follows? The meaning of Edwards can as little be admitted. The words: "The rest *will I set in order* when I come," do not contain any threatening, any announcement of rebukes to be addressed to them. Meyer's meaning falls to the ground for this reason: that the divisions, *σχίσματα*, mentioned vers. 18, 19, are not put by the apostle in any connection with the disorders in the Holy Supper, which are explained by a wholly different cause. Consequently the two subjects cannot have been combined in one by Paul, and both embraced in the *πρῶτον μέν* of ver. 18. We have therefore simply, with Olshausen, de Wette, Rückert, to place the understood *then again* at ver. 20, where the rebukes begin relating to the celebration of the Supper. And such is the meaning to which we are led by the close study of the relation between the three terms *συνέρχεσθε*, *ye come together* (ver. 17), *συνερχομένων ὑμῶν*, *when ye come together* (ver. 18), and *συνερχομένων οὖν ὑμῶν*, *when therefore ye come together* (ver. 20). Meyer thinks that the second *συνερχομένων* (ver. 20) is the repetition of the *συνερχομένων* (ver. 18). Hence it is he combines in one and the same rebuke the blame bearing on the divisions and that which applies to the profanation of the Supper. This is his error. The second *συνερχομένων* is not the repetition of the first, but of the *συνέρχεσθε*, *ye come together*, of ver. 17: "You come together for the worse, and that chiefly because of your divisions (vers. 18, 19), then again because of the way you celebrate the Supper." Here is the second rebuke, developed from ver. 20 to ver. 34. Meyer asks

why, if it is so, the first rebuke is found so briefly treated? Quite simply, because this matter of divisions had already formed the subject of the whole first part, chaps. i.–iv., and Paul needs only here to refer to it, while applying to their meetings for worship what he had said of the malign influence exercised by such divisions over the life of the Church in general.—The two *συνερχομένων* are therefore parallel to one another, and both rest on the *συνέρχεσθε* of ver. 17. Only the first of these participles points to their assemblies merely in a passing way, while the second, referring as it does to the subject about which the apostle is now most seriously concerned, the profanation of the holy table, is emphasized by the *οὖν, therefore;* this particle shows that he is returning to the thought which had mainly suggested to him the *εἰς τὸ ἧττον συνέρχεσθε, ye come together for the worse* (ver. 17).

The first thing which Paul has to blame in their assemblies for worship, is the *divisions* which break out among them.—The *τῇ* before *ἐκκλησίᾳ* in the T. R. should be rejected. The meaning is not: in the *church*, but: in *church:* "when you come together in a general assembly of the Church." The point in question is the manner, not the place; comp. xiv. 23. The form of the phrase seems incorrect; for it is not at the time when their divisions break out that the apostle hears of them. This finds its explanation the instant we refer the present participle *συνερχομένων*, not to the time, but to the manner of meeting.—The news might have reached him either by the house of Chloe (i. 11), or by the deputies of the Church (xvi. 15).—The: *and I partly believe it*, is very delicate. Paul

would admit that the state of things has been described to him in certain respects worse than it is. But when a Church is in the moral state in which that of Corinth is, it must inevitably become a theatre of discord. This necessity is of the same kind as that indicated by Jesus when He said: "It must needs be that offences come" (Matt. xviii. 7), that is to say: given such a world as ours.—In the following verse the moral reason is explained which renders these discussions providentially necessary.

Ver. 19. When a Church is forming, or when in a Church already established a revival takes place, there is a sort of fascination exercised over a great number of individuals who adopt the gospel preaching, or the new ideas, less from a serious and personal moral need than from a spirit of opposition or innovation, or from a proneness to imitation. Hence, at the end of a certain time, the necessity for a process of purifying; this is carried out by a separation due to the fermentation which follows from the contact of the heterogeneous elements within the same mass. The effect of this action is to show in clear light those members of the Church who are serious and genuine, and to separate them definitely from those who have believed only superficially and temporarily. This experience, made over and over again since then by the Church, is that which the apostle foresaw as an inevitable phase in the development of the flock at Corinth. The δεῖ, *there must*, is a heightening of the ὑπάρχειν, the existence as *matter of fact* (ver. 18); see on vii. 26. The apostle thinks that the fact *is*, because he knows that it *must be*. He knows even that there is something graver to

be expected. For the καί, *even*, which follows the δεῖ, *it must be that*, intimates a second gradation strengthening the first. This new gradation bears, as is proved by the position of the καί, on the substantive αἱρέσεις, in its relation to the σχίσματα, *divisions*, of ver. 18. Indeed, it is wholly in vain that Meyer seeks to identify these two terms. No doubt the word αἵρεσις may have a very softened sense, in respect of its etymological signification: *choice, preference* (from αἱρεῖσθαι). But in the New Testament it has always a very forcible meaning; so Gal. v. 20, where it is placed after διχοστασίαι, *dissensions*, and that evidently as a gradation above this already strong enough term; so also Acts v. 17 and xv. 5, where it denotes the opposite parties of the Sadducees and Pharisees among the Jewish people; finally, xxiv. 5 and xxvii. 28, where the Christian community is designated by this term as a special party in the midst of this same people. In all these cases the external division evidently rests on internal opposition, on profound and trenchant doctrinal differences. And it is also in this sense that the word αἵρεσις ought to be taken here, as has been recognised by Calvin, Beza, Rückert, Edwards. The context also imperatively demands this forcible meaning. To the simple divisions which arise from personal preferences or aversions, Paul foresees that there will succeed divisions of a far more profound nature, founded on opposite conceptions of Christian truth. He believes what is told him of the first, because he even expects the second. There will arise among them false doctrines, *heresies*, according to the meaning which the Greek term has taken in

later ecclesiastical language, and thence will follow much graver disruptions than the present divisions. The σχίσματα resemble simple rents in a piece of cloth; but the αἱρέσεις are rendings which remove the fragment and break the unity of the piece. The Second Epistle to the Corinthians shows in how brief a period this anticipation of the apostle was realized.

The καί, which is read in B D after ἵνα, *that*, and which could only be rendered by *also*, gives no precise meaning, and should be rejected.—Of the two ἐν ὑμῖν, *among you*, the first is omitted by D F G, the second by C. They ought to be preserved, both of them. The first applies to the Corinthians the consequence from the moral necessity affirmed in this first proposition; the second puts to them, as it were, a question: "How many will there be found in your Church of these δόκιμοι?"—The δόκιμοι are those who at such crises prove their Christian character by a wisdom and maturity of judgment which mark them in the eyes of all with the seal of Divine approbation; comp. ix. 27. It is with a view to the manifestation of such genuine Christians, that the whole crisis has been permitted (ἵνα, *that*). — The apostle passes to the second subject of rebuke:

Vers. 20–34.

Vers. 20, 21. "When ye come together therefore[1] into one place, this is not[2] to eat the Lord's Supper. 21. For in[3] eating every one taketh before other his

[1] D F G omit ουν (*therefore*).
[2] D F G: ουκετι (*this is no more*), instead of ουκ εστιν (*this is not*).
[3] D E F G: επι τω instead of εν τω.

own supper: and one is hungry, while the other is full." —On the connection with what precedes, see on ver. 18. Here would stand the ἔπειτα δέ, *but next*, if Paul had expressed it. This preamble, ver. 20, is not without solemnity. The very first words make us feel that we are coming to a grave matter.—The term ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, *into the same place*, denotes, like the words ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, *in Church* (ver. 18), a meeting of the whole Church gathered together in the same place; comp. xiv. 23. So it assembled to celebrate the Supper. This rite was preceded by a feast in common, called δεῖπνον, *supper*, a term from which it follows that the celebration took place in the evening. It was thus wished to reproduce, as faithfully as possible, that feast of the Lord at which He instituted the Supper, and which took place on the last evening of His life. Those feasts, of which the Holy Supper formed the close, were called *agapæ*, that is to say, *love-feasts* (Jude, ver. 12). Each one brought his quota. And certainly, according to the idea of this institution, all the provisions should have been put together and eaten in common by the whole Church. But selfishness, vanity, sensuality had prevailed in this usage, and deeply corrupted it. These agapæ had degenerated at Corinth into something like those feasts of friends in use among the Greeks, where men gave themselves up to drinking excesses, such as we find sketched in the *Symposium* of Plato. And what was still graver, and which had certainly not been witnessed even at heathen banquets, each was careful to reserve for himself and his friends the meats which he had provided; hence it was inevitable that an offensive inequality should appear between the guests,

becoming to many of them a source of humiliation, and contrasting absolutely with the spirit of love of which such a feast should have been the symbol, as well as with the rite of the Supper which formed its close. Chrysostom supposes that the agape took place after the Holy Supper; evidently a mistake. It was not till later that this different order was introduced, till at length the meal itself was totally abolished.—*This is not to eat the Lord's Supper*, says Paul. We need not here take ἐστί, as many have done, in the sense of ἔξεστι, *it is allowed, it is possible*, as if Paul meant that in these circumstances it is no longer morally possible to celebrate the communion rightly. It is simpler to understand the words in this sense: "To act as you do (ver. 21), can no more be called celebrating the Supper; it is indeed to partake of a feast, but not that of the Lord." The adj. κυριακόν, *the Lord's*, reminds us that it was He who founded the feast, who gives it, who invites to it, who presides over it.—The following verse explains the severe judgment which has just been expressed regarding this way of celebrating the agape.

Ver. 21. By the way in which they act, they change the sacred feast into an ordinary supper, which has no longer anything in common with the sacred feast which it should recall. It is on the προ, *before*, in the verb προλαμβάνειν, that the emphasis lies: "You make haste to take the provisions you have brought *before* it has become possible to make a general distribution of them, and without sharing them with your neighbours." — The epithet ἴδιον, *his own*, expresses the right in virtue of which the owner thinks he can act thus.—The words ἐν τῷ φάγειν indicate the moment

when the feast begins, following the act of worship which had certainly preceded: when the feasting is reached, including the supper, and then the holy sacrament.—The words: *one is hungry*, refer to the poor who are present.—The verb μεθύειν usually signifies to be intoxicated; but it may also be applied to eating, in the sense in which we say to eat his fill, and so to form a contrast, as is the case in this passage, to πεινᾷν, *to be hungry*. The word μεθύειν certainly shows that the pleasure of good cheer and drinking went the length of intemperance, just as in those friendly feasts at which Greek gaiety and frivolity took free course. — Now follow the rebukes which such conduct deserves.

Ver. 22. "Have ye not then houses to eat and to drink in? or despise ye the Church of God, and shame them that have not? What shall I say to you? Shall I praise[1] you? In this point, I praise you not." —One feels in the lively succession of these accumulated questions the indignant emotion which fills the apostle as he calls up the scene before him. The γάρ, *for*, refers to an idea which is understood: "It ought not so to be, *for* have you not . . . ?" Paul points out three principal sins in this conduct. First, the feast itself so celebrated; the agape, with the Holy Supper terminating it, is not a meal taken for support; it is a religious rite expressly instituted, and that for a religious purpose. If any one wishes to satisfy his hunger, he has the means of doing so otherwise. We learn from this first rebuke how thoroughly distinct in the apostle's eyes was the feast of the Supper from a common feast, even when taken in the most Christian

[1] B F G It. read επαινω instead of επαινεσω.

spirit and hallowed by thanksgiving. To hold, as Vinet somewhere has done, that every Christian meal should become a Holy Supper, is an ultra-spiritualistic error, the thoroughgoing application of which would inevitably compromise the existence, first, of the ministry, then of the Church itself. The second rebuke refers to the want of respect to an assembly like the Church; the third to the offence in particular given to a portion of its members, the poor who are humiliated.—The formula μὴ . . . οὐκ signifies: "It is not so however that you have not?" The other two questions, closely connected as they are, might contain only one rebuke, in the sense that the dishonour to which the Church was subjected consisted precisely in the humiliation of its poor members; for the whole body feels the contempt with which one of its members is treated. But it is better to regard the two ideas as distinct. There is first contempt inflicted on the Church, as such, in this transformation of one of the most solemn acts of its worship into a means of gross and sensual enjoyment; the complement *of God* brings out the gravity of this profanation more forcibly. Then comes the humiliation inflicted on the poor; it appears in all its force if we take the expression μὴ ἔχειν, not only in the sense of poverty in general, but as having a direct application to the present case: Those who have nothing, that is to say, no food with them.—The question: *What shall I say?* indicates the embarrassment the apostle feels when he would characterize such conduct without using terms too severe. There is a litotes full of irony in the last words: *Shall I praise you?* Then returns the tone of the most sorrowful

earnestness: "*In this I praise you not.*" We think, with Meyer and Holsten, that the words ἐν τούτῳ, *in this*, must be connected with the following verb *I praise you not*, rather than with the preceding, *shall I praise you?* as is done by Heinrici and many others. "On other points I can praise you (ver. 2), but on this, not!"

To make the Corinthians blush at their profane spirit, the apostle brings them face to face with the scene of the institution of the sacrament. But his object, in relating this solemn event, is not merely to contrast with their selfish and frivolous disposition the spectacle of Christ's sufferings and devotion. Paul, in going back on the solemn institution of the Supper by the Lord, wishes above all to bring home to them the difference between this feast and a feast intended to satisfy bodily wants. Here is a religious rite, a true ceremony, for it was positively instituted.

Vers. 23–25. "For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, That the Lord Jesus, the night in which He was betrayed,[1] took bread:[2] 24. and when He had given thanks, He brake it, and said,[3] This is My body [which is] for you;[4] this do in remembrance of Me. 25. After the same manner also He took the cup, when He had supped, saying, This cup is the New Testament in My blood: this do ye, as

[1] T. R. with L P: παρεδιδοτο; all the rest: παρεδιδετο.

[2] D F G: τον αρτον (*the bread*), instead of αρτον (bread or *a* bread) [loaf].

[3] T. R. with K L P Syr. here reads: λαβετε, φαγετε (*take, eat*); all the rest omit these words.

[4] T. R. with E F G K L P Syr. here reads κλωμενον (*broken*); D: θρυπτομενον (*bruised*); Sah. Cop.: διδομενον (*given*); ℵ A B C read simply το υπερ υμων.

oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me."—The *for* shows that the account of the institution, which follows, is meant to justify the various rebukes expressed in ver. 22. First of all, Paul establishes on an immovable foundation the authority of his narrative. It comes *from the Lord*, and without any other middle party than the apostle himself.—The ἐγώ, *I*, is put at the head to give the readers an assurance of the truth of the narrative: This is what I hold, *I* from a good source, from the Lord Himself.—But it is asked in what way this account could have been delivered by the Lord to the Apostle Paul, who was not of the number of the Twelve present at the institution of the Supper. The usual answer is this: The apostle had knowledge of the fact from the apostolical tradition; and to prove this mode of transmission, reliance is placed on the use of the preposition ἀπό, which does not denote, as παρά would do, direct transmission, but which simply points to the first source from which the account proceeded. Thus, according to Reuss, "Paul here speaks of a communication made to him by older disciples, but not of an immediate revelation." But the question arises in this case, what means the *I* placed first in the sentence: "*I*, even I have received of the Lord"? If he is speaking of no other communication from the Lord than that which he gave as the author of the rite in question, or that which, through the apostles as its channels, conveyed this account to Paul, thousands of Christians, and hundreds of evangelists, might have said as much as St. Paul; and instead of saying: "*I* have received," Paul, if he was not to be guilty of charlatanism, ought simply to have

said: "We have received of the Lord." In the passage xv. 3, where he is really summing up the apostolical tradition, he avoids using the pronoun ἐγώ which characterizes our passage. If the account of the institution of the Supper really came to Paul from the Lord, it could only be in the way of direct revelation. The preposition ἀπό, which strictly denotes the first origin, is not opposed, as is constantly repeated, to this interpretation; comp. Col. i. 7, iii. 24; 1 John i. 5, where the communication implied in the ἀπό is as direct and personal as possible. And if it is objected, that to express this last idea παρά would have been necessary, which specially denotes direct transmission, it is forgotten that this preposition is virtually found in the verb παρέλαβον, *I received from.*[1] By using the two prepositions ἀπό and παρά the apostle brings out at once the purity of the origin and the purity of the transmission of his account. Heinrici quotes several passages in which the term παραλαμβάνειν is applied to initiation into the mysteries, for example in Porphyry: παραλαμβάνειν τὰ Μιθριακά, *to be initiated into the mysteries of Mithras.* This meaning would certainly suit here. The apostle then would say that the Lord Himself initiated him into the knowledge of this important act of his life. But we have no need of such a comparison to account for the choice of the term used by the apostle.—Bengel, Olshausen, Rückert, Meyer, de Wette, Osiander, have recognised that the only possible meaning of the passage was that of direct

[1] Comp. for the use of the παρά denoting direct communication in the composition of the word παραλαμβάνειν, Gal. i. 9, 12; Philip. iv. 9; 1 Thess. ii. 13; 2 Thess. iii. 6.

instruction given to the apostle by the Lord; comp. Gal. i. 12. It is objected that revelation bears on doctrines, not on historical facts, and it is asked what purpose such a miracle would have served, since Paul could know from ecclesiastical tradition the fact which he here relates. But we find in the Acts a revelation, containing at least the sketch of a historical fact (ix. 12), and several visions in which the Lord conversed with Paul, as friend with friend (xxii. 17 seq., xxiii. 11). If these accounts are not mere tales, we should conclude from them that revelation may also bear on particular historical facts. Now in the present case such a communication was a necessary condition of the apostle's independence and dignity. For he was not a simple evangelist, delegated by men (Gal. i. 1), but a founder of Churches, the apostle chosen for the heathen world, as the Twelve were for the Jewish people, and consequently dependent only on the Lord; and when he instituted in his Churches a rite of such decisive importance as the Supper was, he required to be able to do so without appealing to any human authority, but supported, like the Twelve, by the Lord Himself. As we study the account immediately following, we shall prove the truth of this observation. The manner in which the Lord communicated this fact to him, we know not, and can only refer to Gal. i. 11, 12.

The words: *that which also I delivered unto you*, guarantee the purity of transmission. The *καί*, *also*, expresses the identity between the accounts of Jesus to Paul, and of Paul to the Corinthians.—As he enters on the narrative, Paul adds to the title *Lord* the name *Jesus*, to carry back the thought of his readers to His

earthly person, and so call up the scene of the institution.—If Paul mentions the detail, that it was *night* when Jesus instituted the Supper, it was no doubt to compare with that time the hour when the Church celebrated the rite. Every similar night which shall follow should reproduce the emotions of that original night, and borrow from it something of its deep solemnity. The sad character of that night is brought out by the words: *in which He was betrayed.* Nine Mjj., belonging to the three families, read the verb in the form of παρεδίδετο, which is adopted by Tischendorf. In fact, the later Greek writers tended more and more to assimilate the conjugation of the other classes of verbs in μι to the conjugation of verbs in ημι; or should we see in this strange form the imperfect of a compound of δίδημι (formed from δέω, *to bind*), a word which appears once in the *Anabasis?* The sense would be: "on the night on which they bound Him." But neither the imperfect nor the preposition παρά agrees with such a meaning.—The article introduced by the Greco-Lat. reading before ἄρτον must be rejected. The word literally signifies *a bread;* one of the cakes of unleavened bread placed on the table.

Ver. 24. The thanksgiving of the father of the family at the Paschal feast, referred to the blessings of creation and to those of the deliverance from Egypt. That of Jesus no doubt referred to the blessings of salvation, and the founding of the New Covenant.—Though the breaking of the bread was necessary to its distribution, Jesus nevertheless performed this act as a symbol of what awaited Himself.—The words of the T. R.: λάβετε, φάγετε, *take, eat,* are an interpolation

taken from the accounts of Matthew and Mark. This order is here implied in the act of breaking the bread and holding out the piece.—The τοῦτο, *this*, denotes the piece which He has in His hand. What is the relation between this bread and the body of Jesus? Does the word *is* denote homogeneity of substance, so that the material of bread gave place at that moment to that of the body of Jesus, as Catholics understand it? But if it is the earthly body of Jesus which is in question, it is difficult to conceive how the bread could have become the very substance of the hand which offered it. Or might it be His glorified body? But this body was not yet in existence. It must therefore be said, on this view, that the first Holy Supper was as yet only the institution of the rite, not the real rite, and that now it is the invisible and glorified body of the Lord which takes the place of the bread, or, according to the Lutheran idea, accompanies the bread. But how is it possible to apply either of these two notions to the *blood* of the Lord? We know from xv. 50 that blood is not an element which can belong to a spiritual and glorified body, whether the Lord's or ours (xv. 49). In any case the Lord would have required to say, not: *This* is, but: "*This will be* My body, when the time comes." And even so the Lutheran conception would not be justified, for *being*, in the present or future, does not signify accompanying. The simplest explanation is this: Jesus takes the bread which is before Him, and presenting it to His disciples, He gives it to them as the *symbol* of His body which is about to be given up for them on the cross, and to become the means of their salvation; the verb *be* is taken in the same sense

as that in which we say, as we look at a portrait: it *is* so and so!—The reading of the T. R. κλώμενον, *broken*, which is found in the Greco-Lats. and the Byzs., seems at first sight probable; it is defended by Hofmann. In the other reading: *My body which is for you*, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, there is something extremely bare. But is it not probable that this very bareness, which is more tolerable moreover in Aramaic than in Greek, is that which occasioned the interpolation of the participle? It was so natural to borrow it from the preceding verb ἔκλασε. This view is confirmed by the readings διδόμενον, *given*, and θρυπτόμενον, *bruised*, which are found in some documents. There has evidently been a wish to supply either from Luke (διδόμενον), or freely (θρυπτόμενον), the participle which seemed to be wanting.—If the Alex. reading is adopted, the meaning is this: "My body, which *is there* for you," for your salvation, like this bread placed on the table for your nourishment.

The following words: *This do in remembrance of Me*, are only found in Luke's account of the institution; they are wanting in Matthew and Mark. But these words are of great importance, for it is really on them alone that the idea of the Holy Supper, as a permanent rite, is based. Without them this act might be regarded as having been done by Jesus once for all. Evidently the apostles did not so understand it, for from the first they introduced the regular celebration of the sacrament (Acts ii. 42). We do not the less on that account maintain the importance of Paul's independence, and of the originality of his narrative. — The τοῦτο, *this*, cannot refer, like the previous one, to the piece of bread; what would be

meant by the ποιεῖτε, *do?* It embraces the whole preceding action: the breaking of the bread on the part of Jesus, and the eating on the part of the disciples. This act in its entirety is to be constantly repeated in the gatherings of believers.—The word *do* applies to the apostles, not merely as apostles, but also as believers; they are present both as founders of the Church, commissioned to give over this ceremony to it, and as its representatives, who shall soon be called to celebrate the feast with it.—The words: *in remembrance of Me*, certainly contain an allusion to the lamb slain in Egypt, the blood of which had saved the people, and in memory of which the Passover was celebrated. In Ex. xii. 14, it was said: "This day shall be to thee *for a memorial (lezikkaron).*" Jesus therefore means: "When you shall hereafter celebrate this sacred feast, do it no longer in memory of the lamb whose blood saved your fathers, but in memory of Me and of the sacrifice which I am about to make for your salvation." There is ineffable tenderness in the expression of Jesus: *in remembrance of Me.* As Darby finely observes (in his little work on *Public Worship*), the expression: *memory of Me*, twice repeated, makes the Holy Supper still more a memorial of our *Saviour* than of our *salvation.* Each time this feast is celebrated, the assembly of the disciples of Jesus anew presses around His beloved person. It is clear that the Holy Supper is, as Zwingle thought, a commemorative feast, and that it was most unjust on Luther's part to pronounce on him a moral judgment of condemnation for this view, which might be perfectly sincere. The believing and grateful remembrance of

Jesus is most certainly the part of man in this feast. His ποιεῖν, His *doing*, in this holy action, is the inward disposition of grateful remembrance. This is what was wanting in the frivolous and empty religious demonstrations of the Corinthians. But while recognising this side of the truth in Zwingle's idea, we at the same time put our finger on his error. Side by side with the human *doing*, there is in the Holy Supper the Divine *doing*. In the religion of spirit and life, a ceremony of pure commemoration cannot exist. Every rite celebrated according to its spirit must contain a grace, a Divine gift. And what could be the gift bestowed on the believer in the Holy Supper, if not that which the rite so strikingly symbolizes, the most intimate union with the Lord Himself? How could He who said: "Where two or three are gathered together in My name, I am in the midst of them," fail to communicate Himself spiritually to His own in a feast which so sensibly represents the indissoluble union formed by redemption between Him and them? I say: spiritually; but the word implies the whole fulness of His person; for His person is indivisible. If the fulness of the Godhead dwells in Christ *bodily*, σωματικῶς (Col. ii. 9), His spiritual body cannot be separated from His Spirit; comp. xv. 49.—Thus to man's part in the sacrament, as it is expressed in the words: *in remembrance of Me*, there necessarily corresponds the part of God, which is not referred to here, but which is pointed out in other passages, such as x. 16, John vi. 53–58, and Eph. v. 30–32; not that these last two refer specially to the Holy Supper, they concern at the same time the believer's whole life.

Ver. 25. The first words reappear literally in Luke's account. The two narratives prove that a certain interval separated the two acts of institution. The bread was distributed while they were eating; ἐσθιόντων αὐτῶν, say Matthew and Mark, thus positively expressing what is implied by the accounts of Luke and Paul. The words: *after they had supped*, in Paul and Luke, complete the view of what was done. The feast was therefore closed when the Lord took the cup. The interval which separated the two acts no doubt explains the term: *in like manner also*, ὡσαύτως καί, in Paul and Luke. After the distribution of the bread, Jesus had for a few moments given up the solemn attitude which befitted the institution of a rite, and familiar conversation had resumed its course. Supper ended, at the time of distributing the cup, He resumed the same attitude as in the preceding action.—This cup which Jesus now passes round, certainly corresponds to that which in the Paschal ritual bore the name of *Cos Haberakia* (x. 16), the cup of blessing, which the father of the family circulated to close the feast.—The article τό, *the*, designates the cup as the one which stood there before Him, but at the same time as becoming from that moment the type of those which shall afterwards figure in all the celebrations of the Supper.—The first words of the formula of institution are the same as in Luke; only he adds after the expression ἐν τῷ αἵματί μου, *in My blood*, the determining clause τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον, *which is shed for you*, thus making his formula parallel to that of the other two synoptics: "This is My blood, that of the covenant shed for many." The formula of Paul and

Luke: *This cup is the New Testament*, has something more spiritual about it than that of the other two synoptics. In fact, what, according to this formula, corresponds to the cup, or the wine contained in the cup, is not the blood itself, but the covenant entered into over the blood. Hence it is easy to see what elasticity is demanded in the interpretation of the word *est* (*is*), and how thoroughly mistaken Luther was when he sought at Marburg to crush Zwingle with this one word.—The term *new covenant* alludes to the covenant made at Sinai over the blood of the victim which Moses offered for all the people. Indeed it is related, Ex. xxiv. 8, that Moses took the blood and said: "Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you." This old covenant was recalled every year by the Paschal feast; but Jeremiah had already contrasted it with another, a future and more excellent one, when he uttered the promise: "Behold, the days come that I will make a new covenant with you, not according to the covenant that I made with your fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of Egypt, which My covenant they brake; but this is the covenant that I will make after those days: I will put My law in their inward parts . . . for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sins will I remember no more" (xxxi. 31–34). Matthew and Mark, at least according to the most probable reading, omit the word *new*. According to them, Jesus said: "This is My blood, the blood of the covenant shed . . ." Strange to say, Holsten alleges that Paul has here preserved the true formula adopted in the primitive apostolical Church; for, he says, in view of the

Judaizing adversaries whom Paul had before him at Corinth, he would not have dared to modify the original formula. It was Matthew, according to him, who, seeking to efface every trace of opposition between the old and the new covenant in favour of a strict Jewish Christianity hostile to Paul, deliberately rejected the term *new*. But Mark? What of him, independent as he certainly is of Matthew in his whole account, and betraying not the slightest tendency hostile to Paul? What is more curious still, if possible, is the entirely opposite opinion of Meyer, who thinks that the designation of the covenant as *new*, can only be of *Pauline* origin. There is here a description added at a later time to the authentic words of Jesus. But what! Jeremiah, six centuries before, had already characterized the Messianic covenant by this epithet; and Jesus could not have used the same expression, either at His own hand, or in imitation of the prophet! The absence of the word in the Gospels of Mark and Matthew proves nothing. They both reproduce the formula in use in the Jewish Christian Churches, where the expressions relating to the bread and wine were gradually identified: "This is My body . . ., *this is My blood.*" As to Luke, he depends on Paul, and Paul himself gives us the formula as he "received it of the Lord." It is obvious why he had from the beginning rested his argument on that personal revelation which had been granted to him; otherwise, indeed,—and this is the truth in Holsten's remark,—he could not in opposition to his adversaries have enunciated a different formula from that which prevailed in the apostolic Churches.

The words: *in My blood*, depend, according to

Meyer and Hofmann, on the verb *is:* "This cup is, in virtue of the blood which it contains, the new covenant." But it would be far from natural to say that the blood is the means in virtue of which the cup establishes the covenant. It is simpler, as is admitted by Heinrici and Holsten, to refer the regimen *in My blood* to the notion of the substantive *covenant* itself: *the covenant in My blood*, for: the covenant concluded in My blood. The absence of the article ἡ is objected, which would be required, it is alleged, to connect the substantive with the regimen; but the omission of the article is easily explained by the verbal meaning of the word διαθήκη, *contract;* from this substantive there is easily taken the understood participle διατιθεμένη, *contracted.* As the blood of the Paschal lamb, and afterwards that of the offered victim (Ex. xxiv.), were the foundation of the covenant agreement passed in Egypt and at Sinai between the Lord and His people, so the blood of Christ, represented by the wine contained in the cup, is the foundation on which the new covenant rests, which is concluded in Christ between God and mankind. For the old contract, which had for its object, on the one side, the promise of the Divine protection, on the other, the engagement to obey the law of Sinai, there is substituted the new covenant, which has for its contents, on the one side, the pardon of sins, on the other, free obedience to the Divine will through the Holy Spirit.

The last words: *Do this in remembrance of Me*, express once more the idea of the *institution* of a rite which is to continue to be celebrated in the Church. Here they do not occur even in Luke. But in Mark

and Matthew there are found words which have some analogy to this command: "Drink ye all of it."—In the injunction: *Do this*, the word *this* denotes what Christ is now doing when He holds out the cup to them, and what they themselves do when partaking of it; such is the act which is always to be repeated anew in the assembly of believers. When so? Jesus says: *as often as ye drink.* Evidently this cannot be understood: as every time ye drink, in general, or when ye take any meal whatever. The following verse is opposed to this; for there Paul says: "As often as ye drink *this cup;*" comp. also ver. 22, where the Lord's Supper has been positively distinguished from common meals. Meyer understands: Every time that at a love-feast you come to this final cup. Hofmann and Osiander almost the same: Every time you assemble for a love-feast. But these ellipses are very arbitrary. The thought of the Lord is better explained, as it seems to me, if it is qualified by connecting it with the words: *in remembrance of Me*, and by the evident allusion to the remembrance of the Paschal lamb: "Every time you celebrate, as members of the new covenant, the religious feast corresponding to the Paschal feast of the old, distribute the cup and drink of it in remembrance of Me." The memory of Jesus is to be substituted in their heart for that of the lamb, every time they celebrate the new Paschal feast.—This very indefinite expression ὁσάκις ἄν, *every time it shall happen that*, shows that henceforth this ceremony will no longer be bound to a fixed day of the year, like the Paschal feast, but that it is put at the discretion of the Church. Again we see in this how important it was for St. Paul's

apostleship that he should possess an independent and original acquaintance with the mode in which this ceremony was instituted. Langen, in his monograph on the narrative of the Passion, has sought to combine in one sentence the formulas of Paul and Luke on the one hand, and of Mark and Matthew on the other; but the proposition thus reached is very complicated and clumsy, far from suitable to the sharply cut form which should characterize the institution of a rite. Meyer gives the preference to the formula presented in the two first synoptics as more concise and striking. It seems to me, on the contrary, that Paul's form, independently even of his testimony, deserves the preference. Tradition and ecclesiastical usage must naturally have inclined to assimilate more and more to one another the two formulas relating to the bread and the wine, and consequently to simplify the second as much as possible, to bring it nearer the first, originally the more simple. Paul was put in a position to restore the original difference; and it is from him that Luke has taken his formula, so like Paul's own.

It is singular that Paul, who, agreeably to the historical order, here puts the bread before the cup, has done the opposite in chap. x. No doubt it is because in the last passage, where the matter in question was not the *narrative* of the fact as such, he has followed the order which corresponds to the assimilation of faith. The believer first appropriates the pardon which is connected with the shedding of the blood, then he receives the life and strength which are represented by the eating of the body. Here he simply reproduces the fact. His sole aim is to contrast the

seriousness of the action with the manner in which it is treated by the Corinthians.—He now draws the practical consequences of the description which he has just given (vers. 26–32).

Ver. 26. "For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink the[1] cup, ye do show the Lord's death till[2] He come."—It seems that in order to connect this verse with the foregoing, *therefore* or *so that* would be required, and not *for* or *indeed*. To explain the difficulty, Ewald has taken ver. 26 as the continuation of the discourse of Jesus, which is, of course, inadmissible. Hofmann applies the *for* to the words of ver. 22: "I praise you not," which is equally inadmissible. Meyer, usually so rigorous, suffers here from a sort of philological faint; as the German word *denn* has sometimes the meaning of *therefore*, he translates: "in consequence of this institution by the Lord, see *therefore* what you do when you celebrate the communion." But what so great difficulty is there in preserving the literal sense of γάρ? All that is needed is to connect it with the words: *in remembrance of me:* "If Jesus so expressed Himself, it is because *in fact* the action you perform every time you celebrate the Supper is a memorial of His person. For the meaning of the action is to *show His death.*" The *idea* of the action thus stated is really the reason of the manner in which Jesus instituted it.—In spite of all Holsten may say, the verb καταγγέλλετε is indicative: *Ye show*, not imperative: *Show!* For it is the essence of the action which is thus expressed. If καταγγέλλετε were the imperative,

[1] The τουτο (*this*) is omitted by ℵ A B C D F G It.

[2] The αν, which T. R. reads with E K L P, is omitted by all the others.

the γάρ would be inexplicable; οὖν or ὥστε would have been required, *therefore* or *so that*. With the practice which was becoming established at Corinth of making this feast a social act, a supper seasoned with agreeable conversation, Paul contrasts the moving memory, the celebration of the death.—The term *show*, καταγγέλλειν, vividly recalls the word *Haggadah*, which denoted in the Jewish Passover the historical explanation of the meaning of all the rites of the Paschal feast which the father, in answer to the eldest son's ritual question, gave to his family. Perhaps the narrative of the Lord's death was similarly rehearsed at the Holy Supper. In any case, every believer celebrated its efficacy in his heart, and his grateful cry mingled in the hymns of the assembly with that of his fellow-believers. The *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles* implies that free course is left at this juncture for the words of the prophets present at the assembly. Paul therefore understands by the καταγγέλλειν, *announce*, the individual and collective proclamation of Christ's love in His sacrifice, and of the glorious efficacy of this act. Each one confesses that he owes his salvation to this bloody death.—The τοῦτο, *this*, of the Greek text after ποτήριον, is to be rejected according to the Alex. and Greco-Lats. The words: *till He come*, are connected with the idea of the ἀνάμνησις, *remembrance*. Remembrance ceases when the Lord reappears. Holsten here finds the idea: that then the Lord's death will have brought to an end the exercise of its salutary efficacy. I see in the text no trace whatever of this thought. Paul means that the Holy Supper is the Church's compensation for the visible presence of Christ. It is, so to

speak, the link between His two comings: the monument of the one, the pledge of the other. Thus Paul simply reproduces the meaning of the words of Jesus preserved by Luke (xxii. 18): "I say unto you, I will not drink from henceforth of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God shall come." If we read ἄν, it indicates the uncertainty of the time when Jesus shall come.

Ver. 27. "Wherefore, whosoever shall eat this[1] bread, or drink the cup of the Lord, unworthily,[2] shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord." — From the essential character of the Supper, expounded in ver. 26, there follows the gravity of its profanation. The ἤ, *or*, should be remarked, instead of which we should rather expect καί, *and*, as in ver. 26. But here, no doubt, is the reason of this ἤ, *or*. Though one may not eat the bread unworthily, there is still the possibility of profaning the use of the cup, which did not come till later, at the end of the feast. And the danger was greater, not only because it increased as the feast was prolonged, but especially because it was drink that was in question. The Catholics have therefore sought in vain to justify communion in one kind by this *or*. The argument would have had a certain show of reason if the ἤ were found in ver. 26 instead of καί.—The word ἀναξίως, *unworthily*, has been explained in a host of ways: with a bad conscience, and without repentance (Theodoret, Olshausen); with contempt of the poor (Chrysostom, Billroth); without faith in the words: *given for you* (Luther); without self-examination (Bengel), etc. etc.; see Meyer. The explanation

[1] The τουτου (*this*), read by T. R. with K L P, is omitted by the rest.
[2] ℵ L here add του κυριου (*of the Lord*).

to which the context naturally leads is this: Without the grateful memory of Christ's sufferings, a memory which necessarily implies the breaking of the will with sin. The apostle is thinking of the light and frivolous way of communicating whereby the Corinthians made this sacred feast a joyous banquet, like those which the Greeks loved to celebrate, either in the family, or in a select society, or at a club meeting. The unworthiness of the communicating does not therefore arise from that of the communicant, for by repentance he may always render himself fit to receive Jesus; it arises from his mode of conducting himself inwardly and outwardly. As Bengel well puts it: *Alia est indignitas edentis, alia esûs.*—The term ἔνοχος, from ἐνέχεσθαι, *to be held in* or *by*, denotes the state of a man bound by a fault he has committed. The regimen may be, either the law which has been violated (Jas. ii. 10), or the judge charged with applying the law (Matt. v. 21, 22), or the penalty incurred (Matt. xxvi. 66; Mark iii. 29), or the person or object in respect of whom the violation has taken place; it is in this last sense that the term is used in our passage.—The object to which offence has been given is *the body and blood of the Lord.* The apostle's expression finds a very natural explanation on the supposition of the real presence of the body and blood (the Catholic and Lutheran opinions). But it can be justified also on the symbolical interpretation of the Holy Supper; for to sin against the object which has been solemnly consecrated and recognised as the sign of a thing, is to sin against the thing itself. He who tramples the crucifix under foot, morally tramples under foot the crucified Himself.—If such

is the gravity of the offence implied in a profane communion, the believer, before communicating, ought to do everything to prevent such a danger. This is what the apostle impresses in vers. 28, 29.

Vers. 28, 29. "But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup. 29. For he that eateth and drinketh,[1] eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, if he discern not the body."[2]—The δέ, *but*, is progressive: "But if it is so, here is what is to be done." The term δοκιμάζειν, *examine*, denotes a moral exercise whereby a man puts his heart to the proof, in order to judge of his feelings as to the person of Jesus; he is to examine whether in communicating he will bring to the action that reverential memory of Jesus, which, like an impenetrable barrier, will henceforth interpose between his heart and sin. —Usually the word ἄνθρωπος, *man*, is explained as synonymous with ἕκαστος, *each* (vi. 1); but the term seems here to include at the same time the ideas of weakness and responsibility. —The words: *and so*, signify: "And this examination once accomplished, let him eat . . ."

Ver. 29 returns once more to the idea of ver. 27 to impress more forcibly the necessity of this previous examination, by showing in all its gravity the danger indicated by the word ἔνοχος, *answerable*. The danger is of eating and drinking condemnation, while the man thinks he is appropriating the pledges of salvation.—

[1] T. R. here reads with D E F G K L P It. Syr. ἀναξίως (*unworthily*), a word which is omitted in ℵ A B C Sah.

[2] T. R. here reads with D E F G K L P Syr. του κυριου (*the Lord's*), which is omitted by ℵ A B C.

It seems at first sight impossible with the Alex. to suppress the word ἀναξίως, *unworthily*, which in the T. R. qualifies the two verbs of the conditional proposition. But this difficult reading may be defended in two ways: either by taking from the beginning the idea of eating and drinking in an unfavourable sense, according to ver. 27,—which is unnatural when ver. 28 has intervened;—or by seeking the indispensable limitation in the last words of the verse, μὴ διακρίνων, and translating them thus: "*If* or *when he* discerns not . . ." No doubt this turn of expression is somewhat harsh; but it is more probable that the word ἀναξίως has been added to the text, as an explanation, than that it would have been rejected if it had been authentic. — When he says κρίμα, *a judgment*, the apostle certainly does not mean eternal condemnation; for in that case he would have put the article τό, and the following verses positively prove the contrary. He is speaking of some chastisement or other inflicted by God. But yet he gives us to understand that this first judgment, unless it is followed by repentance and conversion, is the prelude of eternal perdition (ver. 32). There is something tragical in the ἑαυτῷ, *to himself* (*his own*): He incorporates with himself his own condemnation by that eating and drinking which should have aided in his salvation!—Critics are divided in regard to the meaning of the word διακρίνειν. It may signify *to distinguish* or *appreciate;* in the first sense: to distinguish a thing from all others; in the second: to understand its nature, and to measure its full grandeur. From the Lutheran viewpoint the natural inclination is to prefer the first meaning: "Not dis-

cerning with the eyes of faith the body and blood of Christ, which invisibly accompany the visible signs of bread and wine," or, as Hofmann explains: "Not distinguishing from the simple material bread the body which is appropriated by him who eats the bread." From the Reformed viewpoint, the second meaning seems the more natural: "Not surrounding with the respect due to the body of Christ the bread and wine consecrated to represent it." Heinrici cites several passages from the Talmud in which the word *discern*, to distinguish the holy from the profane, evidently includes this idea: to respect the holy, to appreciate it at its full value. It is easy to understand, however, how this word of St. Paul will always remain that to which the Lutheran conception will appeal most confidently. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to set aside as inadmissible this explanation: "not distinguishing, by the feeling of reverence with which the sacrament is celebrated, the body of Christ, represented by the bread, from ordinary food." See on the question of the Holy Supper, at ver. 25.—The words τοῦ κυρίου, *the Lord's*, in the T. R., are probably a gloss.

Vers. 30–32. "For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep. 31. Now,[1] if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. 32. But when we are judged, we are chastened of the Lord, that we should not be condemned with the world."—The apostle had just spoken in a general way of the judgments which profane communion may bring down. He now appeals to the experience of the Corin-

[1] T. R. with C K L P Syr. reads γαρ (*for*); all the rest: δε (*now* or *but*).

thians themselves, who are at the moment visited with a sickness of which many have even died.—*Διὰ τοῦτο, for this cause:* "I am not using vain words when I speak thus to you" (ver. 29).—The word *ἀσθενής, weak*, rather denotes the sickness, and *ἄῤῥωστος, infirm*, the weakening which issues in decay, as if an invisible blow had suddenly blighted the forces of life.—Some, like Eichhorn, have taken the three terms *sickly, infirm*, and *dead*, in the spiritual sense. But the simultaneous use of the two words *sickly* and *weak* could not be easily explained morally; and instead of the verb *κοιμᾶσθαι*, which is never used in the New Testament, except in the sense of physical sleep or death, the apostle would rather have said *νεκρὸς εἶναι* (Rev. iii. 1). Besides, a purely spiritual fact would not have been of a nature to strike his readers sufficiently, and the more because the spiritual weakening had preceded the profanation of the Supper, and was the cause of it as much as the effect. Finally, as Stockmayer well says (*La maladie et l'Evangile*, p. 29): "It is not by spiritual decay that the Lord snatches us from a false position and preserves us from condemnation; it is by judgments suffered in the flesh." Comp. 1 Cor. v. 5; 1 Tim. i. 20. No doubt we must guard here against the faintest materialistic notion, as if the eating of the Supper itself, physically speaking, had produced the sickness, and as if the consecrated food had been changed into poison. It was a warning judgment, specially inflicted by God, such as He sends to awaken a man to salvation.

Ver. 31. And when does such a judgment overtake the Christian? When he has not voluntarily judged

himself. God then comes to his help, awaking his sleeping vigilance by a stroke of His rod. This applies to Churches as well as to individuals.—The true reading is undoubtedly δέ and not γάρ. The δέ may indicate the logical progress of the argument (*now then*), or a contrast between the fact of the chastisement (ver. 30) and what would have happened if the Corinthians had behaved differently (*but*). The first connection is the more natural.—The verb διακρίνειν here signifies *to discern, analyse*, and so to *appreciate;* with the pronoun ἑαυτόν, *himself;* to discern one's own moral state by appreciating what within him pleases or displeases the Lord. By such a judgment, that of the Lord would be anticipated.

Ver. 32. This verse brings back the readers from the favourable supposition to the sad reality (δέ, *but*). Yet the present judgment, severe as it may be, is also an act of mercy on the Lord's part. It is not yet eternal condemnation; it is, on the contrary, a means of preventing it. Here we must distinguish with the apostle three degrees which he denotes by the analogous terms διακρίνεσθαι, *to judge oneself* (ver. 31), κρίνεσθαι, *to be judged* (ver. 32), and κατακρίνεσθαι, *to be condemned* (same verse). The believer ought constantly *to judge himself;* such is the normal state. If he fails in this task, God reminds him of it by judging him by some chastisement which He sends on him, *he is judged;* and if he does not profit by this means, nothing remains for him but to suffer in common with the world the final judgment from which God sought to preserve him, *to be condemned.*—The *world* denotes unconverted and lost humanity.

These same three degrees may be found in Mark ix. 47–50.

After this complete development of the subject, the apostle concludes, as he usually does, with some very simple words, in which he states the practical result of his whole previous argument.

Vers. 33, 34. "Wherefore, my brethren, when ye come together to eat, tarry one for another. 34. If[1] any man hunger, let him eat at home, that ye come not together to incur judgment. The rest will I set in order when I come."—This conclusion reminds us of the passage x. 23–33. Here, as there, Paul, after starting from an outward fact (the disorders in the love-feast), enters on a complete development, intended thoroughly to enlighten the conscience of the Church; then he winds up with some rules of conduct, apparently external, but in which there is concentrated the whole moral quintessence of the preceding exposition. —The affectionate address, *my brethren*, following warnings so serious, has in it something familiar and genial, fitted to open the hearts of his readers to the counsel with which he is about to close. The regimen εἰς τὸ φαγεῖν, *to eat*, might be connected with the following verb, *tarry:* "Tarry for one another to begin the feast." But it is simpler to make it dependent on the verb *come together:* "When you come together, not for ordinary worship simply, but for a love-feast and the celebration of the Supper, tarry one for another to partake of the feast." The verb ἐκδέχεσθαι signifies *to wait* and *to welcome.* The first meaning is the only one found in the New Testament. It is also that

[1] T. R. with E K L P reads εἰ δὲ (*but if*); all the rest: εἰ (*if*).

which is most suitable here; for the word forms an antithesis to προλαμβάνειν, to precede in eating, ver. 21. The apostle wishes, that all seating themselves to eat together, the supper of each may become that of his neighbours; thereby it is that the feast becomes a true agape.

Ver. 34. The first words correspond exactly to the question of ver. 22: "Have ye not houses to eat and to drink in?" In this feast the object is not in reality to take nourishment, but to *eat together.—A judgment*, such as that instanced by the apostle in ver. 29.—The term: *the other points, the rest*, τὰ λοιπά, no doubt embraces a number of questions of detail relating to the celebration of the Supper, such as the frequency, the days, the time of day, the mode of the feast, etc. The Catholics have supposed that the matter in question here was the institution of the Mass, which, they say, became from that time the subject of an Episcopal tradition. But that would not have been a detail of secondary importance, like those which are evidently in the mind of the apostle.

In the representations of the agapæ which are found in the Catacombs, there is seen a company of seven or eight persons grouped round the same table (Heinrici, p. 342). If it was so at Corinth, one can very easily understand the possibility of the abuse pointed out by the apostle; every company of friends might have gathered in a group separate from the rest of the Church. But did such a practice prevail at Corinth? Of this we have not the slightest proof.

The agapæ of which Paul speaks have been compared to the feasts which were celebrated from time to time in Greece by the corporations which then existed in great number, with a view to certain common interests. But however that may be, the origin of the agapæ is Jewish and not Greek. This

feast indeed represented the last supper of Jesus with His apostles, in the course of which He instituted the Holy Communion. Besides, in the feasts of those Greek colleges, it was the common fund of the society which paid the banquet, while our chapter itself proves that in the agapæ every family furnished its own provisions.

From certain notices, for which we are indebted to the historian Sozomenes (5th cent.), it appears that in some Churches (that of Alexandria, for example) the agape preceded the Holy Supper; according to Augustine, and no doubt in all the Churches of the West, it was the opposite: the Supper introduced the agape. Usage might vary according to place, and it certainly varied according to time, till the date when the agape was completely suppressed because of the abuses to which it gave rise.

IX.

On Spiritual Gifts (Chaps. XII.–XIV.).

We have here one of the richest and most interesting parts of our Epistle. These chapters are to us like a revelation of the power of that spiritual movement which went forth from Pentecost, and of the wonderful spiritual efflorescence which at the outset signalized the new creation due to the power of the gospel.—The link which connects this passage with the two preceding is certainly the common idea of public worship; this comes out particularly in chap. xiv., where the apostle treats of the exercise of spiritual gifts in the assemblies of the Church; now that chapter is the conclusion to which the two previous ones point. At the same time there is progress from the two subjects, treated in chap. xi. to this third: the first, that of chap. xi. 1-16 (the demeanour of women in the assemblies),

was of a more external nature; the second, chap. xi. 17–34 (the abuses in the Holy Supper), already went much deeper. The passage chaps. xii.–xiv. comes to what is more vital in the worship of the Church; the subject in question is the Holy Spirit Himself and His Divine manifestations. The Spirit, in the Christian community, may be compared to the nervous fluid in the human body. Thus it is that the apostle advances from the external to the internal.

What general idea ought we to form of the spiritual forces treated in this passage? We mean those new powers which in the apostle's writings often bear the name χαρίσματα, *gifts of grace*, which the Holy Spirit developed within the Church, and about which we have already stated our view, i. 7. The term χάρισμα indicates rather their *origin*, the word πνευματικά (xiv. 1) their *essence*. But for that very reason the former of these expressions has a wider meaning: for it may denote in general everything we owe to the Divine favour.—The Church is the body of Christ, the apostle tells us (xii. 27), that is to say, the organ which the glorified Christ since His departure has created on the earth to realize His design and carry out His purposes, as He formerly did by means of His body, strictly so called, when He was here below. This glorified Christ Himself dwells in believers by His Spirit, who thereby become His active members; and the action which He carries out through them proceeds from the extraordinary forces which He communicates to them. But these new powers may have their point of attachment in natural talents. It is even most frequently the case that the operation of the Spirit fits in to natural

aptitudes; He impresses on them a higher direction, a new bent to the service of God, and He exalts their power by consecrating them to this sublime object.—But so long as the spiritual man, who possesses any of these gifts, has not reached absolute holiness, his personal consecration, and consequently that of his gift, remains still imperfect. Hence arises the possibility of the deterioration of the spiritual forces, either in their use or in their inward essence, by selfishness, pride, vanity, hypocrisy, falsehood, jealousy, or hatred. Was not this what the apostle himself, 2 Cor. vii. 1, called *defilement of the Spirit?*—Now this is exactly what happened at Corinth, and in the most serious manner. The members wished to shine, to take the lead, to surpass one another by means of those spiritual manifestations; they sought those particularly which took the most surprising forms, and they disdained those which, though less showy, were yet the most practical and useful. In this we recognise thoroughly the Greek mind, which turns everything to amusement, even things the most serious; those *children everlastingly*, ἀεὶ παῖδες, as one of their own has called them; comp. xvi. 21.

The principal error which misled the Corinthians and produced their spiritual ignorance (xii. 1) on this subject, seems to have consisted in this: they imagined that the more the influence of the Divine Spirit deprived a man of his self-consciousness and threw him into an ecstasy, the more powerful was that influence and the more sublime the state to which it raised the man; whereas the more the inspired person retained his self-possession, the less did his inspiration partake of a

Divine character. From this point of view, the teacher was far beneath the prophet, and the prophet beneath him who spoke in tongues. Their rule was: the more πνεῦμα (*Spirit*), the less νοῦς (*intelligence*). This judgment accorded with Greek and even Jewish prejudices (see Heinrici, pp. 352–357). Plato said in the *Phædrus:* "It is by madness (the exaltation due to inspiration) that the greatest of blessings come to us;" and in the *Timæus* he says: "No one in possession of his understanding has reached Divine and true exaltation." The numerous sayings of Philo expressing the same thought are well known; and certain sayings of the Old Testament regarding the influence of the Spirit, when it took hold of the prophets, may have given countenance to such an interpretation; comp. Num. xxiv. 4 (Balaam); Amos iii. 8; Hosea ix. 7, etc.

How was it possible to set about the disciplining of such forces, which, from their very origin, a Divine impulse, seemed to escape from the control of the intellectual judgment and to defy all rule? The Pythia obeys only the god who subjects her to his will; the inspired one is above all remark and admonition: The Spirit impels me; what answer can be made to that? The task which the apostle now undertakes is the most difficult and delicate of all that were imposed on him by the state of the Corinthian Church. He has to bank in the most impetuous of torrents. He will require, it is easy to see, all his wisdom and dexterity, and will require to put forth more than ever the apostolic gift which has been conferred on him for the government of the Church.

He begins, in chap. xii., by ascending to the loftiest

principles which govern this mysterious and profound region. In chap. xiii. he points out to the Corinthians the beneficent genius under whose patronage spiritual gifts should always be placed to exercise a salutary influence, viz. love. After having thus paved the way for the result he desires to reach, he passes, in chap. xiv., to the practical treatment of the subject, and lays down some precise and even finical rules for the advantageous exercise of these gifts, particularly those of prophecy and speaking in tongues. After the principles developed in chap. xii. and xiii., these rules do not seem to be imposed by authority; they spring, as it were, of themselves from the conscience of the Church, now sufficiently enlightened.

Chrysostom complained even in his day of the obscurity of these chapters; he explained it by the fact that the circumstances to which this whole treatment applied no longer existed in the Churches of his time. We are still further removed from the apostolic age and from the extraordinary manifestations which characterized it. But the living forces of which the apostle speaks are not entirely withdrawn from the Church, they ought to accompany it to the end of its earthly career (xiii. 10–12). They appear only in another form, so that the study to which we now proceed will not have a merely archæological interest, but is capable of assuming a present and practical value for every believer and especially for every pastor.

The efforts of certain critics (Baur, Räbiger, etc.) to connect the following discussion, in one way or another, with the opposition between the different parties which divided the Church of Corinth (i. 12),

have not issued in any probable result. The text offers no data fitted to favour the hypotheses made in this direction.

I. General Survey of the Domain of Spiritual Gifts (Chap. XII.).

In the first three verses of this chapter, the apostle sets himself to mark out rigorously the domain of which he is about to treat, distinguishing it strictly from the analogous, but alien, religious manifestations, with which it might be confounded, and uniting by a common bond all the various manifestations which belong to it.

1. *The limits of the Christian pneumatical domain* (vers. 1-3).

Vers. 1–3. "Now as to spiritual gifts, brethren, I would not have you ignorant. 2. Ye know that when[1] ye were Gentiles, ye were carried away unto dumb idols, even as ye were driven. 3. Wherefore I give you to understand, that no man speaking[2] by the Spirit of God sayeth: Jesus[3] accursed! and that no man can say: Jesus Lord![4] but by the Holy Spirit." —The δέ seems to me, as to Edwards, to have the adversative sense: "For the rest, I shall set them in

[1] T. R. with F G reads οτι without οτε (*that ye were*).—K reads οτε without οτι (*when ye were*).—ℵ A B C D E L P read οτι οτε (*that when ye were*).

[2] D E F G It. omit λαλων.

[3] T. R. with D E G K L P: Ιησουν; ℵ A B C: Ιησους.

[4] T. R. with D E F G K L P: κυριον Ιησουν; ℵ A B C Syr^{sch}: κυριος Ιησους.

order by word of mouth, there is nothing pressing (ver. 34); *but* in what concerns spiritual gifts, I would not have you left longer in ignorance; I must instruct you at once." The form περί, *as to*, presents this subject as one expected by the readers. This preposition might depend directly on the verb ἀγνοεῖν: "that you should be in ignorance touching . . ." But it is more natural to take it in the same sense as vii. 1 and viii. 1, as a sort of title, and to understand the regimen of ἀγνοεῖν: "in regard to such things." The address: *brethren*, is not only intended to excite the attention of the readers on entering on this new and important subject; it is also meant to soften the humiliation there might be in the expression: *I would not have you ignorant.*—Should we take the word πνευματικῶν in the masculine sense: spiritual *men*, the inspired, or in the neuter sense: spiritual *gifts?* Most modern critics (Hofmann, Ewald, Hilgenfeld, Reuss, Holsten, Heinrici) decide for the first sense, because, as Holsten says, it was rather about the part and the right of the inspired in the assemblies, that Paul had been asked, than about the inspirations themselves. Heinrici rests his view on xiv. 37: "If any man think himself to be a prophet or *spiritual*." These reasons seem to me far from decisive. With the parallel quoted by this last may be contrasted xiv. 1: "Desire spiritual gifts" (τὰ πνευματικά), which is much more conclusive; and to the argument advanced by Holsten, the common-sense answer is, that it was much more natural and wise to estimate the gifts in themselves independently of the persons than to do inversely. I think, therefore, with the ancient commentators and with Meyer that the

neuter sense is preferable. As to the idea of Baur, Wieseler, and others, who restrict the application of the term to the gift of tongues or to those who possessed it, the view seems rather arbitrary. The apostle does not deal specially with this gift till chap. xiv. In chaps. xii. and xiii. he speaks of all the gifts in general, and, particularly in the verses which immediately follow, he marks off the whole domain of the pneumatic forces with which he is about to deal.—The expression: *I would not have you ignorant*, alludes to the mysterious side of the subject, and to its complete novelty to men recently converted.

Ver. 2. Of the three readings given in the note, the first, that of the T. R. (ὅτι alone), is not admissible; would it not be superfluous to say to Corinthian readers, "Ye know that ye were Gentiles"? Holsten answers that the emphasis is not on the predicate *Gentiles*, but on the explanatory appendix: *carried away to idols.* Certainly; but even taking this fact into account, the expression retains something offensive. And especially the construction would be so simple in this sense that it would be impossible to account for the origin of the variants. The reading of K and some Fathers (ὅτε alone, *when*) is not sufficiently supported. And the meaning to which it leads: "Ye know *how* (ὡς), *when* ye were Gentiles, ye were carried . . .," cannot, as we shall see, be admitted. The true reading is that which has representatives in the three families, and by means of which the other two are most easily explained: ὅτι ὅτε, *that when*: "ye know *that, when* ye were Gentiles . . ." The ὅτι has been confounded with the ὅτε in the one set; the opposite confusion has taken place in

the other. This reading no doubt demands that we give to the participle ἀπαγόμενοι, *carried away*, the force of a finite verb, understanding an ἦτε, *ye were;* but this word is easily taken from the ἦτε which immediately precedes. Comp. the similar ellipsis Col. iii. 17, and the examples quoted by Meyer in classic Greek. Heinrici, following Buttmann, prefers, as Bengel had already done, to regard the ὡς as a repetition of the preceding ὅτι, in a slightly different form: "Ye know *that*, when ye were Gentiles, *how*, I say, ye were carried away . . ." But, first of all, the interruption contained in the words: "when ye were Gentiles," is too short to occasion such a repetition; then the proposition: ὡς ἂν ἤγεσθε, is evidently, as is indicated by its very position between the πρὸς . . . and the ἀπαγόμενοι, a parenthetical clause. For if the participle ἀπαγόμενοι were taken as qualifying ἤγεσθε, it would be superfluous in meaning and awkward in form. The πρὸς τὰ εἴδωλα, *to idols*, is the regimen of ἀπαγόμενοι (ἦτε): "Ye were carried away to idols . . ." This forcible term calls up the idea of a whirlwind of impure blasts, to the power of which the Corinthians were formerly given up. There is opposition between the two prepositions ἀπό and πρός: "*far from* the true God, *toward* the objects of a deceptive worship." These objects were *idols*, a word in which are combined the ideas of a false divinity and a material statue. This last was regarded as penetrated with the power of the god whose image it was. These inspirations did not proceed from the idols, but they led to them. The epithet is put after the substantive: "the idols, *the dumb*," so as to bring out vividly this quality, and so the unworthy character of the worship of these false gods

incapable of acting or speaking, and consequently of communicating to the worshipper a Divine inspiration. The parenthetical proposition ὡς ἂν ἤγεσθε, *as ye were driven*, serves to qualify the ἀπαγόμενοι, *ye were carried away*. We must beware of reading, as Erasmus, Heinrici, and others do, with some documents of secondary importance, ἀνήγεσθε in a single word: *quomodo ascendebatis* (Augustine). Not only is the idea of *ascending* unrelated to the context, but especially we thereby lose the meaning of the particle ἄν, which gives precisely the key to these difficult words. This particle, which contains the notion of contingency, indicates that those breathings were every moment changing their direction, and depended on a capricious will. It has been supposed that Paul had in view the influence of the priests, whose passive instruments the Gentiles were in their worship. Does it not rather follow from x. 20 that he is thinking of a diabolical influence exercised by the evil spirits, the authors of idolatry? Now, the fatal storm carried the blinded Gentile, with a whole procession, to the temple of Jupiter; again, it was to the altars of Mars or Venus, always to give them over to one or other of their deified passions; comp. Eph. ii. 2; 2 Tim. ii. 26. To the interesting passage of Athenagoras quoted by Meyer, Edwards adds that of Justin (*Apol.* i. 5): μάστιγι δαιμόνων φαύλων ἐξελαυνόμενοι, "chased with the scourge of evil demons."

Ver. 3. With this diabolical, capricious, and blind impulse, Paul contrasts the new breath with which the Holy Spirit penetrates the Church, a breath which has a fixed and glorious object, the Lord Jesus, and which,

acting on the depths of the consciousness, gives rise to a new utterance in him who is animated by it. Heinrici, following Griesbach and Storr, thinks that the apostle means here to defend the gift of tongues against its detractors. After alluding to the oracles and deceptions of heathen priests, in ver. 2, he now passes, they hold, to the effects of Christian inspiration, which, while offering some analogy to these heathen manifestations, ought yet to be carefully distinguished from them. No doubt the discourses in tongues are unintelligible, and there might be a fear of their containing some blasphemy against Jesus Christ. But this fear may be dismissed, for the Holy Spirit can inspire with nothing which is contrary to the glory of the Lord Jesus.—It is impossible not to feel the very artificial and forced character of this connection between vers. 2 and 3. Besides, we shall see that in this whole section, chaps. xii.–xiv., Paul is speaking, not to exalt the gift of tongues, but, on the contrary, to combat the exaggerated value given to it. This introduction, vers. 1–3, is still quite general, and has no special relation to the gift of speaking in tongues. De Wette seems to me to have apprehended the context better: "As Gentiles, you acted without consciousness and without personal judgment; but now, as Christians, the time is come for your knowing how to regulate yourselves; and hence I make known to you the true principle by which you ought to judge all manifestations of this kind." But this transition is not enough. We must go more to the root of the matter, and not confine ourselves to the contrast between the blind passivity of the heathen state and the full personal consciousness of the Chris-

tian state. For this characteristic of superiority would apply only imperfectly to the gift of tongues, the exercise of which excludes the use of the faculty of the νοῦς, the *understanding* (xiv. 14). The real transition seems to me rather to be this: "In your former heathen state you had no experience whatever similar to that which you now have in the Church. The dumb idols, to the worship of which you let yourself be carried, did not communicate powers similar to those which the Spirit now communicates to you. Consequently, novices as you are in this domain, you need a guiding thread to prevent you from going astray: *This is why I instruct you. . . .*" (Comp. Meyer.)

The first thing needed by a Church so inexperienced in this domain was to know how far it extended, in other words, what was the true character of the Divine influence; who was truly inspired and who was not. The apostle answers this first question by two maxims, the one negative, exclusive; the other positive, affirmative. The character of Divine inspiration does not depend on the form which the discourse takes, but on its tendency. Whether it be a prophecy, a tongue, or a doctrine, matters little; every utterance which amounts to saying: *Jesus be accursed!* is not Divinely inspired; every utterance which amounts to saying: *Jesus Lord!* is Divinely inspired. It should be remarked that Paul here says *Jesus*, and not *Christ*. His concern is with the historical person who lived on the earth under the name of Jesus. It is with Him that all true inspiration is bound up; it is from Him that all carnal or diabolical inspiration turns away. Jesus had said: "Father, all Thine is Mine, and all

Mine is Thine" (John xvii. 10), and "The Spirit of truth shall glorify Me; He shall take of Mine and show it unto you." No utterance whatever, degrading the man who is called Jesus, however eloquent and powerful, emanates from Divine inspiration. Every utterance glorifying the man Jesus, however weak and unpretending, proceeds from the breath from on high. According to the Greco-Lats., the Byz., and the T. R., we should read: *ἀνάθεμα Ἰησοῦν* (*sayeth that Jesus is accursed*), and *κύριον Ἰησοῦν* (*sayeth that Jesus is the Lord*). According to the Alex. and the Peschito, the word *Jesus* is in the nominative: *ἀνάθεμα Ἰησοῦς* and *κύριος Ἰησοῦς*; it is each time an exclamation: *Jesus accursed! Jesus Lord!* Clearly this second reading is the only possible one. Exclamation, much more than cold logical statement, is the language of inspired discourse, the characteristic of which is enthusiasm. In classical Greek the word *ἀνάθεμα* is synonymous with *ἀνάθημα*, and denotes every object consecrated to deity. But in the LXX. and in the New Testament it takes a particular sense, denoting an object consecrated to God in order to its destruction, a being devoted to be cursed (Deut. vii. 26; Josh. vii. 13, etc.; Gal. i. 8); while *ἀνάθημα* preserves the meaning of offering *sensu bono;* comp. Luke xxi. 5. —But to whom in the Christian Church can the apostle attribute the language: *Jesus accursed!* It has been supposed—as is still done by Holsten—that the apostle here refers to discourses hostile to Jesus which were heard from the lips of Jews or even from those of unbelieving Gentiles, who treated Jesus as an impostor, and saw in His ignominious and cruel death a token of

the Divine curse. Comp. i. 23: *to the Jews a stumbling-block.* There might thus be found in this passage the three great religious domains of the time, heathenism (ver. 2), Judaism (ver. 3[a]), and Christianity (ver. 3[b]). But the construction of the sentence does not lend itself to such parallelism. And the question arises, How could the Church of Corinth have been tempted to ascribe such discourses to Divine inspiration? Besides, we have to do here with discourses uttered in the assemblies of the Church; and how would men have been allowed to speak publicly in the Church who were not Christians? One would rather suppose, as Heinrici seems to do, that this first purely negative rule is not meant by the apostle to apply to any real case, and that he has put it down only the better to bring out the idea of the second by way of contrast. But neither is this explanation admissible; for these two criteria are so placed in relation to one another, that the real application of the one implies also that of the other. Must we then believe that Paul admits the possibility of such discourses within the Church itself? When Heinrici declares this supposition absurd, does he transport himself adequately into the midst of the powerful fermentation of religious ideas then called forth by the gospel? In 2 Cor. xi. 3, 4, the apostle speaks of teachers newly arrived at Corinth, who preached *another Jesus* than the one he had preached, and who raised a *different spirit* from that which the Church had received. It was therefore not only another doctrine, but also another breath, a new principle of inspiration, which these people brought with them. In our Epistle itself, xvi. 22, he speaks of

certain persons who love not Jesus Christ, and whom he devotes to *anathema* when the Lord shall come. These utterances would appear very severe, if they were not a sort of *return* for the anathema which these people threw in the face of Jesus Christ. How was this possible in a Christian Church? We must observe, first of all, the term *Jesus*, denoting the historical and earthly person of our Lord, and bear in mind that from the earliest times there were people who, offended at the idea of the ignominious punishment of the cross, and the unheard-of abasement of the Son of God, thought they must set up a distinction between the man Jesus and the true Christ. The first had been, according to them, a pious Jew. A heavenly being, the true Christ, had chosen him to serve as His organ while He acted here below as the Saviour of humanity. But this *Christ from above* had parted from Jesus before the Passion, and left the latter to suffer and die alone. It is easy to see how, from this point of view, one might curse the crucified one who appeared to have been cursed of God on the cross, and that without thinking he was cursing the true Saviour and Christ, and while remaining without scruple a member of the Church. We know the name of a man who positively taught the doctrine we speak of. He was a Jew-Christian, named Cerinthus, very much attached to the law like the adversaries of Paul at Corinth; and it is curious to hear a Father of the Church, Epiphanius, affirm that the First Epistle to the Corinthians was written against this person. We shall not go so far. We would only use the example to show what strange conceptions might arise at this period when Christian

doctrine was yet in process of formation, and when all the ideas awakened by the gospel were seething within the Church. To the example of Cerinthus we can add that of the Ophites, or serpent-worshippers, who existed before the end of the first century, and who, according to Origen (*Contra Celsum*), asked those who wished to enter their churches to *curse Jesus*. In stating this first negative criterion, the apostle therefore means to say to the Corinthians: However ecstatic in form, or profound in matter, may be a spiritual manifestation, tongue, prophecy, or doctrine, if it tends to degrade Jesus, to make Him an impostor or a man worthy of the Divine wrath, if it does violence in any way to His holiness, you may be sure the inspiring breath of such a discourse is not that of God's Spirit. Such is the decisive standard which the prophets, for example, are summoned to use when they sit in judgment on one another (xiv. 29).

After drawing the line fitted to set aside all that presents itself as Christian inspiration without being so in fact, the apostle points out the characteristic common to all those manifestations to which the quality of a true inspiration can and should be accorded, whatever may be the form in which they show themselves. To proclaim *Jesus* as the *Lord;* such is the mark of every Divinely inspired Christian discourse. Such a discourse is a cry of adoration, an act of homage by which the historical person who bore the name of Jesus, notwithstanding His shame and bloody death, is raised by the inspired one to the Divine throne, and celebrated as the Being who exercises universal sovereignty; such is the force of the title κύριος, *Lord;* comp. Phil. ii. 9–11.

It might be objected to the apostle that there are professions of faith in Jesus Christ which are purely intellectual, orthodox sermons which are devoid of the breath of the Spirit. But this objection has no force whatever in the context, especially with the reading κύριος Ἰησοῦς (nominatives), which we have adopted, and which makes these words an exclamation. Such a cry of the heart does not in the least resemble a cold logical affirmation. We might object, with more show of reason, the exclamation of the demons who cried out on seeing Jesus: "Thou art the Holy One of God." But this emotion of fear and this particular insight might well be, even in those beings, an effect of the Spirit's influence; comp. James ii. 19. It is the Holy Spirit who gives to an intelligent spirit the discernment of the holiness of Jesus. Thus, however simple, however elementary in matter a Christian discourse may be, however calm, however sober in form, if its result is to place on the head of Jesus the crown of *Lord*, it is the product of the Divine Spirit, as well as the most extraordinary manifestation which can take place in a Christian assembly.

The field of Divine inspirations is thus marked off by a line of demarcation which every believer can apply. The apostle now explains the relation which those various manifestations of the Christian Spirit, that are embraced in it, sustain to one another. He first expounds the idea, that however *various* those manifestations may be in their outward form, they are one in their principle and end (vers. 4–12).

2. *The unity of spiritual forces in their diversity* (vers. 4–12).

The first and most profound diversity which strikes the mind as it contemplates the display of Divine power within the Church, is the difference between the Divine *gifts*, *ministries*, and *operations*. More than this: in each of these three principal classes there is seen to be a subordinate variety of kinds and species. But these principal and secondary diversities all proceed from one and the same principle, and all tend consequently to one and the same end: vers. 4–6.

Vers. 4–6.

Vers. 4–6. "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. 5. And there are differences of administrations, and the same Lord. 6. And there are diversities of operations, but it is[1] the[2] same God which worketh all in all."—Paul here mentions three principal diversities to which correspond three principles of unity which in reality form only one.—We already know what he understands by *gifts*, χαρίσματα; they are the creative powers which God communicates to believers when their new activity expands under the influence of the life of Christ. The principal of these gifts will be enumerated vers. 8–10.—The term διαίρεσις, translated *diversity*, strictly signifies *apportionment, distribution;* this is its meaning in the LXX. and in profane Greek (see Heinrici); comp.

[1] T. R. with K L reads εστι before θεος, which is rejected by the rest.

[2] T. R. with ℵ A K L P It: ο δε (*but the same*); B C: και ο (*and the . . .*).

the participle διαιροῦν, *distributing*, in ver. 11. But as the apportioning of these gifts by the Spirit is not made arbitrarily, and as it rests on a real diversity between the individuals as well as between the powers themselves, the word may be rendered by the term *diversity*, like μερισμός, Heb. ii. 4 [*distribution*, Marg. R.V.]. We shall see how carefully the various kinds and species of gifts will be distinguished in the enumeration vers. 8–10.—All these varieties of gifts have one and the same principle: the *Spirit* who produces them when He comes to dwell in believers.

Ver. 5. But there exists in the Church a second kind of Divine manifestations; *charges*, namely, or ministries, διακονίαι. This word denotes, not like the preceding, inward aptitudes, but external offices, with which certain individuals are put in charge. There are different kinds of them; some may be related to the whole Church, like the apostolate or the office of evangelist (missionary); others to a particular community, and that either with a view to the spiritual life, as the episcopate, or with a view to different kinds of temporal helps, such as the numerous branches of the diaconate; under these offices even there must have existed functions of an inferior order relating to those material services which were called for by the holding of assemblies and of the agapæ, etc. What was the relation of these charges to the gifts? Probably certain of them, the highest, rested on a spiritual gift which the community had recognised and ordained to a regular function; others, the inferior ones, were mere offices committed to individuals by the Church.—As there are gifts which, by their very nature, cannot

become the basis of an office (speaking in tongues or prophecy, for example), and others which may easily be transformed into a regular function (the gift of teaching, for example), so there are also offices of a wholly external kind, management of material affairs, for example, which are scarcely related to any gift, while others, like the apostolate, have for their foundation a special gift or a whole combination of gifts. These varied offices have, like the gifts, their principle of unity; but this principle is, so to speak, before, not behind them. As the various gifts rest on one and the same principle, the Spirit, so the offices tend to one and the same end, *the Lord*, by whose authority and for whose service they act. To connect the two propositions of this verse, instead of δέ, *but*, Paul here says καί, *and*, no doubt to join this second principle of unity to the preceding, the Spirit, mentioned ver. 4.

Ver. 6. A third kind of varied manifestations: manifold *operations* due to the exercise both of those gifts and those offices. The term ἐνεργήματα, *operations*, denotes the powers realized in acts; the real effects Divinely produced either in the world of body or of mind, as often as the gift or the office comes into action. Thus, in a believer, the Holy Spirit has developed the *gift* of preaching. Recognising this gift, the Church has committed to him the preacher's *office*, with a view to the service of Christ; its ἐνέργημα, *operation*, will be the good discourse delivered by him, and the edification thereby effected in the hearts of his hearers. Another has the gift of healing; this gift cannot, from its nature, take the form of a regular office; but it will be displayed in healing operations;

restored health will be its *ἐνέργημα* in each case.—These varied effects have also their principle of unity. It is God who, after producing the gifts by the Spirit, and establishing the offices for the service of the Lord, Himself produces every good result of the gifts and offices; comp. 1 Cor. iii. 6, 7.—*Τὰ πάντα, all things;* according to the context, the gifts of every kind, and the offices of every kind, as well as the endlessly varied beneficent effects which result from both.—*Ἐν πᾶσιν, in all;* in those who work and in those on whom the effect is produced.—Paul here returns to the *δέ, but,* to pass to the second proposition. He wishes thereby strongly to contrast the supreme principle of unity, which embraces in it the two preceding, the *Spirit* and the *Lord,* with the boundless variety of gifts, ministries, and operations distributed among the members of the Church.

After this general survey of the Divine unity which controls the three great forms of activity and their manifold varieties, the apostle comes to the one which it is most important for him to regulate in the given circumstances, viz. gifts. And before showing how rich in number they are, he reminds them of the common principle which produces them, and points to the common end which unites them, the common advantage (ver. 7). Then he states them in all their variety, each time repeating the one principle from which they proceed (vers. 8–12).

Vers. 7–12.

Ver. 7. "But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to each man for the common advantage."—Each

receives an aptitude from the Spirit, but not for himself; what each possesses is intended for the good of all.—The genitive τοῦ πνεύματος, *of the Spirit*, cannot be, as Meyer and others will have it, an objective complement, as if it were the Spirit who was manifested by the gift. From the fact that in 2 Cor. iv. 2 the word ἡ φανέρωσις has an objective complement (*of the truth*), it does not follow that it should be the same here; the two notions of *truth* and *Spirit* are very different. Paul does not mean that what belongs to the Spirit is revealed by the exercise of gifts, but that He manifests Himself by communicating them. And as the Spirit is *one* (ver. 4), it follows that all the gifts, however different, must tend to a common end, the good of the whole, and not to the selfish satisfaction of the individual on whom they are bestowed. With the dative ἑκάστῳ, *to each*, which is placed first, there is connected grammatically and logically the whole following enumeration of the gifts, or, as has been said, the presents which the bridegroom makes to the bride.

Vers. 8–10. "For to the one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to the other the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; 9. to[1] another faith by the same Spirit; to the other the gifts of healing by the same[2] Spirit; 10. to the other the workings[3] of miracles;[3] to the other[4] prophecy; to

[1] T. R. with A K L reads δε, after ετερω, which is omitted by the rest.

[2] T. R. with ℵ D E F G K L P reads: εν τω αυτω (*the same*); A B: εν τω ενι (*one*).

[3] D E F G read ενεργεια (*power*), instead of ενεργηματα (*workings*), and δυναμεως, instead of δυναμεων.

[4] B D E F G omit δε, which is read by ℵ A C K L P.

the other[1] discerning[2] of spirits; to another[3] divers kinds of tongues; to the other the interpretation[4] of tongues."—Most moderns think it impossible to discover any psychological or logical order in the following enumeration, and think even that there is no force to be ascribed in this respect to the change of the pronoun ἄλλῳ into ἑτέρῳ (once in ver. 9, a second time in ver. 10). Meyer is not of this opinion, and rightly, as it seems to me; for there is nothing arbitrary in Paul's style, and everybody knows that ἄλλος expresses a difference of individual, but ἕτερος a difference of quality. Thus we have the expression in Greek ἕτερος γίνεσθαι, to become other, to change one's opinion, while ἄλλος γίνεσθαι, to become a different individual, would have no meaning. It cannot therefore be without an object that Paul has twice introduced in this enumeration the stronger adjective instead of the weaker. Before the first ἑτέρῳ, *to a different*, we find the indication of two gifts, which, as has always been remarked, relate principally to the faculty of intelligence, and thus form a first homogeneous group. It is easy to understand the reason why Paul assigns to it at this stage the first place. We shall see that the Corinthians were disposed to regard the most extraordinary manifestations, the most ecstatic, as much more really Divine than those which leave man in full possession of his reason. Now the apostle places these very manifestations in the foreground to sweep

[1] B D E F G omit δέ, which is read by ℵ A C K L P.

[2] T. R. with A B D K L reads διακρισεις (*discernments*), instead of διακρισις (singular).

[3] T. R. with A C K L reads δέ, which is omitted by the rest.

[4] A D: διερμηνεια, instead of ερμηνεια.

away this false judgment.—The two terms *wisdom* and *knowledge* have been very variously distinguished. According to Neander and others, wisdom has a practical character, and knowledge indicates something more speculative; according to Bengel, inversely. This last view is evidently false; *gnosis* (knowledge) bears of course on theory. But no more can Neander's view be maintained in the face of chap. i., where the term *sophia*, wisdom, is applied to the profounder exposition of the mysteries embraced in the Divine plan (ii. 6 seq.). Hofmann understands *wisdom* as applying to the general view of the whole domain of spiritual life, and *knowledge* as referring to profound insight into certain particular points in this domain. Heinrici takes wisdom as the simple knowledge of salvation (as it is explained, for example, by the catechism), knowledge as the reasoned understanding of the gospel, as it is given in a course of dogmatic. According to Edwards, gnosis is a degree of Christian knowledge inferior to wisdom, which is the prerogative of mature Christians. There is a measure of truth in these different points of view, but there is something arbitrary about them all. If we start from the meaning of the two substantives, as it seems to follow from the form of the two Greek terminations (σις and ια), we shall rather see in *gnosis* a notion of effort, investigation, discovery (comp. xiii. 2, where this term is connected with the idea of *knowing all mysteries*), and in *sophia*, on the contrary, the idea of a calm possession of truth already acquired, as well as of its practical applications. Gnosis makes the teacher; wisdom, the preacher and pastor. When

corrupted, the former becomes gnosticism, the speculation of the intellectualist; the latter, dead orthodoxy. —It should be remarked, with Hofmann, that the apostle speaks neither of wisdom nor of knowledge in themselves, but of a *word, discourse* of wisdom or of knowledge; for he seizes the gift in action at the moment when it is to serve the edification of the Church.—The use of the two different prepositions διά, *by means of*, and κατά, *according to the standard of*, applied, the former to wisdom, the latter to knowledge, is not arbitrary. Knowledge advances by means of subjective and deliberate study, which, if it is not to deviate from the straight line of Divine truth, must be carried on *according to* the light of the Spirit; whereas the edifying discourses of wisdom are produced in the heart *by* the Spirit, agreeably to the wants of the given situation. Moreover, Eph. iv. 11 shows how the two gifts, as well as the two offices connected with them (*pastor* and *teacher*), are in close affinity.

Ver. 9. If we hold that the substitution of ἑτέρῳ for ἄλλῳ is not accidental, the gifts which follow should have a different character from the two preceding, and this new character ought to reappear identically in the five gifts enumerated down to the following ἑτέρῳ (end of ver. 10). Now it is easy to prove that it is so. The two preceding gifts were exercised in virtue of a communication of light; the following five proceed from a communication of *force*, in other words, from an influence of the spirit, no longer specially on the understanding, but on the will. By *faith* the apostle certainly does not understand saving faith in general; for this is not a special gift, it is the portion of all Christians. Faith

is the root of the Christian life, not one of its fruits. We see clearly from the passage xiii. 2 that the apostle distinguishes between faith in general and faith as a particular gift. As such, it is the possession of salvation taking the character of assurance in God, of heroic daring, resolutely attacking and surmounting all the obstacles which are opposed to the work of God in a given situation. "Father, I know that Thou hearest me always!" Such is the cry of this faith which removes mountains, and of which the history of the Church affords so many examples; witness a Francke, a Wilberforce, a George Müller, and so many others. It is to this gift the saying of Jesus, Matt. xvii. 20, 21 refers. The preposition ἐν, *in* or *by*, indicates that the force of this confidence rests on the Holy Spirit's indwelling in the soul.

There follow the gifts of *healings*, which are closely connected with faith thus understood, for they have as their basis confidence in the power of God applied to disease. Here there is not only a confident prayer; there is a command given in the consciousness of complete harmony with the will of God, such as the: "Rise, and walk," of St. Peter (Acts iii. 6). The substantives *gifts* and *healings* are put in the plural as relating to the different classes of sicknesses to be healed.

Ver. 10. The *miraculous operations*, ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων, have a very natural connection with the two previous gifts. Paul has in view the power of working all sorts of miracles other than simple cures, corresponding to the wants of the different situations in which the servant of Christ may be placed: resurrec-

tions from the dead, the driving out of demons, judgments inflicted on unfaithful Christians or adversaries, such as Ananias or Elymas, deliverances like that of Paul at Malta.—The reading δυνάμεως, *of power*, has no probability.—The Mss. A B read ἐν τῷ ἑνί, *in the one Spirit*, instead of ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, *in the same Spirit*; this reading more forcibly contrasts the unity of the power with the diversity of the effects. But in French we cannot say *the one* without adding *the same*.[1]

The place here occupied by the gift of *prophecy* seems at the first glance somewhat strange. As a gift of speech, it seems as if it should rather be joined to the first group (ver. 8); but it is only so in appearance. The prophet, according to xiv. 3, effects by his utterances "edification, comfort, consolation." This gift therefore belongs to the group of gifts which have the will as their agent, and make use of it to put forth a power. It is miracle in the form of speech. As Hofmann says, "Prophecy does not proceed from a resolution or reflection of the prophet's own, but from a power independent of him, which masters his mind and makes him speak in order to act on others." It proceeds from a revelation regarding the present state, course, and future of the kingdom of God. In transmitting this revelation to the Church, the prophet endeavours to stimulate it and to raise it to the height of his theme. It is in the spiritual domain an effect analogous to that which is produced on the sick man by the: "Rise and walk," pronounced by him who has the gift of healing.—But vanity may easily become

[1] [As we can say it in English, we have translated the verse accordingly. —Tr.]

master of the exercise of this gift, and the prophet allow himself to mingle elements drawn from his own stock with the contents of the revelation received; he may even, without suspecting it, yield to an inspiration of diabolic origin. Hence the exercise of this gift ought to be subjected to control, and to come under the judgment of other persons capable of distinguishing, if need be, the human from the Divine. This judgment, which the apostle calls διάκρισις πνευμάτων, *discernment of spirits*, seems to have been usually exercised, according to xiv. 29, by other prophets. It is attributed, 1 John iv. 1, to the Church in general. St. Paul has given the fundamental direction to guide this judgment in ver. 3. The criterion which John gives, vers. 2 and 3, is at bottom identical with that of Paul. —The plural διακρίσεις, *discernments*, in five Mjj., may be accepted; it is the most difficult reading. It is to be regarded as referring to all the particular cases. By the plural πνευμάτων, *of spirits*, Paul would indicate *the breathings* of the Spirit, which take effect suddenly on the prophets of the Church.

Ver. 10[b]. It is certainly not without reason that the pronoun ἑτέρῳ reappears here. The gift of tongues and that of their interpretation form, in the apostle's eyes, a new category. And the character of this third group is easily distinguished. If in the first we find the influence of the Spirit on the powers of the *understanding*, in the second on the forces of the *will*, it is very clear that in the third we have the influence of the same Spirit on the *feelings*. The passage xiv. 14–16 proves that he who *speaks in tongues* addresses God under the overpowering influence of profound

emotion, which causes him *to pray, sing,* or *give thanks* in an ecstatic language unintelligible to every one who does not share the same emotion, and to which his own understanding, his νοῦς, remains a stranger. It is then his feelings, and his feelings only, which are in activity, to the exclusion of his understanding and will, which are inactive. The man who speaks thus has indeed no intention whatever of acting on those who hear him. The sounds he gives forth are the immediate expression of what he feels: "He speaks to God, and not to men" (chap. xiv. 2).

From the third century down to modern times, the prevalent idea in the Church has been that the gift of tongues was the power of preaching the gospel to different peoples, to each in its own tongue, without having learned it. This gift, it was thought, explained the rapid propagation of the gospel. Irenæus, who, in the second century, speaks of this gift, and speaks of it as a phenomenon still existing in his time, does not express himself very clearly about its nature. He says (*Adv. Hær.* v. 6. 1), "that he has heard many brethren in the churches possessing prophetical gifts and speaking in tongues of all sorts by the Spirit (παντοδαπαῖς λαλούντων διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος γλώσσαις), bringing to the light the hidden things of men, and expounding the mysteries of God." This expression: tongues of all sorts, does not enlighten us sufficiently as to his view. But the opinion of Origen (*ad Rom.* i. 13) and his school is evident. The following, for example, is how Chrysostom, giving himself up to his imagination, describes the fact: "Immediately one made his voice be heard in the language of the Persians, another in that of the

Romans; another in that of the Indians; another in some other tongue." Similarly Theodoret: "Often a man who knew only the Greek tongue, after another had spoken in the language of the Scythians or Thracians, gave the hearers the translation of his discourse" (see Meyer). The narrative of Pentecost (Acts ii.) seemed to point in this direction. Certainly we are not sufficiently acquainted with the hidden powers of the human soul, nor the mysterious relation of external language to inward speaking, to affirm the impossibility of such a phenomenon arising from the influence of the Holy Spirit in the depths of the soul. But with what view would a gift so extraordinary have been bestowed? With Greek and Latin, two languages which it was not so difficult to learn, one could make himself understood everywhere. And supposing the gift were intended to help mission work, of what use could it be in a Church like that of Corinth? Is it possible to conceive behaviour more strange on the part of a Greek of this Church than his setting himself to speak all at once in Arabic, or Chinese, or Hindustani, to express the lively emotions with which the gospel filled his heart? In Mark xvi. 9–20, a passage which, though unauthentic, undoubtedly contains authentic materials, we find the oldest name of this gift uttered by Jesus Himself, and the simplicity of which seems to guarantee its exactness. It is the expression: *to speak in new tongues* (γλώσσαις καιναῖς λαλεῖν). This expression does not suit the nature of the gift, as it was afterwards understood in the Church. Tongues really existing among other peoples would not be *new* tongues: instead of καιναῖς we ought to have

had *ξέναις* or *ἀλλοτρίαις*. Finally, in this sense, how is it possible to explain the term *γένη γλωσσῶν*, *kinds* or *species* of tongues? It is impossible to suppose that the apostle is thinking of the distinction of human tongues into Semitic, Turanian, Indo-Germanic *families!* Besides, this interpretation is now generally abandoned. As to the account of the second chapter of the Acts which gave rise to it, it seems to me that ver. 11 allows another explanation of the mysterious phenomenon related in that chapter.

After Ernesti, Bleek substituted the following for the old interpretation. The term *γλῶσσα*, *tongue*, is frequently employed by Greek grammarians to denote certain expressions rarely or anciently used, archaisms or provincial idioms. Accordingly, Bleek thinks that *speaking in a tongue* denotes discourses mixed with expressions of this kind. He also compares the relation between the Christian who spoke in a tongue and his interpreter to the relation of the *προφήτης* to the *μάντις*, in consulting the oracles. The prophet was the translator of the enigmatical answer (*lingua secreta*) which the god put into the mouth of the latter (*the inspired*). Heinrici appropriates this explanation, and supports it by new and important examples, taken not only from the literary, but also from the religious language of the Greeks. He mentions, in particular, that according to Diodorus, the act of rendering oracles in an obscure and Sibylline style was called *ἐνθεάζειν κατὰ γλῶσσαν*, to speak inspiredly *in a tongue*.—But it is impossible to imagine why, in a community composed of traders, artisans, sailors, etc., the most profound emotions of the saved soul should have found expres-

sion either in ancient and unusual words, or by means of compositions formed of wholly new terms. It is still less intelligible how this labour of reminiscence or creation could have taken place in a state wherein the influence of feeling controlled that of the understanding (xiv. 14).

A third explanation takes the word *tongue* in the phrase γλώσσαις λαλεῖν in its literal sense: to speak while moving the tongue so as to utter sounds of which the speaker is neither master, nor conscious. Such, with certain shades of difference, is the meaning adopted by Eichhorn, Baur, Meyer. With the term tongue thus understood there have been compared the expressions of St. Paul in the Romans; "the Spirit who prays in us *with unutterable groanings*," or who cries by the mouth of the child of God: "*Abba, Father!*" (Rom. viii. 26 and 15). Some sentences of chap. xiv. of our Epistle might suit this meaning. But others are absolutely opposed to it. How in this sense are we to explain the plural γλώσσαις λαλεῖν, to speak *in tongues*, especially when only one person is in question, as in ver. 6? Even in our passage the term γένη γλωσσῶν, *kinds* of tongues, cannot be so explained naturally. A speaking by a motion of the tongue divided into several categories! And can it be supposed that the apostle himself rejoiced and thanked God because he possessed such a faculty more than any of the Corinthians (xiv. 18, 19)?

The gift of speaking in tongues must therefore have been something more elevated. Paul seems to compare it, xiii. 1, to the language of angels. As the bird by its song expresses the full joy of life in the absolute

freedom of existence, so the transport to which the new experiences of the Christian life, of the peace of salvation, of the contemplation of the God of love, of the hope of glory, at times lifted the hearts of believers, was sometimes manifested of a sudden in an extraordinary language of which we can no longer form an idea. Sometimes it was an ardent supplication (*the unutterable groanings* of the Spirit), asking of God the full realization of His purposes of love (Rom. viii. 26); sometimes it was the cry of the spirit of adoption: "Abba, Father!" (Rom. viii. 14), finding vent in the form of joyful thanksgiving; sometimes it was a Psalm-singing, celebrating the ineffable gift of salvation in tones inspired with heavenly sweetness, music rather than language properly so called (xiv. 7). To explain such a phenomenon it is not necessary to have recourse, as Holsten has, to the contrast between the gospel and the miseries of the time, the tyranny of the emperors, the avarice of the proconsuls, the chains of slavery, the despair of poverty, the satiety of wealth. The contrast which thus created new tongues within the Church was more of a spiritual and moral nature; it was the contrast between peace and remorse, holiness and impurity, the hope of perfect life and the fear of annihilation, the possession of God and life without God.

Such emotions, expressed in this mysterious language, the immediate creation of the Spirit, could only be understood by the man whom the Spirit put in communion with those who experienced them. And as such a man, while sharing those emotions, was nevertheless not wholly controlled by them, he preserved the

power of giving account of the Divine object which gave rise to them, and so of expounding the same feelings in distinct words. This is what the apostle calls *interpretation*, ἑρμηνεία, which also depended on a special gift. Is there here an allusion to the technical use made of the word ἑρμηνεία in religious language, to denote the interpretation of the oracles of the Pythia (comp. Heinrici)? This is neither impossible nor necessary. As prophecy had for its auxiliary διάκρισις, *discernment*, because its contents fell into the category of the true or the false, so speaking in a tongue was accompanied by interpretation, which simply made its contents intelligible to the Church, the danger of error not existing, so to speak, in a form of utterance which was only the unreflecting manifestation of a feeling.—It cannot be by accident that the apostle here gives the last place to the gifts of tongues and of interpretation. Throughout this whole passage he speaks from the standpoint of the *common advantage* (ver. 7). If therefore he puts first the word of wisdom and of knowledge, it is because he regards them as the best fitted to impart to the Church solid and lasting edification. If he places after them gifts capable of producing a powerful effect, whether in the way of healing or comfort, it is because after the former they are the most useful; finally, in the last rank comes the gift which is only a matter of emotion without positive result.

On the relation between the gift of tongues as it existed at Corinth, and its first manifestation on the day of Pentecost, we shall not be able to pronounce till after the study of chap. xiv.; see at the end of that chapter.

Such was the wealth of gifts which the Holy Spirit had produced in the Church of Corinth in the days of its first love. But what Paul wished to bring out here was *their unity* controlling all this diversity; he had mentioned it after each gift; and now once again he enunciates it more expressly at the close of the complete enumeration, ver. 11.

Ver. 11. "But all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will."—That *one:* in opposition to the plurality of believers; the *same:* in opposition to the diversity of gifts.—The partic. διαιροῦν, *dividing*, has no expressed object; the emphasis is on the act of dividing. With the adj. ἰδίᾳ, we must understand the subst. μοίρᾳ.—By the words: *as He will*, the apostle does not ascribe to the Spirit a capricious and fantastic mode of procedure. The good pleasure of God is never exercised except in perfect harmony with all the perfections of His character, His wisdom, goodness, righteousness. The analogous phrase, xv. 38, shows how entirely the notion of arbitrariness is excluded, in the apostle's view, from the idea of the Divine pleasure. One may compare in some respects Matt. xxv. 15. — The deliberate will (βούλεσθαι), here ascribed to the Holy Spirit, seems to me to imply His personality, as the act of giving supposes His Divinity. The words: *to every man as He will,* are undoubtedly intended to sweep away, from the more gifted of the Corinthians, every feeling of self-merit, and, from the less favoured, every tendency to discontentment. It will be seen that this double intention is precisely what inspires the following passage (vers. 13–30). But, first of all, ver. 12 serves

by a figure to bring out again the fundamental thought of the passage, vers. 4–11.

Ver. 12. "For as the body is one, and[1] hath many members, but all the members of the body,[2] being many, are one body: so is it with the Christ."—The apostle has just stated a Divine fact, which is the secret of the Church's life: the unity of the Divine force, which animates it in the variety of its manifestations. This principle is realized, first, from the standpoint of the Divine influence in general, in the triple diversity of gifts, offices, and effects produced (4–6); then from the special viewpoint of the Spirit's influence, in the variety of gifts (7–11). In ver. 12 Paul renders palpable the harmony of this diversity with the unity which produces and governs it, by comparing it with what is nearest us, our own body. What is the human body? One and the same life spreading out into a plurality of functions each attached to one of the members of the organism, and labouring for its preservation and wellbeing. — The last words: *So it is with the Christ*, present a difficulty. It seems as if we should have: So it is with the Church. Must we, with Grotius, de Wette, Heinrici, understand by *the Christ* the Church itself, or, with Rückert, the ideal Christ? These two meanings cannot be justified: the former because Paul, if that had been his idea, would have expressed himself more clearly; the latter, because it contains a notion foreign to the mind of the apostle. In general, commentators are agreed in applying the word: *the Christ*, to the personal glorified Christ,

[1] D F G It. read δε, instead of και.

[2] T. R. reads after σωματος with D E του ενος (*of the one*).

seeking, however, in various ways to comprehend the Church under the idea of His person; Chrysostom, Meyer saying: as *head* of the body, He fills and controls it throughout; Hofmann, Edwards regard Christ as the personal *ego* of the organism; Holsten thinks that *the Christ* denotes the *Spirit*, who generally, in Paul's view, is identical, according to Holsten, with Christ's glorified person. This last meaning is false, as well as the affirmation on which it rests. The Spirit is not identified either by Paul, or John, or any biblical writer, with the person of the Christ. The interpretations of Meyer and Hofmann are undoubtedly well founded, but it seems to me that the exact expression of Paul's idea is rather this: The term *the Christ* here denotes the whole spiritual economy of which He is the principle in opposition to the natural economy to which the human body belongs. Similarly it might be said, in describing a law of natural humanity: "It is so in Adam," or in instancing a law of the Jewish economy: "It was so in Abraham." It is a way of forcibly calling to mind the unity of the *personal* principle on which an economy rests, and which forms, as it were, its permanent substance. In the first half of the following verse the apostle applies to the Church this figure taken from the human body.

Ver. 13ª. "And indeed, by being baptized by one Spirit, we have all become one body, whether Jews or Greeks, whether bond or free." — The καὶ γάρ, *and indeed*, relates to the last words of the foregoing verse: *So is it with the Christ*, the demonstration of which it announces.—The καί indicates a second fact analogous to the preceding; the γάρ shows that this fact justifies

the comparison between the human body and what is done in Christ.—How different were both the religious condition (*Jews, Gentiles*) and the social condition (*bond, free*) of all those members of the Church of Corinth! By the same Spirit, into which they had all been baptized, they now find themselves fused, as it were, into one spiritual body, that is to say, into a society all whose members are moved by the same breath of life.—The ἐν (*in* or *by* one Spirit) denotes the means, and the εἰς (*into* one body) the result attained. When we think of the distance which at that period separated Jews from Gentiles, slaves from freemen, we measure the power of the principle of union which had filled up those gulfs. All those men so diverse in their antecedents, when once they go forth regenerated from baptism, form thenceforth only *one new man in Christ* (Eph. ii. 15).

But if diversity of gifts is resolved into unity by the fusion of all the individuals into one spiritual whole, the converse is also true. In Christ, as well as in the human body, unity must spread out into diversity. Such is the new idea to which the apostle passes from the second part of ver. 13. On the understanding of this transition depends the understanding of the chapter as a whole. Thus far the apostle has explained how, notwithstanding their varied multiplicity, the gifts are *one* in virtue of their common principle, the Holy *Spirit*, and their sole destination, not the private advantage of their possessor, but the profit of the whole (ver. 7). Nevertheless this unity of principle and aim should not injure the manifestation of their diversity; they are and should remain *different*, as to the form in

which they show themselves and their mode of action. And it is this other aspect of the truth, the necessary complement of the former, which is developed in the rest of the chapter.

3. *The diversity of gifts in the unity of the body* (vers. 13ᵇ–30).

Vers. 13ᵇ, 14. "And were all made to drink of[1] one Spirit. 14. For also the body is not one member, but many."—The reading is not εἰς ἓν πνεῦμα, but ἓν πνεῦμα without εἰς. This accusative is the qualifying substantive of the verb to make to drink; comp. the same construction iii. 2.—The καί, *and*, contains the transition which we have just mentioned. And what clearly proves that we pass here to the idea of the diversity of gifts is the καὶ γάρ, *for also*, at the beginning of ver. 14, a verse which is evidently meant to explain this diversity by that of the members of the body. This passage to the new idea (diversity) is also that which will enable us to apprehend the true meaning of the second proposition of ver. 13. Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Osiander, Neander, Heinrici find in it the idea of the Holy Supper. They have been led to this view by the mention of baptism in the first part of the verse, as well as by the term ἐποτίσθημεν, *we were made to drink*, which seems to allude to the cup in the sacrament. But the expression to drink the Holy Spirit in the Supper is absolutely foreign to the language of Scripture. It is of the blood of Christ that the believer partakes when he uses the cup. Then in this sense the aor. ἐποτίσθημεν would not find a natural

[1] T. R. with E K reads εις εν, instead of εν.

explanation, for the sacramental act is ever being repeated anew.—Or is it baptism that is still in question, as is held by Chrysostom, Bengel, de Wette, Meyer, Edwards? But the figure of drinking, or being made to drink (ποτισθῆναι), is as foreign to the form of the baptismal rite, as that of plunging, being bathed (βαπτισθῆναι), is naturally associated with it. Besides, the καί, *and*, indicates a new fact. If the second proposition served only to reaffirm in another form the idea of the first, there would be an asyndeton. The new fact in the mind of the apostle seems to me to be the communication of the *gifts* of the Spirit which accompanied the laying on of hands after baptism; comp. Acts viii. 17, xix. 6 (x. 45, 46). By baptism the believer is bathed in the Spirit as the source of new *life;* by the act which follows, the Spirit enters into him as the principle of certain particular *gifts* and of the personal activity which will flow from them. The believer is first *plunged*, bathed, in order to die to himself and live to God (Rom. vi. 3–5); then he is *made to drink*, saturated with new forces, that he may be able to serve the body of which he has become a member. Such are the two sides of his relation to the Holy Spirit. Holsten seems to me to have understood this passage nearly as I have done. It is easy to see how this thought forms the transition from the idea of the unity of the body to that of the diversity of gifts. After having been bathed in the same common life, they all come forth from it with the different gifts communicated to them by the Spirit.

Ver. 14. The apostle impresses this idea by taking up again the figure of the body which he had used to

describe the unity of the Church; to this end it is enough for him to reverse the figure. In ver. 12: many members, but one body; in ver. 14: one body, but many members.—This notion of the diversity of members is *explained* vers. 15–26, and *applied* to the Church vers. 27–30.

Vers. 15–26.

The object of this exposition is manifest. The Corinthians were disposed to exaggerate the value of certain gifts, which, from their extraordinary character, were fitted to strike the senses, in particular of the gift of speaking in tongues. From this prejudice there followed two evils: On the one hand, those who did not possess such gifts kept aloof discontented and discouraged, and the Church was deprived of their services, which might have been very needful; on the other, those who possessed the gifts, took pleasure in displaying them in the assemblies, so as to prevent the less brilliant gifts from filling the place which should have been reserved for them. It is to these two defects that the apostle successively applies the figure of the part played by the members in the human body; to the former, in the passage 15–17; to the latter, in the passage 18–26. Though the application of all the figures to spiritual gifts is transparent, it is nevertheless true that everything the apostle says has already literal verity in relation to the members of the human body.

Vers. 15–17. "If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it not, in spite of that, of the body? 16. If the ear shall say,

Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it not, in spite of that, of the body? 17. If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole were hearing, where were the smelling?"—The foot and the ear speak here as less conspicuous and favoured members than the hand and the eye, which represent the most highly valued gifts.—Many take the last proposition of vers. 15 and 16 as an affirmation in the form of two negatives which destroy one another: "It does *not* come about, therefore, that the foot is *not* of the body." But it is more natural to regard it, with Erasmus, Calvin, de Wette, etc., as a question in the sense of a *reductio ad absurdum*. The doubling of the negative οὐ is caused by the παρὰ τοῦτο, *in spite of that*: "Is it not in spite thereof . . . is it not of the body?"—The meaning ordinarily given to παρά is *because of* (see Meyer, Edwards). But I do not think that this meaning occurs elsewhere in the New Testament. Why not understand simply: *passing alongside of that*, that is to say: *in spite of that;* comp. Rom. i. 26, xi. 24. Meyer, Hofmann, and others understand by τοῦτο, *that*, the erroneous affirmation of the foot and the ear: "What these members say wrongly does not prevent them from being of the body." But it is more natural to refer it to the fact itself of the inferiority of the foot and the ear. "In spite of this inferiority, are not these members really of the body?" Comp. Holsten.

Ver. 17. This verse is more easily connected in the second sense of the word τοῦτο. If, from the fact that the foot is not the hand, etc., it followed that it did not form part of the body, the admirable variety of the

senses would be excluded, and the perfection of the human organism destroyed.

There now follows the counterpart: what Divine wisdom *has done* in answer to the senseless talk of the foot and the ear.

Vers. 18–20. "But now hath God set the members every one of them in the body, as it hath pleased Him. 19. But if they were all one member, where were the body? 20. But now are there many members and one body."—The reality (νυνί, *now*) contrasting (δέ, *but*) with the condemned supposition.—A fine paronomasia, no doubt intentional, in θεός and ἔθετο. The high dignity of each member appears from the thought that it is God Himself who has placed it in the body, and placed it where it is best (the foot at the lower extremity of the body, the ear concealed at the side of the head, and not in view like the hand or the eye). Divine understanding has presided over this whole arrangement; inorganic matter nowhere invades this privileged domain of the human body.

Ver. 19 expresses once more the idea of ver. 17: "If God had acted otherwise, what would have become of the body?" Instead of this admirable organism, we should have a being endowed with a single sense, as is found, for example, in the lowest grade of animalism.—Then ver. 20 resumes the exposition of the actual fact, as God has willed it. The νῦν δέ is the repetition of the νυνὶ δέ of ver. 18. God has not managed things so awkwardly. He has instituted a plurality of members, without however destroying the unity of the body.—The application is obvious at a glance: If the Spirit manifests Himself in certain members only in less

extraordinary or less eminent forms than in others, it does not follow that they should put themselves outside the common life, and bury away their gift, like the wicked servant of the parable, who received only one talent.

The apostle now turns, on the other hand, to those who have received the most eminent gifts (vers. 21–26).

Vers. 21, 22. "But[1] the eye[2] cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you. 22. Nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary."—The δέ, *but*, is sufficiently supported by the documents. As in ver. 18 Paul had contrasted God's *doing* with the *saying* of the foot and the ear, he here contrasts with God's *doing* the *saying* of the eye or the head. The *eye*, privileged as it is by its eminent function and noble position in the body, cannot dispense with the inferior members, the hand, for example, without which it could not appropriate the objects which seem to it desirable. The same is the case with the *head* in relation to the feet. The head is named here, not as representing the Christ, but as uniting all the organs whose functions are most essential to life. What would the ear, the tongue, the nose, the palate do, if the feet were not at their service?

Ver. 22. Nay more, the instant we reflect, we are convinced of the absolute *necessity* of the members which seem to play an altogether secondary part, more secondary even than the hand or the feet. These *weak* parts are no doubt the sensitive organs which are

[1] A C F G P omit the δε (*but*). [2] T. R. with A omits ο (*the*)

protected by their position in the body, the lungs and stomach, for example, on which, above all, the life and health of the whole body depend.—The πολλῷ μᾶλλον has a logical (*much rather*) and not a quantitative sense (*much more*).—Hence it follows that the gifts and offices which have a modest appearance are *necessary*, no less than the others, to the prosperity of the whole.

Vers. 23, 24ª. "And the members of the body, which we think to be less honourable, upon these we bestow more abundant honour; and our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness. 24ª. Whereas our comely parts have no need."—Paul here appeals to a fact of natural instinct in man. Καί: *and moreover.* There is a gradation from the ἀσθενέστερα, *more feeble*, to the ἀτιμότερα and ἀσχήμονα, *less honourable* and *uncomely.* — These less honourable members are the arms, the throat, the breast, the belly, the legs, all the parts of the body on which chiefly the cares of the toilet are lavished.—The apostle pushes the comparison to the utmost. The second καί signifies: *and even.* Hofmann makes the ἡμῶν, *our*, dependent not on ἀσχήμονα, but on εὐσχημοσύνην ἔχει: "derive *from us* greater comeliness;" and similarly in ver. 24 he makes the ἡμῶν depend on χρείαν ἔχει: "Those which are comely of themselves have no need of us to make them such." This commentator sometimes seems to amuse himself with exegetical feats rather than to speak seriously. The ἡμῶν is added to the two adjectives ἀσχήμονα and εὐσχήμονα to express the solidarity which exists between the comeliness of one part of the body and that of our whole person. The shame of *one* of

our members is *ours*. What the apostle wished thereby to impress on the proud Corinthians was, that it pertains to the honour of the whole Church that those who are charged with the humblest functions and the least prominent services should be the objects of the greatest marks of respect; we should say, if we dared so to paraphrase: To the brother serving in the agape, the best portion! To the brother who sweeps the floor, the most honourable place beside the president!

Ver. 24[a]. But, as to functions which of themselves honour those who fill them, there is nothing to add to this intrinsic honour. They resemble the beautiful parts of the body, which would be wronged were they covered. Transparent as the meaning of this parable is applied to the Church, the apostle does not go beyond the figure, as we still find in what follows.

Vers. 24[b], 25. "But God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honour to that which lacked:[1] 25. that there should be no schism[2] in the body; but that all the members should have the same care one for another."—The δέ, *but*, seems to me to be well explained by Holsten: "But as to this contrast which meets the eyes of men God gives the solution of it by the end which He had in view in creating it." God has intermingled feeble members with strong in the human body, comely parts with others not comely, that the latter might be the objects of particular care and attention on the part of the others, and that thus the body might not present the

[1] T. R. with D E F G K L: τω υστερουντι; ℵ A B C: τω υστερουμενω.
[2] T. R. with A B C E K It. Syr. reads σχισμα (*schism*); ℵ D F G L: σχισματα (*schisms*).

spectacle of two orders of members, the one glorious and the other despicable, which would destroy the harmony of the whole and would even impair the favourable effect produced by the first. God has thus succeeded in making every member have an interest in the comely and honourable appearance of all the others. Love on their part thus becomes a matter of rightly understood self-interest. The singular σχίσμα, *schism*, is certainly the true reading; the plural σχίσματα, *schisms*, has been substituted for it, because it was thought there was an allusion here to the divisions in the Church of Corinth. There must not be the contrast between parts beautiful and ugly, glorious and vile, in the masterpiece of creation. — The τὸ αὐτὸ μεριμνᾶν signifies: to have a common care, to be all concerned about one result. This common end is the harmonious beauty of the whole.—By adding ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων, *one for another*, the apostle means that all should be watchful for the honour of all in order to the dignity of the whole. Those members which are of themselves less honourable thus turn out to be the objects of the special interest of all, that there may be procured for them the nobility which they had not naturally. For this end it is that God has established between them all such a close solidarity. And indeed, as the following verse says, there is between them an instinctive sympathy of satisfaction or shame which impels each to provide for the honour of all.

Ver. 26. "And whether[1] one member suffer, all the other members suffer with it; or one[2] member be

[1] B F G It. read ει τι (*if any*), instead of ειτε (*whether*).
[2] ℵ A B omit εν.

honoured, all the others rejoice with it."—*Καί*: *and really.* "This mutual care cannot be wanting for the body, for in fact . . ." The shame or contempt which overtakes one of the members of the body exercises a depressing influence on the condition of all the others. The honour, on the contrary, rendered to one, to the head, for example, when it is crowned, or to this or that other part of the body when it is brilliantly adorned, reacts on the attitude of the whole body, which erects itself and takes on a princely bearing. The application of these figures was self-evident: If gifts inferior in appearance are despised and checked, the state of the whole Church cannot fail to feel it. The honour which the most eminent gifts receive in such circumstances will not be of good quality. It cannot subserve the honour of the whole body, except in so far as the least of its members shares in it. It is clear that the special applications of all these figures must have been self-evident to the minds of the Corinthians. And so the apostle does not enunciate them; he contents himself with a wholly general application, which he gives in vers. 27–30. The idea is summarily indicated in ver. 27.

Vers. 27–30.

Ver. 27. "Now ye are a body of Christ, and members in particular."[1]—This verse gives the reason why the parable of the human body may be applied to the readers. They are a *body of Christ*, not *the* body of Christ; the apostle takes care not to put the article exactly as in iii. 16: "Ye are a temple of God."—*The*

[1] D It. Vg. read ἐκ μέλους.

body of Christ is the whole Church; but for that very reason every particular Church shares in that dignity. Christ, dwelling in it, governs it by His Spirit, and gives it the organic forms fitted to manifest its action.—In virtue of this character belonging to the Church of Corinth, each Corinthian is to it what each member is to the body. The term μέλη, *members*, should not be applied to the particular Churches in their relation to the Church as a whole, as has been thought by several commentators ancient and modern. For this we should have to understand ὑμεῖς, *ye*, of Christians in general, which is not natural; and would not this idea be out of place in the context? The word μέλη, *members*, applies to all the individuals composing the Church of Corinth. The term expresses their plurality, and the restrictive word ἐκ μέρους, *in particular*, their qualitative diversity. Each has only a part in the life of the whole, that which accrues to him in virtue of his individual gifts; comp. the ἐκ μέρους, *in part*, xiii. 9, 10, 12. No member, consequently, may call himself the whole, and claim to absorb for his own advantage the fulness of ecclesiastical activity, as Paul proceeds to point out in the following enumeration, vers. 28–30. Each one, therefore, has need of his brethren. Side by side with his gift, there should be room for the exercise of the gifts of all the rest. The reading of D Vulg. ἐκ μέλους, *members taken from the member*, seems to allude to Christ's being Himself, as the head, one of the members (ver. 21); but it is evident that in ver. 21 the word *head* is taken in another sense.

In the three following verses we find two successive enumerations of those gifts and offices which form the

counterpart of the organs and members of the body. The aim of the first, ver. 28, is to affirm the dignity of all those gifts and offices as being willed and given by God Himself independently of the sort of hierarchy which He has thought good to establish among them. All have their part to play, and no one ought to be excluded, if the whole is to prosper. This idea corresponds to that of the passage 18–26, where Paul had shown that all the members of the body, even those apparently most inferior, are entitled and bound to discharge their function for the good of the whole. The second enumeration, vers. 29, 30, has a wholly different bearing. The idea which inspires it is this: The gifts and offices have been Divinely distributed; no member unites them all in himself. Every brother then, even should he possess the most exalted function, needs the gifts and offices of all his brethren; no one consequently should presume to hinder the exercise of those gifts which he does not himself possess. This second idea exactly corresponds to that of the passage 15–17, regarding the need which the most highly endowed members of the body have of the services of all the rest. Vers. 28–30 are therefore the application of the whole passage vers. 14–26, where the apostle develops the necessity of the diversity of the members in the unity of the human body; only in the application the order of the two ideas developed in the parable is reversed: the necessity of the part and the honour to be given to the inferior gifts and offices, developed in the second place in the parable (vers. 18–26), takes the first in application (ver. 28); and the need which all, even the most eminent gifts, have of all the rest,

expounded in the first place in regard to the members of the body (vers. 14–17), takes the second place in the application (vers. 29, 30).

Ver. 28. "And God hath set some in the Church . . . first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then[1] gifts of healing, helps, governments, kinds of tongues."—The phrase ἔθετο ὁ θεός, *God hath set*, identical with that in ver. 18, shows the correspondence between the idea of ver. 28 and that of the passage vers. 18–26. Edwards acutely observes, that if in Eph. iv. 11 Paul uses the word ἔδωκε, *gave*, it is because in that passage he wishes to bring out the wealth of Christ's gifts, while here he is rather thinking of the sovereignty of Divine power.—In beginning this proposition, the apostle had first in view a simple enumeration, in which all the functions about to follow should be placed on the same footing. Hence the οὓς μέν, *some*, which should have been followed by οὓς δέ, *others;* comp. Eph. iv. 11. But, on reaching the first term of the enumeration, his feeling of the inequality of these gifts and offices causes a modification in the expression of his thought, and instead of the simple term *apostles*, which was to have begun the enumeration, he suddenly introduces, by means of the adverb *firstly*, followed by *secondly*, *thirdly*, etc., the notion of subordination. The apostle had a special reason for reminding this Church, in which liberty was degenerating into licence, of the deference due to the apostolate, and then to the prophetic and teaching offices, those three excellent gifts, to which that of speaking in tongues was childishly preferred. It is

[1] T. R. with K L reads εἶτα (*then*); ℵ A B C: ἔπειτα (*thereafter*).

from this modification introduced into the original thought that the inaccuracy pointed out has arisen. Hofmann has denied any change of construction. He makes of the whole ver. 28 a parenthetical proposition, the principal being found in ver. 29: "And those whom God has set as apostles, as prophets, as teachers . . . (ver. 29), are not however all apostles, all prophets, all teachers," that is to say: "they do not however each combine all these offices." But by this unnatural construction the μέν becomes superfluous, and the substitution of the idea of rank (*firstly*, etc.) for the simple enumeration becomes incomprehensible, not to speak of the strangeness of the question in itself. — The apostle here returns to the general viewpoint of vers. 4–6, where the gifts and offices were combined; he intermingles them in the following enumeration.—The regimen ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, *in the Church*, shows that the circle here embraced in the view of the apostle is larger than that referred to, vers. 8–10, by the enumeration of the gifts prevailing at Corinth. The apostolate could not have figured in this narrow circle, either as an office, or still less as an office belonging to the Church universal. Now Paul, as we have just said, had good reasons for mentioning here the first rank assigned by God to the office of apostle, and hence he rises from the idea of the Corinthian community to that of the whole Christian community. The πρῶτον, *firstly*, combines the two notions of time and dignity, which are in this case closely connected; for the Church sprang, as it were, from the apostolate which founded it, and which remains to the end its highest guide. But the notion of superiority certainly outweighs that of

anteriority, the *secondly* and *thirdly* which follow being incapable of application to time. Paul here includes in the apostolate the ministry of those men who, like James, Barnabas, Silas, took part in founding the Church, and even the evangelists or missionaries (Timothy, Titus, etc.) who are separately mentioned, Eph. iv. 11; comp. Acts xiv. 4, 14; Rom. xvi. 7. Is it not possible that in speaking in ver. 21 of the head as a member of the body, the apostolate was already in his mind?—The *prophets* are those whose office it is to receive the new revelations which God thinks good to grant to the Church at certain times. We shall see, chap. xiv., that every prophetic discourse rests on an immediate revelation, the contents of which are communicated at the moment to the Church. These revelations were intended to enlighten the faithful as to the gravity of the present and imminent situation of the Church, and to enkindle the courage and Christian hope of its members. The prophets of the first age, like the apostles, do not seem to have been permanently attached to a special Church. Like the apostolate, the ministry of the prophets had a universal character, though they might settle for a time in a particular Church (Acts xiii. 1, xv. 32). In several passages (Eph. ii. 20, iii. 5) they are almost identified with the apostles, with whom they shared the task of founding the Church. If all prophets were not apostles, on the other hand the prophetic gift seems to have been bound to the apostolate. In the *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles*, the prophets still exercise an itinerant ministry, going from Church to Church to edify the faithful.—The *teachers*, mentioned in the third place,

were men who had the gift of calmly and consecutively expounding saving truth, and of applying it to the practical life of the Church. If the prophet may be compared to the traveller who discovers new countries, the teacher is like the geographer who combines the scattered results of these discoveries and gives a methodical statement of them. This ministry must have been more local than that of the prophets; for, Eph. iv. 11, it is closely connected with that of pastors, which was decidedly parochial (Acts xx. 28). But we learn from this very passage that the two functions were not identical. It was only gradually, though already in the course of the apostolic age, that the ministry of teaching (*doctorate*, διδασκαλία) was combined and fused, as it were, with the care of souls (the *pastorate*, the ποιμήν). The passage 1 Tim. v. 17 indicates the beginning of this fusion; and the part taken by the *angel* in the Churches of the Apocalypse marks its completion. Hence it is that the latter is made responsible for the state of the Church. If the gift of prophecy still remains in our day in the lively view and powerful expression of the truths of salvation, the doctorate has its sphere in the complete and orderly teaching of these truths, religious or theological.—The apostolate combines the two sides of gift and office, both raised to their highest power. In prophecy, the side of gift evidently outweighs that of office; in teaching the reverse. This is what has rendered the latter more suited to remain with the lapse of time as a regular function.

There follow two pairs of activities, in the first of which only the gift-element is found, while in the

second there is little more than the element of office. And first the gift of *miracles*, literally: powers, then *gifts of healing*. For these two expressions we refer to ver. 10, where the workings of miracles evidently correspond to our δυνάμεις, miraculous virtues. The persons on whom these gifts are bestowed, not having any importance in themselves, do not count, so to speak; this is why the abstract expressions *powers* and *gifts of healing* are substituted for those which denote the individuals themselves, used in the preceding grades. For the same reason the apostle now substitutes for the adverbs expressly indicating rank, which had been used at the beginning, the vaguer terms: *after that, then* . . ., till he ends with simple enumeration. — The reading εἶτα, *then*, in the Byz. (before χαρίσματα), is certainly preferable to the ἔπειτα, *after that*, of the other two families; comp. xv. 23, 24. The εἶτα is a softened continuation of the preceding ἔπειτα; it distinguishes less forcibly than the latter. In proportion as we come down in the scale, the subordination becomes less distinct.

To this pair of gifts there succeeds a pair in which the notion of office is evidently the ruling one. For the offices in question are more or less external. The word ἀντιλήψεις, *helps*, comes from the verb ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, which strictly signifies: *to take* a burden *on oneself* (the middle) *instead* of another (ἀντι); comp. Acts xx. 35; Rom. viii. 26. This term therefore denotes the various kinds of relief which the Church sought to procure for all sufferers, widows and orphans, the indigent, sick, strangers, travellers, etc. These various functions were afterwards united in the

ecclesiastical diaconate, male and female. How could it enter the mind of some exegetes to apply the term to the interpretation of tongues! — The κυβερνήσεις, *governments* or *administrations*, no doubt denote the various kinds of superintendence needed for the external good order of the assemblies and of the worship of the Church. It was necessary to find and furnish the places of meeting, etc. . . . This all required what we should nowadays call committees, with their presidents. The various tasks were probably divided among the presbyters or elders, whose ministry was as yet distinct from that of the teachers. Only gradually was the function of teaching assigned to those who were already charged with such external management. Comp. the passage already quoted, 1 Tim. v. 17, as well as iii. 2; and Titus i. 9, where Paul insists that the elder be capable of teaching and refuting those who oppose sound doctrine. We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of quoting here M. Renan's beautiful remarks on this whole passage (*Saint Paul*, p. 410): "These functions: care of the suffering, the administration of the poor man's pence, mutual assistance, are enumerated by Paul in the last place, and as humble matters. But his piercing eye can here too see the truth: 'Take note,' says he, 'our least noble members are precisely the most honoured.' 'Prophets, speakers of tongues, teachers, you shall pass away. Deacons, devoted widows, administrators of the goods of the Church, you shall remain; you build for eternity.'"

The apostle closes this enumeration with the gift of tongues, including in it here the gift of interpretation. On the expression: *kinds of tongues*, see on ver. 10.

The last place assigned to this gift in a list which, from the beginning, had taken a hierarchical character, can only have, whatever Meyer may say to the contrary, one object, viz. to reduce as far as possible the importance to be attached to it.—The apostle started from the highest ministry in which gift and office appear combined and in their highest potency. Thence he passed through the various grades of gradual disjunction of gifts and offices, to their widest separation, which appears in governments and administrations (as offices) on the one hand, and in speaking in tongues (as a gift) on the other. It is obvious that the classification in our passage has an ecclesiastical character, and is no longer taken, like that of vers. 8–10, from the psychological viewpoint. This is the reason why prophecy here occupies a wholly different place from that which it has in the first list. As we have often said, there is nothing arbitrary in Paul's writings, even where he seems to enumerate at random. The principle of order which he follows here is that of the importance of the gifts and offices, not their intrinsic nature.

It is God, then, who has set in the Church all the different gifts and offices, and who has established among them a decreasing scale of value. The apostle does not state the conclusion from this fact, which was sufficiently apparent from what had been said in regard to the members set in the body by the hand of God. The result is this: No one should consider himself as useless, or be so considered by the Church, because he is less brilliantly endowed than this or that other. Now he passes to a new enumeration in the

form of questions, to which the previous affirmation naturally gives rise: God Himself set these gifts in the Church. And how did He do it? Did He give them all to all? By no means, for that would have been to make every member a sort of whole body, consequently to render it independent of all the rest, and so destroy the body itself. God would not have individuals possessing all the gifts because He would not have any one in a position to be self-sufficient; He so ordered things that the brethren should all need one another. Thus are explained the following questions:

Vers. 29, 30. "Are all apostles? are all prophets? are all teachers? are all powers? 30. Have all the gifts of healing? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret?" — God has given to believers a certain spiritual endowment (ver. 28); but side by side with this endowment He has left a blank in each of them, and so a want which does not allow him to separate himself from the rest. It is obvious that the questions are put so as to lead to the result which was expressed in regard to the members of the body in vers. 14–17. No individual ought to pose as self-sufficient. The body, as a whole, only exists on the condition that each member needs all the rest. The questions, all beginning with μή, all expect a negative answer: "All are not, however, apostles?" None of those, therefore, who are not such, will be able to dispense with the brethren whom God has made apostles. And if this is true regarding apostles and prophets, it is also true in regard to all other gifts and offices.—It is unnecessary to understand ἔχουσιν before δυνάμεις, *powers*. This substantive may

very well be the predicate of the subject. The power of working miracles is identified with its possessor (ver. 28).—*Helps* and *governments* are omitted in this second list, probably because they did not greatly excite the ambition of believers.

It follows, therefore, from this application to the Church, vers. 27–30 : (1) that no one ought to regard himself as being unnecessary to the whole, since he has been placed there with his gift by God Himself (ver. 28) ; (2) and consequently, also, that no one ought to consider himself as possessed of self-sufficiency or as combining in himself all that is necessary for the life of the Church of which he is a member (vers. 29, 30).

From these general principles the apostle might pass immediately to the practical applications he has in view. But, before entering on this subject, which will be treated in chap. xiv., he here inserts a meditation on the fundamental disposition of the Christian life, charity without which all gifts, whatever they may be, become useless, but which, on the other hand, gives them all their true consecration and alone assures their effectual and beneficent exercise (chap. xiii.). To our ver. 31, which forms the transition to this episode, there obviously corresponds ver. 1 of chap. xiv., whereby the apostle returns from this digression to his principal subject.

Ver. 31. "But covet earnestly the best[1] gifts, and moreover I will show you a supremely excellent way." —Theodoret has taken the first proposition interrogatively. In that case it would contain a rebuke, either

[1] T. R. with D E F G K L It. reads κρειττονα (*better*) ; ℵ A B C: μειζονα (*greater*).

in the sense: "Are you careful to seek the most useful gifts? No, you seek the most brilliant;" or in this: "Do you seek the greatest gifts (the most brilliant)? Yes, and it is your sin." But neither of these meanings harmonizes with the following proposition. It leads us to take the first clause as an exhortation resulting from the application, vers. 27–30: "All gifts are useful and in their place; you are right in seeking them. *But* (δέ) let this search be especially after those by which you can contribute most to the edifica- of the whole." The δέ is rather adversative, as de Wette thinks, and as is proved by Edwards against Meyer. Holsten rightly remarks that the adjective ought to be detached from the substantive: "Seek gifts, and the best ones." The reading of the received text κρείττονα, *better*, which is that of the Greco-Lats. and Byz., seems to me preferable to the Alex. reading: μείζονα, *greater*. This is taken, probably, from the passages xiii. 13 and xiv. 5, which have been mistaken for parallels to this. The adjective κρείττων, strictly *more powerful* and so *more useful*, is evidently taken here in this second meaning: the gifts most capable of producing the common edification. The word μείζων would have the same meaning, but less naturally.—By these better gifts, there have been understood faith, hope, and charity (xiii. 13), but wrongly. Never, in Paul's language, are the gifts, which are the means of Christian activity, confounded with the virtues which are the very elements of life. The sequel will show that Paul has especially in view prophecy and teaching. —It is asked how he can stir up believers to *seek* gifts. Does not the very term gifts imply that they are

received, not *acquired* by labour? Must we with Reuss see here an insoluble contradiction between the two elements of Paul's view: Divine gift and human pursuit? But first the pursuit can take place in the way of prayer, an act which agrees easily with the notion of gift. Then the gift may exist in the believer as a germ in a natural talent which it is his mission to cultivate, but which he may also leave buried. No doubt there were among the Corinthians more prophets and teachers potentially than really. Love for the Church would have developed those gifts; but they were decaying in consequence of the false direction which the new life had taken. See this idea of *ζηλοῦν*, *covet*, taken up again in the second part of xiv. 1. At the moment when he was about to develop it, all at once Paul stops, seized with the need of expressing a feeling which has for a long time filled his heart in view of the spiritual state of this Church. What does he mean by speaking of a *supremely excellent way*, which he proceeds to describe? Is it the normal way of attaining to the possession of the most desirable gifts? The way would thus be the true mode of the *ζηλοῦν*. Or is it the way in a more general sense, the way of holiness and salvation, in opposition to gifts which of themselves cannot sanctify and save? Commentators are divided between the two meanings. The former seems at first better to suit the context; it is adopted by Chrysostom, Meyer, Osiander, de Wette, Edwards, and yet the latter is alone really admissible, as has been clearly seen by Tertullian, Estius, Olshausen, Rückert, Hofmann, Holsten. This appears from the relation between our verse and that

by which it is resumed, xiv. 1. There we find clearly expressed the idea of a *contrast* between seeking love and coveting gifts. Consequently, in the apostle's view, love is by no means mentioned here as a means of succeeding in the pursuit of gifts, but as a virtue to be sought first of all and for itself. Meyer and Edwards object that this meaning would have required ἀλλά, *but* (Meyer), or ὅμως, *nevertheless* (Edwards), instead of ἔτι, *moreover;* but wrongly. The apostle *rises* from the encouragement to seek gifts to another recommendation, viz. to walk (ὁδός) in charity. The καὶ ἔτι, *and moreover*, suits this meaning: "Seek gifts, and, moreover, I will now describe a way which is still better than the exercise of gifts, even the best, that whereby alone the possession and exercise of gifts will truly become a blessing." I find in Holsten nearly the same thought thus expressed: "Paul shows that above all gifts and the aspiration after them, there is a higher way open to the Christian — love. The Corinthians find therein the true standard by which to appreciate the value of this aspiration and of its satisfaction." It would be possible to connect ἔτι with καθ' ὑπερβόλην; but in this way we only form a pleonasm; ἔτι is naturally joined with the verb: "And moreover I have to show you . . ." Comp. Acts ii. 26. — The form καθ' ὑπερβόλην, *in superabundance, excellently*, is somewhat frequent in Paul's writings: sometimes it relates to the verb (2 Cor. i. 8; Gal. i. 13); sometimes it qualifies the adjective or the substantive it accompanies; so Rom. viii. 13 (καθ' ὑπερβ. ἁμαρτωλός), and perhaps 2 Cor. iv. 17. Here, applying it to the verb, with Grotius and Ewald, we should be

brought to the meaning: "And to give superabundance of clearness or certainty, I again point out to you the true way." But first this meaning would attach to the false explanation of the word *way*, which we have set aside; and in any case, the indication of the way would not be in the least superfluous, for Paul gives it a whole chapter. The idea of superabundance or excellence therefore qualifies the way itself. The supremely excellent way whereby the Christian ought to seek to attain the end of life is charity. Reuss explains: "A supreme rule which is to guide you in your judgment." The explanation is grammatically correct; but the way designates not the rule for judging gifts, but love itself, which should guide the use of them.—The present δείκνυμι, *I show*, simply announces what Paul is about to do in the following passage (in reply to Edwards).

II. The Way *par excellence* (Chap. XIII.).

This chapter has been called a hymn. In tone indeed it is truly lyrical, especially in the first verses. Charity is poetically personified. In this respect the passage resembles some others in St. Paul's writings, such as the end of chap. xv. of our Epistle, that of chap. viii. of the Romans, or that of chap. iii. of the First Epistle to Timothy. These are, so to speak, specimens of a sublime *speaking in tongues*, interpreted by the *glossolalete*[1] himself. "There is here," as Heinrici well says, "such warmth as could only proceed from the

[1] We may be allowed to use this expression, taken from the Greek, to designate one who spoke in tongues.

purest experience of charity. It is as if love itself stood before us, filled with its holy peace and profound sympathy." The apostle develops three thoughts: (1) the uselessness of gifts, even the highest, without charity, vers. 1–3; (2) the intrinsic excellence of charity, vers. 4–7; (3) the eternal duration of charity, and of charity alone, vers. 8–13. Thus is proved the assertion of ver. 31, that to walk in love is the way *par excellence;* for it alone guides us to the absolute end.

VERS. 1–3.

Without love, the most eminent gifts confer no real worth on their possessor.

Ver. 1. "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am only a sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal."—Hitherto the apostle had put the gift of tongues at the end of each of his lists (xii. 10, 28, 30). Here he puts it foremost, because now he rises from the least valuable to the most useful gift. To give assurance of his perfect impartiality in the valuation he proceeds to make, he supposes himself exercising this gift, as indeed he really possessed it in a rare degree (xiv. 18). And to express its insufficiency more forcibly, he does not consider it only as it appeared in the Church of Corinth, and was an object of ambition to its members; he raises it hypothetically to the most magnificent realization of it possible. Paul supposes himself in possession of the languages of all thinking and speaking beings, terrestrial and celestial. Some, Thiersch for example, refer the term tongues *of men* to the various tongues spoken

by the apostles on the day of Pentecost, and tongues *of angels* to the gift of tongues as it flourished at Corinth. The former of these terms would thus designate the real tongues spoken by different nations: Arabic, Latin, etc. But independently of the question relating to the nature of the gift of tongues on the day of Pentecost, a question which we shall afterwards treat (chap. xiv. end), by thus identifying the gift of tongues at Corinth with the tongues of angels, the apostle would have raised it even above that gift in the form in which it appeared at Pentecost, which is impossible. For the gift in its original form remains of course the perfect type of that kind of spiritual manifestation. Paul therefore simply means: "Imagine a man endowed with all the powers of terrestrial and celestial language. . . ." It is inconceivable how Meyer, with this passage before him, can persist in applying the term *tongue* to the physical organ of speech, which would lead to the meaning: "Though I had in my mouth, I, Paul, the tongues of millions of men and of angels."

In translating I have rendered the word ἀγάπη by the term *charity*, rather than by love. And for this reason: our word love combines two notions which are expressed in Greek by two different words: ἀγάπη and ἔρως. The second denotes the love of desire, which seeks its own satisfaction in the being loved, love as it appears to us in Plato's beautiful myth (in the *Symposium*), where it is represented as the son of poverty and wealth; it is this shade of meaning particularly which attaches in French to the word love (amour). But the Greek language knows another love, the love

of complacency, which is much more disinterested, which contemplates, approves, and yields itself: this is ἀγάπη, a word which is certainly related to the verb ἄγαμαι, *to admire*. To this term it seems to me the word *charity* better corresponds. In our passage the feeling expressed by ἀγάπη is mainly love of our neighbour (vers. 4–7); now this love, being according to Paul an emanation from the love of God, takes the character of disinterestedness, purity, and freeness which distinguishes Divine love.[1]

But how are we to suppose speaking in tongues apart from faith, and faith divorced from charity which is its fruit? Is not the apostle's supposition merely a threat fitted to alarm his readers? Experience proves that a man, after opening his heart with faith to the joy of salvation, may very soon cease to walk in the way of sanctification, shrink from complete self-surrender, and, while making progress in mystical feeling, become more full of self and devoid of love than he ever was. Such is the issue of the religious sybaritism of which revivals furnish so many examples. Christianity, instead of acting as a principle of devotion, turns into poetry, sentimentality, and fine speaking. It may even happen that, after a real and serious conversion, love may be at first developed in the heart and life, but afterwards, in consequence of some practical unfaithfulness, and through a want of vigilance, leading to spiritual pride, charity may be gradually chilled. The gifts originally received remain in some measure,

[1] [The verbal criticism of this paragraph applies, in a measure, to the English as well as to the French words, though perhaps hardly so conclusively, in favour of the adoption of *charity*.—Tr.]

but the inner life has disappeared. In this second case, the perfect γέγονα, "*I have become* and am for the future," is still more easily explained than in the first. The apostle's thought might therefore be rendered thus: "If, after giving myself to Christ, I became the most eminent Christian poet the Church had, and my heart were void of charity . . ."—The two terms *brass* and *cymbal*, which denote, the one a piece of unwrought metal, struck to produce sound, the other the concave plate, used so frequently in the East as a musical instrument, perfectly describe the inflation of an exalted imagination, and an over-excited sensibility. Religious language is then no longer the natural overflowing of a heart filled with love; it resembles the resonant sound of a dead and hollow instrument. We might apply the word χαλκός, *brass*, as we sometimes do in French, to the trumpet; but, as Meyer says, Paul begins with a vague expression to pass to one more specific. Suidas says that the expression δωδωναῖον χαλκεῖον was a proverbial name for those who speak much and do nothing (Heinrici). The word ἀλαλάζον denotes in general what makes a great noise, such as a war-cry.

Ver. 2. "And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and [though I have] all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing." —The apostle rises to the higher gifts. The gift of the *prophet* and that of the teacher (*knowledge*) are here joined together by the expression: *knowing all mysteries*, which, from its position, seems to be connected with both. And in fact both relate to the

understanding of God's plan of salvation. Now this plan is the supreme *mystery*, and contains within it all particular mysteries (comp. ii. 7). It is to the latter, to certain details as to the final accomplishment of salvation, for example, that the revelations granted to the prophets specially refer; whereas *knowledge* denotes the understanding of salvation itself in its totality, and as already accomplished and revealed in Christ. The expression εἰδέναι γνῶσιν, *to know knowledge*, is a familiar form in Greek. To be remarked is the article before γνῶσις, *the* knowledge, a form by which Paul means: all it is possible to have; and the adjective πᾶς, *all*, thrice repeated, with the words *mystery*, *knowledge*, and *faith*, supposes each of those gifts possessed in its ideal perfection, like that of tongues in ver. 1.—Commentators explain otherwise than I have done the relation between the three propositions concerning prophecy, the understanding of mysteries and knowledge. Heinrici finds two gifts here: (1) prophecy, with which he connects the understanding of mysteries, and (2) knowledge properly so called. But how can knowledge (γνῶσιν) be thus separated from (εἰδῶ) knowing? Edwards rather connects the second proposition with the third. Meyer applies the three propositions to one and the same gift, prophecy; but xii. 8 expressly distinguishes prophecy from knowledge.

Faith is taken here in the same sense as in xii. 9; the assurance, founded on the feeling of reconciliation, that nothing can resist us when we are really doing the work of God. Possible obstacles are represented under the figure of a mountain to be removed, as in Matt.

xvii. 20. The abrupt brevity of the phrase which closes this paragraph: *I am nothing*, contrasts with the long developments given to the preceding propositions. Behold the fruit of all those magnificent gifts: all speech, all knowledge, all power, and yet nothing! What such a man has done may be of value to the Church; to himself it is nothing, because there was no love in it. Love alone is anything in the eyes of love. —But how is it credible that a man can reach this height of knowledge and power in God without love? Here, again, are we not face to face with an impossible supposition? No; the faith of first days may develop more or less exclusively in the direction of knowledge (ver. 2[a]) or of force of will (ver. 2[b]), as well as in the direction of sensibility (ver. 1); comp. Luke ix. 54, where James and John ask the Lord to bring down fire from heaven on the Samaritan village. Faith is there, but where is charity? This is what Jesus points out to them. Or there are believers who may have preserved the gift of prophesying, of driving out demons, of working miracles, while in the eyes of Him who tries the heart and reins they are only workers of iniquity; comp. Matt. vii. 22. In our day, too, one may be a celebrated theologian, the instrument of powerful revivals, the author of beautiful works in the kingdom of God, a missionary with a name filling the world; if in all these things the man is self-seeking, and if it is not the Divine breath of charity which animates him, in God's eyes this is only *seeming*, not *being*. The apostle goes further still.

Ver. 3. "And though I distributed[1] all my goods,

[1] T. R. with K: ψωμιζω: all the rest: ψωμισω.

and though I gave my body to be burned,[1] but had not charity, it profiteth me nothing."—The apostle here comes to acts which appear to have the greatest value, because they seem identical with charity itself. In the first, it is the office of ἀντίληψις, *help* (xii. 28), rising to the most magnanimous sacrifice, the complete giving away of all possessed in behalf of the poor. We must read, not the present ψωμίζω, but the aorist: ψωμίσω. The second denotes a summary gift bestowed once for all; the first would apply rather to a continuous giving day by day; ψωμίζειν, to break down into pieces to give away. Edwards rightly observes that the term implies two things: (1) the gift bestowed by the giver's own hand; (2) on a multitude.—Finally, to the sacrifice of means made for men, Paul adds the highest sacrifice, that of life, offered to God. How are we to conceive of this sacrifice? Can it be that of a man who rushes into a house on fire to save one in sickness? But the ἵνα, *in order that*, seems to imply the intention of perishing. It is rather the acceptance of martyrdom which is in question. If there is a case in which the Alexandrine reading should be set aside without hesitation, it is that of the variant καυχήσωμαι, *that I may glory*. Either the copyists have read χ for θ, or more likely they have been too eager to introduce the reason which would annul the value of the martyrdom, and have anticipated the following words: *but have not charity*, which become superfluous. In any of the cases previously pointed out, the expressed cause of nothing-

[1] T. R. with C K: καυθησωμαι (*that I may be burned*); D E F G L: καυθησομαι (same meaning); ℵ A B: καυχησωμαι (*that I may glorify myself*).

ness is no other than the absence of love; it is also the only one which suits the context. Here, again, is one of the cases in which Westcott and Hort, by maintaining this reading, abandoned even by Lachmann and Tischendorf, have only proved the inconvenient consequence of partisanship. It is probable that of the readings *καυθήσωμαι* of C K (future subjunctive) and *καυθήσομαι* of the Greco-Lats. (future indicative), we ought to prefer the second. The form of the future subjunctive is a barbarism only found in later writers. The indicative with *ἵνα* often occurs in the New Testament (ix. 15; Gal. ii. 4; 1 Pet. iii. 1, etc.).

But how can such acts be done otherwise than from love? The sacrifice of goods may be carried out in the spirit of ostentation, or may proceed from a desire of self-justification, and consequently be dictated by a wholly different feeling from love. It may be so likewise with the sacrifice of life. Witness the funeral pile of Peregrinus, in Lucian, or that of the Hindoo who had himself burned at Athens, under Augustus, and whose tomb was pointed out, according to Strabo, with a pompous inscription, relating how "he had immortalized himself." The pagan Lucian himself calls such men *κενόδοξοι ἄνθρωποι*. Certainly it is not such the apostle has in view, but a Christian carrying to this degree the appearance of love to Christ, while seeking at bottom only his own fame or self-merit in the eyes of God. There is the well-known case of the presbyter who, when giving himself up to death as a confessor of the faith, was accompanied by a Christian, with whom he was at variance, and who asked him to forgive him before dying. He absolutely refused him the

reconciliation asked with such importunity. Arrived at the place of execution, he faltered, denied, while the other boldly confessed and perished in his place. He might have persisted from shame of denying His Lord, and to avoid being taxed with cowardice. His martyrdom would not have been on that account more acceptable to God. The trickeries of self-love are unfathomable, and deceive the very man who is their instrument. — The *οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι, it profiteth me nothing*, is here substituted for the *οὐδὲν εἰμί, I am nothing*, of ver. 2, because now it is not the worth of the person but of the acts which is in question. What was intended to assure me of salvation, has no value in the eyes of God, whenever the object of it becomes self, in the form of self-merit or of human glory. Love accepts only what is inspired by love.

Such is the first reason fitted to justify the *καθ' ὑπερβολήν* of ver. 31, the supreme excellence of the way which is called *charity*. The most eminent gifts, the most heroic acts avail nothing the instant they are not inspired by it. The absolute worth of charity also appears from the opposite consideration: while without it, all is nothing, it produces all of itself. It is the mother of all the virtues, "the bond of perfection," as St. Paul himself says, Col. iii. 14.

Vers. 4–7.

The following picture is not drawn at random, and, so to speak, at the good pleasure of the author. It is as closely connected with the state of his readers as the foregoing passage. It is a mirror in which the Church is called to contemplate the humiliating image of what

it has become, while it beholds the state which it is called to endeavour to attain. While tracing it, the apostle has two things constantly before his eyes: on the one hand, the figure of Him who realized on earth the ideal of a life of charity; on the other, the remembered sins against charity to which the Corinthians had given way in the exercise of the fair gifts bestowed on their Church, because the use of them had not been subordinated to this cardinal virtue.—The apostle begins with the two essential features which characterize this disposition, the one negative, the other positive.

Ver. 4ª. "Charity suffereth long, it is kind."—*Suffereth long*, in regard to wrongs, even repeated, from our neighbour; here is the victory over a just resentment. The term μακροθυμεῖν denotes the long waiting time during which the man refuses to give way to his θυμός.—*Kind, full of goodness*, animated by the constant need to make oneself useful; it is the victory over idle selfishness and comfortable self-pleasing. The verb χρηστεύεσθαι, from χρηστός (χράομαι), strictly denotes the disposition to put oneself at the service of others.—*In tolerandis malis*, says Calvin, in regard to the former of these terms; *in conferendis bonis*, in relation to the latter.

There follow eight negative qualities, which unfold the contents of the former of these two terms, the μακροθυμεῖ.

Vers. 4ᵇ–6ª. "Charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, charity is not puffed up, 5. doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not easily provoked, taketh not account of evil; 6ª.

rejoiceth not in unrighteousness." — The connection between the first four dispositions is obvious. With *envy*, which bears on the advantages of others, there is naturally connected *boasting* in regard to one's own. The word περπερεύεσθαι is of unknown origin. Perhaps it is an onomatopœia, the reduplication of the first syllable expressing vain boasting, or perhaps it is connected with πέρα, *beyond*, and denotes the act of transgressing the just measure. It has also been derived from the Latin *perperam (præter operam)*. The ancient commentators sometimes take it for the vice of precipitancy, sometimes for that of boastfulness. Others, affectation, petulance, or frivolity (see Edwards). The most probable meaning is that of ostentation. It is easy to understand from the passages xii. 14–17 and 21–26, the application of these first two terms to the state of the Church of Corinth. The inconsiderate use of the dictum: "All things are lawful for me" (vi. 12, x. 23), serves also to explain the second. Hence the transition to *inflation*, as the inward source of the two preceding evils. The word φυσιοῦσθαι was used, iv. 6, to denote the presumptuous self-satisfaction with which certain Corinthians were filled; comp. in general chaps. i–iv.

Vers. 5, 6ª. Finally the want of propriety, ἀσχημοσύνη; forgetfulness of seemliness, respect, politeness; this term points back to the rebukes xi. 5 (the demeanour of women) and 21, 22 (the conduct in the Holy Supper). We shall see in chap. xiv., from the limits which the apostle sees himself forced to put to the use of certain gifts, how those who possess them set themselves above the respect due to the Church and to those who possess different and still more useful gifts.

—These four terms relate rather to the abuse of gifts; the following four bear on the Christian life in general. —It is impossible on reading the phrase: *seeketh not its own,* to avoid recalling what was said, chaps. viii.–x., of the use which many members of the Church without charity made of their spiritual liberty, showing not the least concern for the salvation of the weak, provided they might enjoy pleasures in which they thought they had a right to indulge. The term *to be provoked* no doubt alludes to the dissensions and law-suits (chap. vi.).—The phrase λογίζεσθαι τὸ κακόν, *to reckon the evil,* has been explained in the sense of suspecting evil or meditating it with a view to injuring others; but the article before κακόν seems to indicate that the evil in question is there, realized, rather than an evil to be done; and as to the first meaning, it has been remarked, not without reason (see Edwards), that it would rather require ἐνθυμεῖσθαι (Matt. ix. 4). It is better, therefore, to understand: "does not rigorously take account of the wrongs it has to bear from its neighbour;" comp. 2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. iv. 6. Charity, instead of entering evil as a debt in its account-book, voluntarily passes the sponge over what it endures.— Finally, it feels no criminal *joy* on seeing the faults which may be committed by men of an opposite party. Rather than eagerly turn to account the wrong which an adversary thus does to himself, it mourns on account of it. This last proposition is the transition to the first of the five positive qualities which are afterwards mentioned.

Vers. 6[b], 7. "But it rejoiceth with the truth; 7. covereth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all

things, endureth all things."—It is impossible to leave out of account the σύν, *with*, which enters into the composition of the verb συνχαίρειν (*to rejoice with*), and to translate simply: rejoiceth *in the truth*. Truth is here personified as charity itself is. They are two sisters; when truth triumphs, charity rejoices with it. We might understand by *truth* the preaching of salvation; but it seems more natural here to give it a general meaning, corresponding to the word *unrighteousness*, in the preceding proposition; the subject in question is truth in opposition to falsehood. Love chooses to see the truth coming to light and triumphing, even if it should be contrary to the opinion cherished by it, rather than to see error which might be most useful to it holding its ground.

Ver. 7 continues to develop the positive good done by charity. Here properly begins the development of the second fundamental feature of charity, the χρηστεύεται, *it is kind*. In four master-strokes the apostle draws in a complete and indelible manner the portrait of this angel of goodness come down from heaven. The verb στέγω (*tego*), *to cover*, might here signify, as usually in Paul's style (ix. 12), *to bear;* but it would be difficult to avoid a tautology with the fourth term, ὑπομένειν, *to endure*. It is better therefore to understand the word in the sense of *to excuse*. Charity seeks to excuse others, to throw a mantle over their faults, charging itself, if need be, with all the painful results which may follow. This conduct is explained by the following term: *it believeth all things*. The term *believe* usually refers to God; here it denotes apparently confidence in man; but in reality

this confidence has for its object the Divine in man, all that remains in him of God's image. For it is this which leads charity to interpret the conduct of fellow-men rather in a good sense.—Of course this faith goes only to the point where sight arrests it by discovering distinctly the opposite of the good which it loved to suppose. But, even then, the task of charity is not at an end: where it must cease to believe, it still *hopes*. While recognising with pain the present triumph of sin, it cherishes the hope of the future victory of good. —And in this generous hope it does not *weary;* it holds on, *ὑπομένει*. Taking part with the Divine long-suffering, it endures with perseverance; *ὑπομένειν*, literally: *to hold on under* (a burden). Here the matter in question is not evil in general, as in the *στέγει*, but personal wrongs. By this last word, the apostle returns to that with which he had started: love is long-suffering, and thus he finds the transition to the third idea of the chapter: the objective permanence of charity.

Vers. 8–13.

The absolute duration of charity is developed in these last verses: first, in opposition to gifts, then even in contrast to the other two fundamental virtues, faith and hope. Thus the apostle completes the demonstration of his thought: charity is the supremely excellent way.

Vers. 8–10. "Charity never faileth.[1] As to prophecies,[2] they shall be done away; as to tongues, they

[1] T. R. with D E F G K L It.: *ἐκπίπτει*; ℵ A B C: *πίπτει*.
[2] B: *προφητεια καταργηθησεται* (*prophecy shall be done away*).

shall cease; as to knowledges, they shall be done away.[1] 9. For[2] we know in part, and we prophesy in part. 10. But when that which is perfect is come,[3] that which is in part shall be done away."—The first words: *never faileth*, are, as it were, the theme of the following passage. This is why the subject: charity, is repeated. The best proof of the absolute value of charity is its eternal permanence in contrast to everything else, even the most excellent; and the subjective persistence of charity in the believer (ver. 7) is the prelude, as it were, of this objective permanence.—It seems as if the verb ought to be in the future; but the present is here, as often, that of the idea.—The two readings: πίπτει and ἐκπίπτει, have almost the same meaning: the former, however, is the simpler and more probable. An allusion to the spot from which the fall takes place (ἐκ) is unnecessary. The verb πίπτειν, *to fall*, cannot, as Holsten would have it, refer solely to the value of charity in this sense: It never loses its worth. The following antitheses: *shall be done away, shall cease*, prove clearly that its *duration* is the point in question. Prophesying and speaking in tongues will cease, but not loving.

The transient character of gifts, even the most eminent, such as prophecy and knowledge (between which Paul introduces, as an inferior gift, speaking in tongues), proves their relative and secondary value. The *Vatic.* reads the singular προφητεία; all the other documents have the plural.—To what epoch does the

[1] ℵ A F G: γνωσεις καταργηθησονται (*knowledges shall be done away*), instead of γνωσις καταργηθησεται (*knowledge . . .*) in B D K L.

[2] K L read δε (*but*), instead of γαρ (*for*).

[3] T. R. here reads with K L Syr.: τοτε (*then*).

abolition of prophecy belong? If history is consulted it seems to answer: toward the end of the second and during the third century. For the *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles* shows us the prophets still in full activity in the first half of the second century. But the apostle's answer, in ver. 10, certainly makes the abolition of prophecy, as well as that of tongues and of knowledge, coincident with the advent of the perfect state; consequently with Christ's glorious coming, which will introduce this state. It is vain to attempt to fix an interval between the abolition announced in ver. 8 and the τὸ τέλειον ἐλθεῖν, the advent of perfection, of ver. 10. But if, according to this text, the total abolition of gifts cannot take place before the end of the present economy, there may come about a modification in their phenomenal manifestation. The very figure which the apostle uses in ver. 11 easily leads to the idea of a gradual metamorphosis, which will pass over their mode of manifestation. For the *speaking* of the child, its mode of *feeling* and *thinking*, do not give place suddenly to the analogous faculties of the mature man; the change in these three respects takes place insensibly and progressively. So the spiritual gifts granted to the primitive Church, while accompanying and supporting the Church to the very threshold of the perfect state, need not do so necessarily in the same form as at the beginning. Prophecy may be transformed into animated preaching; speaking in tongues may appear in the form of religious poetry and music; knowledge continue to accomplish its task by the catechetical and theological teaching of Christian truth (see on chap. xiv. conclusion).

In speaking of tongues Paul substitutes for the word καταργεῖσθαι, *be done away*, the term παύεσθαι, *to cease*, become silent. This feverish agitation of discoursings in tongues, which uplifted the Church of Corinth, will calm down.—The reading γνώσεις, *knowledges*, of the *Sinaït.* and the *Greco-Lats.*, is regarded by most, even by Tischendorf, as an assimilation to the preceding substantives. But sufficient account has not been taken of Rückert's remarks. It is not *the* true knowledge which shall cease; it is only the various fragments of knowledge, received here below (γνώσεις), which shall pass away to give place to perfect knowledge (ver. 12).

Ver. 9. The reading γάρ, *for*, is evidently preferable to the δέ, *then*, of the Byz. The apostle wishes to explain why this doing away shall take place. Prophecy lifts on each occasion only a corner of the veil which covers the plan of God and its final accomplishment. Similarly the isolated acts of spiritual knowledge grasp the truth of salvation only in fragments, and consequently every particular point of the great fact. Even to possess the complete knowledge of one point, the whole would require to be known distinctly. Now this full and only true knowledge is not granted us in the present economy. As to tongues, the apostle does not think it necessary to justify their disappearance. The reason for it is too evident: it is their ecstatic character. The only ground for ecstatic transport is that we are not yet living fully in the reality of the Divine. When we live in God, we are in Him without going out of ourselves. This is why there is no ecstasy in the life of Jesus, at least after His baptism.

Ver. 10. But far from being an impoverishment of the Church, this loss of gifts, on the contrary, will coincide with her rising to the possession of perfect fulness; it will be the imperfect melting into the perfect. In contrast to the term ἐκ μέρους, *in part*, one would expect τὸ πᾶν, *the whole*, the entire. But it is not without reason that the apostle says τὸ τέλειον, *the perfect*, substituting the idea of perfection in quality for that of completeness in quantity. For the future knowledge will differ from that which we have here in *mode*, still more than in *extent*. Our view will not only embrace the totality of Divine things; but it will contemplate them from the centre, and consequently in their real essence. At present not only do we know only fragments, but even these we discern but indistinctly.—The aor. ἔλθῃ, *shall have come*, alludes to a fixed and positively expected moment, which can be no other than that of the Advent.—The apostle uses a comparison to illustrate the necessity of this substitution of the perfect for the imperfect.

Ver. 11. "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child;[1] when I became a man, I put away childish things."—Man's natural growth is a figure of that of the Church; both follow the same law, that of development and transformation. In proportion as the faculties, in course of development, acquire a higher mode of activity, the previous mode ceases of itself.—It seems evident to me, as to most commentators, that by the three terms, λαλεῖν, *to speak*, φρονεῖν, *to feel, aspire* (this term expresses the unity of feeling, thought, and will), and λογίζεσθαι, *to think*, the

[1] T. R. with E F G K L P Syr. here reads δέ (*but*), omitted by ℵ A B D.

apostle alludes to the three gifts mentioned, vers. 9–11; *speaking* corresponds to tongues, *aspiration* to prophecy, and *thinking* to knowledge. The gift of tongues corresponds in the Divine domain to the babbling of the child in its first joyous experience of life. Prophecy, whose glance penetrates to the perfection yet to come, corresponds to the ardent aspiration of the childish heart, which goes out eagerly into the future, expecting from it joy and happiness; and knowledge, which seeks to penetrate Divine truth, corresponds to the simple thoughts whereby the infant mind seeks to find an explanation of things. It is therefore a groundless objection which Holsten makes to this triple and obvious correlation when he alleges the absence of all relation between the φρονεῖν, *aspire after*, and prophecy. —The active verb κατήργηκα, *I put away, I put an end to*, denotes the spontaneity of this surrender. As it is with pride that the young man shakes off the puerilities of childhood, so it is with profound satisfaction that the mature man substitutes the manly activity of the profession which he has embraced for the passionate dreams of childhood and youth. Such is the image of what will be experienced by the faithful when the perfect state for which they are preparing shall be unveiled to them, at Christ's coming. Then they will willingly let fall all those rudiments of the spiritual life with which they were delighted, inflated perhaps, as was the case at Corinth. It is from this point that we can perfectly understand the delicate allusion, i. 7.— M. Sabatier (*l'Apôtre Paul*, p. 7), failing to understand the comparison which the apostle makes, thinks that he is here speaking of himself, that he wishes to describe

his spiritual state immediately after his conversion, and that in the same sense in which he applied the image of the child to the spiritual state of the Corinthians, iii. 1 seq. He thus finds in our ver. 11 a proof of the considerable changes which took place in the apostle's convictions from the time of his conversion up to the date when he wrote this letter.[1]—Such a misunderstanding is without parallel.

The following verse contains the explanation of this comparison.

Ver. 12. "For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I have been known."—The ordinary application of the two parts of this verse to the gift of knowledge seems to me mistaken. Why should the apostle in this application omit the gift of prophecy? We shall find that the terms of the first half of the verse apply as naturally to the last gift as those of the second half to knowledge. As to tongues he omits them, as already in ver. 9. He does not think it necessary to revert expressly to their future disappearance.—The object of βλέπειν, *to see*, is here God Himself, with His plan of grace and glory toward us. The mirrors of the ancients were of metal; those made at Corinth were famous. The image which they presented could never be perfectly distinct. There is no ground for Rückert's idea that what is meant is a window formed of semi-transparent glass or of a square of horn. Tertullian already understood it so: *Velut per corneum speculat* (see Edwards). The διά, *through*,

[1] "The points in question here," says he, "as the parallel passages prove, are childhood and ripe age in the Christian life."

on which this view rested, may signify: *by means of.* Or the term *through* may be suggested by the fact that the image seems to be placed behind the surface of the mirror.—We perceive Divine things, says the apostle, only by means of their image in a mirror. Plato had already expressed a similar idea in his famous comparison of the cave. This figure signifies two things: knowledge of a *mediate* character, and for that very reason always more or less *confused.*—*Ἐν αἰνίγματι*, literally: in the form of enigma. The word *αἴνιγμα* denotes a sentence which, without expressly saying the thing, leaves it to be guessed. It thus serves to bring out the relative obscurity in the manifestation of Divine things, which we now possess. If we apply the expression exclusively to the gift of knowledge, we shall see in *the mirror*, with some, space and time, those necessary forms of all our ideas, or the categories of reason which determine all its processes; Paul in that case would have here anticipated Kant. Or, according to others, Paul is thinking of the facts of sacred history as manifesting God's character and essence, or of the revelations of Scripture in general. Holsten combines these two last interpretations. But do we not arrive at a more natural explanation of the apostle's words, if we apply them to the gift of prophecy? The image in the mirror corresponds in this case to the inward picture which the Spirit of God produces in the prophet's soul at the time of his vision, and in which the Divine thought is revealed to him. And the expression: *in the form of enigma*, which we have translated *darkly*, exactly renders the character of such a picture. The prophet required in every case to apply his whole

attention to the vision to extract from it the idea of the fact revealed to him; comp. 1 Pet. i. 10, 11. What seems to me to confirm this meaning is the analogy of the terms used by Paul to those of the Pentateuch, particularly in the passage Num. xii. 6–8, where the Lord says: "If there be a prophet among you, I will make Myself known unto him, *ἐν ὁράματι, in a vision*, and I will speak unto him, *ἐν ὕπνῳ, in a dream;* but My servant Moses is not so. . . . With him I speak *mouth to mouth*, *στόμα κατὰ στόμα*, and he seeth Me, *ἐν εἴδει, manifestly,* and not *δι' αἰνιγμάτων, in enigmas* (confused representations)." With this mediate view of the Divine, by means of prophetic picture, the apostle contrasts the immediate intuition which will be the character of future contemplation; and he here uses expressions which remind us of what is said in the Old Testament regarding the incomparable mode of communication between God and Moses (Deut. xxxiv. 10: *mouth to mouth*, and Ex. xxxiii. 11: *ἐνώπιος ἐνωπίῳ, face to face*). The communication which God granted to Moses, and to Moses only, was a kind of anticipation of the final mode of intuition here described; comp. Num. xii. 8 (LXX.): *καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ κυρίου εἶδε, and he saw the glory of the Lord.*

The second part of the verse relates to the gift of knowledge. With the fragmentary, successive, analytic, discursive mode of our present knowledge, there is contrasted the intuitive, central, complete, and perfectly distinct character of our future knowledge. The verb *γινώσκω*, strictly: *I learn to know*, denotes effort and progress. Then Paul substitutes for the simple active verb *γινώσκω*, the compound *ἐπιγινώσκω* in the middle

form to denote the complete assimilation of the knowledge to come: to put the finger on the object, so as to possess it entirely. And, to give the fullest idea of this kind of knowledge, he uses the boldest conceivable parallel, identifying the knowledge which we shall have of God with that which He now has of us. The καθώς, *according as, as,* indicates the immediate and perfectly distinct character, and the καί serves still more to emphasize the notion of identity.—The first person singular is substituted in this second part of the verse for the first plural, *we see,* to emphasize more strongly the absolute inwardness of this wholly personal relation. Meyer, Kling, Hofmann, Holsten think that the aorist *I have been known* refers to the date of conversion; comp. Gal. iv. 9; but this restricted sense is unnatural in our passage. Paul is speaking of the knowledge which God has of man during the whole course of his life. From the standpoint of the life to come, at which the context puts us, this knowledge appears to him as a thing of the past.—With this whole view opened up, what became of the superiority of knowledge and speech on which the Corinthians prided themselves so greatly (comp. i. 5, 7)? As the faint glimmer of dawn gives place to the brightness of the rising sun, so those confused conceptions and those fragmentary knowledges in which they glory will vanish in the brightness of immediate vision granted at the hour of the Advent (the ἀποκάλυψις, i. 7). What will then remain of the present state? Nothing? No; that would mean that all the present labour of the believer is vain. Something will remain, undoubtedly: but it will not be gifts, it will be the virtues which

constitute the essential elements of the Christian character, without which, as Heinrici says, the Christian personality itself is extinguished:

Ver. 13. "But now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."—As Paul so often does (1 Thess. i. 3; 2 Thess. i. 3, 4; Col. i. 4, 5), he here sums up the Christian life in the three dispositions: *faith*, which takes salvation as already accomplished, Christ come; *hope*, which goes out to the part of salvation yet to be accomplished, Christ coming again; finally, *charity*, which embraces the ever-abiding Christ, and in Him all beings, and which is already salvation itself realized in the individual. Such are the three elements of the Christian life which will not pass away with the coming of the perfect state. Holsten has asked, with good right, why Paul here brings in the comparison of charity with those other two virtues, whereas, considering the passage as a whole, he was not called to compare it with anything but gifts; and he gives himself up to a rather subtle lucubration to show that faith was to replace, throughout the present era, the knowledge of the early days, and hope the prophecies of the apostolic epoch. There is not in the text the least trace of this idea, which is besides excluded by the true meaning of the word *abide*. The answer seems to me simple. To exalt charity supremely, Paul contrasts it not only with gifts which pass away, but also with the virtues which remain as well as it, and declares its superiority even over them.—The particle *νυνὶ δέ*, *but now*, might be taken in the temporal sense, as it is sometimes, perhaps, in Paul's writings (see Rückert on v. 11).

In that case we must explain thus: "But *at the present time* there abide faith, hope, charity." This meaning is inadmissible for the following reason: The three virtues are contrasted with the three preceding gifts, which are to cease with the future era, and not to enter into the perfect state. Now, if these three virtues also only belonged to the present epoch, there would be no contrast to set up in respect of duration between them and gifts. We must therefore give the particle a logical sense; comparison of charity with the two other virtues contains the indication of a new element, of the true state of things. "In reality, this is what abides, and by no means what you suppose." The contrast between virtues and gifts is likewise emphasized by the apposition τὰ τρία ταῦτα, that is to say: "*these three*, and not the three gifts of which we have been speaking." What has only an intellectual, oratorical, or lyrical character is transient; what edifies, what produces self-renunciation, the giving oneself to God and men, this is what abides.

How are we to understand the expression *abide?* At the first glance one is disposed to give it, in contrast to the abolition of gifts, the most absolute sense: *abide* eternally. Gifts will be done away at the coming of the perfect state; but these three virtues will remain in the perfect state itself. But against this idea there rises an objection which from the earliest times has struck all commentators. It is, that according to St. Paul, faith, in the perfect state, must give place to sight (2 Cor. v. 7), and hope to possession (Rom. viii. 24). According to this, faith and hope would pass away as well as gifts. Various

ways have been sought of solving this difficulty. Osiander imagines he can distinguish two epochs in the perfect state, the one embracing the thousand years' reign, the other beginning at the end of this reign and belonging to eternity. Gifts cease, according to him, on the threshold of the first of these epochs; faith and hope only at the beginning of the second. But the text presents not the slightest indication of this distinction; the perfect state is represented in it as one single era from which gifts only are excluded. Some, like Beza, Bengel, Rückert, refer the term μένειν, *abide*, to the entire duration of the present economy. But what becomes in that case of the contrast between the three virtues which remain to the end of the present period and the three gifts which are to cease at the coming of the perfect state? — Several commentators, such as Calvin, Holsten, Heinrici, are thus led to take the word *abide* in a logical sense. These three things, says Holsten, *remain in full value*, while gifts lose theirs, knowledge is replaced by faith, and prophecy by hope. But if this explanation is to give a clear meaning, it always amounts to making Paul say that gifts were to cease with the first ages, while faith and hope were to preserve their value to the present day, and until the end of this economy. How can any one help seeing that by this contrast the notion of *time* still remains attached to the word *abide*, from which indeed it is inseparable in the context? For it springs from the evident antithesis between the word *abide* and the preceding verbs: *shall cease*, *shall be done away*, *I put away*. This has been felt by most commentators, while fully acknowledging the difficulty of harmonizing

the permanence of faith and hope with Paul's other sayings in which their transformation and, consequently, their future cessation are taught. Grotius observes that faith and hope, while formally transformed, will abide in their *fruits*. According to Hofmann, likewise, Paul's expression is justified by the fact that *believing* remains in seeing, as hoping in possessing; for sight has come through faith, and possession through hope. But is not this to do violence to the meaning of the word *abide?* And might not the same be said of gifts?— Meyer, nearly to the same effect: These virtues will remain in the salvation we have obtained through their means, and moreover in this sense: that faith remains eternally the means of our communion with Christ, and that hope will never cease to catch new perspectives of glory, even in the perfect state. Kling (in Lange's Bible) says better still, as it appears to me: While love is the real possession of the Divine, faith and hope belong to its acquisition; now is this acquisition a fact which can ever cease? — Indeed, eternal blessings are not like a bag of gold pieces, which are received once for all. The permanent essence of the creature is to have nothing of its own, to be eternally helpless and poor; every instant it must take possession of God by faith, which grasps the manifestations which He has already given, and by hope, which prepares to lay hold of His new manifestations. It is not once for all, it is *continually* that in eternity faith changes into vision and hope into possession. These two virtues, therefore, abide to live again unceasingly.

But notwithstanding this permanence of faith and hope, the palm belongs to charity, as *the greatest of*

the three. The apostle does not say the most durable, for the duration of all three is absolute. The τούτων might refer to the other two virtues only; μείζων would then have its regular comparative sense: "*greater* than they two." But as τούτων necessarily refers to τρία ταῦτα, we must give to μείζων the superlative meaning: "*the greatest* of the three;" comp. Matt. xviii. 4. This superiority of charity has been variously explained. Some, like Calvin, say: Greater in virtue of its eternal duration; but this duration belongs also, as we have just seen, to the other two. Others: Because faith and hope belong only to the individual's inward life, while charity exercises a salutary influence beyond him (Meyer, Heinrici, Holsten). But is not faith also an active force outwardly? De Wette: Because love is, according to ver. 7, the true principle of faith and hope. But in ver. 7 faith and hope referred solely to conduct toward our neighbour, and not to the appropriation of salvation and our relation to God. According to Paul, it is, on the contrary, faith which is the principle both of hope and of true love (Gal. v. 6).—We have just seen that faith and hope abide continually, but undergoing incessant transformation, the one into sight, the other into possession. It is not so with charity. Love does not see, does not acquire, it *is* the Divine. God does not believe nor hope, but He loves. Love belongs to His essence. Like God Himself, it could not change its nature except for the worse. Love is the end in relation to which the two other virtues are only means, and this relation remains even in the state of perfection. Hence it is the greatest, and hence also the apostle called

charity and the work of charity: "The way *par excellence.*" So he resumes, xiv. 1, by saying: "Follow after charity." In this verse the apostle returns, as we have said, from the digression on charity to his subject strictly so called: the exercise of spiritual gifts. He has now placed them under the ægis of the one principle which can render their exercise truly beneficial and make up for them, if they should ever come to an end.

III. Practical Rules for the Exercise of Gifts (Chap. XIV.).

In ver. 31 of chap. xii. Paul had recommended the seeking of spiritual gifts, as the inference from the whole discussion of chap. xii.; then he had passed to the cardinal recommendation: in all things walk in charity. Now he comes to the more special practical directions which he has to give in regard to the exercise of gifts, and it is from charity that he draws the general rule whence he makes them all flow.

1. *The comparative usefulness of the gifts of tongues and of prophecy* (vers. 1–25).

Ver. 1. "Follow after charity; but desire spiritual gifts, and especially to prophesy."—The general rule is this: Every one should seek, above all, the gifts most fitted to contribute to the common good. Such is the principle Paul applies first of all to the valuation of the two gifts which seem at that time to have played the most considerable part in the life of the Church of Corinth, glossolalia[1] and prophecy. And as what is

[1] See note, p. 234.

intelligible is evidently superior, with a view to edification, to what is not so, he concludes without hesitation for the superiority of prophecy, and even for the exclusion of glossolalia, unless there be some way of rendering it intelligible.

There is a contrast between the terms διώκειν, *to follow*, and ζηλοῦν, *to desire*. The former refers to something indispensable, the latter to a faculty which is simply desirable; see on xii. 31. The evident relation between our verse and that does not allow us to restrict the meaning of πνευματικά (spiritual gifts), as Rückert, Ewald, etc., have done, to glossolalia. Prophecy cannot be put outside of the *pneumatica*, as if it was to be sought *more than* they. It is comprehended in this expression, which denotes spiritual gifts in general (xii. 31); the apostle has particularly in view, no doubt, glossolalia, prophecy, and teaching. The word μᾶλλον, *rather*, does not therefore exclude the pursuit of these two last gifts; on the contrary, it implies it.—Instead of ἵνα, *that*, Paul might have put simply: "Especially desire prophecy." But his thought is strictly speaking this: "Seek states of inspiration, and that especially with the view of attaining to the possession of the best of gifts, prophecy."

Why among these gifts, all desirable, does prophecy occupy the first rank? This is what the following passage explains, in which Paul shows the inferiority of the gift of tongues as compared with prophecy; and that first as to the edification of the Church (vers. 2–20), then as to the conversion of persons outside of the Church (vers. 21–25).

VERS. 2–20.

Vers. 2–5.

Vers. 2, 3. "For he that speaketh in a tongue speaketh not unto men, but unto God: for no man understandeth him; howbeit in the spirit he speaketh mysteries. 3. But he that prophesieth speaketh unto men edification, exhortation, and comfort."—Paul here describes the *mode* in which the two gifts act. The glossolalete addresses God, and that in a language which no man understands, so that what he says remains a mystery to all who hear him; speaking in a tongue is a sort of spiritual soliloquy. It is impossible here to apply the meaning given by Meyer, Holsten, etc., to the word *tongue*, which according to them denotes the material organ of speech. What could the apostle mean by saying that he who speaks by moving the tongue speaks to God? The word denotes the ecstatic language which flourished at Corinth. The singular applies to each particular case; the plural (γλώσσαις λαλεῖν) to the gift in general. When a man speaks in ordinary language, his thought is addressed to those around him; but when he speaks in this particular tongue, his thought is turned to God only. And the proof is, that nobody understands this kind of manifestation. Wieseler has taken the word ἀκούειν, *hear*, in the physical sense, and concluded from the term that the glossolaletes spoke only in a low voice. But, xiii. 1, Paul compares them to sounding brass and the clanging cymbal, and in ver. 8 to the startling sound of the trumpet giving the signal for battle. Ἀκούειν, *hear*, has therefore in this place, as

so frequently, the meaning of understand; comp. Gen. xi. 7 (LXX.): "That they should not hear each the voice of his neighbour" (Matt. xiii. 13, etc.).—This passage is equally incompatible with the idea of really existing foreign tongues; for there might easily have been found at Corinth some one who understood the foreign tongue used by a glossolalete.—The δέ, at the end of ver. 2, is adversative: "*But*, far from being understood, he speaks mysteries." The term *mystery* is here used in a derivative sense. It usually denotes the Divine plans which remain a secret to men, so long as God does not reveal them; it refers to the secrets of a man in relation to other men. What the speaker in a tongue says remains between God and him, and is a mystery to the hearers.—It is possible to explain the dative πνεύματι in the sense *by* the spirit,—which would then be the Divine Spirit as guiding the man's spirit,—or it may be translated: *in spirit;* then it is the spirit of the glossolalete himself, who is carried away in an ecstasy, and in a manner raised for the time above the exercise of the understanding; comp. Rev. i. 1. This second meaning is the more natural, seeing there is no article nor preposition before the substantive. It is evident that the state of the glossolalete was that of an ineffable conversation with God. Our passage has been justly compared with Rom. viii. 26, 27, where the apostle speaks of the unutterable groanings whereby the Holy Spirit intercedes in the believer's heart; only we may not conclude from this comparison, with Holsten, that glossolalia consisted only of confused groanings. Our whole chapter shows that there was language properly so called.

Ver. 3. It is otherwise with the man who prophesies; he addresses men to communicate to them from God some new grace, light, force. There is not only in him an involuntary expression of a personal state of mind, there is conscious will to act on the hearers by the communication of an immediately revealed Divine thought (ver. 30).—The apostle says, not: the prophet, but: "he that prophesieth," because he conceives him in full activity in the midst of the assembly. — In indicating the contents of his speaking: *edification, exhortation, comfort*, the apostle identifies the declaration itself with its effect.—There is no reason for subordinating the two last terms, as Meyer does, to the first, or to make the first, as de Wette does, the effect of the two following. They are all three co-ordinate. Edification denotes a new development and a confirmation of faith, by some new view fitted to strengthen the soul. The second term denotes an encouragement addressed to the will, an energetic impulse capable of effecting an awakening or advancement in Christian fidelity. If the first term relates mainly to faith, the second refers rather to love. The third, comfort, points rather to hope; παραμυθεῖν, to soothe the ear with a sweet myth, putting pain to sleep or reviving hope.

In our times the conclusion has often been drawn from this verse, that since to prophesy is to edify, exhort, comfort, whoever edifies, exhorts, comforts, merits, according to Paul, the title prophet. This reasoning is as just as it would be to say: He who runs, moves his legs; therefore whoever moves his legs, runs; or, to take a more nearly related example: He who speaks

in a tongue, speaks to God; therefore whoever speaks to God, is a glossolalete. No, certainly; one may edify, comfort, encourage, without deserving the title of prophet or prophetess. The absurd reasoning which I have pointed out has been dictated by the desire of being able to proclaim certain women prophetesses who think themselves called to speak in public, in order to give them the benefit of the implicit authorization contained in xi. 5. — From this contrast in the intrinsic nature of the two gifts, the apostle passes to the difference of results obtained by them.

Ver. 4. "He that speaketh in a tongue edifieth himself; but he that prophesieth, edifieth the Church."— From his intimate communion with God, the glossolalete derives a blessing which, even though it is not transformed into precise notions by the exercise of the understanding, makes itself felt as a power in the depths of his soul; but the Church has received nothing of the kind, for it has understood nothing of the inward dialogue kept up with God. Prophecy, on the contrary, is like a torrent of living water which overspreads and quickens the whole Church. Hence the conclusion drawn, ver. 5.

Ver. 5. "Now I would that ye all spake in tongues, and rather that ye prophesied; but[1] greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues, except he interpret, that the Church may receive edifying."—The following is the result of vers. 1–4: the gift of tongues is a good thing; but prophecy is

[1] T. R. with D E F G K L It. Syr. reads γαρ (*for*); ℵ A B P: δε (*but*).

superior to it, unless by interpretation the discourse in a tongue be transformed into prophecy. The first δέ is progressive, *now*: "Now I do not reject glossolalia, I desire that it should abound; but I desire still more earnestly the development of the gift of prophecy."—The γάρ, *for*, which, in the Greco-Lat. and Byz. texts, connects the second part of the verse with the first, has been substituted for the much more difficult δέ, which is the reading of the Alex. The δέ is adversative; it is well explained by Holsten: "*But* yet there is a case in which the man who speaks in a tongue is as great as the prophet." The term *great* is used here from the standpoint of utility. The measure of this greatness is borrowed from the principle of charity.—In the form ἐκτὸς εἰ μή, *unless . . . not*, the μή, *not*, is a pleonasm arising from the mixing of the two following constructions: *excepting if* (ἐκτὸς εἰ), and: if not (εἰ μή).—The subject of *except he interpret* can be no other than the glossolalete himself. No doubt, failing him, some other might do it (comp. ver. 27). But, as a rule, Paul expected that he should do it himself (vers. 13, 15). There was thus less room left for arbitrariness. By way of analogy, we may imagine a man coming out of a dream and explaining what he has seen and heard, and so giving account of the broken exclamations and words which the bystanders had heard without understanding them.—The διά, in the verb, indicates the detailed, discursive element of the contents of the brief and summary sayings uttered in a tongue.—The complete uselessness of tongues without interpretation is demonstrated in what follows by a series of examples, vers. 6–12.

Vers. 6–12.

Ver. 6. "But now, brethren, if I come unto you speaking in tongues, what shall I profit you, except I shall speak to you either in revelation, or in knowledge, or in prophesying, or in doctrine?"—The first example Paul offers to the Corinthians is that of his own person; they all knew what power his presence in a Church exercised; many of them promised themselves considerable edification from the visit he announced to them. Well! there was a way of making this visit utterly useless: in place of prophesying and teaching, let him set himself to play among them the part of glossolalete; and if this holds in Paul's case, how much more in all others!—The δέ is adversative; it contrasts the glossolalia without translation, which Paul by hypothesis ascribes to himself in ver. 6, with glossolalia with interpretation in ver. 5ᵇ.—*Νυνί, now:* "things being so." Hofmann gives this word the temporal meaning: "If I come *now* among you;" but this connection of *νυνί* with *ἔλθω* is forced.—By the address *brethren*, he appeals to their good sense.—Meyer thinks that the second *ἐάν, if* [*ἐὰν μή, if not = except*], is subordinate to the first, and that the *speaking*, referred to at the close of the verse, relates to the *interpreting* of the discourse in a tongue, so that the meaning of the verse would amount to this: "Wherein shall I be useful to you if I speak to you in a tongue, but without giving an interpretation in the form either of prophecy, or doctrine, of what I at first said in an unintelligible form?" This meaning is inadmissible; for nowhere are prophecy and doctrine represented by Paul as the interpretation of a tongue. The meaning

is this: "Wherein should I be useful to you if I figured among you only as one speaking in tongues, and not besides as prophet or teacher?" Of course he speaks of glossolana in itself and apart from interpretation.—The four terms at the end of the verse evidently form two parallel pairs. On the one hand: *revelation* and *knowledge*—these are inward Divine gifts; on the other: *prophecy* and *doctrine*—these are the external manifestations of the twofold Divine communication: revelation expressing itself in prophecy, and knowledge in doctrine. Revelation, which makes the prophet, is a sudden and lively perception, produced by the Spirit's operation, of some aspect of the Divine mystery, the work of salvation; this view, immediately expressed in its first freshness, forms prophecy (ver. 27). Knowledge is the result of an exercise of thought directed by the Holy Spirit (xii. 8: κατά, *according to*), which leads to the distinct understanding of some element of salvation and of its relation to all the rest; this knowledge is expressed in a *doctrinal* discourse. In the two first terms, the meaning of the ἐν, *in*, is therefore this: "a speaking resting *on* a revelation, *on* an act of knowledge," and, in the two last terms: "a speaking taking effect *by* a prophecy, *by* a doctrine." Heinrici's objections to this double correlation of the four terms: revelation, prophecy, knowledge, doctrine, seem to me without force. Modern commentators are unanimous in recognising it.—To this decisive example, the apostle adds others, taken from ordinary life. And first he instances musical instruments:

Vers. 7, 8. "Even things without life giving sound, whether pipe or harp, except they give a distinction in

the sounds . . ., how shall it be known what is piped or harped? 8. For, also, if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"—If the sound of instruments is to furnish to the ear an intelligible and significant melody, it must be subject to the laws of tone and rhythm, to the intervals of scale and measure. — The adverb ὅμως, which stands first, should not be confounded with ὁμῶς or ὁμοίως, *likewise;* it signifies: *however;* so Gal. iii. 15, where it applies to the word ἀνθρώπου, *of a man*: "The covenant of a being who *after all* (*however*) is only a man." So here this adverb, as Hofmann well observes, bears on the word ἄψυχα, *inanimate*: "Instruments, which *after all* are only inanimate beings, are also subject to this law of being intelligible only by means of the distinction of sounds." How much more human language, which is the expression of intelligent thought! It is therefore by no means necessary to apply this ὅμως, as Meyer does, to the participle φωνὴν διδόντα: "Though, however, giving a sound." This meaning does not agree so well with the position of the adverb. —The *pipe* and the *harp* represent, the one wind instruments, the other stringed instruments; they were the two principal instruments which the ancients used in worship and in sad or joyful ceremonies.—*How shall it be known:* "How shall one apprehend the air, and know whether he should weep, dance, etc.?"

Ver. 8. The trumpet itself, whose sounds are yet so powerful, is subject to the same law. Its signals are not understood except on condition of being distinct. This example is added to the foregoing—hence the *also;* and it confirms them—hence the *for.* The word

πόλεμος, *war*, is here taken, as often, in the restricted sense of battle. What follows, ver. 9, may be regarded either as the application of the examples quoted, to the gift of tongues, or as a new example borrowed from human speech in general. We shall have to decide between these two interpretations.

Ver. 9. "So likewise ye, except ye utter by the tongue distinct speech, how shall it be known what is spoken, for ye shall speak into the air?"—Those who, like Hofmann, already find in ver. 9 an example taken from human language, may punctuate after καὶ ὑμεῖς, in the sense of: *so ye also.* "As inanimate instruments must give forth distinct sounds if their music is to be understood, *so ye also.* As men, you ought to speak distinctly, if you wish to be understood by your fellows." The words διὰ τῆς γλώσσης, *by means of the tongue*, may be understood in this case either of the material organ, or of the faculty of language (Hofmann). But if this were the apostle's meaning, he would not say: "Likewise *ye* also." For the general truth thus expressed would apply no more to the Corinthians than to other men. Paul would be emphasizing more precisely the contrast between inanimate beings and man, as such. We must therefore regard the passage as the application which Paul makes of the foregoing examples to the Corinthians: "And you also, Corinthians, if *in your glossolalia* you do not speak a distinct language, it will be like an unintelligible voice lost in the air." The expression: *by the tongue*, should be taken, as is natural, in the same sense as throughout the chapter: speaking in an ecstatic tongue. The means of rendering this

language distinct is interpretation. The apostle confirms this conclusion in vers. 10, 11, by appealing to the intelligible character of all the languages in use among men.

Vers. 10, 11. "There are,[1] it may be, so many kinds of voices in the world, and none[2] of them is without signification. 11 Therefore if I know not the force of the voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh a barbarian, and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian unto[3] me."—The asyndeton here denotes, as it almost always does, a strong reaffirmation of the foregoing idea. Vers. 10 and 11 indeed confirm by a new example the proof given in vers. 7–9. By the expression: *kinds of tongues* (voices), the apostle certainly does not understand what we call *families* of human languages; every existing language is in his view a kind. These languages are exceedingly many: τοσαῦτα, *so numerous*. But the exact number he does not know; the expression εἰ τύχοι, with names of number, has the force of taking away from them all precision. Edwards: "whatever may be their number." —The pronoun αὐτῶν, *of them*, is a gloss, but a correct gloss. We must beware of understanding οὐδέν in the sense of *no human being* (Bleek) or *no nation* (van Hengel), as if Paul meant: "No man or no people is without language." This idea would be unconnected with the context. The meaning is: "No language exists without articulate words." Only the apostle expresses this idea in a striking form, saying, in a

[1] T. R. with A L: εστιν; all the rest: εισιν.
[2] T. R. with E K L Syr. here add αυτων (*of them*).
[3] D E F G omit εν.

manner: "No tongue is not a tongue" (Aucune langue n'est une non-langue). The articulation of words and syllables belongs to the essence of human tongues. The Greeks are fond of such paradoxical expressions; comp. βίος ἀβίωτος, a life which is no life; ἄχαρις χάρις, etc. (see Heinrici). — The *force* here denotes the signification of the sounds.—The Greeks and Egyptians called those peoples *barbarians* who did not speak their language.—The ἐν ἐμοί might certainly signify: *in my judgment* (Heinrici, Edwards); but according to the context the meaning rather is: in what concerns me; as between this man and me.—The application of this example is given in ver. 12, in the form of a practical direction:

Ver. 12. "Even so ye, forasmuch as ye are zealous of inspirations, seek that ye may excel to the edifying of the Church."—Several have made the first three words of the verse a separate proposition: *Even so ye;* that is to say: "Ye also would be as barbarians to one another, if ye spoke in tongues without interpretation." But the asyndeton which would follow from this construction, in relation to the following proposition, would be without good reason. The οὕτω indicates the inference to be drawn from what precedes: "*So,* since distinct language is necessary to your being understood, take care, in view of the Church's good, to develop the spiritual gifts which you love, so as to make yourselves more and more intelligible." One cannot help feeling that there is something slightly ironical in the words: *forasmuch as ye are zealous* . . .; "since ye are so eager for manifestations of this kind." There is an allusion here, as Edwards

says, to the spirit of ostentation which led them to seek gifts.—The plural πνεύματα, *spirits*, has given commentators much concern. The word cannot be identified with spiritual gifts, πνευματικά in general; it implies something more special. It must be taken as a strong individualizing of the Holy Spirit, not in the sense of many personalities, as Hilgenfeld thinks, who makes a comparison between spirits thus understood and the evil spirits in cases of possession of which the gospel speaks; but in the sense that the one Divine principle spoken of in chap. xii. manifested itself in transient and very various *breathings of inspirations* in the assemblies of the Church; comp. vers. 26, 27. This extraordinary form of the Spirit's influence, of which tongues were the most emphatic manifestation, was that in which the Corinthians loved above all to enjoy the presence of this Divine principle. The apostle does not absolutely combat this disposition, but he seeks to guide it: "Well and good! Seek inspirations, but such as will always serve the good of the Church, and not the gratification of the curiosity of some or the vanity of others!" To this end prophecy should have the preponderance, or tongues be accompanied with interpretation.—The regimen: *for the edification of the Church*, is placed first by inversion; it depends, of course, on the verb περισσεύητε. The apostle is fond of this sort of construction, which sets in relief the regimen containing the principal idea; comp. iii. 5, vii. 17, ix. 15, etc. Meyer and others prefer to connect this regimen directly with ζητεῖτε, *seek*, for the reason that otherwise the regimen should have been placed after this verb, immediately before

ἵνα, *that*. But this reason is not at all decisive, and the meaning is simpler in the former case: "You seek inspirations; let it only be in the interest of the Church, and not in your own, that you seek to abound in this respect" (see Edwards).—This general conclusion, drawn in ver. 12, is expressed in vers. 13–15 in a concrete and practical form.

Vers. 13–15. "Wherefore[1] let him that speaketh in a tongue pray that he may interpret. 14. For[2] if I pray in a tongue, my spirit prayeth, but my understanding is unfruitful. 15. What is it then? I will pray[3] with the Spirit, but I will pray[4] with the understanding also: I will sing with the Spirit, but I will sing with the understanding also."[5]—There are two readings: διό, *wherefore*, and διόπερ, *wherefore indeed;* the second is perhaps taken from viii. 13 and x. 14, where Paul also states the conclusions of a discussion.—The ancient Greek interpreters and many moderns, Erasmus, Calvin, Rückert, Hofmann, etc., make the words: *that he may interpret*, the logical object of the word: *let him pray:* "Let him ask of God the power to interpret." But the terms αἰτεῖν or δεῖσθαι would perhaps suit better a positive position than προσεύχεσθαι, which rather denotes the state of prayer; and the use Paul makes of this same term προσεύχεσθαι in the following verses, specially to denote ecstatic prayer, hardly admits of our taking it in ver. 13 in another sense. The words: *let him pray* (in tongues) *that he*

[1] T. R. with K L: διοπερ; the rest: διο. [2] B F G omit γαρ (*for*).
[3] ℵ A D E F G P: προσευξωμαι (*let me pray*); B K L: προσευξομαι (*I will pray*).
[4] A D E F G P: προσευξωμαι; ℵ B K L: προσευξομαι.
[5] B F G K P omit και (*also*).

may interpret, therefore signify: "In giving himself up to the Spirit who leads him to pray in a tongue, let him do so with the intention and with the settled aim beforehand to reproduce the contents of his prayer afterwards in intelligible language." So Meyer, Edwards, etc. It does not therefore follow that ἵνα is here taken, as has been thought, in the sense of *ita ut, so that*. Heinrici rightly observes, that in the exercise of every χάρισμα (*gift*) the intention of the will remains in force.[1]

Ver. 14. There is in the state of the glossolalete, who cannot interpret, something incomplete and insufficient. —The expression: *my Spirit*, is taken, by Heinrici and Holsten, to denote the Spirit of God acting and speaking in me. But the following expression: *my understanding*, forbids us to think of anything except a faculty belonging to the person of the man himself;

[1] An extract from Hohl (*Bruchstücke aus dem Leben und den Schriften Ed. Irwings*, Saint-Gall, 1839, p. 149) on the Irvingite manifestations, similar to that described in our chapter, may help to explain the whole passage: "Before the outburst of speech, it was noticeable that the person about to speak became profoundly self-absorbed, isolated from his surroundings; he shut his eyes and covered them with his hand. All at once, as if struck with an electric shock, he underwent a convulsion which shook his whole body. Then there escaped from his quivering mouth, as it were, a burning torrent of strange sounds, forcibly emphasized, and which, to my ear, resembled most those of the Hebrew tongue. Every sentence was usually repeated three times, and given forth with incredible vigour and precision. To this first explosion of strange sounds, which were looked upon as the evidence of genuine inspiration, there succeeded each time, and with emphasis equally forcible, a longer or shorter address in English, which was also repeated several times sentence by sentence, or even word by word, and which consisted sometimes of serious exhortations or terrible warnings, sometimes of consolations full of unction. This latter part passed as the developed interpretation of the former, though it was not expressly given out as such by the speaker. After this manifestation, the inspired person still remained for a time buried in profound silence, and only recovered slowly from this great expenditure of force."

comp. ii. 11; Rom. viii. 16; and 1 Thess. v. 23, passages where it is in vain attempted to set aside the idea of the three fundamental elements of the human person, *body, soul, and spirit:* the body whereby the soul communicates with the external and material world; the spirit whereby it enters into relation with the higher and Divine world; finally, the soul itself, the free and personal force which acts by means of these two organs, using them to bring down the Divine world into the terrestrial, and thus transforming earth into heaven. But it is self-evident that the human spirit is not considered here in its natural isolation from the Divine Spirit, but in its complete union with Him. When carrying it into the state of ecstasy, the Divine Spirit separates it for the time from the *νοῦς, the understanding*, which is a faculty of the soul, or rather the soul itself viewed as thinking. Thereby the impressions take the character of pure feeling, ineffable emotion; it is a state of spiritual enjoyment of which sensual intoxication is, so to speak, the gross caricature; comp. Acts ii. 13; Eph. v. 18–20. Such a state manifested itself in extraordinary voices, consisting of prayers (*προσεύχεσθαι*, ver. 14), praises (*ψάλλειν*, ver. 15), or thanksgiving (*εὐλογεῖν, εὐχαριστεῖν*, ver. 16), and expressing the satisfaction and aspirations of the saved soul. Only the understanding was not a partner in this state; it is *unfruitful*, says the apostle. The word used, *ἄκαρπος*, is taken by Chrysostom, Calvin, and others in this sense: does not reap fruit for itself. It does not seem to me accurate to allege, as Edwards does, that this meaning is contrary to ver. 4, where it is said that the glossolalete edifies himself. For the

speaker in a tongue must not be confounded with his νοῦς. But the context speaks rather in favour of the active sense: it does not produce fruit. The understanding, not deriving from this state any new idea, produces nothing, that is to say, has nothing to communicate to others.[1] The conclusion is drawn in ver. 15.

Ver. 15. The question: *What is it then?* invites the readers to find the conclusion for themselves. What will it be? To exclude ecstasy and speaking in tongues? By no means, but to complete the pneumatic transport by the exercise of the understanding: to pray in the spirit, there is the tongue; to pray in full self-possession, there is the interpretation. The understanding here fills, in a manner, in relation to the tongue, the part of the *prophet*, when, in the heathen world, he interpreted the mysterious oracles given forth by the Pythia.—The reading προσεύξωμαι, *let me pray*, would express an encouragement addressed by the apostle to himself; which is wholly out of place. As Edwards says, the best MSS. often confound ο and ω; and if this were an exhortation, it would require to be in the plural.—We here find two of the principal forms of glossolalia described from the standpoint of their contents: *prayer*, προσευχή, intense aspiration after the fulness of the blessings assured to faith; and *singing*, ψαλμός (comp. ver. 26), the joyful celebration of all the favours already received. The verb ψάλλειν (from

[1] The Jewish philosopher Philo thus describes the inspiration of the prophet: "Natural reason is banished by the coming of the Divine Spirit, and it returns when He goes. For," he adds, "what is mortal and what is immortal cannot dwell together." Paul would not have approved of such a psychology; and in any case it is not to prophecy, but to speaking in tongues, and only to a certain extent, that this description, according to him, would have applied.

ψάω) strictly signifies to touch the chord of the instrument, hence to sing with accompaniment. The singing of improvised hymns was therefore one of the principal forms of speaking in tongues. Edwards, agreeably to the strict sense of ψάλλειν, thinks that the singing might be accompanied in public worship with the sound of the harp; comp. Eph. v. 19, where ψάλλοντες is distinguished from ἄδοντες.—*Benediction*, εὐλογία, or *thanksgiving*, εὐχαριστία (ver. 16), is closely related to this form, from which it differs only by the absence of singing. Pliny says of the Christians, in his letter to Trajan, that in their worship they are accustomed *Christo quasi deo carmen dicere;* but this expression refers to the hymns of the whole Church (Col. iii. 16; Eph. v. 18–20), and not at all to the singing of the glossolaletes.—From the unfruitfulness of glossolalia, when not followed by interpretation, there arises for the Church a situation, the awkwardness of which the apostle expresses in the words which follow, vers. 16–19.

Vers. 16, 17. "Since, if thou blessest[1] in[2] spirit, how shall he that occupieth the room of the stranger say Amen at thy giving of thanks, seeing he understandeth not what thou sayest? 17. For thou verily givest thanks well, but the other is not edified."—The ἐπεί, *since*, relates to this thought understood: "And indeed we must act thus (add interpretation to speaking in a tongue), since if . . ." Paul here substitutes the second person (*thou*) for the first, because in ver. 15 he

[1] T. R. with F G K L: εὐλογησας (*if thou hast blessed*); the rest: εὐλογης (*if thou blessest*).

[2] B D E P read εν (*in*), which is omitted by the rest, and T. R. with A L read τω before πνευματι.

states what he thinks he ought to do himself, whereas in ver. 16 he supposes an interlocutor acting in an opposite way whom he wishes to convince of his mistake.—It was customary in the synagogue, at the close of a prayer, for all the audience to appropriate the contents of it, solemnly adhering to it by the *Amen* (Deut. xxvii. 15 seq.; Neh. viii. 6). Justin (*1st Apol.*) affirms the continuance of this usage in the Church: "After the president has closed the prayers and thanksgivings, all the people present express their assent by saying: Amen! Now the Amen in Hebrew signifies: So let it be!" See in Edwards the similar passages from Tertullian, Cyril, Jerome, etc. This form of worship became an empty formality when the congregation had not understood the meaning of the benediction pronounced.—On benediction, as the matter of ecstatic discourses, compare the expressions in the Acts: "speaking the wonderful works of God" (ii. 11); "magnifying God" (x. 46).—The expression: *he that occupieth the room of*, ὁ ἀναπληρῶν τὸν τόπον, must not be referred, as several interpreters have done, to this or that special portion of the audience, whether heathen who had come out of curiosity or from religious interest, or immature Christians, catechumens (Heinrici). Paul thus designates all the members of the Church, because in this situation they play the part of unintelligent hearers in relation to the glossolalete. The word ἰδιωτής strictly designates the purely private individual, in opposition to the man in office; hence, in all domains, the man who is unacquainted with the business on hand, the apprentice, the private soldier, the ignorant man. Heinrici mentions the fact that it

was used in the language of the religious corporations of Greece to denote one who was not yet a member of the society. Paul therefore means that the glossolalete who speaks without interpreting, makes the congregation play a *part* similar to that of the strangers or semi-strangers who were sometimes present at their assemblies, and did not understand the ordinary Christian addresses. Now this, according to him, is to be wanting in courtesy (ἀσχημονεῖν, xiii. 5). The word τόπος, *room, place*, does not point to a fixed place occupied by non-Christians in the assemblies. It is here taken figuratively: to fill the function, to play the part of; comp. Acts i. 25 (λαβεῖν τὸν τόπον); and in Clement's *Epistle to the Corinthians*, c. 63: τὸν ὑπακοῆς τόπον ἀναπληροῦν, to fill a position of dependence (Edwards). Such is also the meaning of the corresponding Hebrew expression (*male mekom*). Josephus (*Bell. Jud.* v. 2, 5) says, in speaking of Titus, who, in a surprise, had required to draw his sword and do the part of a private soldier, that his friends begged him "not στρατιώτου τάξιν ἀποπληροῦν, him, their commander and the lord of the earth." The military term τάξις, *rank*, naturally takes the place in this passage of the ordinary word τόπος. The impropriety of which the glossolalete is thus guilty toward the Church (xiii. 5) comes out clearly from the question at the close of the verse. The article τό should be remarked before ἀμήν: "*the* Amen," the Amen by which the whole assembly is accustomed to appropriate the prayer of one of its members. If the Church is thus to give its assent to the thanksgiving uttered, it must understand it. The term εὐχαριστία, *thanksgiving*, is the equivalent of

εὐλογία, *benediction.* If there is a shade of difference in their meaning, it is this, the first refers rather to Divine benefits personally received; the second, to the Divine perfections considered in themselves and celebrated for their own sublimity.

Ver. 17. The σύ, *thou*, and the καλῶς, *well*, are slightly ironical. The expression *the other* denotes all the members of the congregation taken individually.—The apostle, in ver. 6, put his own case to prove the uselessness of tongues without prophecy; here he alleges it again in proof of the uselessness of tongues unaccompanied with interpretation.

Vers. 18, 19. "I thank [1] God,[2] I speak [3] in tongues [4] more than ye all; 19. yet in the Church I had rather speak five words with my understanding,[5] that I might teach others also, than ten thousand words in tongues." —The apostle means by ver. 18 that he by no means disdains the gift of tongues, so highly prized at Corinth; he even thanks God for having bestowed it on him richly. These words have been understood in two ways; by some: "I give thanks, I bless, I adore, in the form of discoursing in tongues, more than you all." In this sense, we should have to prefer the reading λαλῶν, *speaking*, of the T. R. or that of the *Alexandrinus*, which simply rejects the word λαλῶ or λαλῶν: "I give thanks in tongues, more than you all." But I think it probable that these two poorly supported

[1] T. R. with A L adds μου (*my* God).

[2] F G It. Syr. here add οτι (*for this that*).

[3] ℵ B D E F G P read λαλω (*I speak*); T. R. with K L: λαλων (*speaking*). A omits this word.

[4] T. R. with B K L P Syr.: γλωσσαις (*tongues*); the rest: γλωσση (*tongue*).

[5] T. R. with K L: δια του νοος μου; the other eight: τω νοι μου.

readings are corrections whereby it has been sought to give the word εὐχαριστεῖν the same meaning as it had in ver. 17: to thank God in an ecstatic discourse. The true reading is undoubtedly λαλῶ, *I speak*. This verb would require in strictness to be connected with the foregoing εὐχαριστῶ, *I give thanks*, by the conjunction ὅτι, *for the fact that* (as is the case in the reading of F G); but very often in classical Greek this conjunction is omitted, and the two verbs are simply put in juxtaposition: "*I give thanks, I speak . . .*" for: "I give thanks for the fact that I speak." This is probably the true reading. Moreover, this meaning might also be that of the reading λαλῶν.—We must, with the Alex. and Greco-Lats., reject the μου after θεῷ, for which there is no sufficient ground in the context.—There is room for hesitation between the plural (*tongues*) and the singular. Both readings are admissible. But what is inconceivable is, how Meyer in such a passage can still apply the term *tongue* to the material organ: Paul giving thanks to God because he speaks more than all the Corinthians by means of his tongue! And if we read the plural, then this meaning becomes altogether absurd (comp. ver. 5).—It should be remarked that he does not say: "Because I speak in *more* tongues than you all;" as he would require to do if he was thinking of actually existing foreign tongues; but: "Because I speak in tongues *more than* you all." It is a mode of speaking in which he surpasses them all.

Ver. 19. After paying this homage to glossolalia, the apostle consigns this gift to its place. This place is the domain of private edification, not public worship.

The emphasis is on the word ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, *in the assembly*. The contents of the verse are explained by ver. 4: He that speaks in tongues edifies himself; but he gives nothing to the Church.—In the reading τῷ νοΐ μου, the words denote the mental state of the speaker (*of sober sense*). In the received reading (διὰ τοῦ νοός μου), the νοῦς, *the understanding*, comes in as the instrument of assimilation by means of which the intuitions of the prophet and the thoughts suggested to the teacher are conveyed to the Church. The *also* before ἄλλους signifies: "Not only myself, as would be the case with the gift of tongues, but others also."—In the form θέλω ἤ, the ἤ, *than*, depends on the idea of comparison contained in θέλω. Classic Greek thus uses ἤ with θέλω and βούλομαι (see Edwards). The verb κατηχεῖν, to make a sound penetrate to the ears of any one, comes thus to signify *to instruct, catechise*. The term includes the two gifts of prophecy and teaching. The apostle concludes this whole development with a saying intended to lead the imprudent and frivolous Corinthians to serious reflection.[1]

[1] To the extract from the work of Hohl, I shall here add the following passages from the work of E.-A. Rossteuscher on the history of the Irvingite Church, published under the title: *Der Aufbau der Kirche auf den ursprünglichen Grundlagen* (2nd ed., 1886): "The speaking in a tongue lasts longer or shorter, five minutes at most. Sometimes it is only a few words, as it were the first outburst of the manifestation; it is, so to speak, the hidden source from which there comes afterwards in the intelligible part of the discourse the stream of life, fitted to water the Church. It is always a deeply felt kind of speech, which evidently fills the whole soul of the speaker. The discourse is accompanied sometimes with tears and groans, sometimes with cries of joy and even laughter. The speaking is regularly formed, and markedly rhythmical. . . . It is uttered with a force and a fulness of voice and often with a rapidity foreign to the person's ordinary mode of expression. They are accents which shake the soul, and pierce the heart as prophecy itself cannot do.

Ver. 20. "Brethren, become not children in understanding: howbeit in malice be ye children, and in understanding be men." — The address *brethren*, is fitted to bring them back to the feeling of Christian dignity which had been singularly weakened in them. The μὴ γίνεσθε, *become not*, gives it to be understood that this abandonment to a sort of childishness has already begun among them. It is indeed the characteristic of the child to prefer the amusing to the useful, the brilliant to the solid. And this is what the Corinthians did by their marked taste for glossolalia, and the sort of disdain they testified for prophecy and still more for teaching. The word φρήν, strictly *the diaphragm*, denotes the physical seat of the action of the νοῦς, the understanding. The νοῦς is the faculty of the soul (ψυχή), whereby the latter discerns spiritually as by the eye it discerns physically. The apostle adds, not without an allusion to all those defects in charity with which he has had to charge them in the course of the Epistle: "If you will be children, well and good, provided it be in malice; but as to understanding, advance

The voice acquires a majesty found nowhere else. . . . One of the inspired said to Irving: 'When I am seized by the Spirit, and lifted into the presence of God as one speaking with tongues, it is as if a covering were dropped over all that surrounds me, and as if I no longer saw anything except the goal of my aspiration and the way leading to it. . . . I feel myself shut in with God, hidden in His tent, secure from all the suggestions of the world, the flesh and the devil. . . .' Another of the inspired, M. D., thus described the spiritual contents of the state: 'The intimate perception of the presence of God in Christ, and of my own state in Jesus, with a torrent of joy which words cannot describe. . . . In this state, self-consciousness blends with the consciousness of God without being lost in it. The inspired one is conscious of his own existence and of a power superior to his existence with the same clearness. This inward state remains the same during the unintelligible and the intelligible part of the discourse."

more and more toward full maturity." Malice, κακία, has its seat in the heart, not in the understanding.—What an exhortation to people so proud of their wisdom! The words, Rom. xvi. 19, have some resemblance to these, but without offering the humiliating side contained in our passage.

Before going further, let us sum up the course of this discussion: Paul began with proving, that in respect of usefulness, the gift of tongues is inferior to prophecy (vers. 1–5). Then, advancing a step, he showed that without interpretation this gift becomes even entirely useless (vers. 6–15). He went still further; he proved, in the third place, that to exercise it in this way, is to commit a real impropriety against the Church (vers. 16–19); finally, he concluded, ver. 20, with an appeal to the good sense of his readers.

Throughout this whole exposition, the apostle has considered the exercise of gifts only from the standpoint of their usefulness to the members of the Church; but in their assemblies for worship, there was another element requiring to be taken into account; this was the strangers, not yet gained or only half gained for the faith, and whom it was necessary to avoid alienating by giving them offence. It is with a view to such persons that the apostle treats the question in the sequel. Ver. 20 is at once the preface to this new development and the conclusion of the foregoing.

Vers. 21–25.

Ver. 21. "In the law it is written: With men of other tongues and lips of strangers[1] will I speak unto

[1] ℵ A B read ετερων (*of others*), instead of ετεροις (*other*).

this people; and yet for all that will they not hear me."—The absurdity, the puerility of the preponderating use of tongues in the assemblies is demonstrated from this new point of view. Paul introduces the subject by quoting Isaiah xxviii. 11, 12. He calls the book of the prophets *the law*, as is sometimes done in the New Testament; comp. ver. 34, and John x. 34. This wide meaning of the word *law* is due to the feeling that all the other parts of the Old Testament rest on the law, and themselves form law for believers. —This passage from Isaiah seems at the first glance to have no connection with the gift of tongues; for it applies in the prophetic context to foreign nations, particularly the Assyrians, by whose invading forces God will visit His people, after having sought in vain to bring them to Himself by the words of the prophets. It does not take long, however, in the closer study of the parallel, to understand its meaning. As to this rude and unintelligible language which, according to Isaiah, God will hold with His people, by giving them over to strange and cruel nations, it is the unbelief of His people, in the words of the prophets, which will force Him to use it; if the Israelites had listened to the prophets with faith, God would not have required to speak to them in strange tongues. So it is with glossolalia, says the apostle; this speaking in unintelligible tongues, which has suddenly sprung up in this new era of the kingdom of God, is the evidence of a separation on God's part, not certainly from those who speak in tongues, but from those to whom He thus speaks. The fact, indeed, proves that the intelligible revelation of God has not been received

as it ought to have been. As is well said by Kling: "When God speaks intelligibly, it is *to reveal* [open] Himself to His people; when He speaks unintelligibly, it is because He must *hide* [close] Himself from them." Pentecost will be cited as an objection, where the gift of tongues appears as a blessing of grace, not as a sign of the Divine displeasure. But, first of all, on that day interpretation accompanied tongues, and transformed them immediately into preaching; but especially speaking in tongues, as it broke forth on that day, had a wholly different signification for believers from that which it had for the mass of the Jewish people. In regard to Israel, which had rejected the preaching in good Hebrew which Jesus had addressed to it for three years, this strange phenomenon was a beginning of rupture, a certification of unbelief. God, while continuing to appeal to it, now addressed Himself to other nations; the people of God was on the eve of its rejection.

The apostle's text differs considerably from the translation of the LXX., which is altogether inaccurate; it also differs from the Hebrew text itself. It is a free reproduction, exactly corresponding, in the first part, to the meaning of the Hebrew, but differing from it sensibly in the last words. The Hebrew says: "And they would not hear;" which applies to the unbelief of the people in regard to the ancient prophetical revelations; while in Paul the words: *and yet for all that will they not hear me*, apply to the conduct of the unbelieving people in regard to the tongues themselves, as is proved by the: *and yet for all that.* The idea expressed by Paul is, therefore, that this new means,

tongues, will fail as well as the former; in Isaiah, prophetical preaching; in Paul, evangelical preaching. How can we help thinking here of the persevering unbelief of Israel, even after Pentecost, an unbelief of which, after Palestine, the whole world, Greece itself, was at that moment the theatre? Paul does not mean that this plan will absolutely fail, and with all. Otherwise why should God still use it? But the use of such means supposes, not faith, but unbelief in those to whom it is applicable? What folly then, what puerility on the part of the Corinthians, to show a strong predilection for a sign of this kind in the worship of believers! It matters little whether we read ἑτέροις (other lips) with the Greco-Lats. and the Byz., or ἑτέρων (lips of others) with the Alex.—Applying the words of Isaiah, as he does here, Paul is led to the following conclusion:

Ver. 22. "Wherefore tongues are for a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not: but prophesying serveth not for them that believe not, but for them which believe."—At the first glance one might be disposed to take the former part of the verse as indicating the salutary effect which glossolalia should produce in those who hitherto had not been able to believe (ἀπίστοις), through the wonder and amazement which such a gift will cause them (Chrysostom, Calvin hesitatingly, Grotius, Meyer in his first editions). But this meaning would be contrary to the words: *And yet for all that will they not hear;* and the example quoted in ver. 23, instead of justifying, would belie this affirmation. Others, on the contrary, have thought that the language points to a sign announcing

to unbelievers their near judgment, *iræ signum* (Beza, Billroth). This is also Edwards' view: "The ecstatic cries in the midst of the assembled Church were intended by God to show unbelievers (the heathen of Corinth) that the day of the Lord was near." In this sense, the ἄπιστοι are not merely people who have not yet believed; they are confirmed unbelievers. Without saying precisely that judgment is announced, we think that tongues are a testimony of unbelief made to the people to whom God thus speaks. God speaks to them unintelligibly only because they are deaf to His clear revelation. We find an analogous fact, Matt. xiii., at the date when Jesus adopts speaking in parables as His habitual method of teaching (vers. 11, 12). After seeking in vain to awake the conscience of the people by His previous teaching (Sermon on the Mount, for example), when Jesus comes to the time when He must reveal to His own the nature and laws of the kingdom which they are to labour to found, He uses the language of parable, which they alone can understand. It is a sign of His growing breach with the mass of the nation. So it is with tongues. Glossolalia is neither a means of conversion, nor a sign of approaching judgment on unbelievers. It is a demonstration given to their own conscience of the state of unbelief which God sees them to have reached. Would a God of light manifest Himself in the midst of His own by unintelligible sounds? Here there is a sign of severance which is gradually carried out.

It is wholly otherwise with prophetic exhortations. These are a sign of faith or of the disposition to believe which already exists in those to whom God thus speaks.

It should be remarked that in opposition to ἀπίστοις, *unbelievers*, the apostle does not here say πιστοῖς, *believers*, as would seem natural, but πιστεύουσιν, *those who* at this moment *are in the act of believing*. This present participle denotes equally the state of a man who has just reached faith, and the state of him who already possesses it. Hence the general principle laid down here agrees with the result described in ver. 24, where an ἄπιστος is brought to faith by prophecy. The man is so called only as not yet believing, and because of his state when he came; he is nevertheless a πιστεύων in respect of what takes place in him, in the course of the meeting.—Critics discuss the question whether the words εἰς σημεῖον, *in sign of*, used in the former clause, should be understood in the latter. It matters very little for the sense. Grammatically the ellipsis seems natural. But the meaning of the word *sign* is modified of course in passing from the one clause of the sentence to the other. In the former, the sign is one of displeasure, implying a charge of unbelief; in the latter, it is one of pity, powerfully calling the man to repentance and faith. Such an appeal is not directed to one already confirmed in unbelief (the ἄπιστοι of ver. 22); but it is made to men such as the ἄπιστος of ver. 23. Erasmus and Bleek have tried to resolve the difficulties of this verse by taking οὐ, *not*, both times in the sense of οὐ μόνον, *not only*. But why not say οὐ μόνον, if this had been his thought?

The apostle now supposes two cases fitted to impress by way of extreme examples the truth of the law which he has just stated:

Ver. 23. "If therefore the whole Church be come

together into one place, and all speak in tongues, and there come in novices, or unbelievers,[1] will they not say that ye are mad?"—This is the first case: an assembly in which only glossolaletes speak.—*Into one place* is related to *the whole.* These plenary assemblies were held doubtless only at more or less considerable intervals; they attracted more strangers and others out of curiosity than the more private gatherings. Those whom Paul here calls ἄπιστοι, *unbelievers*, and ἰδιῶται, *novices*, are people who do not yet belong to the Church. By the second, Meyer and others understand Christians who have neither the gift nor the knowledge of tongues. But how, Rückert rightly asks, could these people be contrasted with *the whole Church?* Meyer supports his view by the use of ἰδιώτης, ver. 16, where he holds that this term denotes the members of the Church themselves. But this is a mistake. What is said in ver. 16, that the glossolalete makes the members of the Church play the part of ἰδιῶται, proves precisely that the ἰδιῶται are not members of the Church. The impropriety consists in giving the members of the Church a part which is not theirs. On the other hand, Hirzel,[2] Rückert, and Holsten thereby understand non-Christians. But how distinguish them in that case from the ἄπιστοι, *unbelievers?* Hirzel proposes to apply the first term to non-Christians of Jewish origin, the second to those of Gentile origin. But this distinction is unfounded. Starting from the simple meaning of ἰδιώτης (ver. 16), we get at a perfectly natural distinction. The ἄπιστος is an *unbeliever* whom curiosity has attracted, but who has not yet given

[1] B omits ἢ ἄπιστοι. [2] *Studien und Kritiken*, 1840.

any sign of faith ; the ἰδιώτης is a novice, an *apprentice* in the domain of faith, a man who has already received some impression and some instruction, but who is not yet baptized, we should say nowadays : a catechumen. Such people, in the exercise of plain common sense, will ask how, if God dwelt there as a Father in the midst of His children, He could speak to them in an unintelligible language : "You shall appear to them madmen, not subjects of inspiration."—Edwards, with some ancient commentators, thinks that the πάντες, *all*, means that the glossolaletes speak all at once, and that the confusion which follows, no less than the unintelligibility of the tongues, is the cause of the impression made on the visitors. But the perfectly analogous expression in regard to prophecy, ver. 24, proves that it is not necessary to give this so improbable meaning to the πάντες of ver. 23. Paul wishes to describe an assembly where there is room for nothing except manifestations of glossolalia, succeeding one another without interruption during the whole meeting. Then the opposite example :

Vers. 24, 25. "But if all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or a novice, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all ; 25. the[1] secrets of his heart are made manifest ; and so falling down on his face he will worship God, and report that God is in you of a truth."—We have just seen the effect of tongues without prophecy ; now, on the contrary, we have what prophecy will do without tongues.—The novice and the unbeliever enter, as in ver. 23, during the meeting. Paul here uses the singular

[1] K L read here και ουτω (*and thus*), which is omitted by all the rest.

instead of the plural (ver. 23); no doubt because the fact he is about to describe will have a purely individual character. It may be thought with Hofmann, that if ἄπιστος is here placed first, the effect is: the unbeliever, and *à fortiori*, the novice. The latter, indeed, was already better prepared to feel the power of prophetic speech, while at ver. 23 it was the reverse: the novice, and *à fortiori*, the unbeliever. Three effects are ascribed to prophecy: conviction, ἔλεγχος; examination, ἀνάκρισις; manifestation, φανέρωσις. — The word ἐλέγχειν signifies *to convince* of error or sin. Every utterance of a prophet is like a flash, lighting up the heart of the hearer and discovering to him in a general way his guilt and defilement.— The word ἀνακρίνεσθαι is not fully rendered by the translation: *is judged;* the Greek term rather denotes the detailed inquiry than the sentence pronounced. His whole inner man is searched, so to speak, by the words of the prophets.

Ver. 25. Then a sudden penetrating illumination, spread over his whole life, is produced in him: he sees himself, as a whole and in the particular details of his life, as God sees him. One might apply this description to the revelation of certain particular circumstances of his life, as when Elisha speaks to Gehazi (2 Kings v. 26), or Jesus to Nathanael and to the Samaritan woman (John i. and iv.). But it is simpler to think here of a moral illumination, similar to that of the judgment, which shows a man his past and present state in its true light. What passes in him at such a moment resembles what passed in Paul on the way to Damascus. Struck by this light, he casts

himself in the dust, not before man, but before God, acknowledging that such brightness can only proceed from the Holy of holies and the Searcher of hearts; that consequently it is He who speaks by the mouth of those into the midst of whom He has come.—The participle *ἀπαγγέλλων*, *reporting*, may refer only to what passes at the time in the assembly itself; it is a cry escaping from him under the power of overwhelming emotion: "Yes, God is among you of a truth!" But this declaration may be regarded also as extending after his departure from the assembly to those whom he meets.—The *ἐν ὑμῖν* may signify: *among you;* but in this context, where inspiration is the matter in question, perhaps it is more natural to explain it: *in you.* So Meyer, Edwards, etc. — By the *ὄντως*, *really*, the man recognises that the claim of Christians to Divine inspiration is well-founded. Here is the opposite of the *μαίνεσθε*, *ye are mad* (ver. 23). The apostle could not better close the discussion on the relative value of the gifts of tongues and of prophecy than by these two examples; and now he can go on to lay down the practical rules which will secure the salutary use of these gifts.

2. *Rules for the exercise of gifts* (vers. 26–40).

Ver. 26. "How is it then, brethren? when ye come together, every one[1] of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a revelation, hath a discourse in a tongue,[2] hath an interpretation.[3] Let all things be

[1] T. R. with D E F G K L Syr. add *υμων* (*of you*).

[2] T. R. with L put *γλωσσαν εχει* (*hath a discourse in a tongue*) before *αποκαλυψιν* (*hath a revelation*). K rejects these words.

[3] D E F G: *διερμηνειαν* instead of *ερμηνειαν*.

done unto edifying."—The meaning of the question: *How is it then?* is the same as in ver. 15. The apostle would lead his readers themselves to draw the conclusions which flow from the principles laid down. Fundamental rule: No gift should be set aside. Every manifestation of the Spirit ought to have its place; enough that all turn to edification. The ἕκαστος ἔχει, *every one hath*, should be understood like the similar phrase i. 12; every one has not all, but every one ought or at least may have something. The proposition may be taken interrogatively. But it is better perhaps to understand it in the sense of a tentative affirmation: "If so be." The repetition of the verb brings out, as Bengel says, the distribution of gifts. The apostle enumerates five of these manifestations. The ψαλμός, *psalm*, is not here a chant in the form of a tongue, the *singing in the spirit*, of ver. 15. For special mention is afterwards made of discoursing in a tongue and of its interpretation. It is therefore a psalm, like those spoken of in Col. iii. 16 and Eph. v. 19 (*psalms, hymns, spiritual songs*); a singing ἐν νοΐ, *with sober mind* (ver. 15), as is suitable to the opening of worship. It seems to me improbable that Paul has in view an Old Testament psalm or an already existing Christian hymn, recited or sung. The word ἔχειν, *to have*, does not prevent its being an improvisation. For, as is observed by Holsten, the term is afterwards applied to a *tongue* and its *interpretation*, which are immediate products of the Spirit's working.[1]—The

[1] Heinrici quotes a remarkable parallel from Philo. The latter says in regard to the Therapeutæ: "After the speaker another rises and sings a hymn addressed to God, either one newly composed by himself, or one of the ancient hymns made by the poets of other days."

διδαχή, *doctrine*, naturally comes after the psalm-singing, being the solid basis of worship. In a religion of light, everything ought to rest on clear and exact instruction. Here is the word of knowledge or wisdom spoken of xii. 8.—According to the MS. L and the received text, there would now follow discourse in tongues, thanksgiving in the transport of ecstasy; but the Alex. and Greco-Lats. here place the ἀποκάλυψις, the *revelation*, expressed in a prophecy. In the first reading there would be a contrast: the calmest element, instruction, would be followed by the most emotional, the most excited, discoursing in a tongue. This order is less natural than that of the second reading, according to which doctrine is followed by a revelation, that is to say, a prophecy. The latter is already characterized by an immediate inspiration more pronounced and extraordinary. What further speaks in favour of this last reading, is the fact that it would be unnatural were speaking in tongues to be separated from interpretation by prophecy. The Byz. K, which almost always coincides with L, entirely omits the words γλῶσσαν ἔχει, *hath a tongue;* it is therefore probable that they were supplied in L, but misplaced by the corrector.—To revelation there is naturally attached speaking in a *tongue;* it is the highest degree of the ecstatic state, consequently the culminating point of worship; after which *interpretation*, which follows, closes by leading adoration back to that state of calm reflection in which the worship had begun (the psalm) and ought to finish. Thus it is that feeling rises by steps as to the third heaven, to return at the close to practical life. We have therefore in this series of actions the

type of normal worship, in which all the elements of understanding and feeling are united, and in which every believer endowed from above can give free scope to his particular gift. It is a spiritual banquet, so to speak, to which every guest brings his quota, just as in the agapæ (xi. 20 seq.).—The apostle now passes to the special rules relating to the exercise of glossolalia.

Vers. 27, 28.

Vers. 27, 28. "If any man speak in a tongue, let it be by two, or at the most by three, and each in his course; and let one interpret. 28. But if there be no interpreter,[1] let him keep silence in the Church; and let him speak to himself, and to God."—In Greek this verse begins with the word εἴτε, *whether*, to which there should be a corresponding εἴτε applied to prophecy (ver. 29). This form very pointedly betrays the accidental (by no means indispensable) character of glossolalia in worship.—The apostle gives three rules regarding this gift. The first relative to *number: two or at most three;* as if two were quite sufficient. The κατά is distributive: two or three each meeting. Edwards thinks that what is referred to here is an antiphony, expressed by ἀνὰ μέρος, *in turn*, as if a duet of glossolaletes was intended. It was this style of performance, in his view, which gave rise to the later antiphonic chants, such as those of which Pliny speaks in his letter to Trajan. How far will the imagination go! Certainly Paul would never have approved of the simultaneous utterance of several discourses, the one hindering the effect of the other. Besides, ἐν μέρει

[1] B D F G: ερμηνευτης, instead of διερμηνευτης.

would have been required to express the sense given by Edwards (see Passow).—The second rule relates to *order: ἀνὰ μέρος, each in course*, consequently: one at a time. The contrary, no doubt, sometimes happened at Corinth. The form *ἀνὰ μέρος* signifies, like *ἐν τῷ μέρει*: in determinate order, in his turn, but not: answering one another. — The third rule fixes the *mode;* the tongue ought to be followed by an interpretation. The expression *εἷς*, *one*, seems to signify that one and the same interpreter ought to act for the two or three discourses in tongues; no doubt to prevent discussions as to the meaning of any one of the discourses. The apostle does not say whether this interpreter is himself one of the glossolaletes, as might be held in accordance with vers. 5 and 13, or if he is some other inspired one, as might be supposed from ver. 28 and xii. 10. Both cases might occur. Holsten alleges that interpretation took place only in the case of one of the three tongues, and by the same man who had spoken in it. But this meaning is contrary to vers. 5 and 28, which expressly exclude the use of a tongue without interpretation.

Ver. 28. The first words have sometimes been translated: "But *if he is not* an interpreter." But it would be impossible to say to which of the two or three glossolaletes the words should be applied, and the position of the verb *ᾖ* before the predicate shows that it is the idea of *being* which is emphasized. The simple *ᾖ* is therefore for *παρῇ*; comp. Luke v. 17; and the translation must be: *But if there be no interpreter.* Holsten objects that it was impossible to know beforehand the absence of all interpreters,

because interpretation was not an office invariably attached to this or that person. But, on the contrary, the necessary conclusion from the passage is that the gift was more or less permanent, whether it belonged as a rule to one of the glossolaletes or to some other of the members of the Church. This view is confirmed by xii. 10.—If every believer known to be endowed with this faculty is absent, and the glossolalete does not himself interpret, he is to keep silence in the congregation. But the apostle would not have him to suppress the moving of the Spirit; for himself he may yield to the impulse to thanksgiving and mental prayer which has taken possession of him and raises him to God.—There follow the rules regarding the exercise of *prophecy*.

Vers. 29–33[a].

Vers. 29, 30. "As to the prophets, let them speak two or three, and let the[1] others judge.[2] 30. And if anything be revealed to another that sitteth by, let the first hold his peace."—The εἴτε, *whether*, which we expect to correspond to the εἴτε of ver. 27, changes into a simple δέ, *but* or *as to*, and that no doubt because, if the presence of glossolaletes is accidental and uncertain, that of prophets is a fact which does not seem doubtful.—Paul again lays down three rules: The first, as to *number*. By saying simply *two or three*, suppressing the τὸ πλεῖστον, *at most* (comp. ver. 27), Paul shows that he accepts the number

[1] ℵ A B E K read οἱ before ἄλλοι (*the others*), whereas D F G L omit οἱ (*others*).

[2] Instead of διακρινέτωσαν (*judge*), D F G read ἀνακρινέτωσαν (*make inquiry*).

three, in the case of prophets, more easily than in the case of tongues.—The second rule relates to *mode;* prophecy, like tongues, has its necessary complement: discernment, that judgment by which any impure elements, which might have found their way into it, were to be described as such and removed. It should be borne in mind that as yet there was neither a written Word nor a body of doctrine strictly formulated. All was in course of formation; it belonged to prophecy itself to bring the new elements which were afterwards to be elaborated and ordered by διδασκαλία, *teaching.* How important, then, was it that no strange mixture should be cast, if one may so speak, into the molten mass! Hence the importance of a διάκρισις, *discernment*, a trial of the ideas expressed in the prophecies which were addressed to the congregation.—By whom was this judgment exercised? Some have thought that the term οἱ ἄλλοι, *the others*, could only designate the other *prophets;* but in that case should we not rather have οἱ λοιποί, *the rest* of the prophets? Melanchthon thought that the word applied to all the members of the Church, and the view seems to me to be in a certain measure correct. Of course in practice such an office, in which every one had the right to take part, could only be carried out by means of the most capable, especially the *teachers.* The passage 1 Thess. v. 20, 21, seems to confirm this wider meaning of the word *the others.* Meyer objects that διάκρισις was a gift (xii. 10), and that consequently every believer did not possess it. It is needless to say that the meaning of *the others* is limited by the possession of this gift. Only there is

nothing to prove that the gift belonged only to the prophets themselves.—What was the standard of this judgment? It is not without reason, certainly, that the apostle began his whole exposition regarding spiritual gifts (xii. 1–3), by indicating the precise character which distinguishes true and false inspirations, mentioning that the first have for their common characteristic and essence the cry of adoration: *Jesus Lord!* while the others tend to the abasement and rejection of Jesus. It was enough, then, to bring every prophecy into connection with this centre of all Christian revelation, the person of Christ, and to see what was the tendency of the prophecy that had been heard, to disparage or to glorify Him. It is no doubt to this standard that Paul's expression Rom. xii. 6 applies, *the analogy of faith.* This judgment must consequently have mainly set aside everything in a prophetic discourse which could compromise the Divine sovereignty of Jesus over the world, the Church, and the individual soul. This is in harmony with the saying of Jesus, John xvi. 13, 14: "When the Spirit is come, *He will glorify Me.*"

Ver. 30. The third rule relates to *order*: If, while a prophet is speaking, another receives a revelation, both should not speak simultaneously; the first should keep silence. But, it will be asked, why should not the second rather wait till the first finished? Assuredly, because the freshest revelation will also produce the purest prophecy. It is by lengthening his discourse that the prophet is in danger of mixing what is *his own* with the Divine communication. The apostle's injunction is well fitted to set aside empty amplifications

and verbiage.—The expression: *to another that sitteth by*, shows that the prophet speaking was standing, and that he to whom the new revelation is addressed testifies his intention to speak by rising. There is something strange in the impersonal and passive form *ἀποκαλυφθῇ, it is revealed to him;* it seems as if the cloud of Divine revelation were seen passing from over the one to the other.—It might be thought that the verb *σιγᾷν, to keep silence*, is used here in the sense of *σιωπᾷν, to become silent;* but it can have its natural meaning: "Let him from that moment keep silence." —It might seem presumptuous thus to regulate the manifestations of the prophetic spirit; hence the apostle in the following verses expressly justifies the liberty he takes of fixing a rigorous mode of procedure in such a domain, where everything seems to be given up to the incalculable breathing of the Spirit.

Vers. 31–33ª. "For ye may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn, and all may be comforted. 32. And the spirits[1] of the prophets are subject to the prophets. 33ª. For God is not a God of confusion, but of peace."—Ver. 31 might be understood in this sense: "Thus it may happen that those who prophesy to-day will in their turn be taught and exhorted to-morrow." Each member will alternately play an active and a passive part. But in that case Paul would have said: *καὶ οὕτω, and so*, rather than *γάρ, for*. The true meaning seems to me to be this: "For you must all have it in your power to fill the prophet's function one after another" (of course: those who have the gift of prophecy); now this is what could not be done except by

[1] D E F G read *το πνευμα* (*the Spirit*).

observing the rule given in ver. 30. Supposing, indeed, that a prophet had spoken indefinitely, he would have prevented the others from declaring what God revealed to them for the instruction or comfort of the Church. And thus is explained the second part of the verse: many members of the Church would have been deprived of the light and strength God wished to communicate to them by means of those other prophets who had been prevented from uttering their message. But this arrangement, of course, rested on a supposition: to wit, that the prophet was able to exercise the control necessary to restrain, if it was needed, the outburst of the prophetic inspiration which animated him. And this supposition the apostle now lays down as a reality in ver. 32.

Ver. 32. The καί here signifies: *and indeed.* The terms: *of the prophets* and *to the prophets,* have sometimes been referred to different persons, as if Paul meant that the prophets should be humble enough to subordinate themselves to the other prophets, either by accepting their judgment (ver. 29), or by consenting to give place to them (ver. 30). So Calvin, Bleek, Rückert, etc. But it would be impossible to explain on this view why Paul should say: "*the spirits* of the prophets," rather than the prophets themselves. And instead of *are subject* or *subject themselves,* it would require to run: *should subject themselves.* Hofmann also justly remarks that Paul would have said in this sense simply ἀλλήλοις: "should subject themselves *to one another.*" It is not without purpose that he brings the term *prophets* in the Greek into immediate contact with itself, as if to describe the reaction which every

prophet is capable of producing on himself. The fact here enunciated by the apostle is of a psychological nature. He declares that the prophetical breathings or inspirations do not carry the prophet away without his consent or against his will. In chap. xii. 2, he began by reminding the Corinthians of the state of passivity to which they were formerly accustomed when, in the midst of heathenism, they were carried away blindly by diabolical inspirations. It is not so with the operation of the Divine Spirit; this does not deprive the prophet of his liberty. Consequently he has no right to make inspiration a pretext for refusing to submit to the rules laid down by the apostle. The plural πνεύματα, *spirits*, here denotes, as in ver. 12, the particular impulses and revelations granted to the prophets. Heinrici and Holsten contrast the prophet with the glossolalete, who, according to them, did not enjoy the same liberty in regard to his inspirations. This surely is a mistake; for vers. 27 and 28 would be unintelligible if he did not enjoy his full liberty in relation to the Spirit. Divine inspiration differs from diabolical, in the fact that the latter takes man from himself,—it is a possession,—whereas the former restores him to himself. The present ὑποτάσσεται signifies, not *are subject*, but *subject themselves*, and that at the very moment when the prophet wills it.

Ver. 33ª. The general maxim stated in this verse is the foundation of all the preceding injunctions. The term ἀκαταστασία denotes the disorder of a whole whose parts are at strife with one another, and εἰρήνη, *peace*, harmony of a whole, all whose parts act in concert. God dwells only in a whole of this second kind. The

axiom justifies the rules which Paul has been giving, for without them the Church could only present a spectacle of complete disorder, which would banish God out of it.

There remains a last injunction, also essential, in the apostle's view, to the good order of the Church, that regarding the speaking of women in the assemblies. Paul has purposely reserved this point for the last. For it was not till after imposing silence conditionally on the prophets that he could think of imposing it on women.

Vers. 33b–38.

Vers. 33b–35. "As in all the Churches of the saints,[1] 34.[2] let your[3] women keep silence in the Churches: for it is not permitted[4] unto them to speak; but to be under obedience,[5] as also saith the law. 35. If they will learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home: for it is a shame for women[6] to speak in the Church."—The last words of ver. 33 are joined, by many commentators, to what precedes. But how could Paul say: "God is not a God of confusion, but of peace, as in all the Churches of the saints"? He would have required to say: "God is *among you* a God . . .," or: "God is a God . . . as *is seen* in all the

[1] F G here add διατασσομαι (*I ordain*).

[2] These two verses, 34 and 35, are transposed by D E F G and Ambrosiaster after ver. 40.

[3] ℵ A B omit υμων (*your*), which is read by T. R. with D E F G K L.

[4] T. R. with K: επιτετραπται (*was permitted*), instead of επιτρεπεται (*is permitted*).

[5] T. R. with D F G K L: υποτασσεσθαι (*to be subject*); A B: υποταγησεσθωσαν (*let them be subject*).

[6] T. R. with D E F G K L Syr.: γυναιξιν (*for women*); ℵ A B: γυναικι (*for woman*).

Churches . . ." As they stand, the words: *as in all the Churches* . . ., cannot evidently depend on the preceding clause, which is a general maxim regarding the character of God. Besides, this clause is in close logical relation to the argument of ver. 36: "Did the Word go forth from you, or did it come to you only?" And it is this very thing, probably, which has led several Latin copyists to transpose vers. 34 and 35, putting them after ver. 40, in order thus to connect more directly the last words of ver. 33 with ver. 36. The addition of the verb διατάσσομαι, *I ordain*, to the end of ver. 33, in two of the Greco-Lat. MSS. which have made this transposition, is due to the same cause. From this point of view the clause was read as follows: "So *I ordain* in all the Churches of the saints;" then the text continued with ver. 36: "Or did the Word of God come out from you . . .?" In other terms: Do you think you have the right to put yourselves above the rules followed by all the other Churches? Thus the words of ver. 33[b] and of ver. 36 were put as referring to all the rules given in this chapter regarding the use of glossolalia and prophecy; and as the injunction relative to women broke this connection, some Greco-Lat. documents were led to transpose vers. 33 and 34 after ver. 40. But it is to be remarked that no document rejects these verses, which guarantees their authenticity, wrongly suspected by Heinrici and positively attacked by Holsten. Moreover, the latter himself recognises the impossibility of connecting the last words of ver. 33 with the preceding context. Only he does not find the connection with the sequel much more tenable: because, says he, the word *Churches* in

ver. 33 denotes the communities of believers, whereas in ver. 34 it can only designate their assemblies for worship. But these two meanings are so closely connected with one another, that they may perfectly well be used here side by side. "All the assemblies (groups of believers) have their customs; and to these customs belong the silence of women in the *assemblies* (meetings for worship)." This meaning is perfectly suitable. Holsten again asks why, if these words are really Paul's, we have here: "the Churches *of the saints*," and not, as in xi. 16: "the Churches *of God*." The answer is easy: The saints, distributed in Churches, locally speaking, yet form only one great spiritual whole; the Corinthians should not isolate themselves from this community of saints by adopting customs rejected by all the rest of the body, such as the speaking of women in the assemblies. The term ἅγιοι, *saints*, expresses the venerable character which belongs to such customs.

Ver. 34. Here we have the principal proposition, on which depends the ὡς . . ., *as* . . ., of ver. 33ᵇ. The pronoun ὑμῶν, *of you* (if it is authentic), must form an antithesis to τῶν ἁγίων, *of the saints*. It may be made dependent on the ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, *in the assemblies*, which follows; in this sense: "Your assemblies should resemble those of the other saints." But it is more natural, seeing the position of the pronoun, to connect it with αἱ γυναῖκες, *women*. "Let *your* women behave like those of the saints in all the Churches." The authenticity of the word appears to me guaranteed by the combined authority of two of the three families of MSS., and by the support of the Peschito. Not being necessary to the clause, it was easily omitted.—There

is a touch of irony in the following clause, if, with the T. R., we read the infinitive, ὑποτάσσεσθαι, *to be subject:* "It is not allowed to them to speak, but to be subject." This irony is in keeping with the context. It disappears if, with the Alex., we read the imperative: ὑποτασσέσθωσαν, *let them be subject!*—The words: *as saith the law,* refer to Gen. iii. 16: "Thy husband shall rule over thee." It is obvious that the apostle regards speaking in public as an act of authority exercised over the congregation which listens; comp. 1 Tim. ii. 12. And as the attitude of authority over the man is contrary to that of obedience which was imposed on the woman during the present economy, he draws the conclusion that the speaking of the woman in public is in contradiction to the position assigned to her by the Divine will expressed in the law. It is easy to see why the apostle substitutes the general idea: *to be subject,* which relates to the whole life of women, for that of *not speaking* in the assemblies; it is because the silence of women in worship is only an application of the general condition of subordination which is imposed on them in relation to man. Of course the law contained nothing regarding the part of women in the assemblies; but, by determining the character of their life in general, it had, according to Paul's view, indirectly settled the question. Comp. Col. iii. 18; Eph. v. 22. The καί, *also,* puts on the same level the apostle's precept (ver. 34ª) and God's declaration in Genesis, so certain is Paul that he speaks as he does in virtue of the will of the Lord (ver. 37).—Here, as tacitly in ver. 19, the ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, *in Church,* is opposed to ἐν οἴκῳ, *at home,* in private. The word αἰσχρόν, *shameful, misbecoming,* seems very

strong. Paul sees in the public speaking of woman a mode of acting contrary to the attitude enjoined on her both by nature and the command of the Creator; comp. xi. 1–16. He does not say criminal, immoral; it is a question of propriety or modesty.

Ver. 35. Several commentators, Heinrici for example, draw from this verse the conclusion that the speaking forbidden to women, ver. 34, is neither teaching, nor prophecy, nor discoursing in tongues, but solely the mania of raising questions in the assembly, and so posing as teachers under pretence of asking explanations. If they have questions to put, they should reserve them for the house, and address them to their husbands. But, even in this sense, the right to teach in the Church would be none the less denied to them by the apostle. For if women cannot put questions without going out of their sphere and shocking decorum, much less can they teach without committing an impropriety. But more than this: the meaning thus sought to be given to ver. 35, by restricting it by ver. 36, is contrary to the true relation between the two verses. The particle εἰ δέ, *and moreover if*, which begins ver. 35, introduces, not a simple explanation, but a gradation: "And even if they would learn something, they ought to abstain from asking in the congregation; they should reserve their questions to be submitted to their husbands in private." The form εἰ δέ, *and if*, is therefore founded on the fact that questioning was the case of least gravity, the one which seemed most naturally to admit of exception. But this very exception Paul rejects; for he knows how easily, under pretext of putting questions, women

could elude the prohibition which forbade their public speaking. Woman belongs to the domestic hearth, so that a simple public question on her part would alone be an impropriety; for by putting her on a public stage, as it were, such an act would go contrary to the modesty of her destined sphere. To be remarked is the adjective ἰδίους, their *own* husbands; they ought to do nothing to affect the bond of dependence which unites each of them to *her* husband. Holsten asks how this applies to those who have husbands insufficiently instructed, or to those who have husbands yet heathen (chap. vii.), we may add: or to those who have no husband at all. But these last are regarded as living in the house of their parents, to whom they can naturally turn; and as to the others, they are special cases which will find their solution in practice, without Paul's needing to point it out. It is enough for him to settle in a summary way woman's moral position and duty.

Conclusion as to the preaching of women.

In chap. xi. we have already treated of the relation of this prohibition to the authorisation granted to women to prophesy or pray, implicitly contained in ver. 5 of this chapter. Our study of chap. xiv. confirms the idea that the word λαλεῖν, *to speak*, in this chapter, cannot apply merely to simple questions, or vain gossiping, in which women might indulge with one another during worship. The term *speaking in the Church*, especially in a chapter where it is applied throughout to the glossolaletes and prophets, can only designate a public speaking, which has for its end to teach and edify. Thus, then, while referring to the observations presented on the subject in chapter xi., we think we shall not be far from the apostle's view if we thus state the result of the two passages taken

together: "As to women, if, under the influence of a sudden inspiration or revelation, they wish to take the word in the assembly to give utterance to a prayer or prophecy, I do not object; only let them not do so without having the face veiled. But in general, let women keep silence. For it is improper on their part to speak in church."[1]

The apostle is not ignorant of the manifold opposition which this injunction will encounter in the Church. Vers. 36–38 are addressed to those who, on the ground of an alleged higher inspiration, would affect to despise the direction which he has just given, as well as all those which had gone before.

Vers. 36–38. "Or, indeed, came the Word of God out from you? or came it unto you only? 37. If any man think himself to be a prophet, or inspired, let him acknowledge that what I write unto you is from the Lord.[2] 38. But if any man be ignorant of it, let him be ignorant."[3]—The ἤ, *or* (ver. 36), signifies, as usual with Paul at the beginning of a question: "Or, indeed, if you will not admit what I say." For the two following questions, the apostle returns to the idea with which he had introduced the subject of the speaking of women: *As in all the Churches . . .* (ver. 33ᵇ).

[1] Does it follow from what we have said in regard to prophecy (that it has become transformed, in the course of the Church's development, into lively preaching, p. 250), that woman, authorised to prophesy, is by that very fact also authorised to preach? This would be to forget that what gave rise to the exception as to prophecy was its having the character of immediate and sudden revelation. This character having ceased, the ground of exception falls with it. The more preaching thereby approaches teaching, the more it comes under the mode of action reserved for man and forbidden to woman.

[2] D F G read κυριου εστιν (*is the Lord's*); ℵ A B: κυριου εστιν εντολη (*is a commandment of the Lord*); T. R. with K L Syr.: κυριου εισιν εντολαι (*are commandments of the Lord*).

[3] T. R. with B E K L Syr.: αγνοειτω (*let him be ignorant*); ℵ A D F G: αγνοειται (*he is ignored*).

"Or are you the mother Church in which the preaching of the gospel took its rise, and from which it spread through the world?" In that case one could understand how the Corinthians could affect complete independence. "Or are you the only Church among the Gentiles to which it has come?" In that case the claim to follow a course alone, and at their own pleasure, would also be intelligible. These two questions are somewhat sarcastic, as happens when one wishes to bring down presumption. The same is the case with the following verses. The apostle knows that there are leaders on the spot, who, in rivalry with him, claim to derive authority only from the Lord and from the immediate inspiration of the Spirit. Hence ver. 37.

Ver. 37. The term δοκεῖ εἶναι, *thinks himself to be*, denotes a claim true or false.—We must not give to the word πνευματικός, *spiritual*, hence *inspired*, too restricted a sense, according to which it would denote a class different from the prophets, as is done by the commentators who regard this term as designating only the glossolaletes (Baur, Heinrici). It is more natural to understand the ἤ, *or*, in the sense: *or in general*, as iv. 3, so that the term *spiritual* comprehends the prophets also. The best way for these organs of the Spirit to prove the reality of their inspiration will be, the apostle declares, their perceiving his superior wisdom and apostolic authority, not criticising his ordinances, but rendering practical homage to their excellence by conforming to them: the Spirit should acknowledge the Spirit.—The ἃ γράφω, *the things that I write*, is at once the object of ἐπιγινωσκέτω, *let him acknowledge*, and the subject of the following proposi-

tion: "Let him acknowledge the things that I write *as being*" . . . etc.—The three families of MSS. have each their own reading in the following clause. The shortest and most sober is that of the Greco-Lats.: "That the things which I write are *the Lord's*." The Alex. add the idea of commandment: "are a *commandment* of the Lord." So also the Byz., but putting the word commandment in the plural. One would naturally be inclined to give the preference to the first reading. But is it not possible that the word commandment, in the singular or plural, was rejected because it was taken in the meaning attached to it in vii. 10, to denote a precept uttered on the earth by the Lord Jesus, and because no such saying was found in the Gospels? If the term ἐντολή, *commandment*, is authentic, it is hard to know whether to prefer the singular or the plural. The singular may have been substituted for the plural from regard to the Divine precept quoted ver. 34. But the plural may also have been introduced in order better to bring under this term all the many preceding ordinances.—However that may be, the apostle here expresses the intimate consciousness he has of not having directed the Church, while settling these delicate questions, in ways of his own choice, but of having been guided by the light which is assured to him as an apostle charged with founding and governing the Church of the Gentiles; comp. Rom. xii. 3. It is with this elevated conviction of his apostolic inspiration that he adds the following words, ver. 38.

Ver. 38. There is more than indifference, there are severity and threatening in these words; they are

addressed to the persons whose folly was characterized by the word δοκεῖ in the previous verse. "If there are among you people who reckon their ideas superior to mine, let them follow them!" Of course such speaking is not addressed to people with whom one is on good terms. We have to bear in mind the first chapters of the Epistle, where the apostle once and again alluded to the disrespectful sentiments of a party in the Church toward him; comp. also vii. 40.—The reading ἀγνοείτω, *let him be ignorant*, is the only admissible one. After all he has said, the apostle no longer seeks to convince those who think themselves wiser than he is; he abandons them at once to their inexperience and their responsibility. The reading ἀγνοεῖται, *he is ignored*, preferred by some commentators, and again recently by Heinrici, would signify: "Willing to be ignorant of God, he is ignored (rejected) by Him." Edwards regards ἀγνοεῖται as a future indicative middle: "he will be ignored (at the judgment)." Comp. viii. 3. It is difficult to explain the origin of this variant (see Meyer's attempt). But the threat of perdition for refusal to accept directions so external in their nature as those which precede would be rather severe. The reading ἀγνοείτω: "Let him be ignorant at his risk and peril!" is the only one worthy of the apostle, and really natural.—Paul closes with a very precise statement of his conclusion:

Vers. 39, 40.

Vers. 39, 40. "Wherefore, brethren,[1] covet to prophesy, and forbid not to speak in[2] tongues. 40.

[1] ℵ A B add μου (*my brethren*).
[2] B D F G It. read εν before γλωσσαις.

But[1] let all things be done decently and in order."—We have already seen again and again in this Epistle that after a searching discussion, going to the very heart of his subject, Paul likes to conclude with a brief practical direction, in which the different sides of the question are reflected; so vii. 38, xi. 33, 34. It is the same here. The preference given to prophecy over tongues is expressed by the antithesis of the two verbs: *covet* and *forbid not.* The latter expression reminds us of the two sayings 1 Thess. v. 19, 20: "Quench not the Spirit," and: "Despise not prophesyings." It appears from these two warnings that the general tendency at Thessalonica was to disdain and disparage the extraordinary manifestations of the Spirit, whereas at Corinth they were exalted, especially in the instance of tongues. The apostle takes care to guard each Church, on right or left, according to its wants.

Ver. 40. If ver. 39 is the summing up of the dissertation on gifts, contained in chaps. xii.–xiv., ver. 40 is the close of the whole section which refers to questions of worship, chaps. xi.–xiv. The word εὐσχημόνως, *with seemliness*, refers particularly to the demeanour of women and to the celebration of the Supper; the κατὰ τάξιν, *in order*, rather alludes to the recommendations given in regard to the exercise of gifts, chap. xiv.

Conclusion regarding the gift of tongues.

The detailed study of this chapter has, I think, confirmed the previous result, to which we were led, chap. xii. 10,

[1] T. R. here omits with K L the δε, which is the reading of all the others.

regarding the nature of glossolalia. Most certainly the tongues spoken at Corinth could not be really existing foreign tongues. The glossolalete did not evangelize, did not preach; he praised and gave thanks. To express such feelings would an existing tongue be chosen which had never been learned?—The same objection may be made to the Bleek-Heinrici explanation. What purpose would it serve to go in quest of old unused expressions, or to create extraordinary combinations of words to give utterance to the impressions of joy and adoration with which the possession of salvation filled the heart? Such a course would rather betray the labour of reflection than emotion or ecstasy. In any case, it is far from probable that there would be at Corinth many believers having at command the archaic forms of the learned tongue.—The explanation held in our day by many commentators, that the tongues consisted only of inarticulate groanings and a babbling of confused sounds, which had no meaning, is not less incompatible with our chapter. How would the apostle have attached to this gift such value as to give thanks for the rich command he had of it himself? The apostle, as chap. xiv. itself shows, was too sound-minded to give himself up to a religious exercise so puerile as is thus supposed, and to allow it a regular place in Church worship. Finally, it is impossible not to connect the gift which was developed at Corinth with that which was manifested on the day of Pentecost at Jerusalem, and which is again mentioned on several subsequent occasions in the book of the Acts x. 46: "They heard them speak in tongues" (at the house of the Gentile Cornelius); xix. 6: "The Holy Spirit came upon them, and they spoke in tongues and prophesied" (the twelve disciples of John the Baptist instructed by Paul). The term being the same in the Acts and in our Epistle, it ought to denote a kind of language radically homogeneous. Now how is it possible to suppose that on Pentecost the speaking in tongues could have consisted of unintelligible utterances which had really no meaning? Could the multitudes have exclaimed: "We hear them speak in our own tongues the *wonderful works of God*" (Acts ii. 11).

I can only therefore regard the gift of tongues as the expression, in a language spontaneously created by the Holy Spirit, of the new views and of the profound and lively emotions of the human soul set free for the first time from the feeling of condemnation, and enjoying the ineffable sweetness of the relation of sonship to God. And as the influence of the Holy Spirit takes possession of the whole soul and every one of its natural powers, to make it its organ, it also took possession of the gift of speech, transfiguring it, so to speak, to give utterance to emotions which no natural tongue could express. It was, doubtless, a something intermediate between singing and speech, analogous to what we call a recitative, and the meaning of which was more or less immediately comprehensible like that of music. On Pentecost, when this language was manifested in its most distinct form, every well-disposed hearer understood it at once, in a way analogous to that which produced interpreters at Corinth, and could translate it immediately, so that he thought himself listening to his own tongue: "How *hear we* every man in our own tongue wherein we were born?" It must be borne in mind that human language is not an accidental, arbitrary creation, nor the work of the understanding only, but that it is the spontaneous product of the entire human soul. There is at the root of all existing languages, an *essential*, unique language; no doubt, if it existed as such, it would be composed of onomatopœiæ. This is what Plato expressed, after his own fashion, in a passage of the *Cratylus*, quoted by Heinrici: "It is manifest that the gods at least call things truly (*πρὸς ὀρθότητα*), and theirs are the natural names (*φύσει ὀνόματα*)." This necessary language of the human spirit could be drawn forth at this decisive point of history by the Divine Spirit from the depths of the soul, and made more or less imperfectly the organ of His first communications.

I have quoted various witnesses, in the two notes pp. 278, 286, as to the manifestations which signalized the first serious religious awakening that led to the founding of the Irvingite Church. It seems to me impossible to regard these phenomena as purely artificial imitations of those described by the New Testament in the first times of the Churches of

Judea and Greece. At the beginning especially, these manifestations were remarkable for unaffected sincerity. Later, love of the extraordinary and desire to shine undeniably introduced an impure alloy, as was the case at Corinth itself. Such manifestations therefore give evidence of a real faculty latent in the depths of the human soul, which a profound religious awakening may call into exercise at any time under fixed conditions, and the creative action of which may yet in our day produce effects similar to those of the first days of the Church. We were not wrong, therefore, in maintaining the possibility of the reappearance of gifts during the whole course of the present economy (see on xiii. 8), while concluding from the apostle's words in this same chapter that the normal progress of the Church tends rather to the diminution of such phenomena, as a transition to their complete disappearance in the perfect state.

X.

The Resurrection of the Body (Chap. XV.).

From ecclesiastical, moral, and liturgical questions, the apostle passes to one of a dogmatic nature. He has reserved it for the last, no doubt, because of its importance. Doctrine is the vital element in the existence of the Church. The Church itself is in a manner only doctrine assimilated. Any grave corruption in teaching immediately vitiates the body of Christ. The apostle opened his letter by laying down as the foundation of his work, Christ crucified; he concludes it by presenting as the crown of his work, Christ risen. In these two facts, applied to the conscience and appropriated by faith, there is concentrated indeed the whole of the Christian salvation.

The subject of the resurrection of the body does not

appear to have been treated in the letter which the Corinthians had addressed to Paul. Ver. 12 of our chapter rather leads us to think that he had accidentally learned, perhaps from the delegates of the Church who were now with him, what was being said at Corinth by some individuals (τινές) who posed as adversaries of the resurrection.

Did they deny the resurrection of Christ Himself? It does not seem so at the first glance, for the apostle starts from this fact as admitted, to infer therefrom our own resurrection. But he takes such pains to lay this foundation of his argument, that it seems to me impossible not to hold, in opposition to the opinion of most modern commentators, that the conviction of those people, and even of many members of the Church, was shaken on the point. One of the two negations could not in the long run fail to lead to the other; for in virtue of the close union between Christ and believers, salvation cannot otherwise be realized in the latter than in the person of their Head.

Who were these *certain?* It has been supposed that they were former Sadducees who, while going over to Christianity, had imported into it some remnants of their former opinions. But there is no proof of the propagation of Sadduceism outside of Palestine; and a Sadducee converted to Christianity would have experienced too radical a change to admit easily of such a mixture of heterogeneous opinions. All the religious and moral deviations which we have hitherto observed at Corinth proceeded from the Greek character; it is probable that it was so also in this case. From the Greek point of view, especially since the time of

Plato, it was customary to regard matter, ὕλη, as the source of evil, physical and moral, and consequently the body as the principle of sin in human nature. It is obvious, therefore, that the resurrection of the body which, from the Jewish Messianic viewpoint, was looked upon as the consummation of the expected salvation, and as an essential element of future glory, must have appeared to the Greek mind as a thing very little to be desired, as the restoration of the principle of evil. This view had even gained the Jewish thinkers of Alexandria who came under the influence of Greek philosophy, such as the author of *Wisdom* and the philosopher Philo, to whom we may add the Essenian monks. They all agree in regarding death as setting man free from the bonds of the body, and in making the immortality of the *soul*, of the soul alone, the object of their hope. Heinrici thought he found in Josephus evidence of a change of opinion on this point even among the Pharisees, as if they had come to hold metempsychosis, instead of the resurrection of the body. But the passage quoted by this critic (*Bell. Jud.* ii. 8, 14) proves nothing of the kind: "Every soul is immortal; either it passes into another body, which is the abode of good, or it is punished through the eternal chastisement of evil actions." The meaning of these words is, that resurrection of the body is a privilege granted to righteous souls only.

There is nothing, I think, to prevent us from connecting with the denial of the resurrection by certain of the Corinthians what Paul says in 2 Tim. ii. 18 of two heretics: "That, according to them, the resurrection of the dead was past already." Evidently

these teachers would not see in the resurrection anything else than spiritual regeneration; the restoration of the body was relegated by them to the domain of fable. It must be remembered that there was not yet in the Church any positively formulated system of doctrine, and that the teaching was being gradually formed by the labours of prophets and teachers under the direction of the apostolate.

One or two passages of this chapter, particularly vers. 32-34, have led some to suppose that those whom the apostle combats, denied not only the resurrection of the body, but even the immortality of the soul and the judgment; and it has been thought that they belonged to the materialistic sect of the Epicureans. But it seems to us impossible that men of that stamp could have have adhered to Christianity; see besides on this question at the passage indicated.

Should we identify the opponents of the resurrection with one of the four parties mentioned i. 12? Those of Paul and Peter are evidently at once beyond suspicion. Meyer, Heinrici, and others think of the disciples of Apollos as men who cultivated human wisdom. But we think we have refuted the prejudice relative to the disciples of Apollos. There would remain only οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, *those of Christ.* Perhaps, indeed, it might be concluded from some parallels (2 Cor. xi. 3, 4, for example) that it was in this camp those τινές were found; but, on the other hand, the Second Epistle shows that the party of *those of Christ* had at its head men who had come from Jerusalem and were ultra-Judaizing. Now, as we have seen, antipathy to the resurrection cannot well have come

from the Jewish side. All idea must therefore be given up of connecting the subject in question with the dissensions treated chaps. i.–iv.

In the following discussion the apostle begins by showing that with the resurrection of the body the entire system of Christian salvation rises or falls : vers. 1–34 ; then he resolves the difficulties which the fact presents, and concludes by raising the triumphant song of life over death : vers. 35–58.

I. With the Fact of the Resurrection of the Body Christian Salvation rises or falls (vers. 1–34).

The apostle's first care is to establish firmly the fact of the resurrection of Jesus, on which rests the expectation of our own (vers. 1–11).

Vers. 1–11.

Vers. 1, 2. "Moreover, brethren, I make known unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and wherein also ye stand; 2. by which, also, ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain." —There is something surprising in the term γνωρίζω, *I make known to you*, for in the immediately following words Paul declares that the gospel he is about to expound to them, he preached to them, and they themselves received and held it. This, however, is not a sufficient reason for abandoning the natural meaning of the verb, and making it signify, as some do : "I *remind* you . . .," or with others : "I *call* your *attention* to . . ." Some (Bengel, Ewald, Heinrici,

etc.) think that we have a construction similar to that of iii. 20, or Gal. i. 11: "I make known to you the gospel . . ., in what way I preached it to you (*τίνι λόγῳ εὐηγγελισάμην . . .*, ver. 2)," meaning: "I make known to you *in what way* I preached to you the gospel." But the contradiction between making known and having preached remains all the same, though the first term should apply to the form and not to the substance. If the Corinthians had heard Paul, and believed through his ministry, they must have known both the substance and form of his preaching. Hofmann seeks the solution in the special sense he gives to *τίνι λόγῳ*: "In what thought, that is to say, with what *aim*, I preached to you." The apostle's intention in preaching to them was, according to this critic, to show them by the resurrection of Christ that salvation is for us, as for him, a principle of glorification. But how is it possible to read all this in vers. 1 and 2? Paul would easily have succeeded in expressing this thought more clearly if it had really been his. It seems to me, as to Holsten, that the word: *I declare to you*, is chosen with the intention of humiliating the readers. Paul wishes to bring out by the intentional contradiction between this term and those which follow: "I preached, you received, you stand fast," the corruption which has been introduced among them of the conception of salvation, to the extent of transforming the meaning of the message he had brought them, so as to make it a wholly different thing, though outwardly speaking they remained faithful to it. Thus is explained the somewhat strange form of the *τίνι λόγῳ εὐηγγελισάμην*, ver. 2. Meyer and Holsten seem to me

to hold, as to this proposition, the only possible construction, by making it depend, not on σώζεσθε, *ye are saved*, but on κατέχετε, *keep in memory*: "If you firmly keep in mind how I preached it to you (the gospel)." There is an inversion, as so often in Paul (iii. 5, vii. 17, xiv. 12, etc.), and that with the view of bringing out clearly the whole dependent proposition which is the object of κατέχετε: "If, in the sense in which I preached it to you (the gospel), you hold it firmly." They run no risk of denying Christianity, but of abandoning the true sense in which they received it from Paul, and in which it can preserve its saving power. And this is why Paul is obliged to make, as it were, a new communication of it to them. There is between the verb γνωρίζειν, *to make known*, and εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, *to preach*, this difference: that the second indicates the simple statement of the historical fact, and the first embraces the explanation of its full meaning and its relation to salvation as a whole. —The two καί, *also*, which follow one another, clearly indicate a gradation. To preaching succeeded the acceptance of faith; to this, perseverance in profession.

Ver. 2. But this acceptance and profession are not yet salvation itself. There is needed the κατέχειν, the act of *keeping in mind* and keeping *well*. This is why Paul adds: "whereby also you are put in possession of salvation, if you hold it as I have taught it to you." The word λόγος here denotes the exact meaning Paul had given to the facts here related. Faith should grasp not only the fact, but also the Divine thought realized in the fact.—The pronoun of direct interrogation, τίνι, is designedly used instead of the relative

pronoun ᾧ: "If you keep in mind *in what* way . . .," instead of: "If you keep in mind the manner *in which* . . ." The first form is more suited to express a qualification. Paul alludes in this τίνι to a variety of conceptions as to the facts of salvation.—But why to this first restriction: *if you keep in mind*, does he add a second: *at least unless you believed in vain?* The former bears on the subjective perseverance of the Corinthians to keep the true meaning of the facts of salvation; the latter bears on the objective reality of the facts themselves. Salvation by faith in Christ crucified and risen is impossible except as this Christ crucified and risen is a reality. Now there is a supposition on which constant faith in Him, as Paul preached Him, would not save, viz. that Christ did not exist. This supposition, revolting as it is to the Christian conscience, Paul nevertheless expresses, and seems to take in earnest in the following demonstration; and in the minds of many certainty as to the Divine facts, and of the resurrection in particular, must evidently have been shaken.—As to the form ἐκτὸς εἰ μή, see on xiv. 5. The word εἰκῇ, *in vain*, may signify: without foundation, without sufficient reason, as in Matt. v. 22 and Col. ii. 18. But ordinarily it signifies *without result*, without effect, as in the classical expression εἰκῇ βάλλειν, *to throw an arrow which does not hit;* comp. Rom. xiii. 4; Gal. iii. 4, iv. 11. In the former sense: "unless you believed in a pure fable" (vers. 14, 15). In the latter: "unless your faith remains without effect (because its object is nothing real)." Substantially the two meanings come to the same.

The apostle had (xi. 2) praised the Corinthians for

maintaining the ecclesiastical institutions which he had given them; he is evidently careful not to say as much here in regard to their keeping of his doctrinal traditions. And now he sets himself to expound to them the whole doctrine of the resurrection which he had declared to them, and he begins by reminding them, vers. 3–11, of that whole series of irrefutable testimonies on which faith in the resurrection of the Lord Jesus rests, the fact which forms the foundation of that which he wishes to develop.

Vers. 3–5. "For I delivered unto you, first of all, that which I also received: how that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures, 4. and that He was buried, and that He rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures, 5. and that He was seen of Cephas, then[1] of the Twelve."[2]—The *for* bears, not on either of the secondary ideas of the previous verses: If you hold firmly, or: By which you are saved, but on the principal idea: "I declare to you what I preached to you." Paul means: "The points which I put in the first rank, when I preached the gospel to you, are the following." He had laid down as the basis of Christian teaching, in the same way as he does here, the facts of the Lord's death and resurrection. We need not, with Chrysostom and Hofmann, give the word *first* the temporal meaning; it is the fundamental importance of those one or two points which Paul wishes to characterize by the term. —It was formerly held that the word *I received* referred, as in xi. 23, to a direct communication from

[1] T. R. with B K L P: ειτα (*then*); ℵ A: επειτα (*thereafter*); D F G: και μετα ταυτα (*and after these things*).

[2] T. R. with ℵ A B K L P Syr.: δωδεκα (*twelve*); D F G It.: ενδεκα (*eleven*).

the Lord. Modern commentators rather think that the reference here is to a human tradition, to the narrative of the Twelve as witnesses to facts. And indeed it should be remarked that the apostle does not here say ἐγώ, *I* [emphatic], and that he does not add, as in the passage quoted, *of the Lord.* He evidently knew the facts of the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus in the same way as the whole Church, by their public notoriety and the narratives of the apostles. If Paul afterwards speaks specially of two appearances which were granted to Peter and James, this agrees well with the fact that it was with these two men he had conferred personally during his first stay at Jerusalem, after his conversion (Gal. i. 19). But, true as this view is, perhaps it is incomplete. In the gospel preached by Paul at Corinth, there was not only, as we have seen, the historical side of facts; his preaching contained a higher element, the understanding of those facts as expressed in the words: *for our sins*, and: *according to the Scriptures.* And on such points Paul had received, as he says, Gal. i. 12, the teaching of the Lord Himself whereby alone the external facts related in apostolical tradition had become to him soteriological facts; I think, therefore, that he designedly used the verb παρέλαβον, *I received*, without regimen, leaving it in all its generality, that it might embrace both human tradition and Divine teaching.—The καί, *also*, expresses the exact conformity between the deposit committed to Paul and his conveying of it to the Corinthians.—The regimen: *for our sins*, has special importance, because it is the Divine meaning of the fact, as he will afterwards explain it, vers. 17, 18. It is quite clear that in

this phrase the ὑπέρ does not signify: *in place of*, but: *in behalf of*: "In behalf of our sins to expiate them." This phrase is found nowhere else in Paul; but comp. Heb. ix. 7 and x. 12.—The regimen: *according to the Scriptures*, has its importance: the Divine testimony of the Scriptures is designedly placed before all the apostolic testimonies which are about to follow. The Scriptures had said the event would happen; the witnesses declare it has happened.

Ver. 4. It is asked why the burial of Jesus occupies a place among these few essential facts. It is certainly not with a view to the spiritual application which is made of it, Rom. vi. 4; for this belonged to a more advanced stage of teaching. Neither is it to establish the reality of the death, for interment does not exclude the possibility of a lethargy. But the fact of interment ever recalls "that empty tomb on which, as has been said, the Church is founded," and which remains inexplicable by all who deny the bodily resurrection of Jesus. It is indeed what excludes both the supposition of hallucination on the part of the apostles and that of a purely spiritual reappearance of Jesus after His death. The dead body laid in the sepulchre disappeared. What became of it? No explanation other than the fact itself of the resurrection has ever been able to account for this mystery.—Passing from the facts of the death and burial to the resurrection, Paul discontinues the aorists (*died*, *was buried*) for the perfect (ἐγήγερται). For the risen Christ continues in life.—Does the regimen: *according to the Scriptures*, which is repeated here, apply only to the fact in general or specially to the detail: *the third day?* In the former

case, we must think of Isa. liii. and Ps. xvi.; in the latter, we must add to these passages the history of Jonah and Hosea vi. 2.—This date of the *third day* was not accidental; for, as Hofmann observes, it is precisely then that dissolution ordinarily begins to appear.

Ver. 5. The two first appearances mentioned here, that to Peter in the course of the day of the resurrection, and that to the Twelve on the evening of the same day, are also mentioned by Luke (xxiv. 34–36); the second only by John xx. 19 seq. Paul omits that to the two disciples going to Emmaus described in detail by Luke, and that to Mary Magdalene related by John. The reason no doubt is, that neither those two disciples, nor Mary, were of the number of the witnesses expressly chosen by the Lord.—The term ὤφθη may signify *was seen*, or *appeared* (*in vision*); in each case the context must decide. In this passage, after the word: *He was raised* (ver. 4), the choice is not doubtful; it can only designate, according to the writer's view, a bodily appearance. This is also plain from the very object of this whole enumeration of apostolic testimonies. What is St. Paul's aim? To prove our bodily resurrection. Now it is impossible to understand how a simple vision, a purely spiritual appearance of the Lord, could serve to demonstrate our bodily resurrection. — The appearance to Peter, mentioned here and in the passage of Luke, is one of the traits which reveals the close relationship between Paul's tradition and the third Gospel.—The εἶτα, *then*, of the *Vatic.* and the Byz., separates the two facts less than the ἔπειτα, *afterwards*, of the *Sinaït.* and the *Alex.*

The former reading is the better; for the appearing to the Twelve was much more closely connected with that to Peter than those which follow; comp. Luke xxiv. 35, 36. With greater reason must we set aside the reading of the Greco-Lats.: καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, *and after these things*. The same MSS. read τοῖς ἕνδεκα, *to the eleven*, instead of τοῖς δώδεκα, *to the twelve*. This reading is either due to the reflection that Judas was wanting on that occasion, or it is borrowed from Luke xxiv. 33. The Twelve were still the Twelve, notwithstanding the absence of one or even two of them (Thomas). For the term calls up above all the official character which had been impressed on them at the time of their election. Holsten suspects the authenticity of the last words, τοῖς δώδεκα, because of the difficulty of explaining their relation to the end of ver. 7 (see on this passage). But notwithstanding the Greco-Latin variant (τοῖς ἕνδεκα), they are not really wanting in any document.—Thus far all was dependent on the verb παρέδωκα, *I delivered unto you*. But from this point the sentence breaks off, and the following appearances are stated in the form of independent propositions. Should we infer, with Heinrici, that Paul had not spoken at Corinth of the facts afterwards mentioned on the occasion of his first preaching? In any case that would not apply to the appearance mentioned in ver. 8. Holsten thinks that Paul no longer remembered the limit between the appearances which he had mentioned and those he had omitted. But this even is unnecessary. He may very well have broken the construction in order to prevent the sentence from dragging.

Ver. 6. "After that He was seen of above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain unto this present, and some[1] are fallen asleep." —The ἔπειτα, *thereafter*, separates more forcibly than the εἶτα, *then*, of ver. 5; it makes the following appearance a new step in the series, and rightly so. This appearance took place considerably later, and certainly in Galilee. Already before His death Jesus had told His disciples that after His resurrection He would go before them into Galilee (Matt. xxvi. 32; Mark xiv. 28). The angel and Jesus Himself (according to Matt. xxviii. 10) had repeated this promise to the women on the day of His resurrection (Mark xvi. 7 and Matt. xxviii. 7). Moreover, Matt. xxviii. 16, mention is made of a command which Jesus gave to His disciples to gather together on a certain mountain in Galilee all the believers of that country. No doubt Matthew, in relating the appearance so solemnly prepared for, speaks only of the Eleven; but if it was, as it is impossible to doubt, that which the angel and, according to Matthew, Jesus Himself announced to the women on the morning of the resurrection, this gathering must have embraced all the followers of Jesus, and not only men, but also women. This is what explains a gathering together in a given place, at a certain time fixed beforehand. It must therefore be held that the appearance mentioned in our ver. 6 is no other than that related by Matthew at the end of his gospel, and in which Jesus took leave of all His Galilean followers, that is to say, of His Church. The Eleven were there in the foremost rank, and it was to them in particular that the command was

[1] T. R. with K L P here adds καὶ (*also*).

addressed to begin the mission to the whole world (Matt. xxviii. 18–20). This is no doubt the reason why Matthew mentions them only. We should not be surprised that the apostle so expressly mentions this testimony. It was that of the whole Church, the apostles included; what a difference between it and a simple private testimony! The word ἐπάνω, *more than, above*, is not a preposition, but an adverb; as a preposition it would govern the genitive (Mark xiv. 5). The word ἐφάπαξ does not here signify, as often, *once for all*, but *at one time*.—The words *five hundred* and *still live* have evidently, in the apostle's view, an apologetic bearing: "You can go and ask them, if you like: there they are, still, and in great numbers." Here we have a striking example of the small value which in criticism belongs to the argument taken from silence. Here is a fact of public notoriety, quoted in a writing the authenticity of which is indisputable, by a witness whose declaration is above suspicion; and the fact is omitted in our four Gospel narratives, or, if it appears in one of them, it is devoid of the circumstances which render it so striking in the narrative of it given by St. Paul. After this, what is to be thought of arguing against the reality of an act or saying of Jesus because it is mentioned only in one Gospel and not in the others!—The apostle now passes to a third group.

Ver. 7. "After that[1] He was seen of James, then[2] of all the apostles."—The reading ἔπειτα, *afterwards*, is preferable here; for we come now to the last appear-

[1] D E Cop. here read εἶτα.

[2] ℵ A F G K here read επειτα (*afterwards*), instead of εἶτα (*then*), which is the reading of T. R. with B D E L P.

ances granted to the apostles. That given to James no doubt preceded by a short time the appearing on the day of the ascension, which immediately follows. This James can only be the one who played a considerable part in the Church of Jerusalem, as head of its council of elders (Acts xv. 13 and xxi. 18), and who is called, Gal. i. 19, "the Lord's brother," and ii. 9, "one of the pillars of the Church." He was not a believer during the Lord's lifetime (John vii. 5); but we find him united with the apostles and holy women, in the upper chamber, immediately after the ascension (Acts i. 14). This extraordinary change was no doubt brought about by the appearance here mentioned, which should not be confounded with that described by a legend preserved in the Gospel of the Hebrews (Jerome, *de viris illustr.* c. 2); for had there been a foundation of truth in this narrative of the apocryphal book, the fact must have immediately followed the resurrection.[1]

The subsequent appearance to all the apostles can only be that of the day of ascension. But why the adjective *all*, and why is it placed so emphatically after the substantive? Meyer thinks Paul wishes thereby to indicate a larger circle of persons than that of the Twelve properly so called (ver. 5), including, for example, James or others, such as Barnabas or Silas, who sometimes in the New Testament bear the title of apostles; comp. Acts xiv. 4, 14; 1 Thess. ii. 6. But the expression *all the apostles* does not naturally

[1] According to this legend, James bound himself at the last supper of Jesus not to eat bread till Jesus had risen. Jesus, after His resurrection, relieves him from his vow.

express the idea of a circle larger than the Twelve, and at the time when this appearance took place, before Pentecost, no *apostles* different from the Twelve could possibly be thought of (see Holsten). On the other hand, if the expression *all the apostles* has the same meaning as that which was used in ver. 5 (*the Twelve*), why this wholly different expression here? Hofmann answers: Because in ver. 5 the apostles were mentioned as forming the intimate companions of Jesus, while here they are mentioned as founders of the Church. Holsten rightly regards this distinction as arbitrary, and on this, according to him, inexplicable difference of expression he again fastens the suspicion of inauthenticity, which he throws on the last words of ver. 5. But this is a very risky conclusion. Perhaps the particular expression used here is explained by the special character of this last gathering of the apostles round their Master. One is struck with the two expressions in Luke's narrative, Acts i. 4, 6: καὶ συναλιζόμενος, *and having assembled them;* then: οἱ μὲν οὖν συνελθόντες, *they, therefore, having come together.* It is obvious that this gathering was, like that of ver. 6, the result of a positive and solemn convocation on the part of Jesus. It was to be the last, His adieu to the apostles, as that of ver. 6 had been His adieu to the Church. The apostolic college must be there in full, and Jesus had provided that none of the apostles should be wanting. This explains the πᾶσι, *all*, especially if we think of Thomas, who was absent the first time (the appearance of ver. 5), and must on no account be wanting this last time. The term *apostles* reminds us of their mission to the world, of

which the ascension was about to become the signal.—Finally, Paul mentions the fact which closed the series of the appearances of the risen One, and which was separated from all the preceding by a much greater interval than those which had separated these from one another.

Ver. 8. "And lastly, after all, He was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time [the untimely birth]."—By the first words the apostle seems to indicate not only that the appearance to him came after the others, but that it was the close of the appearances of the risen One in general. He is not speaking in this passage of visions, like those he himself had afterwards, or like that of the Apocalypse.—The adverb ἔσχατον, *in the last place*, is used before the gen. πάντων, *all*, as a preposition. The word *all* may relate to all the individuals mentioned in the foregoing enumeration, or, with Meyer, to the apostles only, because of the term τὸ ἔκτρωμα which follows; or finally, we may apply it, as Edwards does, to all Christians in general, in the sense that no one after Paul was to see, and no one really saw, the risen Christ. I doubt whether the apostle had these three shades distinctly present to his mind. He certainly thought of all the persons enumerated above, among whom the apostles ranked first, and judged that with this appearance granted to him, the list of such facts was closed.—The strange word ἔκτρωμα, *abortion, untimely birth*, from τιτρώσκω, *pierce, tear*, denotes a child born in a violent and premature way. And as such children are generally inferior in strength to those who are born in a normal way, the expression has been taken as denoting nothing

more than a feeling of infirmity: "As a helpless babe scarcely deserves the name of man, I dare hardly regard myself as an apostle;" so Theodoret, Bengel, de Wette, Meyer, Edwards. But Paul himself affirms in ver. 10: "that he laboured more than they all." This is no admission of weakness. And why not abide by the explanation indicated by the etymological and uniform meaning of the word used? Why not take it to denote the violent and unnatural mode of his call to the apostleship, especially at the moment when he is recalling the appearance of the Lord on the way to Damascus? So Calvin, Grotius, Billroth, Heinrici. The other apostles were called when they were already believers; they are like ripe fruits which fell, so to speak, of themselves from the tree of Judaism, and which the Lord's hand gathered without effort, whereas he, Paul, was torn, as by a violent operation, from that Judaism to which he was yet clinging with all the fibres of his heart and will. Ambrosiaster understands the word in this sense: born out of time (too late), when Christ had already returned to heaven. But this circumstance would rather imply something honourable (Gal. i. 1).—The article *the* (τῷ) designates Paul as the only one so named, and probably alludes to the fact, that in a numerous family there is often a child ill-born. It is obvious that when he recalls the boundless grace which was shown him in that striking act of mercy, the apostle feels the need of casting himself in the dust.—The form ὡσπερεί occurs nowhere else in the whole New Testament except in a variant (iv. 13); but it is frequent in the classics, especially in Plato. The final ει is properly a conjunction belonging to a verb

understood ("as *if* it were").—These two sides of his ministry, the facts which humble him and the height to which grace has raised him, are developed in the following verses:

Vers. 9, 10. "For I am the least of the apostles, that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the Church of God. 10. But by the grace of God I am what I am, and His grace[1] toward me was not in vain;[2] but I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, but the grace of God[3] with me."—The *for* bears on the repulsive figure which has just been used. It by no means justifies the explanation of ἔκτρωμα, which we have set aside; its whole force falls on the sequel of our verse on to the ἐδίωξα, *I persecuted.* The apostle cannot think of that decisive moment of his life without remembering that at that very time he was playing the part of a persecutor. For this it was which necessitated the violent operation to which he was subjected. On ἐλάχιστος, comp. Eph. iii. 11.—The word ἱκανός, *capable*, when a moral act is in question, takes the meaning of "*morally* capable," and thus becomes synonymous with ἄξιος, *worthy*; comp. Matt. iii. 11 with John i. 27 (see Edwards). Καλεῖσθαι, *to bear the title of . . .*—On the whole passage, comp. 1 Tim. i. 12–14.

Ver. 10. The δέ is strongly adversative; it contrasts with what Paul was, when he was yet left to himself, what grace made him.—By the expression: *what I am*, Paul means first a saved believer, then an apostle, finally, the apostle of the Gentile world. It is this last

[1] D F G omit η. [2] D F G read πτωχη (*poor*), instead of κενη (*empty*).
[3] T. R. with A E K L P here reads η, which is rejected by ℵ B D F G.

idea which he specially develops in the following words.—The word κενή, *empty*, applies to the intrinsic power of the grace which was shown toward him.—If with the Greco-Lats. the ἡ were omitted after the word αὐτοῦ, the εἰς ἐμέ might depend on the verb: "*was* not in *vain toward me;*" but this idea does not suit the context so well as that of the ordinary reading, which preserves the ἡ: "The grace *shown toward me* was not in vain."—The word ἐκοπίασα, *I laboured*, denotes not only labour properly so called, effort, toil, sufferings, journeys, prayers, but also the fruits obtained; comp. John iv. 38. The inward power of grace in Paul was demonstrated by its fruitfulness. Indeed, it is only from the viewpoint of the works accomplished that Paul can add without presumption, and as appealing to a patent fact, *more than they all.* These words might signify: more than any one of them in particular. But they should rather be understood, with Meyer, Osiander, Edwards, in the sense of: more than all of them together. The first meaning would be too weak; the second contains no exaggeration; comp. Rom. xv. 19. After thus suddenly rising to the full height God gave him, he abases himself again, as if he were alarmed at what he has just declared. This extraordinary labour was not, strictly speaking, his own, but that of the grace which wrought with him. The art. ἡ, which is here read by the Byz. before σὺν ἐμοί, connects this regimen closely with the word χάρις: "The grace *which is with me,* it was that which wrought." But the omission of the article in the other two families leads us to apply the regimen *with me* to the verb *laboured* (understood), which is better: "It was not I, however, who laboured,

but the grace of God *laboured with me.*" It seems as if *by me* would have been more logical, as corresponding better to the absolute negative : *not I.* But Paul cannot overlook all the intensity, good-will, and personal devotion which he has thrown into this immense labour. And hence, notwithstanding all his humility, the *with me* forces itself into his thought. If he had not been open to the impulse and power of grace, how could it have produced such effects by him !—Evidently these two verses are a digression, but for the digression there is a good reason. We have already seen at the beginning of chap. ix. that there were people at Corinth who were making inquiries as to the reality of Paul's apostleship, and who said : He has not seen the Lord ; therefore he is not really an apostle. Paul does not in this First Epistle enter upon a direct discussion with such opponents, as he will be forced to do later. He restrains himself, till the latent evil shall be unmasked. But he makes certain allusions to the accusations which he cannot yet combat. His object in this passage is to show that although he has been called quite differently from the Twelve, God has nevertheless certified him to be a true apostle, and that consequently he is entitled to join his testimony to theirs. It is precisely this parity with them, in the matter of bearing witness to the resurrection, which is expressed in the following verse, the conclusion of vers. 3-10.

Ver. 11. "Therefore whether I, or they, so we preach, and so ye believed." — The οὕτω, *so*, expressly goes back on the τίνι λόγῳ, *in what sense*, of ver. 2. The present κηρύσσομεν, *we preach*, denotes a constant fact; the aorist ἐπιστεύσατε, *ye believed*, a past fact done

once for all, but without the idea of a spiritual decline, which Chrysostom found in this past. This declaration proves that it was matter of notoriety in the Church that the gospel of Peter and of the Twelve rested on the same foundation as that of Paul, on the facts of Christ's death and resurrection regarded as having effected the salvation of the sinful world (*for our sins*, ver. 3; *and that according to the Scriptures*, vers. 3, 4). The historical conception of primitive Christianity presented by Baur is incompatible with the fact attested by Paul.—This verse, while summing up the foregoing passage, forms the transition to the following section.

Vers. 12–19.

The idea of the whole passage is this: The denial of the resurrection of the dead draws with it that of Christ's resurrection, and thereby gives the lie to the apostolic testimony and to the whole of Christianity.

Ver. 12. "Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?"—Why, then, it has been asked by Rückert and Scherer, would the resurrection of Christ be denied by denying the resurrection of the dead? If Christ is of a different nature from us, as Paul holds, it does not at all follow from the fact that He rose, that we ourselves should rise. And M. Scherer adds: "It is easier to doubt apostolic infallibility than the laws of logic." Grotius, Meyer, and Kling have sought to answer by these very laws of logic, and explained the reasoning thus: If there be no resurrection

of the dead, the resurrection of Christ cannot be a fact; the genus not existing, the species cannot. But if such were the apostle's thought, he would certainly, in ver. 13, have put the οὐκ ἔστιν before the subject; for this verb would contain all the force of the argument. Besides, it is not of the resurrection of the dead as an abstract idea that Paul would speak; he designates by this name a definite historical event, the resurrection of the dead expected at the end of the earthly economy. Finally, the argument would not be decisive, for one might always lay down an exception in favour of Christ, not only because of His superior nature, but especially, as would apply much better here, because of His perfect holiness, which did not allow of His remaining under the power of death. Paul is not reasoning as an abstract logician, but as an apostle. The basis of his argument is a fact which pertains to the essence of the Christian salvation: our new life, flowing from union with Christ, is nothing else than participation in His life. Salvation therefore cannot be realized in us otherwise than it is realized in Him. If to the heavenly life upon which He has entered there belongs the possession of a risen and glorified body, it must be so with us. Our glory being His glory, which He communicates to us, it must be homogeneous with His. The apostle's question, ver. 12, is therefore perfectly justified: *How say some among you . . . ?*—The expression κηρύσσεται ὅτι signifies: "He is preached *as risen;*" still the τίνι λόγῳ of ver. 2.

Vers. 13–15. "If there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen. 14. But if Christ be

not risen, then[1] is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. 15. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that He raised up Christ: whom He raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not."—After descending from the cause (the resurrection of Christ) to the effect (ours), the apostle ascends, in ver. 13, from the denial of the effect to the denial of the cause, to show afterwards that this last denial is a belying of the unanimous apostolic testimony which he has just cited.

Ver. 14. The testimony of the apostles had for its essential subject the resurrection of Christ. If this is not a fact, their testimony is an imposture.—The word κενόν, *vain*, denotes a testimony the matter of which is an unreal event. And if the testimony is such, it is the same with faith in the testimony; it is also vain (κενή), in that the object which it believed itself to be taking hold of is purely fictitious.—In the reading of B L (καί after ἄρα) the two καί should be regarded as correlative: "*both . . . and . . .*"

Ver. 15. And what in this case are the apostles who have borne witness to the world of an unreal fact? Impostors, and impostors of the worst kind, for their testimony bears on a false fact which they dared to ascribe to God Himself! The verb εὑρισκόμεθα, *we are found*, expresses the idea of surprisal: "Lo, we are taken in the flagrant sin of falsehood!" The word ψευδομάρτυρες θεοῦ, *false witnesses of God*, might be understood in the sense: "Divine messengers giving false testimony;" the gen. θεοῦ being made dependent on μάρτυρες alone. Or it might be explained in the

[1] B L Syr. here add καί (*also*).

sense: "Falsely calling ourselves messengers of God;" θεοῦ depending in this case on the term ψευδομάρτυρες taken as a whole. But the explanation which best agrees with the context is this: "Testifying falsely in regard to God;" in the sense that, as is said afterwards, the apostles ascribe to God a work which He never really did. The gen. θεοῦ is that of the object: false witnesses regarding God, and even according to the following words: κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, *against God.* Such a testimony is indeed an act of impiety, an act of violence to God Himself. For is it not to assail His honour to ascribe an act to Him which He never really did? It is exactly the same as if an act done by Him were denied.—The conj. εἴπερ, *if truly*, recalls the saying of the τίνες: "If the thing is real, as they allege."

Vers. 16–19.

Ver. 16. "For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised."—This verse seems to be a needless repetition of ver. 13. It is not so. Paul once more takes up the inference already drawn in ver. 13, in order to deduce from it a second conclusion parallel to that which he had expounded in vers. 14, 15. The denial of Christ's resurrection, as it follows from the denial of the resurrection of the dead, implies the accusation of imposture against the apostle, vers. 13–15. But more than that: this same denial, following from the same premiss, implies the nothingness of the Christian salvation, vers. 16–19.

Vers. 17, 18. "Now, if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye[1] are yet in your sins. 18. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished."—

[1] ℵ A read καὶ (*and*) before ἔτι.

Once deny Christ's resurrection, and there is no more salvation in Him.—The word *ματαία* denotes, as often, the vanity of the thing from the standpoint of its effects, its uselessness. Such is the difference between it and the *κενή*, *vain*, of ver. 14. Faith in the resurrection, not taking hold of a real fact (*κενή*), cannot procure for the believer the salvation he expects (*ματαία*). It is completely to mistake the meaning of this saying, to follow Heinrici and several others, in applying the expression: *to be yet in one's sins*, to the moral bondage of sin. The apostle certainly does not mean: "If Christ be not really risen, you will not be able to conquer your evil inclinations." Nothing in this Epistle has prepared us for such an idea. It is of the state of condemnation arising from unpardoned sins that he wishes to speak, as is clearly shown by the following verse. The idea is this: Condemnation can only be taken away by the expiatory death of Christ, and expiation would never have taken place if the victim who accomplished it had not been restored to life. As long as the security is not let out of prison, it must be concluded that the debt is not paid. If then Christ did not leave the prison of death, our justification was not obtained by His death; and we are still, we believers, as much as others, condemned. Bonnet rightly says: "No one can understand the doctrine of Scripture regarding the resurrection, unless he has clearly present to his mind the intimate and indissoluble relation there is between sin and death." Christ dead without resurrection would be a condemned, not a justified, Christ. How could He justify others?—Hence there follows immediately

the disastrous consequence drawn in ver. 18 : the perdition of those who have been seen to die peacefully in the faith of Christ.

Ver. 18. There is a sharp contrast between the two terms : *falling asleep in Christ* and *having perished.* To close the eyes in the joy of salvation, to open them in the torments of perdition ! The verb ἀπώλοντο, *perished*, cannot designate annihilation, for it is explained by the preceding expression : *to be yet in sins.* It denotes a state of perdition in which the soul remains under the weight of Divine condemnation. Nor does the aorist allow us to explain this idea of perishing proleptically, as the sense of destroying or annihilating would require.—So much for the dead ; and what follows for us who still live here below in the faith of that unrisen Christ ? The apostle tells us in ver. 19 :

Ver. 19. "If in this life only we have hoped in Christ,[1] we are of all men most miserable."—Rückert makes the adverb *only* apply to the regimen *in Christ :* "If we have rested all our hopes here below on Christ only . . ." But in order that this conditional proposition might form a ground for the following inference, Paul would have required to add the idea : and this one hope ended in deceiving us. The position of μόνον, *only*, in the Greek clause, shows, besides, that this adverb bears on the clause as a whole, verb and subordinate clauses included : "If we are men who have only our hope in Christ during the course of this life . . ." The opposite, they are men whose hope in

[1] T. R. places εν Χριστω (*in Christ*) with K L P after ηλπικοτες εσμεν (*we have hoped*) ; all the rest after εν τη ζωη ταυτη (*in this life*).

Christ is eternally realized above. — We must not translate ἐν, *in*, in the sense of εἰς, *for*, which would lead to a slightly different idea.—The word ζωή is used here in the sense of βίος, as in Luke i. 75, xvi. 25, etc.—The position of the words ἐν Χριστῷ, *in Christ*, after ταυτῇ, is certainly the true one.—The apostle has been charged, on the ground of the last words of the verse, with taking up a very inferior moral standpoint, because he seems to say that the practice of virtue has no value in itself, but acquires it only by the reward which crowns it. Stoicism, with its maxim: "Virtue is its own best reward," is, it is alleged, far superior to the apostle's standpoint. But it is forgotten that it is not the fulfilment of the simple moral law which is here in question; no natural duty imposes on man a life of labours, privations, and sufferings of all kinds, such as that which the apostle accepted, and which should be accepted by Christians in general in the service of Christ. The free choice of such a life can only be justified by the hope of the most excellent blessings, and these blessings consist by no means of certain external pleasures granted by way of reward, but in the satisfaction of the noblest and most elevated wants of human nature, of the aspiration after holiness and life eternal. To see these blessings escape you, when all inferior ones have been sacrificed to gain them,—to have renounced earth for heaven, and instead of heaven to find hell, like other sinners,—for it is *salvation* that is in question here,—would not this be a still sadder condition than that of worldly men who at least allowed themselves on the earth a comfortable life and the lawful pleasures which were within their

reach? To the sufferings accumulated during this life there would come to be added the most cruel deception after this life. Is there not here enough to justify the apostle's exclamation in the view of sound sense?

Thus, the resurrection of the dead falling, everything falls: (1) the resurrection of Christ Himself, vers. 12, 13; (2) the veracity of the apostolic testimony and the reality of the great object of Christian faith, vers. 14, 15; (3) salvation itself, with its eternal blessings, vers. 16-19.—And now let us replace the foundation, which by supposition we had for a moment removed: the whole majestic edifice of the Christian salvation rises again before us even to its sublime consummation! Such are the contents of the following description, vers. 20–28. The resurrection of the dead, closely bound up with the resurrection of Christ, appears as the fundamental fact on which rests the Christian hope to its furthest limit.

Vers. 20–28.

Vers. 20–22. "But now is Christ risen from the dead, the first-fruits of them that sleep.[1] 21. For since by a man came[2] death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. 22. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."—The words: *But now*, are, as it were, the cry of deliverance, after the nightmare through which the apostle has brought his readers, by opening up to their view the abyss into which we should be plunged by the denial of the resurrection. The *now* contrasts the certain reality of the fact with the perfect void resulting from its denial;

[1] T. R. with K L Syr. here reads εγενετο (*became*).
[2] T. R. with E F G L P reads ο before θανατος (*the* death).

this void, opened up for an instant, no longer exists except as a vanished past.—The words ἐκ νεκρῶν, *from the dead*, would suffice to prove that Paul is thinking of a bodily resurrection; for spiritually Christ never was among the dead.—The verb *became*, added by the Byz. reading, must be rejected; the word *first-fruits* is not a predicate, it is a simple apposition: "He rose again *as first-fruits*," and not to remain alone in His state of glory. Christ risen is to the multitude of believers who shall rise again at His Advent what a first ripe ear, gathered by the hand, is to the whole harvest. Is there in this expression a distant reminiscence of the rite in which the apostle had so often taken part as a Jew, the offering in the temple of the first sheaf of the year, as the first-fruits of the harvest? This festival took place yearly, on the morrow after the Passover, the 16th Nisan. It is difficult to doubt this recollection in the apostle's mind, especially if it is held, according to the fourth Gospel, that Jesus was crucified on the afternoon of the 14th Nisan, and that consequently He was raised on the morning of the 16th. But this reminiscence, even if it is real, did not determine the idea and expression of *first-fruits*. Both offered themselves spontaneously.—The term first-fruits is justified in ver. 21 (*for*).

Ver. 21. In the expression ἀπαρχή, *first-fruits*, there was implicitly contained the notion of a community of nature between Christ and us. For the ear gathered as first-fruits is corn like all the rest. This is the idea which the apostle expounds in this verse. As it was by a member of the human family that it was smitten with death, so it is by a member

of the family that it must obtain resurrection. The Apostle Paul here proclaims the idea with arresting solemnity: that death and resurrection are human facts, that is to say, the causality of them belongs to man himself. The idea is not exactly the same as that expressed in Rom. v. 12 seq., though closely connected with it. In the passage of Romans, the emphasis is on εἷς, *one*, in opposition to *many*: one involving the many in his death, and one in His salvation. Here there is no εἷς; the emphasis is on ἀνθρώπου, *man*. It is the truly *human* origin of these two opposite phases in the existence of humanity which Paul wishes to set in relief. By man subjection to death was imposed on men; by man there must come to them the power of rising again. It is for man to repair the evil done by man.

In ver. 21 there is stated, in the form of an abstract law, the necessary correlation between these two analogous but opposite facts. In ver. 22 the two historical personalities will be contrasted with one another in whom this colossal antithesis has been realized.

Ver. 22. The fact proves the principle; hence the *for*.—It is not without intention that Paul in this verse substitutes the preposition ἐν, *in*, for the διά, *by*, of the preceding verse. The relation expressed by διά was more external; it was that of causality. The relation expressed by ἐν is more intimate; it is that of moral solidarity, community of life. The latter explains the former: "If all died *by* Adam, it is because all were smitten with death *in* him, in whom they were embraced; if all are to live again *by* Christ,

it is because there is *in* Him the power which justifies them and which will make them live again because of their relation to Him."

Must we give to the word πάντες, *all*, the same extension in the two propositions? Some answer in the affirmative, and infer from it universal final salvation; so Origen, Olshausen, de Wette, etc. But this notion does not seem to agree either with the scriptural view in general, or with that of Paul in particular: Matt. xii. 32, xxv. 46; Mark ix. 48, xiv. 21; 2 Thess. i. 9; Phil. iii. 19.—Others, like Julius Müller, find expressed in the verse merely the *destination* of all to resurrection in Christ, a destination which may be annulled by refusal to believe in Him. But the future *shall be made alive* means more than this. It denotes, especially in contrast to the present, *die*, a positive and indubitable fact. Most commentators (Augustine, Bengel, Rückert, Hofmann, Holsten, Beet, Edwards, etc.) think that we must understand a self-evident condition, that of faith: "As in Adam all men die, so in Christ shall all (believers) be made alive." This limitation of the meaning of the second πάντες, *all*, seems at first sight very arbitrary, in view of the absolute meaning of the first. But we shall get reconciled to this interpretation if we take account of Hofmann's observation that ζωοποιεῖσθαι, *to be made alive*, is a more limited idea than ἐγείρεσθαι, *to be raised*. For this second term applies in general to all who shall live again, even to perish, whereas the first applies to the complete gift of perfect life (Rom. viii. 11). The limitation of the subject can therefore naturally proceed from the special meaning of the verb itself.

"The two πάντες embrace those only to whom each of the two powers extends" (Hofmann). Moreover, it should be remembered that Christ can hardly be regarded as the *first-fruits* of the damned who are raised again, and ver. 23, which continues the development begun in ver. 20, evidently takes account only of believers. These reasons have great force, and perhaps this interpretation is really that which corresponds best to the apostle's view. But there is another which, without falling into the thought of universal salvation, preserves the equality of extension which it is so natural to hold between the two πάντες. It is more or less the view of Chrysostom, Calvin, Meyer, etc. May it not be said of those who shall rise to condemnation, that they also shall rise *in Christ?* The judgment to which they shall be subjected in the clear and perfect consciousness of their personality will bear on their sins in general, but especially on their unbelief in the Lord and on their rejection of the amnesty which was offered them in Him. The Saviour having once appeared, it is on their relation to Him that the lot of all depends for weal or woe; it is this relation consequently which determines their return to life, either to glory or to condemnation. And it is with this fact of a moral nature that the other, and more external one, is connected, which was implied in the διά of ver. 21, and which is expressed in John v. 28, 29: the resurrection of all by the power of the Son of man, whether to condemnation or to life. It is true that in this passage John does not use the term ζωοποιεῖν, which he had employed in ver. 21, in an exclusively favourable sense. And the New Testament contains no other

passage in which the term is not applied to spiritual or physical quickening in a good sense. But we have just seen the word ζωή (ver. 19) applied to earthly existence in itself, and there is nothing to prevent the word ζωοποιεῖν, taken alone, from being used to denote restoration to the fulness of spiritual and bodily existence, with a view either to perdition or salvation. The term is applied to bodily healing and bodily life in the LXX. (2 Kings v. 7; Neh. ix. 6); see Meyer. It has also been proposed to give πάντες a purely restrictive sense: "*None* will be raised otherwise *than in* Him."—This meaning would be admissible if Paul were here treating of the means of resurrection. But the one point about which he is concerned is the certainty of the event, which does not suit this explanation.

In what follows, the apostle assigns to the resurrection its place in the totality of the Divine dispensations which are to close the history of the development of humanity.

Ver. 23. "But every man in his own order: Christ the first-fruits, and afterward they that are Christ's at His coming."—The word τάγμα, *order*, denotes the place assigned in a series to each individual or group. The apostle has here before him two ranks of the risen: the first formed by Christ alone, moving foremost; it is He who opens up the way to the life of glory. Then He is followed by all His faithful people who form the second rank. It is the same idea as was expressed by the figure of the first-fruits and the harvest.—There is no solid reason for including, as Meyer would, in the expression οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, *they that are Christ's*, all who confess the name of Christ, Christendom in general.

Paul explains clearly enough what he understands by *being Christ's* when he says, Rom. viii. 9: "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His." In Colossians (iii. 4) he says likewise: "When Christ, *our life*, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with Him in glory," which shows that in his view Christ must be our life if His advent is to be the signal of our participation in His glorious appearing. The same also is clearly obvious from Phil. iii. 11, where he goes the length of employing this expression of doubt in regard to himself: "If by any means I may attain to the resurrection of the dead." He could not so express himself in speaking of the universal resurrection, for all will infallibly share in it; he is therefore thinking of the special resurrection, in which only *true* believers will participate; and he recalls the constant effort whereby alone he can reach that desirable goal. For, in order to reach it, it is necessary, according to 2 Cor. vii. 1, "to be cleansed from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit," and "to perfect holiness in the fear of God." Such, according to St. Paul, is the character of *those who are Christ's*, and who shall form the second order in the company of the risen. It will not therefore be all those who bear the name of Christians. There will be a first division, which will be effected at the time of the Advent, between the true and the false members of the Church; this will be the prelude of the universal final judgment. Van Hengel has unfortunately thought of applying the word *Parousia* to the epoch of Christ's presence on the earth. The believers who had the privilege of living with Jesus Christ here below will also have, according to him, the privilege of

rising first with Him. But how should this privilege have attached to an external and accidental circumstance? And is not the term *Parousia* in the New Testament a constant expression, all the meanings of which were known to the Churches? Finally, the article οἱ could not be wanting before the regimen ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ.—Edwards, at least if I understand him, refers the ἕκαστος, *each*, in this verse, to God, to Christ, and to believers: Christ, ver. 23ᵃ; believers, ver. 23ᵇ; God, ver. 28.—The apostle now establishes the relation between this resurrection of believers at the Advent, and the whole cycle of events which shall precede the end of all things.

Ver. 24. "Then the end, when He shall deliver up[1] the kingdom to God, even the Father: when He shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power."—The εἶτα, *then*, does not allow us to identify the time of the τέλος, *the end*, with that of the Advent. Paul would have required to say in that sense τότε, *at that time*, and not εἶτα, *then* or *thereafter*. The εἶτα implies, in the mind of the apostle, a longer or shorter interval between the Advent and what he calls *the end*.—What is this end? According to Theodoret, Bengel, Meyer, Osiander: the end of the resurrection, the third act of the drama of which we have just seen the first two (the resurrection of Christ and that of believers); consequently the universal resurrection. But would not Paul have qualified the word *the end* more precisely, if such had been his thought? And would he not have brought out more clearly the relation between

[1] T. R. with K L It. read παραδῶ (*shall have delivered up*); ℵ A B D E F G P: παραδίδῳ or παραδίδοι (*delivers*).

this third phase and the two preceding? Used without qualification, as it is here, *the end* must designate the end absolutely speaking, πάντων τὸ τέλος, *the end of all things*, as Peter puts it (1 Ep. iv. 7), the goal of the entire economy of education, redemption, and sanctification, the time when God's thought shall be at length fully realized in regard to man, come to his perfect stature in Christ. Chrysostom explains: the end of the *present age;* which is true only if we include within the present age the whole interval between the Advent and the end; Holsten: the end of this created world, which, when believers have once been removed by resurrection to a higher world and hostile powers vanquished, has no more value and passes away. This critic rightly points out the mistake of Meyer, who thinks that Paul makes the present age end at the Advent, failing to remember that so long as death is not destroyed (ver. 26), the present age still continues. Besides, the apostle will say positively what he understands by *the end* in ver. 28.

And what fact shall mark this solemn epoch which the apostle calls *the end?* He explains in the following words: *when He shall deliver up the kingdom to God and the Father.* A reading which is found in two Byz. and in the T. R. runs: "When He *shall have delivered up,*" ὅταν παραδῷ (the aorist subjunctive). If this were the true reading, the end would not coincide with the delivering up of the kingdom into the hands of the Father; it would follow it. But this reading is too weakly supported and has not sufficiently appreciable intrinsic superiority to make it preferable to that of the Alex. and Greco-Lat. documents. The

latter read παραδιδοῖ or παραδιδῷ (two equivalent forms of the present subjunctive), which signifies: "When He delivers up," for: "when He *shall deliver up.*" According to this reading, what Paul calls *the end* coincides absolutely with the delivering up of the kingdom into the hands of the Father. The same follows from ver. 28.—We may understand by βασιλεία (*the reign*), either the *kingdom*, the state of things in which God shall reign perfectly, or the *kingship*, the dominion exercised over this state of things. The second is the more natural meaning according to ver. 25 ("He must reign till . . .") and ver. 28, where it is said the kingdom of the Father must follow from the cessation of that of the Son.—In the expression: *to God and the Father*, are contained the two relations of Jesus to God: His subordination to Him as His *God* and His essential union to Him as His *Father*.

How will the interval be filled between the Advent and the end when the kingdom shall pass from the Son's hands into those of the Father? This is what the apostle explains in the following words: *When He shall have put down all rule* . . . He really uses here the subjunctive aorist, according to all the documents, which proves that he is taking a step backwards. For this aorist is equivalent to our future perfect. It implies that the event which is about to be mentioned will transpire, on the one hand, immediately before the end, on the other, after the Advent. It is obvious how false it is to translate, as is often done: "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom to the Father and put down all powers . . ." This translation makes two events coincide, which, according to Paul, are successive.

The meaning, on the contrary, is: "When He shall deliver up the kingdom to God and the Father, after having put down all powers . . ." The Advent will therefore be separated from the end (the delivering up of the kingdom) by an epoch of judgment. The word καταργεῖν strictly signifies: to reduce to impotence; hence to put down a power. The powers put down can only be the powers hostile to God and His kingdom; for they are called *enemies* in ver. 25, and their fall is the condition of the establishment of the Divine kingdom (ver. 28). It has been thought that the reference here was to earthly powers (Calvin, Grotius); but the terms used by the apostle are so frequently employed by him to designate the invisible powers which contend against God and which seek to drag mankind into their opposition to His kingdom (comp. Rom. viii. 38; Col. i. 13, 16, ii. 15; Eph. ii. 2, vi. 11, 12), that it is impossible to depart from this almost technical meaning. What confirms this explanation is, that in ver. 26 death personified is ranked among the powers put down by the reigning and judging Christ. By ἀρχή, *command*, may be understood the superior beings who, in this invisible domain, exercise command over the others; the ἐξουσίαι designate authorities armed with legal qualification; δυνάμεις, the executive forces. The πᾶσαν, *all*, is not repeated with the third term, which would have been monotonous.— Such, then, will be the use of the interval between the Advent and the end. This period of judgment will only end with the complete reduction of the last enemy; and it must be so, for such is the declaration of Scripture.

Ver. 25. "For He must reign, till He[1] hath put all[2] enemies under His[3] feet."—Paul cites the well-known words of Ps. cx. 1: "The Lord said unto my Lord: Sit Thou at My right hand till I make Thine enemies Thy footstool." The Divine necessity expressed by *He must* follows from this promise of Jehovah to the Messiah.—The emphasis in the saying quoted is put by Paul on the *till;* for the object of the quotation is to justify the terms of ver. 24: *when He shall have put down.* According to this Divine declaration, the reign of the Messiah on the throne of the Father must last *till* there be no longer any enemy left capable of separating God and man. Then this reign will cease. It has therefore for its essential object the carrying out of this judgment on the opposing powers which still remain after the Advent. The subject of the verb *put* is, according to some, God, as in the Psalm (Beza, Grotius, Bengel, Holsten); according to others, Christ Himself (Chrysostom, Rückert, de Wette, Meyer, Hofmann, Edwards). The latter rest their view on the fact, that it is the reigning Christ who must act. But, even if it is God who fights, Christ is not therefore inactive; God acts with Him and by Him. If the αὐτοῦ after πόδας is unauthentic, we cannot well think of any other feet than those of Him who is the subject of the verb; in this case Christ is the subject. As the *till* indicates the certainty of victory, the ἄν, if it is authentic, expresses the uncertainty of the moment when the struggle shall cease.

[1] T. R. with K L adds αν, which is omitted by ℵ A B D F G P.
[2] A F G here read αυτου (*His*), omitted by ℵ B D E K L P.
[3] F G omit αυτου (*His*).

At what time does the apostle make the kingdom of Christ, of which he here speaks, begin? It seems at first sight as if it could be no other than the date of the ascension. But would the idea of a purely spiritual reign, such as that which began with the ascension of Jesus, harmonize with a context like this, where the external and universal fulfilment of the Divine plan is in question? Is it not more natural to take the term *βασιλεία* in its full sense, at once spiritual and external, as in ver. 50? Comp. also vi. 10; Eph. v. 5; Gal. v. 21, then the prayer: "Thy kingdom come," and the words of the Apocalypse xii. 10: "I heard a voice saying: The kingdom of God is come." The reign begins, according to Luke xix. 15, when Jesus, after receiving the kingship in heaven, returns to the earth to exercise it. It is the coming of Jehovah in the person of the Messiah, promised by the prophets, and which Jesus called His Advent. We must therefore regard the reign of Christ as the whole state of things which follows the Advent, and which will last till the epoch called *the end*. It is the whole interval between the time when He shall appear visibly as king, and that when He shall cease to be so (ver. 28); and as among the ancients reigning meant judging, and judging reigning, so the Saviour's reign here consists of judgment.—The *till* setting a limit to Christ's reign, it has been asked if there was not a contradiction between these words and those of Isaiah ix. 6 and Luke i. 33, where it is said, "that of His kingdom there shall be no end." This question has been variously answered (see Meyer). It seems to me that the simplest solution is this: Christ's kingdom in these

prophetic sayings is confounded with that of God, which He is commissioned to establish. The distinction between the two is a new revelation whereby the apostle gives precision and completeness to the prophetic revelations. What remains true in these is, that Christ has no successor; for God cannot be regarded as the successor of the Messiah.

Christ's victory, to be complete, must reach to the last enemy, and that even in the external and bodily domain.

Ver. 26. "The last enemy which is destroyed is death."—The literal rendering is: "As last enemy, death is destroyed." Here is the consummation of the reign and of the judgment exercised by Christ over the powers opposed to God. Death is impersonal, no doubt, but its reign nevertheless does violence to the Divine glory, and after the personal powers have been put down (vers. 24, 25), this gloomy power of death must be destroyed, that God's glory may shine forth freely throughout the entire domain of existence. This judgment of death consists of two acts. Firstly, all beings who have become its prey must be rescued from it; this is what will be effected by the final and universal resurrection, which will bring to the light the *third rank* of the risen. In the second place, death must no longer have power to make new victims; this will be the result of the resurrection itself, which, by transforming our perishable into incorruptible bodies, will put them for ever beyond the reach of death. — The apostle declares that this will be the enemy *last* conquered. Why so? Because the power of death rests on certain profound bases of a moral

nature, which must be taken away before the throne of this enemy can fall. Death is an effect; the suppression of the effect supposes that of the causes. The apostle will explain this more clearly in ver. 56. It was so in the life of Christ, in which the victory over sin and Satan, during His life, and the victory over the law and condemnation, in His death, became the foundation of His resurrection. It must be the same also for mankind (see at ver. 56).—Without this last victory of the Divine work, there would remain in human existence a domain, that of the body, to which Divine power would not have penetrated, and in which God's work, conquered for a time, had not taken its revenge. This is why the body of the last man must participate in the victory over death, as well as that of Christ Himself; comp. Rev. xx. 12, 13, where there is a magnificent description of the general resurrection in which the Messianic kingdom of Jesus will issue.—As Edwards rightly observes, it follows from this passage that death will continue to reign over the earth between the Advent and *the end*.—It has been asked whether, in the final judgment which will follow the universal resurrection, there will only be the condemned. This might be inferred from the fact that all who *are Christ's* are raised at the time of the Advent (ver. 23). But is it not allowable to think with Luthardt, that among the multitudes who have gone down, and who go down daily, to the place of the dead, without having known the gospel or expressly rejected it, there will be individuals who shall yet accept it; for it is said that it will be preached to them also (1 Pet. iii. 19 and iv. 6), and Jesus positively

declared that there is still pardon in the other world for the man who has not committed the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Matt. xii. 32). The judgment which will follow the universal resurrection will therefore have a double issue, as Jesus expressly says (Matt. xxv. 46, and as appears from Rev. xx. 15).

Ver. 27. "For He hath put all things under His feet; now when He saith all things are subjected to Him, it is manifest that He is excepted who subjected all things to Him."—The first proposition is laid down as an indisputable truth; because it is taken from Scripture, Ps. viii. 7. In the Old Testament it relates to man in general, at the time of his creation. But as the destiny of man thus declared is not realized, because of the fall, in any one save in the person of the Son of man, the normal man, the Messiah, it is with good right applied to Him in the New Testament; comp. Eph. i. 22; Heb. ii. 8.—The subject of ὑπέταξεν, *subjected*, can only be God, as in the Psalm. The verb in the past refers to the Divine decree appointing Christ sovereign of the universe; of course the execution of the decree does not take place without His own co-operation. — But why does the apostle insist on expressing the exception relating to God? Who could suppose that God formed part of those: *all things*, which were to be subjected to the Messiah? In the state of exaltation which prevailed among the Corinthians, had some one advanced the idea that God, considered as the impersonal force which animates the universe, would one day be wholly subject to the Messiah, as the supreme representative of the world? We met in xii. 3 with an opposite eccentricity which

is not more startling. But perhaps this remark, introduced by the apostle in the second part of our verse, is meant only to pave the way for the idea of the subordination of Christ to the Father (ver. 28).—The subject of εἴπῃ seems to me to be simply: God, by the Scripture. Meyer thought that the εἴπῃ should rather be applied to the declaration which God will make when the decree subjecting all things to Christ shall be realized, and God shall have proclaimed the fact in the ears of the whole universe. The δῆλον ὅτι would require in this case to be regarded as an adverbial form, in the sense of *evidently:* "When God shall have declared that all is subjected to Him, evidently He will Himself remain outside of this universal subjection." But the connection between the two propositions would not be logical; what would be needed would not be: When God shall have said that . . ., but: When the fact itself shall have taken place. The second proposition gives the impression of a principle, as well as the first, and seems in no wise to refer to a particular time. As to the δῆλον ὅτι, Meyer's meaning is admissible, but not necessary. We mention only as an exegetical curiosity the explanation of Hofmann, who makes the two propositions beginning with ὅταν, *when* (vers. 27, 28), two parallel propositions, the principal one beginning at the τότε, *then*, of ver. 28. The δῆλον ὅτι signifies, according to him, *that is to say*, and the proposition depending on it is a parenthesis!—The evident fact which Paul wishes to express is, that at the time when all shall be subjected to Christ, voluntarily or involuntarily, only two powers will remain in existence: that of Christ, a power visible

and universal, and that of the Father, who gave the Son this sovereign position. But this duality will last only for an instant; it will be immediately terminated by the free act of the Son which will close the development of things:

Ver. 28. "But when all things shall be subjected unto Him, then shall the Son[1] also[2] Himself be subject unto Him that subjected all things to Him, that God may be all[3] in all."—The δέ is progressive: from the subjection of all things to Christ, Paul passes to the subjection of Christ to the Father. We here return to the idea of ver. 24: "Then the end, when He shall deliver up the kingdom . . . after having put down . . ." The last victory is gained, the end comes. Thus the meaning of the digression interposed in vers. 25–27 is obvious: the end or the delivering up of the kingdom to the Father must be preceded by the destruction of all rebel forces (ver. 24[b]); for the Son cannot give up to the Father an empire which has not been completely pacified; and this subjection of rebel forces can only take place through the Messianic reign and judgment of Jesus (vers. 25, 26); as the result of all, the subjection of all things to the Son (ver. 27). And now the conditions of the end are given.—What follows: "Then shall the Son Himself be subject," reproduces more emphatically what had been said in ver. 24 in the terms: "When He shall deliver up the kingdom to the Father." The condition of the end was the subjection of all things to the Son;

[1] Several Fathers omit ὁ υἱός (*the Son*).
[2] B D E F G omit the καί (*also*).
[3] A B D omit τά before πάντα.

the end itself is the subjection of the Son, and in Him of all things, to God. The subjection of the Son is evidently voluntary. Hence it is that the apostle uses the second aorist passive, which more easily takes the reflective sense than the first aorist. The latter would express entire passivity. We here come on one of the most important and difficult conceptions of our Epistle, and of St. Paul's Epistles in general. It is very difficult to harmonize this idea of the subjection of the Son with the ordinary conception of the Trinity, according to which the Son is eternally equal with the Father. To escape the advantage which the Arians took of this passage, it has been sought in various ways to eliminate from it the idea of submission. The subjection of the Son, according to Chrysostom, denotes His full agreement with the Father. According to Augustine, it is the act whereby the Son will guide the elect to the contemplation of the Father; according to Beza, the presentation of the elect to the Father; according to others, the manifestation by means of which the Son will make the Father fully known to the whole world (Theodoret): meanings which are all utterly insufficient to render the force of the expression used by the apostle. It has also been attempted to understand by the Son here the mystical body of Christ, the Church (Ambrose); and this is perhaps the reason why the words ὁ υἱός, *the Son*, are omitted in some of the Fathers. — A larger number distinguish between the Divine and the human nature of Christ, and ascribe what is here said of Him only to the latter. This attempt to divide the Lord's person into two natures, one of them subject, while the other

remains free and self-sufficient, is the more unfortunate in this passage, as the word used to designate Christ is precisely that which most forcibly characterizes His Divine being, ὁ υἱός, *the Son*, absolutely speaking.—Many commentators apply what is here said of Christ to the cessation of His mediatorial office between God and men; for where there is no more sin, there is no more need of redemption or intercession. To the reign of grace, administered till then by the Son, there will succeed the state of glory (Luther, Melanchthon, Bengel, Olshausen, etc.). But Paul is not speaking of the cessation of priesthood; it is the delivering up of the *kingdom* which is in question, and of a kingdom whose principal work is to judge, a very different thing from redeeming and interceding, and in any case it is not to God that He could deliver up His mediatorial function. This is recognised by Meyer, Hofmann, Heinrici, and others. These apply the term βασιλεία, *kingdom*, to the judicial sovereignty exercised by Christ over the hostile powers (ver. 24), and to His universal sovereignty, which flows from it (ver. 27). "The subordination of the Son to the Father," says Hofmann, "consists in the fact that He ceases to have in the view of the world that mediate position between the world and God, in consequence of which the world saw in Him a ruler different from God, possessing a sovereignty which belonged to Him as His own. This rule within the world ceases because it has reached its end." This explanation would be satisfactory if we had only to account for the expression of ver. 24: "to deliver up the kingdom to the Father." But the phrase used in ver. 28 to designate the same fact is

very different: "the voluntary submission of the Son to Him who subjected all things to Him." For this expression does not bear only on the function of the Son, but also on His personal position, and it seems difficult with such words before us to avoid the conclusion of R. Schmidt, when, in his monograph on St. Paul's Christology,[1] he thus expresses himself: "Either the characteristic of absolute existence is not essential to the notion of God, — which no one will allow,—or it must be confessed that the apostolic conception here stated is incompatible with the Divine nature of Christ." This author concludes that the idea of the subjection of the Son, as here taught by the apostle, is in contradiction not only to the ecclesiastical dogma of the Trinity, but also to all the expressions of St. Paul which imply Christ's divinity and pre-existence.

I do not think that so logical a mind as that of the apostle can with any probability be suspected of self-contradiction, especially on a point of such fundamental importance. I have already remarked once and again (iii. 23 and xi. 3), that the idea of the subordination of the Son to the Father expressly forms part of his Christological conception, no less than that of His Divine pre-existence. The two notions are simultaneously included in the title *Son*, which, as Edwards says, implies "the possibility of subjection and, at the same time, equality of nature." Exactly so is it with the term *Word* in John. As the word is subordinate to the thought, and yet one with it, so in the notion of Son there are united the two relations of subordination and homogeneity. The living monotheism of Paul,

[1] *Die Paulinische Christologie*, 1870.

John, and the other apostles was not less rigorous than ours, and yet it found no contradiction between these two affirmations. Now if, in Paul's view, it is so with the Son in His Divine state, must not the position of subordination have appeared in Him still more compatible with the character of the Son when He had once entered into the mode of being belonging to a human personality? Subordination was therefore, according to him, in harmony with the essential relation of the Son to the Father, in His *Divine* and *human* existence. If consequently He is called to reign, by exercising Divine sovereignty within the universe, it can only be for a time, with a view to the obtaining of a particular result. This end gained, He will return to His normal position: subordination relatively to God the Father. Such, as it seems to me, is the true thought of the apostle. How did he understand the state of the Son after this act of voluntary subjection? In his view, this act of subjection could be no loss to the Son. It is not He who descends from the Divine throne, it is His subjects who are raised to it along with Him: "To him that overcometh, will I grant to sit on My throne, as I overcame . . ." (Rev. iii. 21). Even on the Divine throne, Christ is only "as an elder brother in the midst of many brethren" (Rom. viii. 29). "Heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ," says St. Paul in the same sense, that is to say, sharing with Him the Divine inheritance, the possession of God Himself. He is therefore no longer a king surrounded by His servants, but a brother who in relation to His brethren keeps only the advantage of His eternal priority (πρωτότοκος, *first-born*). We must

therefore beware of understanding this subjection in the sense of an absorption of Christ in the Deity, so that His personality thenceforth disappears. The expression *to be subjected* denotes quite the opposite of this idea, which is besides incompatible with the apostle's various sayings which we have just quoted. The thought of St. Paul seems to me to be this: The Son returns to the state of submission which He had left to fill the place of Messianic sovereignty, because, God communicating Himself directly to all, He ceases to be mediator of God's sovereignty over them.

The καί, *also*, before αὐτός (*Himself*), in the Byz., ought certainly to be preserved; it has been rejected as too closely identifying the Son's subordination with ours, in the same way as it was thought necessary here to reject ὁ υἱός to avoid the risk of doing wrong to His divinity.—The periphrasis: *to Him who subjected to Him*, serves to justify the delivering up of the universe to the Father; He restores it to Him who gave it to Him.—The last words: *that God may be all in all*, do not depend, as Hofmann and Grimm think, on the secondary idea: *who subjected all things to Him.* What needs to be explained is, not the end for which God subjected all to the Son, but the end with a view to which the Son restores all to God. Such is the dominant thought of the whole passage from ver. 24. This *in order that* depends, therefore, on ὑποταγήσεται, *shall be subject.* He effaces Himself to let God take His place. Formerly it was He, Christ, in whom God manifested Himself to the world; it was He who was *all in all* (Col. iii. 12). But He took advantage of His relation to the faithful only to bring them to that

state in which God could directly, without mediation on His part, live, dwell in them, reveal Himself, and act by them. This time having come, they are, as to position, His equals; God is all in them in the same way as He was and is all in His glorified Son. They have reached the perfect stature of Christ (Eph. iv. 13).

But, strange to say, Paul does not use either the name *Father*, or that of *God and the Father* (ver. 24); he says: "that *God* may be all in all." And yet it seems as if the name Father would be the corresponding one to the title Son. All is so maturely weighed in the apostle's style, that he must have had an intention in his choice of the name. He did not here wish to designate God specially as Father, in opposition to the Son and the Spirit, but God in the fulness of His being, at once as Father, the source of all, both in Himself and in the universe, as Son revealing Him, and as Spirit communicating Him. It was in this fulness that God dwelt in the man Jesus, and it is with the same fulness He will dwell in every man who has become in Him His child and heir. Such are "those things" of which Paul spoke ii. 7, "which God has prepared for our glory."—The expression: *πάντα* or *τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*, *all in all*, certainly does not merely signify: to be all *to them* (to their hearts) because of their love and admiration, as has been concluded from certain analogous Greek expressions. The *in* denotes a real indwelling. The living God thinks, wills, and acts through them. They are as Jesus was, on the earth, at once His free and submissive agents, the depositaries of His holiness, the bearers of His love, the interpreters of His wisdom throughout the boundless

spaces and unnumbered worlds of the universe. It is by filling them that through them God fills all things. It seems to me that the neuter *πάντα*, *all things*, by no means obliges us to take the *ἐν πᾶσιν*, *in all*, in the neuter sense. The meaning is: *all* in *each*, so that every member of this glorified society has no longer anything in him which is not penetrated by God, as the transparent crystal is all penetrated with light. The masculine sense is demanded, as Meyer well says, by the correlation to the *αὐτὸς ὁ υἱός*, the Son Himself. This meaning also comes out very naturally from the analogous saying Col. iii. 11: *πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν Χριστός*. At the height at which he has arrived, the apostle can only think of a *being* of God spiritually, like that of which Jesus speaks in His last prayer: "As Thou, Father, art in Me and I in Thee, that they also may be in us" (John xvii. 21). It is therefore a mistake in Hofmann and Edwards to take *πᾶσιν* in the neuter sense: "all *in all things*," even in inanimate beings.— We must certainly read, with the *Vaticanus* and the *Cantabrigiensis*, *πάντα* without the article; the *τά* has come in from the three *τὰ πάντα* which precede; but there *τὰ πάντα* denoted the totality of the universe, which is unsuitable here.

The partisans of universal salvation have always regarded this last saying as one of the most solid points in support of their theory. But the expression *in all* may be explained in two ways, without ascribing this idea to Paul. Either it may be held that he is thinking only of those who have freely joined in the submission of the Son, and who, united to Him, are embraced in Him; or the *in all* may be applied even to

the reprobate, in the sense that in them too the Divine perfection will shine forth, in the twofold aspect of justice and power; comp. Phil. ii. 10, 11, a passage which, however, refers neither to the same time nor to the same fact. If the idea of universal salvation were Paul's view, it must apply also to devils, as Olshausen himself cannot help admitting. But ver. 25 does not lead to such a conclusion, and this thought evidently goes beyond all the limits of the biblical view.[1] What the apostle meant to express here is this sublime idea: that the goal of history and the end of the existence of humanity are the formation of a society of intelligent and free beings, brought by Christ into perfect communion with God, and thereby rendered capable of exercising, like Jesus Himself when on earth, an unchangeably holy and beneficent activity. This view, which is also that of one of the greatest thinkers of our day, Lotze, exclusive of the Christian element on which it rested in the case of the apostle, sets aside, on the one hand, the Pantheism which denies all existence of its own and all free activity to the creature,—this is contradicted by the ἐν πᾶσιν, *in all*,—and on the other the Deism, which ascribes to man an activity in good separately from God,—which is excluded by the πάντα ἐν, *all things in*, of St. Paul.

The apostle has thus assigned to the resurrection of the body its place in the system of the Christian salvation as a whole. He has brought out its three phases (Christ's resurrection, the resurrection of believers, the universal resurrection), and he has pointed out the correspondence between these phases and the three

[1] I cannot admit that it is contained in Col. i. 20.

principal epochs of the Divine work (the consummation of salvation in Christ Himself, the inauguration of His Messianic kingdom, and the close of His whole work). Certainly such a discussion exhausted the first side of the question, the *reality* of the resurrection of the body. Before, however, passing to the second aspect of the question, the *possibility* of so extraordinary a fact, Pauls adds one or two considerations as to the *practical* consequences, to which the denial of this truth naturally leads (vers. 29–34).

Conclusions regarding the passage (vers. 12–28).

On this passage we find *four principal views:*

1. Some, like Reuss, think that it applies throughout only to believers, and that it contains absolutely nothing in regard to unbelievers, because in the context Paul deals only with the development of true life.

2. Weiss[1] and R. Schmidt go further. According to them, Paul holds absolutely no resurrection of the unbelieving. The latter, according to Paul, remain, without returning to life, in the gloomy existence of Hades.

3. Grimm[2] holds, on the contrary, a universal resurrection, which will open up to all men, without exception, participation in eternal felicity.

4. Meyer thinks that our passage contains the idea of a universal resurrection, embracing unbelievers as well as believers.

This last viewpoint appears to me the only admissible one. The opinion of Reuss can hardly give an adequate explanation of ver. 26; for the complete victory over death announced in this verse can only be found in a resurrection which will extend to all the victims of death without exception. This same passage seems to me also incompatible with the opinion

[1] *Biblische Theologie des N. T.*, § 99b.

[2] "Ueber die Stelle 1 Kor. xv. 20–28": *Zeitschr. f. Wissensch. Theol.* 1873.

of Weiss, notwithstanding the efforts this critic makes to harmonize it with the expressions of the apostle (§ 99, note 4). Ver. 26 has no meaning unless it adds to the idea of ver. 23 that of universal resurrection. Besides, we have the express words of Paul, Acts xxiv. 15: "Having hope in God, which they (the Jews) also share, that there will be a resurrection of the dead, of the just *and of the unjust*." Luke knew St. Paul sufficiently to avoid attributing to him on this point a declaration which would have been contrary to his view.—As to Grimm's opinion, we have spoken of it already in connection with ver. 22. We merely add here the words of Reuss regarding this view: "Neither Paul nor any member of the primitive Church dreamed of it."—It must therefore be admitted with Meyer and the majority of the commentators, that Paul teaches a resurrection to life, and a resurrection to condemnation, agreeably to the Lord's express declaration John v. 28, 29, and to the delineation Rev. xx. 12–14. Return to the fulness of personal existence by the resurrection of the body is the necessary condition of judgment in the case of both.

Does St. Paul distinguish two epochs of resurrection?

Reuss, Weiss, and many others do not think that Paul distinguishes a first resurrection, that of believers, at the Advent, from a second general, and later, resurrection. Ver. 23 is sufficiently explained, according to Weiss, if it is supposed that Paul meant to anticipate this objection: Why, since Christ is raised, is no dead believer yet raised? The answer, according to Weiss, is: Each in his order; Christ first; the others afterwards, only at the time of His Advent. But is this contrast between Christ and believers sufficient to explain naturally the term ἕκαστος, *each*, of ver. 23? Besides, it is impossible to find, either in this passage or in any other part of the New Testament, the least trace of an objection like that which Weiss here imagines. In the passage 1 Thess. iv. 13 seq., Paul is not answering the objection: Why are our dead not raised? but the question: Why do we, believers, die before the Lord's return?

Reuss and Weiss also allege that the Advent being, according to the whole of the New Testament, the signal of the end of things, there would not be between this event and the

giving up of the kingdom to the Father the interval needed for a new act of resurrection. But we have seen, on the contrary, that Paul distinctly separates the Advent from *the end* (the giving up of the kingdom to the Father). "Then the end," says he, "when He shall give up the kingdom, *when He shall have put down* (or after having put down) His enemies . . ." This putting down is an action which requires some time; now this action is, on the one hand, the consequence of the Advent, and, on the other, the condition of the end. It is therefore posterior to the one, anterior to the other. And if the victory over death is to take place in this period, and to mark its close, if moreover, as we have seen, it can only be found in universal resurrection, the distinction between two resurrections, that of believers and that of human beings in general, in Paul's mind, can no longer be contested. The same conclusion follows clearly from Phil. iii. 11, which can only apply to universal resurrection.— Moreover, there is nothing so wonderful in this idea of two resurrections in Paul's writings. There are two sayings of Jesus in the Gospel of Luke which prove that He taught exactly to the same effect, xiv. 14: "Thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just;" this expression has no meaning unless it is contrasted with another resurrection, that of the unjust, xx. 35: "They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world and the resurrection (literally: *that*) *from the dead*." This expression contrasts the first resurrection (that of the just from the dead) with the resurrection of the dead generally. Finally, we find the same distinction in the Apocalypse, xx. 6: "Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection!"

Finally, let us compare the *principal parallel passages in the New Testament* on the subject treated in this section:

1. In ver. 51 of our chapter there is described the resurrection of believers of which ver. 23 speaks. Only an important circumstance is added, of which no mention is made here: the transfiguration of believers who are living at the time of the Advent. The apostle had no occasion to mention this detail in our passage. It is obvious how prudently the argument *e silentio* must be used in criticism.

2. 1 Thess. iv. 13–17. At the time of the Advent the

dead *in Christ* rise—which implies that the rest do not rise,—and living believers are carried to meet the returning Lord —which implies a bodily transformation effected in them, precisely that which is expressly mentioned 1 Cor. xv. 51. There is therefore entire harmony between our passage and that of Thessalonians. The Advent will be accompanied by the resurrection of believers, and of believers only.

3. Phil. ii. 9–11. Mention is made of the supreme elevation of the Messiah terminating in the universal homage rendered to His kingship throughout all the domains of heaven and earth, and places under the earth. This homage corresponds to the universal submission spoken of in ver. 27 of our passage.

4. Rev. xx.–xxi. Meyer, Grimm, and others hold that this passage is irreconcilable with ours. Let us see. The Advent was described at the end of the preceding chapter, from xix. 11. What takes place after this event?

Satan is cast into prison for a thousand years; then, being set free, he makes a last attempt to overthrow the work of God by destroying the community of the saints; after which he is finally judged and goes into the lake of fire to rejoin the Beast and the False Prophet who had been cast into it at the time of the Advent (xix. 20).—Does not this whole representation exactly correspond to what St. Paul called, in ver. 24, the putting down of hostile powers, which takes place during the reign of Christ inaugurated by the Advent?

At the time of the Advent the saints, the martyrs, and all those in general who refused to take part in the work of the Beast, rise again, and thrones of judgment are given them (xx.).—This is the resurrection of believers mentioned in our ver. 23. It is objected that only those martyrs and believers are mentioned who have overcome the test of the kingdom of Antichrist, and not those who have struggled and conquered during the whole course of the history of the Church. It is forgotten that from the New Testament point of view this last crisis is very near to the apostolic times. *It is the last hour*, says John (1 Ep. ii. 18). *The mystery of iniquity doth already work*, says Paul, speaking of the work of the Man of Sin. The believers of the eighteen centuries which have followed are therefore implicitly included in those who are

mentioned in the Apocalyptic description, as they are in our ver. 23. Let us add, as an interesting parallel, what Paul said vi. 2 of the judgment of the world and even of angels by the saints. The reign of Christ and of the Church of the risen is a time of judgment in Paul as well as in the Apocalypse.

At the end of the thousand years the resurrection and the last judgment take place; and death is cast into the lake of fire (*ὁ θάνατος καὶ ὁ ᾅδης ἐβλήθησαν εἰς τὴν λίμνην τοῦ πυρός*). Here we have the most exact parallel to our ver. 26, where death is destroyed, and destroyed as the last enemy.

The new heaven and the new earth replace the work of the first creation; "*the tabernacle of God* (*θεοῦ σκηνή*) comes down *among men; God dwells with them, their God.*"—Had John meant to give a commentary on the last words of our ver. 28: *And God shall be all in all*, could he have done better?—And it is between these two representations that there are said to be insoluble contradictions! There are in each only one or two features which more particularly distinguish it from the other; in that of Paul: the giving up of the kingdom to the Father; in that of the Apocalypse: the indication of the duration of a thousand years as the interval between the Advent and *the end*, and the setting in relief of a last attempt on the part of Satan, at the end of the Messianic reign of Jesus, which leads to his final perdition. These special features only serve to demonstrate the originality and independence of the two conceptions.

5. If, finally, we consider the sayings of Jesus relative to His future Advent, it is evident that the Master's coming described in the parable of the talents (Matt. xxv.), in that of the pounds (Luke xix.), and in the parable of the virgins, refers to the Advent by which the Messianic kingdom will be inaugurated. The same is true of the prophecies relative to the preliminary division which on His return takes place within His Church, Luke xvii. 22–37, and in which some are taken, others left. These sayings refer to the Advent, when, according to Paul, *those who are in Christ* shall alone be raised (1 Cor. xv. 23). It is no less clear that in the great description of the final and universal judgment (Matt. xxv. 31), we find ourselves face to face with an entirely

different scene. Here it is not the members of the Church who are called to give account of the use of the gifts which they have received; it is *all nations* (*πάντα τὰ ἔθνη*, all the Gentiles) who appear before the judgment-seat. As Edwards says: "In Matt. xxv. 31 a transition is unquestionably made from the resurrection of saints which takes place at the coming of Christ to the general judgment which takes place after that event."[1] The *ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, but when the Son of man shall come*, seems therefore to denote a final coming, posterior to the Advent.

This doctrine of the apostle is not to be regarded as an importation into the gospel of his former Pharisaism. I believe it is impossible to cite a passage of Jewish theology really like that of our Epistle or the parallel passage of the Apocalypse (see Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, 1886, § 29).

There is a real harmony, therefore, between the different eschatological passages of the New Testament. Ewald himself pronounces on the central point of the question, when he says: "Though Paul does not expressly mention the Millennium of Rev. xx., he yet places, between the preceding period and the end of that which follows, a sufficiently long interval filled with many various and considerable events." If this harmony is not recognised by Meyer, it is the consequence of his false interpretation of vers. 23, 24. It is, besides, perfectly legitimate to complete, as we have done, the one of these representations by details taken from the other, since we are obliged to do something similar with the various passages of St. Paul himself. Thus in vers. 50, 51 of our chapter he supplies the fact of the transformation of those Christians who shall be alive at the Advent, of which he says nothing in our passage, and in 1 Thess. iv. 15–17 he supplies the fact of their being caught up into the air, of which no mention is made in the two passages of our chapter.

[1] Edwards adds in a note: "After reading Bishop Waldegrave's *New Testament Millenarianism* (2nd ed. 1866), and Dr. Brown's *Second Advent* (6th ed. 1867), I am not convinced that the apostle does not teach the doctrine of two resurrections. Neither of these writers, so far as I have observed, touches upon the argument that death is not destroyed at the Advent."

Vers. 29–34.

After securing for the resurrection of the body its place among the great hopes which stir the hearts of all believers, the apostle adds, as a supplementary argument, a few reflections as to the moral consequences of the denial of the dogma. Suppress the resurrection, and *baptism for the dead* becomes meaningless, and devotion to the cause of Christ madness. The only true wisdom is to enjoy the good things of this brief life as much as possible.—The apostle, when he reasons thus, seems to confound the dogma of the resurrection of the body with that of the immortality of the soul. We shall examine this difficulty at the close.

Ver. 29. "For else, what shall they do which are baptized for the dead? If the dead rise not at all, why are they baptized for them?"[1]—The ἐπεί, *for since*, is here taken, as often, in the sense of: for if it is not so (if the dead rise not). The English translation can render this idea by: *for otherwise, else.* This conjunction rests, not on ver. 28 only, but on the whole preceding passage, from ver. 20: "If Christ risen be not the first-fruits of a harvest of glorified ones in whom God will become all in all . . ."—We must not confound the expression τί ποιήσουσιν, *what shall they do?* with the form τί ποιοῦσιν, *what do they?* The understood answer with the verb in the present would be: *Nonsense*, an absurdity; whereas with the verb in the future the meaning is: *what result, what profit will they gain?* Answer: *none.* It has been sought

[1] T. R. with L Syr^{sch}: των νεκρων (*the dead*), instead of αυτων (*them*).

to explain the future in a purely logical sense: "What will every baptism be, performed under such conditions (once the resurrection is denied)?" But the following verses show that Paul's eye is really turned to the future, the future which is to follow death: and if such was the meaning of this future tense, the logical condition would have required to be more expressly indicated. The meaning is certainly the same as that of the question: τί μοι τὸ ὄφελος, *what advantageth it me* (ver. 32)? The idea therefore is: "What will accrue to them from such a baptism?" Holsten recognises this: "The future relates to the result yet to come."

Somewhere about thirty explanations are reckoned of the expression: *to be baptized for the dead.* This diversity is due, on the one hand, to our ignorance of the usage to which Paul alludes, on the other, to the absence of any parallel expression to guide us in the explanation of it. The term used by the apostle was evidently well known to his readers. In their Christian vocabulary it was a sort of technical phrase.—The ancient commentators are not altogether at one about its explanation. In two of his works (*Cont. Marc.* v. 10, and *De resur. carn.* 48) Tertullian says that the apostle is here referring to the custom of baptizing a living Christian in place of another who died without baptism; but he does not think it follows from the reasoning of the apostle that he approved of such a custom. Epiphanius relates that the Cerinthians, when one of their catechumens happened to die, caused a member of the Church to be baptized in his room, that the deceased might escape the penalties of the

unbaptized. Chrysostom tells the same story of the Marcionites.[1] But these two Fathers do not think the apostle meant to refer to such a custom as existing among the first Christians. It is otherwise with Ambrosiaster: "Paul takes an example from the fact that if any one died before receiving baptism, a living person was baptized for him, because it was feared either that he would not rise again, or that he would rise again to suffer." A very large number of ancient and modern commentators have adopted this meaning given by the Roman commentator, particularly Anselm, Erasmus, Grotius, Rückert, de Wette, Neander, Kling, Heinrici, Renan, Reuss, Edwards, Holsten. The last, as well as Kling, thinks he can connect this custom of representative baptism with the sickness prevailing at Corinth, mentioned xi. 30. This connection is inadmissible; for those who were stricken with sickness were unworthy communicants, who were all baptized. As to the explanation itself, I do not think the apostle could have taken as the basis of an argument a superstitious custom absolutely opposed to his spiritual conception. Reuss himself says: "We grant that the argument in itself is extremely weak; indeed, it has probably no other object than to show the opponents guilty of self-contradiction." But even on this supposition, what purpose would have been served by adopting this course of bad logic and of doubtful

[1] "When a catechumen of theirs dies, they conceal a living one under the bed of the deceased; then, approaching the latter, they converse with him and ask him if he wishes to receive baptism. Then he who is under the bed declares in place of the dead that he would like to be baptized" (*Catena*, p. 310). Neander and Heinrici suspect Chrysostom of caricaturing the procedure of the Marcionites.

honesty? The opponents whom he sought to convince by such means would no doubt have answered that one absurdity is not proved by a greater; for, if they rejected the resurrection of the body, they would evidently reject baptism for the dead so understood. Rückert and Heinrici think that this was merely a preliminary argument, and that Paul had in view to rectify the superstitious custom from which it was drawn, when he should go to Corinth (xi. 34), that is to say, that he had in view then to refute himself! Heinrici supposes that this strange procedure arose from the consideration which he required to show to his colleague Apollos, who was very zealous in the matter of baptism, and who had introduced this kind of ceremony at Corinth. But we have seen that the part ascribed to Apollos by this critic is a simple creation of his imagination. It would consequently be necessary, if such was St. Paul's argument, to go the length of holding with Holsten that the apostle's spiritualism was yet very rudimentary, and that he himself had not drawn from it its last consequences. But who can believe that the man who had combated the *opus operatum* with such energy in his conflict with Jewish legalism, would have restored or tolerated it himself in a new form in the Churches which he had founded? The man whose spiritualism became that of the entire Church, and ours also at the present hour, certainly did not adopt in his evangelical convictions and practice an element stamped with the grossest religious materialism. Besides, we have no instance which can lead us to suppose that such a custom had a place in the life of the primitive Churches. It was not

till after the apostolic period that the idea of the magical virtue of the sacraments began to corrupt the primitive spirituality. To these reasons there is added another, taken from the text itself: As the advantage of such an act must have accrued, not to those who performed it, but to those in whose behalf it was performed, instead of saying: "What shall they gain who are baptized for the dead?" Paul would have required to say: "What will the dead gain for whom such baptisms are performed?" This last reason would seem to me of itself sufficient to secure the rejection of an interpretation otherwise so incompatible with the apostle's moral dignity and with the character of the apostolic Churches. As to the sects mentioned by the Fathers, they belong to a later period, when the life of the Church had lost its primitive simplicity, both in doctrine and ritual. And it may be supposed, not improbably, that it was our very passage, misunderstood, which gave rise to the absurd practices to which we have referred.

This meaning, the first—we admit—to occur to the mind, being set aside, we find ourselves face to face with a multitude of explanations, no one of which has yet succeeded in gaining general approval. Certain of them may be set aside without discussion, so evidently do they do violence to the meaning of one or other of the terms used by Paul. Beza: "Those who bathe the dead before burying them;" Thomas Aquinas: "Those who are baptized to obtain the pardon of mortal sins;" Olshausen: "The new converts who are baptized to fill the blank left in the Church by the Christians who die;" John Edwards

(year 1692), quoted by Edwards: "Those who are converted by contemplating the glorious death of the martyrs, as Paul himself was in consequence of Stephen's death." — Luther and Ewald[1] explain: "Those who are baptized over the graves of the martyrs." But the preposition ὑπέρ, *over*, has never this local sense in the New Testament, and such a custom belongs to a kind of devotion posterior to the time of the apostles. Besides, the argument would have proved absolutely nothing. — Several commentators apply the word τῶν νεκρῶν, *the dead*, to the baptized themselves. So Chrysostom and the ancient Greek commentators: "for themselves as dead, that is to say, with a view to their own resurrection;" Chrysostom paraphrases τῶν νεκρῶν by τῶν σωμάτων. To the same effect Linder:[2] "*In gratiam cinerum.*" But to give the argument any force, it would require to be established that the apostolic Church maintained a peculiar relation between the sacrament of baptism and the bodily resurrection of the baptized. The passage Rom. vi. 1 seq. proves nothing in this respect; for it refers only to spiritual resurrection. Then there would have been no need of the article before νεκρῶν; Paul must have said in this sense: for [*some*] dead (themselves as dead), and not: for *the* dead.—Otto[3] has modified this meaning, applying the term *the dead* to the adversaries of the resurrection at Corinth. The question, according to him, is ironical: "Why, if there is no resurrection, do these people have themselves

[1] *Die Sendschreiben des Apostels Paulus*, p. 213.

[2] *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1862.

[3] *Dekalogische Untersuchungen, nebst einem Anhang über die Todtentaufe in Corinth*, 1857.

baptized to result in their being of the dead, not of the living?" The answer would thus be ironically introduced into the question. But in this sense the article would have required to be rejected. And would not this sarcasm be utterly out of place after the sublime thought of ver. 28? Finally, the following question, in that case reproducing it a second time, would be grossly out of place. — It would be much more natural, starting from this explanation of *τῶν νεκρῶν, the dead*, to adopt the sense of Epiphanius and Calvin, who apply the words to the catechumens threatened with death by accident or disease, and who asked baptism, as Calvin says, "either for their own consolation, or for the edification of the brethren." In this case we must understand the words: "for the dead," in the sense of: in view of death, or: as about to be soon gathered to the dead; as Bengel says: "*qui mox post baptismum ad mortuos aggregabuntur.*" But one cannot help feeling how forced are the two meanings thus given to *ὑπέρ*, especially the former.

A group of more probable explanations, approaching in meaning the words of Bengel just quoted, is that in which the term: *the dead*, is applied to all deceased Christians, and to the Lord Jesus Christ Himself. So Pelagius and Diestelmann:[1] "For the love of Christ; to be one day united with Him and with the faithful who surround Him in His kingdom." But the term: *they who are baptized*, would require in this case to be applied to all Christians; now the *οἱ* before *βαπτιζόμενοι* denotes a special class of Christians. As is well said by Calvin: "*Non de omnibus loquitur quum*

[1] *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1861.

dicit: quid facient qui baptizantur?" And if Paul wished to characterize Christians in general, why speak of baptism rather than of faith? It is faith, and not the sign of faith, which opens the way into the kingdom of Christ. The same objections are opposed to Köster's[1] meaning: "To remain united to their dead Christian relatives and friends." This explanation has moreover against it the want of a more precise description added to the general term "the dead."

But these last interpretations, though we cannot accept them as satisfactory, set us on the way of what seems to us the true one. Morus, Flatt, and Lightfoot (the older) have thought that in this phrase: *to be baptized for the dead*, the word *baptized* referred, not to the baptism of water, but to the baptism of blood, by martyrdom. We have two sayings uttered by the Lord, in which the term baptism is used in this meaning; the one pointing to His own death, Luke xii. 50: "I have a baptism to be baptized with;" the other, to the bloody death of His disciples, Mark x. 38: "Can ye be baptized with the baptism wherewith I shall be baptized?" One can easily understand how, under the influence of such sayings, there was formed in the primitive Church a new expression such as that used here by the apostle, to denote the bloody death of martyrdom. The words: "for the dead," would thus signify: to be baptized, not as the believer is with the baptism of water to enter into the Church of the living, but to enter into that of the dead, the word dead being chosen in contrast to the Church on

[1] *Lutherische Zeitschrift.* 1862.

the earth and to bring out the heroism of that martyr-baptism which leads to life only through communion with the dead. Thereby the article *οἱ* before *βαπτιζόμενοι* is fully explained; such baptized ones certainly form a class of Christians by themselves. The future also, *ποιήσουσιν*, is accounted for: "If there is no resurrection, what will be gained by such baptized ones, by their joining the ranks of the dead for the love of Christ and of the Church in heaven?" Finally, we shall see how natural on this explanation is the transition to the question of ver. 30: "Why do we also stand in jeopardy every hour?" To this interpretation it is objected that there had not yet been either persecutions or martyrs in the Church of Corinth. But there had been persecutions and martyrs in the Church in general; comp. Acts vii. 58, ix. 1, xii. 2, xiv. 19; and there might have been some which are unknown to us. Ver. 32 of our chapter shows how many circumstances there are even in the life of the best known of the apostles of which we are totally ignorant.[1]

[1] We ought to mention at least in a note the astounding explanation of Hofmann, which it is difficult to take seriously: The *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν* depends not on *οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι*, but on *τί ποιήσουσι*; *νεκροί* should be taken in the moral sense; the second *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*, or rather according to the true reading the *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν*, belongs to the question of ver. 32. The meaning thus becomes: "For otherwise, what will Christians yet be able to do for those who are perishing in their sins? Why also are Christians themselves baptized? Why do we, apostles, from love to them, expose ourselves to constant dangers?" But in this chapter *νεκρός* can only be taken literally; the regimen *ὑπὲρ* naturally depends on *οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι*: and this participle with the article must here designate a special class of Christians; the *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν* can only, considering the parallelism, depend on *βαπτίζονται*, as the first *ὑπὲρ* on *βαπτιζόμενοι*; not to speak of the vagueness of the expression: "*to do something* for the dead and for Christians."

The second question is a more emphatic repetition of the first. And therefore we are led to refer the proposition εἰ ὅλως . . . to what follows. As the first question was prefaced by the ἐπεί, the second is introduced by the subordinate proposition, which is a more emphatic development of the ἐπεί: "If absolutely the dead do not return to bodily life."—The καί signifies *notwithstanding*, as in vii. 21. These are two things which cannot co-exist (to remain dead, and to be baptized for them). Undoubtedly we must read ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, *for them*, with almost all the authorities, connecting this regimen with βαπτίζονται, and not with κινδυνεύομεν, as Hofmann will have it.

Vers. 30, 31. "And why stand we also in jeopardy every hour? 31. I protest, brethren,[1] by that glorying in you,[2] which I have in Christ our Lord, I die daily." —The transition from the bloody death of the martyrs (ver. 29) to the daily life of the apostles, which is a constant menace of martyrdom (ver. 30), is easily understood. The force of the καί, *also*, which, in the other explanations, always presents some difficulty, is perfectly simple. — The *we* includes Paul, Silas, Timothy, who laboured together at Corinth; then the other apostles, who live like Paul in perpetual danger of death. — This ver. 30 reminds us of the passages iv. 9; 2 Cor. iv. 10, 11, xi. 23–27; Rom. viii. 35, 36.

Ver. 31. Comp. Rom. viii. 36: "For thy sake are we killed all the day." There is no day nor hour of the day when they may not expect to be seized and

[1] T. R. omits ἀδελφοί (*brethren*), with D E F G L It.

[2] T. R. with A reads ημετεραν (*our*), instead of υμετεραν (*your*), read by all the rest.

brought to execution.—The classical phrase νή with an accusative of person or thing, as an affirmation on oath, occurs nowhere else in the New Testament, yet Paul might have had the opportunity of using it 2 Cor. i. 23. — The reading ἡμετέραν (*our*), which signifies: "the cause of glorying which we may have in you," is condemned not only by the authority of the documents, but by the two verbs in the singular, between which this adjective would stand. According to the reading ὑμετέραν, *your*, the subject is still the ground of glorying which Paul finds in them: "the cause of glorying you are to me by your faith." What labours had not this work cost him! What dangers had he not had to run to accomplish it! The last words: *in Christ our Lord*, soften what might be too self-exalting in these expressions. If all these successes have been gained by him, it is only because of his communion with Christ.—The apostle finally takes from his present stay at Ephesus an example of that daily death in the midst of which he passes his life.

Ver. 32. "If it is as man that I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me? If the dead rise not, let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we die."—The meaning of the expression κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, *according to man*, must be determined by the context. It might be applied to human *strength*, which was not that with which the apostle laboured; or he might mean that in his work he had a higher *end* in view than that which the natural man sets before him in labouring. I am inclined to believe in a third meaning: With a view to what man can give by way of

recompense. The θηριομαχεῖν, *to fight with wild beasts*, is taken by almost all modern commentators, down to Meyer, Reuss, Heinrici (Holsten excepted), in the figurative sense: to struggle with a furious multitude excited against him. It is in the same sense that Ignatius (*Ad Rom.* c. 5) speaks of the ten leopards (his keepers) with whom he has to fight day and night during his journey (θηριομαχῶ δέκα λεοπάρδοις). In favour of this sense we could not quote the tumult raised by the goldsmith Demetrius; for this event did not take place till after the composition of our letter, and Paul did nothing on that occasion which could justify the term *fight*. But some similar scene might have passed at Ephesus in the first period of Paul's sojourn. I cannot, however, adhere to this explanation of the word θηριομαχεῖν. Similar conflicts were too frequent in the apostle's life to admit of his mentioning this one in so exceptional a way. Unless we are to ascribe to Paul an exaggeration very alien to his character, it will be every way more natural to apply this expression to the punishment of the *bestiarii*, in the strict sense of the word. This meaning agrees better also with the feeling of free-will which breathes in the words: *If I have fought*. To this is objected the right of Roman citizenship which Paul possessed, and which secured him from such treatment. But if the thing passed in a popular rising, the apostle's protestations might not have been listened to. It is also said that he could not have escaped death, and that in any case such a fact could not fail to be mentioned in the Acts. But how many facts of this kind are mentioned in the list 2 Cor. xi., of which we have not a hint in the narrative of the

Acts! And as to deliverance, it may have been due to some providential circumstance or other which we cannot divine. The fact is that this ἐθηριομάχησα designates in the apostle's view the apogee of the: "I die daily," and this gradation admits only of the literal sense. As Holsten says: "If there were nothing extraordinary and particular in this fight, Paul would not have so mentioned it in the context."[1]—When he says: *What doth it profit me?* the apostle's thought is that only the expectation of a life to come can explain such conduct. Moral duty in itself would not account for it, for there is no natural obligation which requires a man to sacrifice himself in the service of Jesus Christ. Besides, when he speaks of profit, Paul is thinking, not of a reward due to acquired merit, but of God's response to the holy aspirations with which He has Himself endowed the human soul.

The proposition: *If the dead rise not,* would be awkward, if connected with what precedes; it suits better as an introduction to what follows: "Say then also, in this case, like the despisers of the Divine judgment in Isaiah (xxii. 13): Let us eat . . ." Paul does expressly say that such language is used at Corinth; but he declares that it is the natural consequence of what is said there about the resurrection. There is, I

[1] Hofmann and Holsten explain the non-mention of this fact in the Acts by the alleged intention of Luke to relate nothing contrary to the benevolent action of the Roman magistracy toward Christianity. But what of Paul's three shipwrecks, all of them previous to the only one which Luke relates Acts xxvii., and his spending three times twenty-four hours in the deep (2 Cor. xi. 25)? Is it from deference to the Romans that Luke has omitted them also? Besides, the right of Roman citizenship would certainly not have been disregarded by Roman magistrates; comp. Acts xvi. 38, 39, xxii. 27–29.

believe, less of bravado than of despondency in the saying quoted: "Since we have nothing better to look for, let us at least enjoy the present." This forms the transition to the word of warning and exhortation which closes the first part of the chapter.

Vers. 33, 34. "Be not deceived: evil company doth corrupt good[1] manners. 34. Awake up righteously, and sin not; for some of you have not the knowledge of God: I speak [thus][2] to move you to shame."—The formula μὴ πλανᾶσθε does not signify: Let not yourselves be misled by others; its meaning always is: "Do not deceive yourselves (by false reasonings)." — What follows applies undoubtedly to the secret thoughts of the Corinthians whereby they sought to excuse certain acts which still kept up a connection between them and the heathen society around; comp. particularly chaps. viii.–x. This meaning seems to me more natural than that of Meyer, who applies the expression *evil companionships* to the τινές, the *some* spoken of in ver. 34. Paul is rather addressing the whole Church of which these some still form part. It is they who run the risk of being seduced by their heathen friends.—Erasmus, Luther, and some moderns (Heinrici, Holsten) give to ὁμιλίαι the meaning of *conversations*. This is a possible meaning. But the ordinary signification, *societies, companies*, is perfectly suitable.—The saying quoted by Paul has been found in the fragments of the *Thais* of Menander, a comic poet, who flourished in the 3rd century before Christ. It is easily recognised as an iambic trimeter acatalectic

[1] T. R. reads without authorities χρησθ', instead of χρηστα.
[2] T. R. with A F G K L · λεγω (*I say*); ℵ B D E P: λαλω (*I speak*).

verse, provided it be written, as in the T. R., putting χρῆσθ' and not χρῆστα. We are uncertain whether Menander borrowed this sentence from common usage, and simply made a verse of it, or if it passed from his comedy into ordinary use, as a sort of proverb. Paul himself may have borrowed it either from the one or other of these sources. In both cases, the form χρῆστα is probably Paul's original reading; why should he have been concerned to preserve the exact poetic form? The meaning only was of importance to him. The form χρῆσθ' is therefore a correction. Already true in its application to ordinary moral life, the saying becomes still more so from the religious and Christian standpoint. Spiritual life is quenched in the atmosphere of carnal society, and a sort of intoxication quickly comes over him who frequents it. Hence the following abrupt exhortation.

Ver. 34. The word ἐκνήφειν strictly signifies: *to get out of the stupefaction caused by drunkenness.* The aorist imperative denotes an energetic, decided act. Nothing less will do if the Church is to shake off the torpor with which some of its members have been seized.—The word δικαίως here signifies *seriously*, or as we say: *en règle*, in due order. They were so far awaked already from their natural slumber, from their former carnal state, but only half; and hence the reason why this state had so easily regained the upper hand in many of them.—The present imperative ἁμαρτάνετε, *sin*, forms a contrast to the preceding aorist: the act of awaking is unique, decisive; but the state of sin which would follow without fail from the intoxication into which they were plunging, would, if they persisted,

become permanent; this is what forms the danger of it; for such a life swayed by sin leads to total apostasy. Such is the terrible sin present to the mind of St. Paul when he uses the verb ἁμαρτάνετε, suggesting the strict meaning of the word in Greek: *to miss the aim.*—The *for* states the reason why he thinks he ought to address to them so formidable a warning. There was in the Church a knot of strong-headed members who, as we have seen, more than once derided the apostle's directions, and claimed to be more clear-sighted than he. Paul describes these people strangely. Instead of saying to them that they have not the knowledge of God, he says literally: that *they have the non-knowledge*, ἀγνωσία, of God. It is not merely a deficiency, the lack of a good thing, it is the possession of a real evil. It involves not only inanition, but poisoning. We must beware of limiting this *non-knowledge* of God to the denial of His power to raise the dead, as might be inferred from the parallel Matt. xxii. 29; the rebuke is too serious for that: it is the Divine holiness, the apprehension of which these men have stifled within them, by substituting for it a deeply corrupted notion of God's character, that they might give themselves up to their presumptuous and profane frivolity; it is that moral libertinism to which the Pantheistic conception of the Divine Being leads. For as to the suspicion of atheism, it is excluded by the very expression which the apostle uses. In the presence of such a group of men within the Church there is cause for profound humiliation, and at the same time an alarming danger. According to the T. R., the meaning of the last words would be: "I

say this to you (λέγω) to shame you." According to the Alex.: "I *speak* thus to you (λάλω) to . . .," which is undoubtedly better. The apostle thus insists on the tone he is obliged to take, rather than on the matter of his words.—This severe tone is intended to throw them back on themselves (ἐντρέπεσθαι), and so to make humiliation succeed to pride and the feeling of their fall to that of the superiority which they think they possess over all the other Churches; comp. the expressions either analogous, vi. 5, or opposite, iv. 14.

The apostle has restored the expectation of the resurrection to its true bases, and so demonstrated its certainty. It now remains to solve the objections which are raised to the *possibility* of such an event, by showing how it will take place. This is what he does in the second part of the chapter.

But, before passing to the study of this new subject, we have to examine the question put at the beginning of the foregoing discussion: Does not the apostle throughout this passage confound the resurrection of the body with the immortality of the soul, and does he not ascribe to the denial of the former, practical consequences which, strictly speaking, only flow from the denial of the latter?—It seems to me that the Apostle Paul could not possibly be so much of a novice on this question as to be guilty of such confusion. The question of the survival of the personality after death was as thoroughly raised by Sadduceism as that of the resurrection of the body; and it is impossible that in the polemic of the Pharisees against the Sadducees the two questions should not have been distinguished. Are we not entitled to suppose, especially after the

immediately preceding verses, that if Paul reasons as he does, it is because in the opinion of the adversaries whom he had before him the two denials were really confounded? And, in fact, once the hope of the resurrection of the body is abandoned, there no longer remains any very solid security for the survival of the person after death. There is a speedy gliding down the incline which leads from the idea of the annihilation of the body to the Pantheistic absorption of the finite spirit in the absolute Spirit. And it seems to me that if we carefully weigh the bearing, not only of vers. 33 and 34 of our chapter, but also of the passage vi. 12–20, there can be little doubt that the adversaries of the resurrection at Corinth were on this path, though Paul carefully avoids expressly saying so, and only exhibits this disastrous consequence as a result to be dreaded. But in this question there is another point of view, which is to be carefully taken into account. Paul is reasoning not as a philosopher, but as an apostle, that is to say, from the viewpoint of the Christian salvation. Now if the resurrection be once denied, either as to believers or as to Christ Himself, what means the survival of the soul after death? Paul has told us in ver. 18: "Then they which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished;" a saying the meaning of which is obvious from the preceding words: "We are yet in our sins." Such an immortality is more to be dreaded than desired; it is not therefore of a nature to weaken the pernicious practical consequences drawn from the denial of the resurrection. It rather gives them new force. For is not condemnation following a life of sacrifice still more terrible than

annihilation? Weiss says with perfect truth (*Bibl. Theol.* § 96[a]): "If Paul contends against those who deny the resurrection as if this denial involved the negation of all life after death, it must be remembered that with the denial of the resurrection of the body the resurrection of Christ in his view fell to the ground, and that consequently communion with the living Christ beyond the tomb was no longer possible." In such circumstances, the conclusion was evident: Why torment ourselves to acquire and to bring into the possession of others a salvation which will never be realized? Better enjoy life peaceably till it be withdrawn from us.

The same confusion which is here ascribed to Paul might be imputed to Jesus Himself, on the occasion of His reply to the Sadducees, Matt. xxii. 29–32 and parallels. This reply indeed assumes that the immortality of the soul necessarily implies the resurrection of the body.—The position of Jesus face to face with the Sadducees was almost the same as that of Paul in relation to the Corinthian opponents of the resurrection. The Sadducees could not conceive the existence of the spirit as independent of that of the body; from the annihilation of the latter there followed therefore the annihilation of the former. Hence it is that Jesus, not confining Himself to solving the difficulty which they had put to Him, takes the offensive and saps at the root their view of the resurrection, demonstrating to them, by the declaration of Jehovah to Moses regarding His relation to the long-dead patriarchs, the survival of their persons. He argues on the foundation of Jewish monotheism, as St. Paul

here argues on the foundation of Christ's own resurrection. The relation of the patriarchs to the living God implies the permanence of their personal life, as the relation of believers to Christ raised in the body implies the permanence of their personal and bodily life.

II. The Mode of the Resurrection of the Body (vers. 35–58).

After demonstrating the essential part played by the resurrection in the Christian salvation, the apostle sets himself to answer the objections which this doctrine might raise. These objections were probably uttered ironically by certain members of the Church of Corinth who wished to parade their wisdom. It was not difficult, indeed, to turn the doctrine into ridicule, especially if it was understood in the gross way in which it was taught by the Rabbins, who regarded the resurrection as a restoration pure and simple of the present body by the reunion of the material elements of which it was composed. This is proved by numerous sayings in the Talmud; and it was probably this point of view at which the Sadducees placed themselves to ridicule this belief; as it is also by representing the resurrection in this way that scoffers of our own day give point to their sarcasms.

The apostle begins by answering two objections which human wisdom raises against the resurrection of the body: vers. 35–49; then he explains what will happen to the bodies of those who do not pass through death: vers. 50–53; finally, he closes with a triumphant conclusion: vers. 54–58.

Vers. 35–49.

And first of all the two questions: ver. 35.

Ver. 35. "But some one will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" —These two questions have not altogether the same meaning, as is obvious even from the δέ, *and further*, which connects them. But neither do they differ, according to Meyer's view, as the general idea from the particular fact. The former bears on the hidden working whereby the awakening of the body which has been given over to death is accomplished (πῶς, *how*); the latter, on the result of this mysterious operation, that is to say, on the nature and qualities of the raised body (ποίῳ σώματι, *what* body). The passage which follows leaves no doubt as to the reality of the distinction between the two questions, for ver. 36 contains the answer to the former, and vers. 37–49 the answer to the latter.—Τίς, *some one;* one of those sages whose whole spiritual stock consists in not knowing God (ver. 34).—The verbs in the present: *are raised, come*, are ideal presents, and as such, include the fact to come in which the idea will be realized.—The apostle replies to the former question in ver. 36:

Ver. 36. "Fool![1] That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die."—The vocative ἄφρον, *fool*, is evidently a correction, and ἄφρων to be read as a nominative; comp. Luke xii. 20. This nominative is used by apposition: "Fool *that thou art*, thou that thinkest thyself so wise!"—The pronoun σύ, *thou*, by

[1] ℵ A B D E F G P read ἄφρων instead of ἄφρον, which is read by T. R. with K L.

its position, is strongly emphatic; according to some, as opposed to θεός, *God*, in the sense: "As for thee, thou sowest what dies, whereas God sows what is to live;" but this antithesis is foreign to the context. This σύ, *thou*, put first, is logically connected with the epithet fool: "*Thy own* daily experience might instruct thee, if thou hadst eyes to see! Every time thou sowest a grain, thou *thyself* dost overturn the objection thou art raising."—The term ζωοποιεῖται, *is quickened*, does not strictly apply to a grain of corn; it is chosen in view of the application made of it to the raised body.—The death of the seed, the condition of its return to life, consists in the dissolution of its material wrappings under the action of the earth's moisture and heat. It is by this process of destruction that the impalpable germ of life which dwells in it, and which no anatomist's scalpel can reach, is set free. In proportion as the putrefaction of all the material elements takes place, this force awakes and shows itself by the simultaneous appearance, in opposite directions, of the two vital shoots, the stem and the root, the first vestiges of the new organism which is preparing to appear. Such is the answer given by nature to the first question raised: How is the resurrection effected? Through death itself! Through dissolution to true life: such is the way! What appears to be the obstacle is the means. This is the law which nature illustrates, and which satisfies common sense as solving the point in question. The apostle, by answering thus, avoids two rocks, against which those who treat this question lightly are very apt to make shipwreck. The one consists in identifying the raised body with the present body, as if the first must be formed

by the reunion of all the material molecules of which the second was composed. Who could regard a magnificent oak, or an apple-tree laden with its vernal beauty, as the material reconstruction of the acorn or of the pip from which they sprang! The other, on the contrary, consists in destroying all connection between the two bodies, as if the latter were a new creation, without organic relation to the former. In this case we could no longer speak of resurrection. In reality, death would not be vanquished; it would keep its prey. God would simply do something new by its side. —In John xii. 24 the Lord uses this same figure of the grain of corn, applying it, however, to spiritual death and resurrection.—The apostle answers the second question, vers. 37–40. And first summarily, vers. 37, 38.

Vers. 37, 38. "And when thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain: 38. but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed a[1] body of its own."—The *καί*, *and*, marks the transition to the second question. The answer to it will be much more developed. The first question implied an inexplicable mystery, and the answer could only be given by means of a not less mysterious analogous fact, borrowed from the life of nature. Here it is otherwise, for the point in question is the nature of the new body, which will result from this unfathomable operation, in contrast to the nature of the present body.—In translating: *when thou sowest*, we have tried to render more exactly the meaning of the construction used by the apostle than when it is

[1] T. R. reads with K L Or. Chrys.: *το* (*the*) before *ἴδιον*.

translated: *as to what thou sowest.* Literally, the meaning is this: "What thou sowest, thou dost not sow it (as being) the body which is to spring up . . ." This singular form, in which the expression: *that body that shall be,* is the grammatical apposition of: *what thou sowest,* is intended to express very forcibly the essential identity of the present and the future body. —The expression *bare grain* tacitly contrasts the grain stripped of all covering or ornament with that wealth of organs (leaves, calyx, corolla), which forms the beauty of the developed plant. By making use of this expression, the apostle no doubt means to suggest the nakedness of the human body when it is laid in the earth. Holsten applies the term *bare* [naked] to the soul divested of its body in Hades. But the subject in question is the body, and not the soul. The phrase εἰ τύχοι signifies neither *perhaps,* nor *for example,* as some translate, but: *if so be,* that is to say: according to the kind of grain thou hast in hand, at the time when thou sowest.

Ver. 38. With this bareness of the grain deposited in the earth, the apostle contrasts God's creative power, which quickly invests the seed with the covering, the body assigned to its kind, by making the plant sprout which is to serve as its organ. By saying: *as it hath pleased Him,* and not: as it pleases Him, Paul certainly refers to the law of vegetation established by God for every plant at the time of creation. This Divine volition remains in the bosom of changing nature; it controls beforehand the result of the sower's action. It is obvious how false it is to allege that Scripture knows nothing of the constancy of the laws

of nature. The author who wrote, Gen. i. 11, in speaking of plants of all sorts: "bearing fruit after their kind," already understood this fundamental fact. —Thus the hundred thousand species of plants of which the vegetable kingdom is composed are all organized in such a way that to this infinite variety of seeds there corresponds an exactly similar variety of vegetable organisms. The article τό, *the*, before ἴδιον is to be rejected. In these last words: "*A* body of its own," there is implicitly contained the answer to the second question of ver. 35: *With what body?* The God who took care at the creation to furnish every seed with a body of its own, will know how to give to the energy hidden in our terrestrial body the new organ it will need when this vital principle shall be set free by death from the temporary wrapping in which it is now hidden. And to satisfy the inquirer who put the questions of ver. 35, on the subject of the new organ which is to replace our earthly body, and to prevent his imagining that God might be at a loss to produce a body entirely different from the present, the apostle invites him to cast a glance over the infinite diversity of the organisms which form the visible universe: vers. 39–41. The variety of vegetable organisms bears on form only, not on substance; it would not therefore of itself authorize the conclusion which the apostle wishes to establish, namely, the possibility of a new body, substantially different from our present body. Hence it is that he instances in the totality of nature differences still more profound than he had pointed out between the various kinds of plants.

Ver. 39. "All flesh is not the same flesh; but the

flesh of men is one, the flesh of beasts another, that of birds another, that of fish[1] another."—*Σάρξ*, *flesh*, denotes the substance of the organism, and not merely its external form. In this series of examples, man is placed at the head; for, while belonging by his body to the animal kingdom, he alone of all living beings possesses the capacity of reaching a higher existence.—*Κτήνη*, strictly: *cattle;* a word coming from *κτάομαι*, *to acquire, possess;* here, no doubt, denoting all *quadrupeds*, among which cattle form the class nearest to man.—*Πτηνά*, *birds;* this class follows the preceding, perhaps by way of alliteration, the names of the two classes differing very little in Greek.—*Fishes* are put last, as being lowest in the scale.

These four classes may be united in a single group, that of terrestrial beings, to be contrasted with a higher group, *celestial bodies.* These latter differ from the former both in substance and splendour.

Ver. 40. "There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial; but the glory of the celestial is different from the glory of the terrestrial."—In the first words Paul has in view difference of substance. Many, de Wette, Meyer, etc., understand by bodies celestial the bodies of angels; comp. Luke xx. 36; Matt. xxviii. 3. For, according to them, the term *σῶμα*, *body*, cannot apply to inanimate beings, like stars; unless we ascribe to Paul the ancient superstition which regarded these last as living beings. But we are not obliged so to limit the use of the word *σῶμα*, *body;* compare the application made of it to plants in vers. 37, 38. The scoffers

[1] T. R. with F G K L puts fishes before birds; ℵ A B D E P have the inverse order.

who refused to believe in the existence of the future body would hardly have admitted the existence of angelic bodies. To convince them on their own ground, the apostle appeals exclusively to what is seen: the grand spectacle of the starry sky, with the infinitely numerous and varied bodies with which it is studded. It is the counterpart of the not less rich, though less brilliant spectacle which is presented by terrestrial nature. The last words specially bring out this difference of splendour. The word δόξα denotes the brightness raying forth from existing objects. Terrestrial beings have theirs: flowers in the variety of their forms and colours, animals in their agility, grace, or strength, man in the nobility of his bearing, the freshness of his complexion, the light of his eye. But how great is that of the celestial bodies which illumine the earth with their brightness! To be remarked is the use of the adjective ἑτέρα, *different*, instead of ἄλλη, *other*. We pointed out, xii. 8–10, that the apostle does not use these terms indifferently. Here his intention is clear. He uses ἑτέρα, *different*, to denote the general difference between the two great classes of beings, and he applies ἄλλη, *other*, to the secondary difference distinguishing terrestrial bodies from one another (ver. 39), and celestial bodies from one another (ver. 41).

Ver. 41. "The glory of the sun is one, and the glory of the moon another, and the glory of the stars another: for star differeth from star in glory."—Even in the case of beings having so great a resemblance in nature (substance and form), if we observe them with some care we discover differences between one and another which attest the infinite riches of God's work and the illimitable

range of His power. What a difference between the animating splendour of the sun on a fine day and the quiet moonlight; between the calm beauty of the latter and the penetrating and pure scintillations of the stars! There are differences too between the stars themselves. The brilliance of Venus does not resemble that of Mars, nor the latter that of Jupiter; and what a difference between the planets and the fixed stars! Open your eyes, then, the apostle means to say, and as you see so many different glories shining in the heavens, you will cease to ask, as if God's power were limited: "With what body shall they come?" You will understand how infinite are the resources of Divine power!

It has often been thought, that by stopping to describe so particularly this wide diversity of splendour, the apostle meant to allude to the difference of glory which will exist among the risen, according to the different degrees of moral perfection to which they have attained. The Fathers especially dwelt fondly on this view; see Ambrose, Chrysostom, Tertullian. This last makes the future body of God's servants correspond to the flesh of men; that of pagans, to the flesh of beasts; that of the martyrs, to the flesh of birds; that of the Christians who have had only baptism with water, to the flesh of fishes; then the glory of Christ corresponds to the brightness of the sun; that of the Church, to the brightness of the moon; that of the Jews, to the brightness of the stars (*De Resurrectione*, c. 52). All this is evidently only a play of imagination. The context requires no such application; for, as is proved by the sequel, Paul proposes, by bringing as it were before the very eye the infinite

resources of Divine power, to show that God can hold in reserve for His elect a body absolutely different from their terrestrial body. But, while holding exegetically by this application, the only one justified by the context, we need not deny the possibility of a purely secondary allusion to the diversity which God may be pleased to make between the bodies of the risen. As Holsten well says: "The way in which Paul emphasizes the diversity of the heavenly bodies implies the supposition of an analogous difference of glory between the risen."

The apostle now applies the facts which have just been cited to the question under discussion: vers. 42–49. And that by expounding, first, the difference of nature between the present and the resurrection body.

Vers. 42, 43. "So also is the resurrection of the dead. The body is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption: 43. it is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness; it is raised in power."— Here, strictly speaking, is the answer to the second question of ver. 35: *With what body?* Answer: with a body which, far from being the reappearance of the former, will have characteristics of an absolutely opposite kind. The verb σπείρεται, *it is sown*, is generally applied, in accordance with the term *sow* in vers. 36 and 37, to the interment of the body. This meaning may no doubt suit the first member of the first antithesis: *sown in corruption.* But it is impossible to carry out this application in the first members of the three following antitheses. The term *weakness* is not suitable to the state of the dead body, whatever Meyer may say; and in any case, it would form a singular stage beyond the preceding term, dissolution.

Finally, it is still more impossible to apply the term *psychical*, "moved by a soul," in ver. 44, to the body which is laid in the tomb. No doubt it may be said that the point in question here is not *the state* of the body at that time, but its *nature* during life. But it is still very forced to apply the term *animated* to the body when deprived of the breath of life. For this reason, several commentators, such as Erasmus, Calvin, Heinrici, have been led to apply the term *sow* to the fact of *birth*. This meaning may suit the second and fourth epithets (*weak*, *psychical*); but hardly the other two (*in dishonour*, *dissolution*). How could Paul thus characterize the life of the child, full of freshness, at the moment when it begins to unfold its powers? Hofmann has been driven by these two impossibilities to understand by the word *sow* the giving up of the body, not specially to interment, but to the power of death, which works in it all through the duration of its earthly existence. This explanation comes near to what seems to me to be the true meaning of the four antitheses; but it is insufficient, inasmuch as it does not clearly account for their gradation. Their order is in a manner retrograde; and the meaning of the word *sow* is modified and widened as we pass from one antithesis to another. In the first, it relates to interment, as is required by the word φθορά, *dissolution*. In the second (*the state of dishonour*), the thought, taking a first retrograde step, embraces in the term *sow* all the miseries of this earthly life, which precede and go to produce the dissolution of the body, all the humiliating conditions to which our body is now subjected; comp. the expression: "the body of our humiliation" (Phil.

iii. 21). In the third antithesis, the term *weakness* brings us to the moment of birth, to that state of entire powerlessness which belongs to the infant at its entrance into life. Finally, the term *psychical* body, in ver. 44, carries us further back still, to that moment when the breath of life, ψυχή, is communicated to the physical germ which is about to begin its development in order to serve the ψυχή as its organ. The word *sow* thus embraces all the phases of the body's existence, which, beginning with the first dawn of being, terminates in committal to the earth. It is in this sense that the earthly life is so frequently compared to the time of sowing, and eternity to the time of harvest. The three first corresponding terms : *incorruptibility*, *glory*, and *power*, are easily understood. The first represents the body to come as exempt from the touch of sickness, decline, and death ; the second, as free from the daily infirmities of the present body, and all radiant with the brightness of perfect life ; the third, as endowed with unlimited power of action.—But these three opposite characteristics distinguishing between the present and the resurrection body are all three effects ; they rest on a fourth contrast which touches the very essence of the two bodies, and which the apostle indicates in the first proposition of ver. 44 by the antithesis between a *psychical* and a *spiritual* body. It is this last contrast which is developed in the following passage, vers. 44[b]–49.

Ver. 44. "It is sown a psychical body, it is raised a spiritual body ; there[1] is a psychical body, and[2] there

[1] ℵ A B C D F G read εἰ (*if*) before ἐστι. This word is wanting in T. R. following E K L Syr[sch].

[2] The καὶ is placed by ℵ A B C D E F G after ἐστι (*there is also*) ; T. R. with K L Syr. places it before ἐστι (*and there is*).

is a spiritual body."[1]—The terms *animated* or *animal* body are the only ones in our language by which we can render the term reproduced in our translation by the Anglicized Greek term. The meaning of the epithet is clear; it denotes a body, not of the same substance as the soul itself,—otherwise it would not be a body,—but formed by and for a soul, destined to serve as an organ to that breath of life called ψυχή, which presided over its development. Neither, consequently, is the *spiritual* body a body of a spiritual nature,—it would still less be a body in that case,—but a body formed by and for a principle of life which is a spirit, and fully appropriated to its service. As the soul does not create the substance of the animal body, but finds it already prepared in a previously existing organism, so the spirit does not create the spiritual body,—which would exclude all continuity between it and the earthly body,—but it takes hold of a germ released from the present body, and causes it to open, not to resume, as in the generation of plants and animals, the cycle of its former existence, but to begin a mode of existence infinitely superior to the old one. The law of the beings belonging to nature is to revolve uniformly in the same circle; the privilege of spiritual being is to surmount this iron circle and to rise from the natural phase, which for it is only the means, to a higher sphere which is its end. This contrast arises from the wholly different mode of being possessed by the soul and the spirit. The soul is only a breath of life endowed with a certain measure of power, capable

[1] ℵ A B C D E F G It. here read σωμα (*body*), which is omitted by K L Syr.

of taking hold of a material substance, subjecting it to itself, converting it into its agent, and using this organ for a fixed time up to the moment when it will no longer lend itself to such use. The characteristic of the spirit is that it possesses a life which is constantly being renewed, while acting and communicating itself (John iv. 14). In a new order of things, after extracting from the body an organ adapted to its nature, it will perpetually renew its strength and glory. Such a body will never be to the principle of its life what the earthly body so often is to the inhabiting soul, a burden and a hindrance; it will be the docile instrument of the spirit, fulfilling its wishes and thoughts with inexhaustible power of action, as we even now see the artist using his hand or his voice with marvellous freedom, and thus foreshadowing the perfect spiritualization of the body. If any one should deny the capacity of matter thus to yield to the action of the spirit, I should ask him to tell me what matter is; then, by way of showing what spiritualized matter may be, I should invite him to consider the human eye, that living mirror in which all the emotions of the soul are expressed in a way so living and powerful. These are simple foreshadowings of the glory of a resurrection body. We cannot go further; a *spiritual body* is one of those things "which eye hath not seen, which have not entered into the mind of man, and which God reserves for them whom He loves."—The *spirit*, the future body's principle of life, is not directly the Spirit of God, it is spirit as the higher element of the human personality, but acting in its union with the Divine Spirit. We have already seen (xiv. 14) that the apostle

ascribes to man, not only a ψυχή, *soul*, but also a πνεῦμα, *spirit*, which is the soul's organ in perceiving the Divine world.

The second part of ver. 44 presents three rather important variants. The Alexandrine and Greco-Latin documents read εἰ, *if*, before the first ἔστι; then they place the καί, *also*, after the second; finally, they omit the word σῶμα, *body*, in the second proposition: "If there is a psychical body, there is also a spiritual." The T. R. omits the εἰ, *if;* it places the καί, *and*, before ἔστι; and it reads σῶμα (*body*) in the second proposition: "There is a psychical body, and there is a spiritual body." It is impossible for me to share the preference of modern commentators (de Wette and Hofmann excepted) for the first of these two readings. The apostle had just expressed a paradoxical idea; the term *spiritual body* seemed even to be a *contradictio in adjecto*. Hence it is that, according to the reading of the T. R., he stops expressly to affirm the reality of this notion: "I do not use the expression at random: there is truly a psychical body . . ., a spiritual." Of this forcible affirmation, the Alexandrine and Western copyists have wished to make a demonstration. They have added εἰ, *if*, thus making the existence of the psychical body a premiss from which to infer logically the existence of a spiritual body. Then they have transposed the καί, *also*, to make it the correlative of the εἰ, *if*, and thereby to emphasize the correctness of the conclusion which is certainly false, for it does not appear how it follows from the fact that a soul can have a body, that a spirit should have one. Meyer seeks to justify this argument

logically; but he does not succeed. Holsten appeals to this understood idea: The soul and spirit are only the two modes of existence belonging to one and the same vital principle; whence it follows that if the soul needs a body in order to act, it is so also with the spirit. But if substantially the soul and spirit are one and the same thing, Paul would here prove the same by the same. Beet adduces this law: God ever wills what is perfect; hence it follows that His work proceeding from the imperfect, which is its beginning, must reach the goal which is the perfect. But how can we infer from this the necessity of a spiritual body? If, as was no doubt thought by the opponents of the resurrection, the purely spiritual state is superior to the spiritual state united to the bodily, the law referred to recoiled against the thesis of a resurrection. But, according to the true reading, that of the Byzantines, there is no argument at all. As Hofmann says, the apostle's purpose is simply to state the contrast between the two kinds of bodies. This is exactly what the Byzantine reading does. No doubt it might be denied that the εἰ, *if*, of the Alex. must be taken in the sense of a proof. But if Paul had meant to make a simple comparison, he would have said καθώς or ὥσπερ.—In regard to the repetition or omission of the word σῶμα, *body*, in the second proposition, it seems to me that the omission would weaken the force of the paradox which the apostle wishes to affirm, while the exact repetition of the same terms renders the expression of it more striking. — In support of this affirmation of two kinds of bodies, Paul produces a saying from Scripture.

Ver. 45. "And so it is written: the first man,[1] Adam, was made a living soul; the last Adam, a quickening spirit."—The apostle does not say, as usually in his Scripture proofs: *καθὼς γέγραπται*, *as it is written.* The form *οὕτω καί*, *and so*, indicates, not a proof strictly so called, but simple agreement of thought. Hofmann even thinks that he may detach this short proposition altogether from what follows, and connect it with what precedes. But this is only a poor expedient intended to set aside the difficulty which attaches to the following quotation. The difficulty is this: If the proposition relative to the first man is a quotation from Gen. ii. 7, it seems as if the same should be the case with the following proposition, relative to the last Adam. But in the Old Testament text there is nothing corresponding to this second idea. How then are we to explain the course taken by the apostle, if the two propositions depend on the: *so it is written?* The apostle evidently had no intention of deceiving his readers by leading them to believe that the second proposition was taken from the Old Testament as well as the first. Most commentators think that he found in the well-known parallelism between the two heads of humanity the right to introduce the second member into his quotation, though it was not expressly found in the narrative of Genesis. But would not this be to carry freedom of quotation to an unwarrantable degree? I do not think it necessary to apply the: *it is written*, to the verse as a whole. The first proposition is taken from a universally known Scripture text. The second is borrowed from the fact of the equally well-known

[1] B K Ir. omit the word *ανθρωπος* (*man*).

appearance of the historic Christ, and Paul expresses it, according to the law of contrast, on the model of the former. As Bengel says: "*Cætera addit ex naturâ oppositorum;*" so that the first proposition alone depends, in his view, on the: *so it is written.* The sequel will still better explain this procedure.[1]

The form γίνεσθαι εἰς, *to be made into* . . ., denotes not only the first moment of man's creation, but also the whole development of this Divine act even to its goal. It is wholly false to make this term ψυχὴ ζῶσα, *living soul*, the equivalent of *psychical man* (ii. 14), and to conclude from this comparison that the *was made* implies the fall. The one point in

[1] We shall quote in a note Holsten's curious explanation. According to this critic, what is said by Paul of the *becoming* [being made] of the first man refers only to the *second* account of creation contained in Gen. ii. 7; whereas what is said of the *becoming* of the last Adam goes back to the *first* account of the creation of man, Gen. i. 26, an account which Paul here applies (with Philo) to the supra-terrestrial man, the celestial prototype of Adamite humanity; this celestial man it was who appeared afterwards in Christ as the Messiah. The: *so it is written*, might thus be applied without difficulty at once to the two propositions of our verse. Holsten has, indeed, to acknowledge that in the account Gen. i. 26, man is not designated as a *quickening spirit;* but as it is said of him that he was made after the image of God, and as God is a spirit, and a quickening spirit, it is proved that this first heavenly man was so likewise. It is also true that this celestial man should strictly have been called *the first* and not *the last* or *the second* (ver. 47). But Paul designates Him thus in virtue of His historical appearance, which was posterior to that of the earthly man.—All this in order to find here a point of support for this favourite thesis of the Tübingen School: that according to Paul, the pre-existing Christ was not a Divine being, but a celestial creature, the luminous prototype of man created in Adam.—But what! Could it be this celestial luminous prototype of humanity to whom God said, Gen. i. 28, 29: "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth; behold, I have given you for nourishment every herb bearing seed!" It was this pre-existing man, was it, whom God created male and female (i. 27)! How is it possible to ascribe to Paul such reveries!—If exegesis were an exhibition of intellectual gymnastics, this explanation might be signalized as its masterpiece.

question here is the fact of creation. The *was made* refers to the progress indicated in the account of Genesis itself, according to which man, created at first of the dust, afterwards received the communication of the Divine breath, thereby attaining the form of existence which was provisionally destined for him. —The Hebrew text says: "And Adam was made a living soul;" the LXX. likewise, translating Adam by ὁ ἄνθρωπος, *man*. Paul preserves the two terms: *man* and *Adam*, because the latter contains the idea of the head of a species. Besides, he adds the epithet πρῶτος, *first*, with a view to the coming antithesis. His object is precisely to trace the line which this man, who is yet only *the first*, and not the final man, shall not be able to pass. This psychical state will only be a point of departure; a new creative act will be needed to produce the final man.

This limit of the natural man, this provisional maximum, is denoted by the term ψυχὴ ζῶσα, *living soul*. In the passages Gen. i. 20 and 24, this same expression is applied to all the animals, to distinguish them from plants. We thus see that the term signifies: a life-breath individualized and animating a physical organism; an animated being, endowed with a body. But these life-breaths which are the principle of animal existence, may be very variously endowed; and consequently the parity of man with the animal world, so strongly emphasized by this term, does not contradict the superiority and sovereignty ascribed to the human species in this same account of Genesis. The meaning of the word ψυχή, *soul*, must not be restricted to the purely sensitive and inferior powers of the human soul.

There is nothing requiring or even authorizing such limitation. As the life-breath belonging to each animal is distinguished by special powers, more or less elevated, that of man differs from that of other animated beings in certain faculties which constitute his superiority over them all and make him their sovereign: the *νοῦς*, *mind*, whereby he distinguishes truth from falsehood, good from evil; *will*, its own mistress and capable of choosing between opposite motives; the *καρδία*, *heart*, that deep and rich soil of feeling into which will and mind strike their roots; finally, the higher organ with which the human soul is endowed for the perception of the Divine, the *πνεῦμα*, *spirit*, the religious sense which distinguishes man absolutely from all that is animal and which forms the starting-point of the higher existence in which the natural life is to issue. If Genesis does not mention this special element of human nature, and speaks only of the soul, it is because it embraces it also in this term. It is not till a subsequent period that spirit will become the dominant principle of human life. In the sphere of natural life, it is the living soul which is the characteristic feature. The soul is for the time the seat of the personality which, by the body, communicates with the lower world and, by the spirit, with God in whose image it is created. From the standpoint of Genesis, the expression living soul therefore denotes a terminal point, the goal of the first creation; whereas from Paul's point of view this goal was a first stage, simply a state of expectation. And this is what gives occasion to the second proposition added by the apostle. The first asserted a fulness, but also a void; and this void the second serves to fill.

Christ is called *Adam*, to characterize Him as head of a race, no less than the first. At the same time He is called *the last*. Why not *the second*, as in ver. 47? Because in consequence of the subject treated throughout this chapter, Paul is concerned, not about Christ's relation to the other Adam, but about the part He fills in relation to humanity, the mission which He has received to bring it to its final state.—There is found in the treatise *Nevé Schalom* an analogous expression: "*Adamus postremus est Messias.*" This agreement of Paul with the Rabbinical writing is easily explained; for it is known that the *Nevé Schalom* is the work of Rabbi Abraham, of Catalonia, who died in 1492.

The last Adam begins by realizing *in Himself* the perfect state. He is πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, *a quickening* [life-giving] *spirit*. There is no article, as if this were His exclusive privilege. It is a human state, which Paul contrasts with a living soul. The construction εἰς πνεῦμα . . ., necessarily leads us to supply the verb ἐγένετο, *was made*, according to the first proposition. Contrasted as it is with *soul*, *spirit* denotes, not only a being that lives, but a principle capable of giving life; which, while continually renewing itself, communicates life to that which it penetrates: "a fountain springing up into eternal life" (John iv. 14). As Edwards says, "the soul is the object [the seat] of life; the spirit is the source of life." The epithet ζωοποιοῦν, *quickening*, is also applied to the πνεῦμα, John vi. 63, and there as characterizing its essence: τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ ζωοποιοῦν. In our context, it seems to me that the term should not be applied to the communication of spiritual life, but rather to the spirit's action on the body, which serves

as its organ. The soul animates the body; it guides and moves it. The spirit does more: it quickens it by communicating to it ever new force and youth. To what point in the life of the Saviour should we apply this γίνεσθαι, *becoming*, which made Him a *quickening spirit?* When He was *created* as the heavenly man, answers Holsten. We delay the examination of this idea of the heavenly man, ascribed to Paul, till ver. 45. At the time of the *incarnation*, thinks Edwards: "Then it was that Christ introduced a Divine force into humanity." This meaning would not, according to this commentator, prevent us from holding that the body of Christ was *psychical*, like ours, during His earthly life, and that He did not receive His spiritual body till the time of His resurrection, by the quickening spirit whom He possessed from the beginning. Ambrosiaster, Grotius, Meyer, Heinrici, etc., think of the time of the *resurrection.* Does not the form γίνεσθαι εἰς, *to be made, become*, relieve us from the necessity of choosing between these different suppositions? From the time of the incarnation there began in Jesus the growing and quickening action of the spirit on the body. This action, suspended by His voluntary submission to the power of death, broke forth gloriously in His resurrection, but in a certain measure only, for the facts prove that in His appearances the risen One still had His psychical body, though already transformed to some extent. Finally, it was at the Ascension that the transformation was completed, and that He put on the *spiritual body* in which He appeared to Paul at the time of his conversion. Compare on the relation between the

spirit of holiness, under the power of which the Lord lived on the earth, and His bodily glorification, Rom. i. 4 and viii. 11.—It may be asked whether the epithet ζωοποιοῦν, *quickening*, already points to the influence which Christ will exercise over the body of His own at the Advent to glorify it like His own; comp. Phil. iii. 21. It is evident that Paul is tending to this idea, which he will express positively in vers. 48 and 49; but for the present it is undoubtedly wisest to answer, with R. Schmidt: "Here there is but one thing in question: whether there will be another body completely different from the earthly body. The question how Jesus succeeds in procuring a spiritual body for other men, is a remoter one" (p. 114).[1] We have already seen that the absence of the article before πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν speaks in favour of this answer.

But a question very naturally presented itself: How does it happen, that the spiritual state being superior to the psychical state, God was pleased to begin with the latter, and then delayed so long to grant the former? Does not God in all things will what is perfect? There is a law which has determined the course taken by God, and which the apostle confines himself to stating here without explaining it.

Ver. 46. "Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is psychical; and afterward that which is spiritual."—Are we right in regarding this as a general law, or must we, with Osiander and others, understand the substantive σῶμα, *body*, and apply the verse exclusively to the particular fact under discussion? The former meaning alone agrees with the ellipsis of the verb, which, if understood, can only be the

[1] R. Schmidt, *Die paulinische Theologie*, vol. i.

present. In the latter sense, Paul would have required to use a verb in the aorist (ἐγένετο, ver. 45). His object is to justify by a general principle what has taken place in respect of the body: the priority of the psychical to the spiritual body.—The law here enunciated, when rightly understood, throws a vivid light on the general course of God's work within humanity. The life of the spirit is substantially identical with holiness; it could not therefore have been given immediately to man at the time of his creation; for holiness is not a thing imposed, it is essentially a product of liberty, the freewill offering of the individual. God therefore required to begin with an inferior state, the characteristic of which was simply freedom, the power in man to give or withhold himself. On the choice which he should make between these two alternatives, to keep his natural life or to give it in order to get it back transformed into a higher life, was to depend his fall or progress. In the former case, spiritual life could not be communicated to man; in the latter, it was accorded to him in response to his free and fervent aspiration; and elevation to the perfect state, even for the body, took place in the direct way of progress. But, even in the opposite case, it was not denied to him for ever; for the miseries of sin might, by a long and sad circuit of experience, bring man to exclaim: "Oh that Thou wouldest rend the heavens, that Thou wouldest come down!" (Isa. lxiv. 1). It was to secure the production of this aspiration, the condition of the gift of the Spirit, that during the course of the psychical period, God adopted a people in the midst of whom this need

of the economy of the Spirit was intended to be more forcibly developed under the pedagogic influence of the law and the prophets. And when the longing awakened by these two means had reached its full intensity, the answer could at length be granted: the fulness of the times was come; the Son was sent, and the Spirit given (Gal. iv. 4–6). The apostle does not therefore share the idea, so long regarded as the orthodox view, according to which humanity was created in a state of moral and physical perfection, and fell from that height. He holds, that even independently of the fall there would have been progress from a lower state, the psychical state assigned as a point of departure, to a higher state, the spiritual state foreseen and willed as the end from the beginning. Apart altogether from sin, psychical humanity was called to develop in all directions the manifold powers with which it was endowed, that it might present to the heavenly guest, the Spirit, when He should come to dwell in it, the psychical and bodily organ fitted to display His perfection in the richest and most varied forms, those of art, science, industry, and social life in all its manifestations. The abnormal intervention of sin did not altogether prevent the realization of this Divine thought. In the East, the sense of the Great; in Greece, that of the True and Beautiful; in Rome, that of the Just; in Phenicia, through its commerce and colonies, that of the Useful; in Israel, that of the Holy, served to prepare for the spiritual economy, the new humanity; that Christendom in which we find so many miseries, but in which notwithstanding also the spirit of Pentecost unfolds. Thus, then, with or without the fall, two

economies, that of the human soul (normal ancient history) and that of the Divine Spirit (normal modern history) : such is the profound law which, from the viewpoint of a free humanity and a healthy Divine preparatory training, must control the history of man. *First the psychical, then the pneumatical.* This law applies, as Olshausen already remarked, to the course of collective no less than of individual life. What light is shed by this law on true Christian education ! Instead of imposing the spiritual state on the child, begin by awakening the need of it, while giving free scope to the expansion of the psychical powers in every direction, which is morally legitimate.—The apostle renders the distinction palpable between the two economies which he has just distinguished, that of the soul and that of the spirit, by contrasting the two *heads* of both (ver. 47) ; thus he will come to the two *races* (ver. 48), and so return to the two *bodies* (ver. 49).

Ver. 47. " The first man is of the earth, earthy : the second man[1] is from heaven."—Here is the sovereign application of the general law enunciated in the previous verse. To the psychical state, which must come *first*, there corresponds the earthly body of the *first* man ; as to the spiritual state, which comes *second*, there corresponds the heavenly body of the *second* Adam. This double correlation is natural ; for the organ, the body, should be adapted to the mode of life of which it is the agent. And each of the two periods consecrated to these two modes of living was inaugurated by a typical individual who represented it in its entirety.—The epithet *second* is here intentionally

[1] T. R. with A K L P Syr. adds ο κυριος (*the Lord*).

substituted for *last* (ver. 45), because the point in question is no longer the final destination of man, but the relation of succession to the preceding phase. The δεύτερος, *second*, answers, as Meyer says, to the ἔπειτα, *afterwards*, of ver. 46. — The qualifications : *of the earth* and *earthy*, belong both to the predicate : "The first man is of the earth, earthy." The second term, χοϊκός, is added to show that it is in respect of the body that Paul thus speaks. The word ὁ or ἡ χοῦς denotes the fine dust which lends itself most easily to become organic matter. This term, which is found nowhere else in the New Testament except in Mark vi. 11 and Rev. xviii. 19, is borrowed from the LXX. ; Gen. ii. 7 : "God formed man of the dust of the earth" (χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς). — Because of the contrast, the second man will also be characterized in respect of the body.

The term ὁ κύριος, *the Lord*, which is added by the T. R. with some documents, after ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος, has nothing corresponding in the former member ; and in this context it naturally excites surprise. As it is wanting in the majority of the documents, it should be rejected from the text.[1] The qualifying phrase *from heaven* corresponds at once to the two predicates of the foregoing sentence. In our ignorance as to what a heavenly body is, Paul could add no precise qualification regarding its nature to contrast with the expression : *earthy*.—The important question is to what time

[1] Neander thought it was Marcion who wished to substitute this term ὁ κυριος for ανθρωπος, to remove from Christ the idea of a human birth. He was led to this view by Tertullian (*Cont. Marc.* v. 10). But Edwards reminds us that Tertullian does not say that Marcion added ὁ κυριος, but only that he suppressed the word ανθρωπος.

we should refer the regimen: *from heaven.* Does it refer to the fact of the incarnation, the coming of the heavenly Christ to the earth to complete the work of redemption? So Athanasius, Baur, Beyschlag, Edwards. Or should we apply this ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, *from heaven*, to the Advent, when the Lord will descend again in His glorified body to glorify the faithful? It is from the first interpretation that the Tübingen school have deduced their theory, according to which the pre-existing Christ was, in Paul's view, a celestial man, the prototype of terrestrial humanity, possessing a luminous (spiritual) body. And thus this school has succeeded in finding an intermediate being between the purely human Christ of the synoptics and the wholly Divine Christ of St. John. But if such was Paul's view, he must have changed his conception between our Epistles to the Corinthians and those of the Roman captivity (Colossians, Philippians), for in these he distinctly affirms the Divine state of the pre-existing Christ; he must even have changed it between our Epistle and the very near date when he composed the Epistle to the Romans, in which he ascribes to Jesus a body entirely similar to our sinful body (viii. 3), and therefore by no means celestial and luminous, but made of dust like ours. He must even have changed his view in the course of our Epistle, for in chap. viii. 6 he ascribes to the pre-existing Christ the work of creation, and in x. 4 he identifies Him with the Lord guiding Israel in the cloud; declarations which it is impossible to harmonize with the conception of a Christ pre-existing as a celestial *man*. But above all, to refer these words to the fact of the incarnation, is to wrench them absolutely

from the context. Gess rightly reminds us[1] that everything here tends to the solution of the question: "With what body do they come?" a question which must of course be solved by the relation of the resurrection body, not to the body of the pre-existing, but to that of the risen Christ. As to the ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, *from heaven*, Gess justly quotes as parallels: 1 Thess. iv. 16 (καταβήσεται ἐξ οὐρανοῦ) and 2 Thess. i. 7 (ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει τοῦ κ. Ἰ. ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ), two passages which point to the Advent. But the parallel Phil. iii. 20, 21, is that which above all appears to me decisive in favour of this application in our passage. There, as here, the apostle is comparing our Lord's glorified body as well as that of risen believers made like His, with our present body, which he calls *the body of our humiliation;* then he says expressly: "Our citizenship is in heaven, *whence* we look for the Saviour, the Lord" (ἐξ οὗ ἀπεκδεχόμεθα . . .); exactly our ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.[2] Similarly the ὁ ἐπουράνιος, *the heavenly*, ver. 48, can only be Christ risen and glorified. For it is to Him we shall be made like, and not to the pre-existing Christ. The title ἐπουράνιοι, given in the same verse to glorified believers, would be enough to prove this. Finally, would it not be strange if Paul, after laying down the principle: first the inferior, then the better, should cite as an illustration of the rule an example which would prove exactly the contrary? For, accord-

[1] *Christi Person und Werk*, 2 Abth. i. p. 127.

[2] Weiss acknowledges the general reference of our passage to the Advent; only the *from heaven* seems to him to apply to the incarnation, inasmuch as Christ's Divine pre-existence may be inferred from His exaltation to glory. There is no trace of such an argument in our verse.

ing to this Christological theory, the heavenly Christ would be first and the earthly Christ second. Thus falls the one solitary ground which the Tübingen school has attempted to find in the whole of the New Testament in favour of the alleged Pauline conception of Christ as a pre-existing celestial man. A similar idea has been put forth as developed by Philo. In commenting on the double account of man's creation, in Genesis, this philosopher lays down a distinction between *man celestial* and *man terrestrial.* Only, according to him the celestial is first and the terrestrial second, and that very naturally, because the former is a pure ideal belonging to the world of conceptions. It is thus obvious how far we are from the idea ascribed to Paul. As to the Rabbinical passages, which present similar expressions,[1] they are probably much later than the first age of Christianity. Besides, did not the Old Testament lead men to compare the Messiah with Adam by way of contrast, even as with Moses by analogy?

After showing the law of ver. 46 realized in the two heads, Paul applies it to the two humanities which proceed from them, and he thus reaches the conclusion relative to the resurrection-body of believers.

Vers. 48, 49. "As is the earthly, such are they also that are earthly: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. 49. And as we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear[2] the image of the heavenly."—The two facts pointed out in ver. 48

[1] Like that of the *Nevé Schalom*, already quoted, p. 421.

[2] T. R. reads φορεσομεν (*we shall bear*) with B, some Mnn., some versions, and some Fathers; but φορεσωμεν (*let us bear*) in ℵ A C D E F G K L P, the majority of the Mnn. It. Vg. Cop. Or. (*often*), and most of the Fathers.

rest on this principle: that every race bears the characteristics of the head from which it proceeds. As Adam was, such is Adamite humanity; as is the glorified Christ, such is humanity glorified in Him. Hence the final consequence drawn in ver. 49.

Ver. 49. *Καί*: "*and* in consequence of this law." The two verbs, the one in the past, the other in the future, show that Paul transports himself to the time of the Advent, which for believers will separate their Adamite past from their Messianic future. During their whole earthly life, even after their conversion, believers bear to the end the image of man taken from the dust, as he was created at the beginning. The past: *we have borne*, places us at that glorious point of time when we shall have laid down this inheritance, and when our existence as sons and heirs of Adam will give place to existence as sons and heirs of God, thenceforth like to the Lord Himself.—In the second clause the large majority of the Mjj. and Fathers read the subjunctive aorist *φορέσωμεν*, *let us bear*, that is to say: "Let us strive to bear." And most modern editors think themselves obliged to follow these authorities. But here again, as in the perfectly analogous case Rom. v. 1, we do not hesitate for an instant to prefer the reading which is by far the least supported. The future has on its side only the *Vaticanus* and the Peschito; but it is demanded by the context, which does not admit of an exhortation any more than in the case of Rom. v. 1. The object is simply to conclude the argument begun in ver. 39: "Such, then, is the body with which they will come: a heavenly body like that of the Lord Himself." If this were an

exhortation, it would be necessary, with Chrysostom, to take the word εἰκών, *image*, in the moral sense: "Let us therefore put on the holiness of Christ," which is manifestly contrary to the entire preceding and subsequent context. We shall see at ver. 50 what has led this Father into his false explanation. This reading was early introduced, because, as Holsten says, it was customary to quote passages separately, and with a view to giving them a practical application. —The future indicative corresponds to the aorist ἐφορέσαμεν, exactly as these same two tenses correspond to one another, Rom. vi. 5; with this difference, that the past and the future are there separated by conversion, here by the Advent. The necessity for reading the future is confessed by Meyer, Rückert, Osiander, Holsten, etc.; and it is vain for Heinrici, Hofmann, Beet, Edwards, to defend the other reading so evidently condemned by the context.

The apostle has answered the two difficulties which were raised at Corinth to the hope of a resurrection: How will it be effected after death has dissolved the body? — By that very death and dissolution. — But with what body will the risen appear?—With a body like that of the glorified Christ, as appropriate to their spiritual state as the present body is to our psychical state.

After this very compact and complete discussion, there remained another case, not anticipated in these answers, that of believers whom the Lord shall find living on the earth at the time of His return. How will it go with them? Here was a question which the apostle, who never forgets a single side of the subjects

he treats, could not neglect. This is the theme of the passage vers. 50–52.

Vers. 50–52.

Ver. 50. "Now[1] this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit[2] incorruption."—The formula τοῦτό φημι, *here is what I say*, is used by the apostle to announce a decisive and final explanation, the exposition of a more profound point of view, which will put the truth previously stated in its full light; comp. vii. 29. It differs from τοῦτο λέγω, which announces the repetition of the same idea in a more developed form. —Before giving the solution of the particular question, Paul lays down a general law which refers equally to the point hitherto treated and to that which is about to follow, so that the verse forms the transition between the two passages. — In this context the expression: *flesh and blood*, can only designate our present physical organism; flesh, in respect of its substance; blood, in respect of the life-principle which animates it; for, according to Scripture, blood is the seat of the vital principle. Irenæus and Chrysostom took the word in its moral sense: τὰς πονηρὰς πράξεις, as if the passage were parallel to Rom. viii. 12, 13; but the expression σάρξ καὶ αἷμα has never the meaning of σάρξ standing alone. It is from this interpretation, likewise excluded by the context, that the false reading φορέσωμεν, in ver. 49, has proceeded. What the apostle means is, that it will not be by being clothed with a

[1] Instead of δὲ (*now*), D E F G It. read γαρ (*for*).

[2] Instead of κληρονομει, D E F G It. Syr. read κληρονομησει (*will inherit*).

body of such a nature that the believer will be able to participate in the perfect state of things which is called the kingdom of God. Such a body would be a curtain which would veil from us the face of God, too weak an instrument to bear such emotions, too dull an agent to execute the works to be done in this new state. Paul has taken care not to say σῶμα, *a body*, because it will be with a body that believers shall take part in that kingdom.—In the second proposition, the verb in the present expresses, as Edwards says, "the nature of the thing;" it is a law which is equivalent to the οὐ δύναται, *cannot*, in the first proposition; only the particle οὐδέ, *neither*, and the subject ἡ φθορά, *corruption*, imply a gradation. *Corruption*, ἡ φθορά, denotes flesh and blood in a state of dissolution already begun. The expression therefore leads us to suppose that the first proposition refers to Christians who shall be alive at the time of the Advent, and the second to dead Christians who *do not inherit*, in so far as they are not raised. The idea is this: it is so impossible that the present body should participate in the life of heaven, that, whether dissolved by death or not, it must be transformed. This is precisely what is developed in the following verses.

Vers. 51, 52. "Behold, I show you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed,[1] 52. in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead

[1] T. R. reads μεν after the first παντες with ℵ A E F G K L P.—The other words present three principal readings:—

(1). T. R. with B E K L P Syr. Cop. Mnn.: παντες ου κοιμηθησομεθα, παντες δε αλλαγησομεθα (*we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed*).

shall be raised[1] incorruptible, and we shall be changed." —The word *ἰδού, behold*, is a call to attention, and the term *μυστήριον, mystery*, justifies the call. It here denotes a special point in God's plan, which the apostle could only know by revelation; comp. the *ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου, by the word of the Lord*, 1 Thess. iv. 15.—Of the three readings presented by the documents in the second part of ver. 51, the reading of the *Sinaïticus* and the *Alexandrinus* would signify, that "we shall all die until Christ come again, but then we shall not all participate in the glorious resurrection granted to believers." This idea is absolutely away from the line of the apostle's present thought. It is a mistake to introduce here the distinction between those who are saved and those who are not. Perhaps it is the error made in *φορέσωμεν* which continues here, as if the matter in question were a practical exhortation. The one thing Paul wishes to explain is what will take place in believers who shall be alive at that time. The same holds of the Western reading in the *Cantabrigiensis*, and the *Itala:* "We shall all be raised, but we shall not all be changed." Paul would thus remind his readers that along with the resurrection of the righteous, there is also that of the wicked, which however will not be a change, that is to say, a glorious transformation. This thought is still more wide of the context than the preceding. Moreover, the two readings and the two ideas are both condemned by ver. 52;

(2). ℵ A C F G: *παντες* (A: *οι παντες*) *κοιμηθησομεθα* (F: *κοιμηθησωμεθα*), *ου παντες δε αλλαγησομεθα (we shall all sleep, but we shall not all be changed).*

(3). D It. Vg. Tertull. (see Edwards): *παντες αναστησομεθα, ου παντες δε αλλαγησομεθα (we shall all be raised, but we shall not all be changed).*

[1] T. R. with ℵ B C K L M: *εγερθησονται*; A D E F G P: *αναστησονται.*

for in this verse it is not the saved and the condemned who are contrasted, but the living transformed and the dead who shall be raised. Hofmann has attempted to make this last reading admissible by connecting the negative οὐ with the first proposition. The meaning would be: "Undoubtedly we shall not all be raised (those who have not passed through death), but we shall all be changed, either by resurrection or by transformation." But in this case the end of ver. 52 would be merely a superfluous repetition; then the position of the negative οὐ at the end of the first proposition (πάντες μὲν ἀναστησόμεθα οὐ) is a form without example in the New Testament.—There remains the reading of the T. R., which has on its side the *Vaticanus*, the Peschito, and the Byz., according to which the apostle says: "We shall not all die, — there will be living Christians when the Lord comes again,—but we shall all require to be changed: living believers by transformation, the dead by resurrection. For it is impossible to enter into the kingdom of glory with this earthly body, composed of materials subject to corruption" (ver. 50). This idea is obviously connected in the closest possible way with that of ver. 50, and leads directly to that of ver. 52. There is therefore no room for doubt as to the correctness of this reading. Moreover, Reiche has clearly proved that it was the prevailing reading down to Origen, and that variants do not begin to appear till about the end of the 3rd century (see Heinrici). — Meyer has raised two difficulties, not to the reading in itself, but to the meaning it gives. According to him: (1) this meaning would have required the negative οὐ to be placed before

πάντες, *all*, and not before the verb; for, strictly speaking, the clause means, not: "Some only shall die, not all," but: not a single Christian shall die; (2) the verb ἀλλαγησόμεθα, *we shall be changed*, cannot, according to ver. 52, contain the two notions of resurrection and transformation; it denotes only the second. Meyer therefore thinks that the meaning is this: "All of us (whether myself, Paul, or the other believers presently alive) shall not have to pass through death; there is *not one* of us who shall die; but yet we must all be changed (by transformation)." If we are resolved to make Paul guilty of an absurdity, it is enough indeed thus to press the form of the phrase. But it is amply proved that in the New Testament, as in the translation of the LXX., the position of the οὐ is not so rigorously observed as in the classic style, a fact arising from the well-known Hebrew usage of connecting with the person the negative relating to the verb; comp. Rom. iii. 20. Thus Num. xxiii. 13, Balak, meaning to say to Balaam: "Thou shalt see part of the Israelites, but thou shalt not see them all," expresses himself in these terms: μέρος τι ὄψει, πάντας δὲ οὐ μὴ ἴδῃς, which, taken strictly, would mean: "All of them thou shalt not see," that is to say: Thou shalt see none of them; a sense evidently contrary to Balak's thought. On the other hand, Josh. xi. 13 and Rom. xii. 4, which are sometimes quoted, seem to me to prove nothing at all. For the meaning of the verb ἀλλάσσεσθαι, *to be changed*, see on ver. 52.

Ver. 52. Paul here describes the change which must infallibly be wrought: he distinguishes the two forms in which it will take place. The two expressions

ἄτομος, an indivisible moment, and ῥιπὴ ὀφθαλμοῦ, literally: *a movement of the eyelid*, denote the suddenness with which the event will happen. Then the apostle indicates the signal by which it will be proclaimed: *the last trump*. It has been alleged that he had in mind a real trumpet; as if the apostle could have imagined that the sound of a metal instrument could penetrate to the ears of the dead reduced to dust! He thereby understands a Divine signal, the nature of which is incomprehensible, and which he describes by a figure taken from Israelitish usages. It was enjoined on the sons of Aaron, Num. x. 2–10, to sound the trumpet in order to call the people together, to strike their tents, or to announce the feast. Now the Advent is the time of the most solemn reunion, of the last departure, of the most glorious feast. This signal is called in 1 Thess. iv. 16: "an archangel's voice, a trump of God." On Sinai the presence of the Lord and of His angels was manifested by noises similar to the sound of the horn. Jesus Himself made use of the figure of the trumpet to indicate the signal which shall gather together His elect from the four corners of the earth. By calling this trumpet *the last*, Paul does not refer either to the seven trumpets of Jericho, or to the seven of the Apocalypse, or to the seven which the Rabbins have imagined, and which, according to them, must give the signal for each of the seven phases of the act of resurrection. Neither does the term signify, as has been thought, the trumpet which brings in the *last* phase of the earthly economy. The term *last* necessarily supposes trumpets anterior to this. I think the apostle means by it the manifestations of the Divine

will given to the beings of the invisible world, and on which depend the decisive crises of the kingdom of God on the earth; comp. Zech. ix. 14. The trumpets of the Apocalypse come under this category, but they do not exhaust it.—The apostle adds σαλπίσει γάρ, *for the trumpet shall sound*, and it has been thought that he does so to materialize the signal. It has not been perceived that the words are closely connected with what follows, and that they serve to indicate how completely simultaneous shall be the signal with its double effect mentioned in the two following propositions: the resurrection of dead believers and the transformation of believers still in life.—There is no difficulty in taking the word *shall be changed* here in a more restricted sense than in ver. 51; for here it is no longer contrasted with *sleeping*, but with *being raised*. Resurrection and transformation being the two forms of the renewal of the body, the verb ἀλλαγῆναι, *to be changed*, may either comprehend both of them, or specially denote the second, when it requires a particular term. —By the pronoun *we*, the apostle understands all believers who shall be alive at the time of Christ's return, and he ranks himself with them contingently; for as he does not know its precise date, it is natural for him, being among the living, to put himself rather among them than in the other class. To rank himself with the dead would have been to say that the Advent would not happen till after his death, and consequently so far to fix its date. In the parallel passage of Thessalonians (iv. 15) he explains himself more clearly: "We," says he, "that are alive, are left unto the coming of the Lord." These last words are remarkable. If

they are not altogether superfluous, they must serve to define the preceding expression: "We that live," in the sense: "Those of us believers that are alive, that remain, not then, but at the time of the Advent." That Paul was not sure of being one of these appears from vers. 30 and 31; then from vi. 14, where he ranks himself among the *raised;* and from Phil. i. 20, 21 and ii. 17, where he speaks of his death as an impending possibility. Paul knew *that,* but not *when,* Christ should return; and he also knew that, according to Christ's own precept, every believer should live in the attitude of a servant waiting for his master, and be ever ready to receive him (Luke xii. 36). Here we see the servant: nothing could be more in keeping with this direction of the Lord than the position taken by the apostle in our passage.—Thus has been demonstrated the *possibility* of the resurrection, and, as an appendix and confirmation, the necessity of a transformation even for those who shall not have had to pass through the dissolution of death. Now the apostle places the reader face to face with this great hope in its entirety, and closes his dissertation on the subject by celebrating the hope, uttering, as it were, a discourse in a tongue, with himself for an interpreter.

Vers. 53–58.

Vers. 53, 54. "For this corruptible body must put on incorruption, and this mortal body put on immortality. 54. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and[1] this mortal shall have put

[1] ℵ C I M omit the words το φθαρτον down to και (*the corruptible . . .* down to *and*).

on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory."[1]—The first words of ver. 53 reproduce in a positive form the idea of ver. 50, and constitute the transition to the development following. The striking parallelism of the two propositions marks the ascending movement of the thought as well as the growing exultation of the feeling: it is the poetic rhythm in Hebrew. Perhaps the first proposition applies rather to the resurrection of bodies which have passed through the dissolution of death, and the second to the transformation of bodies constantly threatened with death during their earthly life. In that case, we have here an allusion to the two modes of change indicated in ver. 52.—The twice repeated expression, *this body*, and the figure of *putting on* evidently imply the idea of the continuity of the new body and the old; it is one and the same organic principle which appears successively in two different forms. The permanent element, contained at first in a corruptible covering, is suddenly raised by an act of Divine omnipotence to an incorruptible mode of existence.

Ver. 54. The form of parallelism is continued. The word τότε, *then*, expresses the grandeur of the time. The participle: *that which is written*, is added to denote the certainty of fulfilment: Scripture cannot lie. — The saying quoted is Isa. xxv. 8, the meaning of which is that the theocracy once restored, its members, dead and living, shall be all raised up together to the sphere of immortality. "God," says the prophet (if God be understood as the subject), "hath swallowed

[1] B D I Tert. read νεικος, instead of νικος.

up death for ever." The LXX., probably following another reading, have translated altogether differently: "Death hath swallowed up triumphantly" (perhaps in the sense of: "It formerly swallowed up . . ."). Paul follows our Hebrew text, only changing the active into the passive: "Death *is swallowed up.*" The word which we translate *victory*, following Paul, is one of the most beautiful terms in the Hebrew language (*nĕtsach*). It denotes the state of perfect inward vigour which excludes all possibility of outward decay, and hence: eternal duration. The expression: *in victory*, seems to me to have the meaning: "Death is absorbed in imperishable life." Such a life is victory gained for ever over death, its enemy. It is not the only time that the LXX. thus render the term *lanétsach*. —The feeling of gratitude and adoration here reaches its culminating point in the apostle's heart:

Vers. 55, 56. "Where is thy sting,[1] O death?[2] O death,[2] where is thy victory?[1] 56. Now the sting of death is sin; and the strength of sin is the law."—The text varies considerably in the MSS., influenced no doubt by the differences between the Hebrew text and that of the LXX. Hosea xiii. 14 says, according to what seems to me the most probable translation: "How shall I ransom them from the power of the grave? How shall I deliver them from death? How should I be thy plague, O death? How should I be thy destruction, O grave?" The meaning is this:

[1] The reading is νικος (*victory*) in ℵ B C I M Cop. in the first question and κεντρον (*sting*) in the second; it is the reverse in the T. R. with D E F G K L P It. Syr.

[2] Θανατε (*death*) is read both times in ℵ B C D E F G It. Cop.; whereas T. R. with K L M P Syr. reads αδη (*grave*) in the second question.

"Yea, I should have done so, hadst thou repented, O Israel! O death, I should have swallowed thee as thou swallowest up men! O grave, I should have been to thee what thou art to them, thy grave! But to act thus for thee, impenitent Israel, is impossible." The LXX. have translated thus: "I will deliver them from the power of the grave, and I will ransom them from death. Where is thy right (thy judgment), O death? where is thy sting, O grave!" What in Hebrew is given as a regret on God's part, as an expression of the desire He had to bestow a great blessing on Israel, becomes in the LXX. a promise to grant this extraordinary benefit, as soon as the desired condition shall have been fulfilled. This signification of the LXX., which is followed by the apostle, corresponds therefore, though only indirectly, with that of the Hebrew text. — In the first question, the T. R. with the Byz. and the Greco-Lats. reads κέντρον, *sting*, and in the second νῖκος, *victory*. The Alex. reverse the words. Perhaps this second reading is the result of a correction after the LXX., who read δίκη (like enough to νῖκος) in the first and κέντρον in the second. Anyhow the term νῖκος, *victory*, is connected in Paul's mind with the εἰς νῖκος of the preceding verse. It corresponds to δίκη, *judgment*, in the LXX. And it is not difficult to understand how the two translations may have arisen from the same Hebrew term. The latter, *debarim*, may be either the plural of *dabar*, *word*, and hence *sentence* (the δίκη, *judgment*, of the LXX.), or the plural of *deber*, *destruction*, and hence *victory* (the νῖκος of Paul). — In the second question, the word κέντρον, *sting*, is the translation of the Hebrew *kétev*,

ruin. This word denotes the murderous power which death exercises over men. By this figure κέντρον, *sting*, death is represented as a venomous animal, a wasp, or a scorpion, which has become harmless through the loss of its sting.

According to the T. R. and the Byz., the apostle apostrophizes *death* (θάνατε) in the first question and *Hades* in the second,—this is the exact reproduction of the Hebrew text and of the LXX.,—whereas in the Alex. and Greco-Latin texts he addresses *death* both times. The first reading seems to be a correction after the Hebrew and Greek texts. To this reason Edwards adds another, and a very interesting one. He points out that Paul never uses the term Hades (Rom. x. 7, he substitutes ἄβυσσος, *the abyss*), a circumstance which is to be explained, no doubt, by his fear of the superstitious ideas which, among the Greeks, attached to the name. Philo himself is careful to distinguish between the true and the false Hades.—This final defeat of death embraces two things: the resurrection of the dead and the immortality of the glorified living. In this saying, Hosea has risen to the sublimest view of Divine salvation. No doubt he described this complete triumph only hypothetically. But as the spokesman of faith in Christ, the apostle proclaims it as a certain reality: γενήσεται ὁ λόγος (ver. 54)!

Now he gives, in two powerful and concise sayings, the moral explanation of that defeat of death which he has just celebrated beforehand.

Ver. 56. A subjective sense is often given to the two propositions of this verse; they are taken to describe man's feeling in view of death. The *consciousness*

of sins committed is that which gives to death its sting, its *agonizing* power; and the threatenings of the *law* are what produce in man the lively and painful consciousness of his sin. Or again, this second proposition is explained according to Rom. vii. 8, 13; it is the law which, by provoking our inward lusts, renders sin more active in the heart and life; comp. Rom. iii. 20. But in a discussion on the resurrection, what have we to do with the trouble experienced by the dying man and the peace enjoyed by believers? Does this peace secure their resurrection? Ver. 18 proves that it is not so. The same is the case with the action of the law on the human conscience and heart, and with its abolition. None of these can explain the resurrection. But this is the apostle's object. He wishes to show how the power exercised by death has been broken, not only in the *experience* of believers, but in its entire *reality:* how it is possible for the believer to rise again, and not how it is possible for him to die in peace. Father Didon recently said, when speaking of the Socialistic manifestations of our day: "There is only one way of protecting ourselves against such forces, and that is to penetrate to the conditions which engender them." And this is precisely what the apostle does here. He penetrates to the profound conditions which laid the foundation of the reign of death, to explain how the Lord abolished them and thus gained the gigantic result, the death of death. He seems to go down with Jesus Himself into the mysterious laboratory where death distils its poisons, to show us how the conqueror set himself to bring this occult and malignant power to an end.

Here we are in the domain of facts the most objective and real in the history of humanity.

The moral bases of the reign of death are these two: *sin* and *the law*. It was by sin that death gained its power over man: "In the day thou disobeyest thou shalt die" (Gen. ii. 17). "As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin . . ." (Rom v. 12). It is said in this same chapter: "As *by man* came death . . ." (vers. 21, 22). If he had not sinned, man, mortal though he was in his bodily nature, would have been raised without passing through this dissolution of his being to the sphere of imperishable life. It was because of sin that death could pierce man with its fatal arrow; comp. Rom. viii. 10: "The body is dead because of sin." But what gave sin this terrible power exercised by it? The *law*, answers the apostle. This thought is explained by the words, Rom. v. 13: "Sin is not imputed where there is no law." When there is no law, there may be faults, but not positive disobedience, revolt. It is violated law which gives sin the character of *high-handed sin*, as the Old Testament calls it, transgression wrought with consciousness and freedom, rebellion. Consequently law alone can make sin an act meriting deprivation of life, capital punishment. If sin is the sting whereby death seeks to kill us, it is the law which makes this sting penetrate deeply enough to reach the springs of life and change them into springs of death. The throne of death thus rests on two bases: sin, which calls for condemnation, and the law which pronounces it.—Consequently it was on these two powers that the work of the Deliverer bore.

Ver. 57. "But thanks to God, which giveth us the

victory through our Lord Jesus Christ!" — Christ's victory over death has two aspects: the one relating to Himself; the other concerning men. He first of all conquered *sin* in relation to Himself by denying to it the right of existence in Him, condemning it to non-existence in His flesh, similar though it was to our sinful flesh (Rom. viii. 3); and thereby He disarmed *the law* so far as it concerned Himself. His life being the law in living realization, He had it for Him and not against Him. This twofold personal victory was the foundation of His own resurrection. Thereafter He continued to act that this victory might extend to us. And first He freed us from the burden of condemnation which *the law* laid on us, and whereby it was ever interposing between us and communion with God. He recognised in our name the right of God over the sinner, He consented to satisfy it to the utmost in His own person. Whoever appropriates this death as undergone in his room and stead and for himself, sees the door of reconciliation to God open before him, as if he had himself expiated all his sins. The separation established by the law no longer exists; the law is disarmed. By that very fact *sin* also is vanquished. Reconciled to God, the believer receives Christ's Spirit, who works in him an absolute breach of will with sin and complete devotion to God. The yoke of sin is at an end; the dominion of God is restored in the heart. The two foundations of the reign of death are thus destroyed. Let Christ appear, and this reign will crumble in the dust for ever. Thus is fulfilled the saying of the apostle, ver. 21: "By man came death; by man cometh the resurrection."

Resurrection is a human work, no less than death itself. It should be remarked that the apostle does not say: *gave*, but: "*giveth* us the victory." Here he is not thinking only of the objective victory which Christ gained once for all in His person, for Himself and us; but of that which He gains daily in believers for whose resurrection He paves the way by destroying the power of the law, which condemns, and that of sin, which leads astray.—It only remains for the apostle to draw from the solemn situation thus described a practical conclusion. This is what he does in few words in ver. 58.

Ver. 58. "Therefore, my beloved brethren, become stedfast, immoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord."—This ὥστε, *so that, therefore*, is like all those which in the preceding parts served to introduce the practical conclusions to which the doctrines led up; comp. iii. 21, iv. 5, vii. 38, xi. 33, xiv. 39.—By the address, so full of tenderness: *my beloved brethren*, Paul seeks to get near those hearts which he may have repelled by his great severity.—He does not say: Be stedfast, but: *become* so; they are not so yet either in faith or in conduct. They must become rooted in Christ to be confirmed.—The following word *immoveable*, reminds them of the perils which their faith runs, such as that which he has sought to set aside throughout this whole chapter. *If ye hold fast*, he had said to them in ver. 2, and in ver. 33: *Be not deceived.*—Once confirmed, their spiritual activity will unfold: *Abounding in the work of the Lord.* The verb περισσεύειν, *to abound*, strictly signifies: to flow over the edges all round. By *the*

work of the Lord, the apostle understands labour for the spread of salvation and for the development of spiritual life. The word *always* is added to remind them of the indefatigable perseverance which should characterize such work.—The apostle closes by indicating the motive which should always stimulate believers anew in the fulfilment of this task. They know *that their labour* in this domain *is not in vain in the Lord.* As the apostle uses the term κενός, *empty*, and not μάταιος (see on vers. 14, 17), we must conclude that he is thinking less of the fruits of the labour than of its nature: this is not an activity of external demonstration, wrought in vacuity, as earthly labour so often is, but serious toil wrought in the sphere of eternal reality. This is why Paul also uses the present *is*, and not the future *will be.* These last words sum up the whole chapter, and at the same time form the transition to the following verses, which directly remind the Corinthians of one of the works to be done for the Lord. This connection with what follows is evident; but yet it is not a sufficient reason for joining this verse, as some commentators have done, to the following chapter.

On Chapter XV.

Reuss and Heinrici think that the notion of a spiritual body is incompatible with the gospel narratives which describe the appearances of Jesus after His resurrection; for Jesus seems still to have had during that period His earthly and psychical body. A journal (*l'Alliance libérale*) has gone further, and concluded that the accounts of the appearances of Jesus in the Gospels are only later legends, due to the ever grosser and more materialistic ideas which were formed of the resurrection.

To remove the difficulty raised by the two writers just named, we need not have recourse to the expedient of B. Weiss, who thinks that every time Jesus wished to appear, He clothed Himself in a sensible and corporal exterior. It needs simply to be remembered that, according to our Gospel narratives, the body of Jesus was not immediately transformed into a spiritual body by His resurrection. It was still in His former body restored that He showed Himself, though this body was already subject to other conditions of existence and activity than our earthly body. It was not till the ascension that the substitution of the spiritual for the earthly body was fully consummated. Jesus Himself indicated the gradual process which was taking place in Him when He said to Mary Magdalene, on the very day of His resurrection, John xx. 17: "I am not yet ascended unto My Father . . ., but I ascend . . ."

As to the opinion which, because of this alleged contradiction, would convert the Gospel narratives into later legends, it meets with an insurmountable obstacle in the fact that these narratives are the redaction of the apostolical tradition daily reproduced in the Churches by the apostles themselves, and the evangelists formed by them, from the day of Pentecost downwards. This is what appears from the nature of things, and what we find established in this very chapter, in which the apostle enumerates as apostolical traditions the principal appearances described in our Gospels. That Paul himself thinks of *bodily* appearances is beyond all doubt, in view of the inference which he draws from them, to wit, our own *bodily* resurrection.

The treatment of the subjects which the apostle had in view being finished, it only remains for him to close this letter with a conclusion like those which are generally found at the end of his Epistles, and which refers to certain special communications (matters of business, commissions, news, salutations) which he had to make to the Church.

CONCLUSION.

(Chap. XVI.)

In this conclusion the apostle treats five subjects: (1) The collection for the poor of the Church of Jerusalem: vers. 1–4; (2) His approaching visit to Corinth: vers. 5–9; (3) News of his delegates and of his fellow-workers: vers. 10–12; (4) Particular exhortation and direction relative to the three deputies of the Church who are at present with him: vers. 13–18; (5) Final salutations: vers. 19–24.

Vers. 1–4: *The collection.*

Vers. 1–4. "Concerning the collection for the saints, as I have given order to the Churches of Galatia, even so do ye. 2. Upon the first day of the week[1] let each one of you lay by him in store, as he hath prospered, that the gatherings be not only when I come; 3. and when I come, whomsoever ye shall approve by letters, them will I send to bring your liberality unto Jerusalem. 4. And if it be meet that I go also, they shall go with me."—When dividing among themselves the preaching of the gospel throughout the whole world, the apostles had made an arrangement by which Paul and Barnabas should from time to time renew the

[1] T. R. with K L M: σαββατων; the rest (except ℵ σαββατω) read σαββατου.

help sent by the Church of Antioch in a particular case, in behalf of the poor Christians of Jerusalem (Gal. ii. 10; Acts xi. 27–30). It has been asked whether the indigence of these last did not arise from the community of goods which had prevailed in the Church for a time, after Pentecost. Augustine had already suggested this idea. Reuss speaks in this connection of imprudence, of squandering of fortunes, misunderstood charity. But it is impossible that sacrifices made for the time, to keep up common tables, and of which a few examples only are quoted in the Acts, could have had so considerable an influence on the monetary condition of the Christians of the capital. Edwards calls attention to the expression τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῶν ἁγίων, *the poor among the saints* (Rom. xv. 26), which proves that the indigence did not extend to all. We must remember what appears clearly from the Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, and the Epistle of James, as well as from the term Ebionites (*poor*) by which Christians of Jewish origin are designated: viz. that Christianity had gained the mass of its adherents from the poor population of Palestine. Now the Christians were hated by the great and rich of Jerusalem on whom they depended for their work. Nothing easier for them, consequently, than to reduce Christians to the last extremity. Moreover, believers must have been exposed by the Jewish authorities in Palestine to a thousand vexations and penalties from which the Churches of other countries were free. If we read carefully James ii. 6 in connection with chap. v. 1–6, we shall have an idea of the painful situation of the Churches of Palestine, and particularly of that of

Jerusalem, at this period. It closely resembled the position of Hindoo converts excluded from their caste, or that of Protestants, newly converted from Catholicism, in Spain or Italy, whom the animosity of the clergy, and their influence over the wealthy classes, often deprive of their means of subsistence. Finally, it must not be forgotten that we have here the imitation of a custom which prevailed among the Jews from the time that the people were scattered over the Gentile world. It appears from Josephus (*Antiq.* xviii. 9. 1) and from Philo (*Leg. ad Caium*, § 40) that, in all the cities where there was a Jewish colony, there was a treasury established in which every Israelite deposited the offerings which he destined for the temple and for the inhabitants of the capital. It was from Babylonia that the richest contributions came. Men of the noblest families were chosen to carry those collections to Jerusalem. It was therefore most natural for the Church to appropriate this usage in behalf of the mother Church of Christendom, all the more because such manifestations of Christian love were the finest testimony to the communion of saints, a close bond formed by the Spirit of God between the two great divisions of the primitive Church; comp. 2 Cor. viii. and ix. and Rom. xv. 25–27.

The form περὶ δέ, *as to what concerns, concerning*, as well as the art. τῆς, *the*, introduce the subject as one already known to the Corinthians (2 Cor. ix. 2); and what is to be said immediately of the Churches of Galatia proves that the matter had long engaged attention. Besides, the passage Gal. ii. 10 shows that it was not the first time such a thing had been done.—

The expression *the saints*, though frequently denoting all Christians (vi. 2; Rom. xii. 13), is certainly not used here by Paul without allusion to the peculiar dignity belonging to the members of the primitive Church of Jerusalem; comp. 2 Cor. viii. 4, ix. 1, 12. They possess, whatever Holsten may say in opposition to Hofmann, a special consecration; they are the natural branches of the good olive tree (Rom. xi. 16, 17, 24), whereas believers of the Gentiles are branches of the wild olive grafted among the former on the patriarchal stem. According to Eph. ii. 19, the Gentiles become by faith fellow-citizens of the *saints*, that is to say, of Christians of Jewish origin. It is from the Church of Jerusalem, St. Paul says (Rom. xv. 27), that spiritual blessings have spread throughout the world. There is much delicacy on Paul's part in emphasizing this characteristic when speaking of an act which might have had something humiliating about it for those who were its objects. This alms-giving thus became the payment of a debt, or better still an act of homage, a sort of tithe offered by the Church of the Gentiles to the Levites of the human race.—Perhaps in the letter of the Corinthians to Paul a question had been put to him as to the steps to be taken for the success of this business. To his high speculative and dialectic powers the apostle united an eminently practical mind. The plan which he advised the Churches of Galatia to follow, and which the Corinthians are now called to imitate, is no other than that which he points out in ver. 2. The κατά is distributive: *every* first day; the cardinal numeral μία, *one*, used instead of the ordinal *first*, is a

Hebraism; comp. Mark xvi. 2, 9. — The terms *σάββατον* (sometimes *σάββας*) and *σάββατα* gradually took the meaning of *week;* comp. Luke xviii. 12; for weeks are measured by Sabbaths. It seems probable from this passage, as from Acts xx. 7, that the day which followed the Sabbath, and which was the day of the resurrection of Jesus, was early distinguished from the other days of the week and substituted for the Sabbath as the ordinary day for religious worship; comp. Rev. i. 10. The *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles* calls it, as the Apocalypse does, *the Lord's day*, omitting even the word *ἡμέρα*, which already makes *κυριακή* an entirely technical term (see Edwards). Our passage presents one of the first indications of the special religious consecration of this first day of the week.—*Each one;* even the least wealthy, even slaves; however little it may be.—The words: *by him*, denote an act done by each in his own house, and not, as some have thought, a gift bestowed in church and known to the giver only.—The expression *θησαυρίζων*, *storing up a treasure*, is very beautiful; while expressing the same thought as *τιθέναι παρ' ἑαυτῷ*, *to set aside*, it brings out the encouraging aspect of this method; such successive deposits, little as they may be, gradually become a respectable sum, a treasure. But the apostle would not have this measure to become a burden such as might oppress the hearts of the givers (2 Cor. ix. 7). Hence he adds: *as he hath prospered.* The verb *εὐοδοῦν*, *to guide happily in a journey*, signifies in the Middle: to make a journey happily oneself; and hence: to prosper in one's business. The plan in

question therefore is the setting apart regularly of a certain proportion of the weekly gain.—The object of this measure is that the sums may be ready when Paul comes, and that there may be nothing to do except to lift them, which will be done quickly and easily, and will give an ampler sum than if the gift were all bestowed at one time.

Ver. 3. Paul has no thought of taking charge of the sum collected himself. He is the ambassador of Christ to the Church, and not a deputy between different Churches. In the passage 2 Cor. viii. 23 he speaks of *apostles*, that is, delegates, *of the Churches* to one another. It is such delegates that the Corinthians will name to represent them to the Church of Jerusalem, and to offer it this testimony of their love; οὓς δοκιμάσητε: "*Those whom you* (yourselves) *shall count worthy* (of this mission)." Several commentators (Calvin, Beza, etc.) connect the regimen *by letters* with the verb δοκιμάσητε: "Whom ye shall approve by letters." It was the Church of Corinth, according to them, which was to furnish its delegates with letters of introduction to the Church of Jerusalem. But does δοκιμάζειν admit of such a meaning? The verb bears rather on the choice than on the envoy. Here it would be necessary to give it the meaning, not only of *declaring worthy*, but of recommending as worthy. It is therefore better to connect the regimen *by letters*, as the ancient Greek commentators and many moderns do, with the verb πέμψω, *I shall send*. It is Paul who will introduce them to the Church of Jerusalem, which is much more natural, for he only stands in relation to it. The plural ἐπιστολῶν might designate

several letters; but it is more natural to understand here only one, whether we take ἐπιστολῶν as a plural of category, or give the singular meaning to the plural substantive, as the Latin *litteræ* so often has. This letter would no doubt be addressed to James as head of the council of elders at Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 18). Meyer justly observes that the δι' ἐπιστολῶν is placed first in contrast to the other possible case: that of Paul going and introducing them himself (ver. 4).

Ver. 4. He is not yet certain that he will go to Jerusalem; but if the collection is large enough, that will determine him to go personally to Palestine, and he will join those who may be charged with presenting it. But in this case Paul is careful not to say: "I will go with them." Conscious as he is of his apostolic dignity, he is well aware that he will be the principal personage of the deputation; and therefore he says: *They will go with me.*—In taking all these measures, Paul's object was not merely to respect the autonomy of the Churches; he wished also to secure himself against the odious suspicions which prevailed at Corinth in the minds of adversaries who were utterly unscrupulous as to the means they used to blacken his character and undermine his authority; comp. 2 Cor. xii. 16-18.—The question which Paul here leaves in suspense, we find answered affirmatively, Rom. xv. 25: "Now I go to Jerusalem to minister to the saints," and Acts xx. 1-6, where we find him at Corinth surrounded by deputies from all the Churches of Macedonia and Achaia, who are preparing to start with him for Jerusalem.

Vers. 5–9 : *His approaching visit to Corinth.*

Paul had just alluded to his approaching stay at Corinth (ver. 3). He now dwells on the subject, to give some explanations about it to his readers.

Vers. 5–7. "Now I will come unto you when I shall pass through Macedonia: for I do pass through Macedonia; 6. and I will abide with you as long as I can, or even winter with you, that ye may bring me on my journey whithersoever I go. 7. For I will not see you now by the way, for[1] I trust to tarry a while with you, if the Lord permit."—It follows from this passage that Paul must have communicated to the Corinthians, either in the letter mentioned chap. v. 9, or verbally by Timothy, another plan, according to which he reckoned on proceeding first from Ephesus to Corinth, merely taking the latter city by the way to go thence to Macedonia; then to return to Corinth to make a prolonged stay. This plan he now finds himself obliged to modify; he will proceed first to Macedonia, and thence to Corinth. The present διέρχομαι, *I pass through*, is the present of idea: "My plan is to pass . . ." From this word, misunderstood, has arisen the error which is mentioned in the critical annotation placed at the end of the Epistle.

Ver. 6. But if his presence among them should be thus somewhat retarded, it will probably be the more prolonged. To this agreeable thought he adds a second, which, if they love him, ought also to gladden them: that they will thus have the task of pro-

[1] T. R. with K L reads δὲ (*but*), instead of γὰρ (*for*), which is read by all the rest.

viding for the new journey, whatever it may be, which will follow his stay. The expression *whithersoever I go* refers to the uncertainty which he still feels as to whether he will start for Jerusalem or for the West.—The verb προπέμπειν signifies: to send on in company while providing for all the wants of the journey. At the time when Paul wrote—it was the Passover of the year 57—he proposed to remain a few weeks more at Ephesus, till Pentecost (ver. 8 and chap. v. 7, 8). He thus reckoned on passing the following summer in Macedonia, and thence proceeding about autumn to Corinth, there to pass the winter of 57–58. It is commonly held that this plan was carried out. I do not think so. It seems to me, as to others, that the complications which arose immediately after this letter between the apostle and the Church of Corinth led in the course of things to much graver changes than is usually supposed. In any case, it seems to me impossible to connect with the simple change of plan here indicated the justification of his loyalty which the apostle is obliged to give in the first chapter of the Second Epistle (vers. 15–18). The change there referred to is evidently one of far greater importance; comp. 2 Cor. ii. 1–4.—The οὗ is often used for οἷ in the later Greek.

Ver. 7. The apostle explains to the Corinthians in this verse what leads him now to modify his original plan. Certain things are actually passing in their Church, especially between him and them, which are too grave to admit of his merely glancing at them, as would be inevitable in the case of a short stay; he would rather not touch them until he was allowed to

treat them thoroughly. We must not, as Meyer does, put the emphasis on ὑμᾶς, *you*, contrasting the Corinthians with the Macedonians. Neither is there ground for contrasting the ἄρτι, *now*, with a previous sojourn also very short. The apostle simply means, that as things are at present between them and him, time is needed to make everything clear, and that consequently he defers his future visit until he shall be able to prolong it as much as necessary. Reuss and others are therefore wrong in taking this passage to prove a second stay of the apostle at Corinth *anterior* to this letter.

Vers. 8, 9. "But I will tarry at Ephesus till Pentecost; 9. for a great door and effectual is open unto me, and there are many adversaries."—It is commonly thought this was the date when the tumult excited by Demetrius the goldsmith occurred (Acts xix. 23 seq.), and that this circumstance abridged the time which St. Paul wished to spend at Ephesus. This supposition seems to me unfounded; it is incompatible with the notice in Acts xx. 31, where Paul speaks of the *three years* he passed at Ephesus; for he arrived at Ephesus about the end of the year 54, and at the Passover of 57 he had not passed more than two years and a few months in the city.—The figure of a *door* denotes opportunities for preaching the gospel. The epithet *great* indicates that the occasions are numerous, and the epithet *effectual*, in which the figure is sacrificed to the idea, relates to the power exerted by the gospel in the midst of those populations. The last words are sometimes understood in a restrictive sense: "*though* there are many adversaries." But Paul rather finds in

the fact a new motive for prolonging his stay. As he is under obligation to those who are disposed to listen to him, he also feels it a duty to confront those who oppose him.

Vers. 10–12 : *Timothy's visit to Corinth.—Apollos.*

The thought of his approaching stay at Corinth leads him to speak of that of Timothy, which is to precede and prepare for his own, comp. iv. 17 ; then from this fellow-labourer he passes to another, Apollos, who is at the moment with him at Ephesus.

Vers. 10, 11. "If Timothy come, see that he may be with you without fear : for he worketh the work of the Lord, as I also. 11. Let no man therefore despise him ; and conduct him forth in peace, that he may return unto me ; for I look for him with the brethren." —These lines betray a certain uneasiness in regard to Timothy's stay at Corinth. This young servant of Christ was timid (2 Tim. i. 6, 7), and probably not highly cultivated ; and he might easily feel himself ill at ease among those Corinthians, some of whom did not respect Paul himself. We know from Acts xix. 22 that Paul had sent him with Erastus from Ephesus into Macedonia, and that he was to go thence to Corinth. But as his time was limited (ver. 11), Paul was not sure whether he could reach the city. Hence the expression : *If he come*, which is not equivalent to : "When (ὅταν) he comes to you." As to the eulogium on Timothy comp. Phil. ii. 19–21, and as to the recommendation *not to despise him*, 1 Tim. iv. 12. His youth also, compared with the gravity of his task,

might bring on him disrespectful demonstrations from certain Corinthians. The regimen *in peace* might be connected with the verb *come*: "That he may come back with the pleasant feeling of a mission happily accomplished." But the inversion is somewhat harsh, and the regimen better suits the verb προπέμψατε: "Send him forward in such a way that he shall depart in peace with you all." The following words seem thus to become somewhat redundant. But they are explained by the sequel: *I look for him*, which gives them this meaning: "That he may be able to return to me without delay, after concluding his mission." The words: *with the brethren*, are frequently taken as referring to Timothy's travelling companions, Erastus for example, who had started with him from Ephesus (Acts xix. 22); so Meyer, Reuss, Holsten. But why this utterly insignificant detail? Edwards understands by them the brethren who carried our Epistle from Ephesus to Corinth. That would be more intelligible. But, as the regimen *with the brethren* bears on the verb ἐκδέχομαι, *I look for*, is it not more natural to refer it to the three deputies from Corinth, who were at that time with Paul at Ephesus (vers. 15–18), and who with him were awaiting Timothy's return before setting out for Corinth? The report which he brought might give occasion for new instructions or even for a new letter from the apostle; hence the propriety of those three brethren awaiting his arrival.

Ver. 12. "As touching the brother Apollos,[1] I greatly desired him to come unto you with the brethren: but

[1] ℵ D E F G It. here add the words δηλω υμιν οτι (*I make you aware that*).

his will was not at all to come at this time; but he will come when he shall find the time convenient."—The form περὶ δέ, *as touching*, might lead us to suppose that the matter here referred to had already been spoken of; that a request even had already been forwarded from Corinth on this subject. In consequence of the situation of parties in this Church, the apostle felt bound to make it clearly understood that it was not he who put any obstacle in the way of Apollos' return to Corinth. The πάντως, *absolutely*, signifies: "notwithstanding all I could say and do." Meyer and others think that the refusal of Apollos was simply occasioned by his present evangelistic engagements, and they explain the εὐκαιρεῖν in the sense of: "when he shall have time," or, as Oltramare translates: "as soon as he can." But it seems to me that the expression used by the apostle is too emphatic to admit of so weakened a signification. The words: "But his will was absolutely not . . .," prove that there was, not an *inability*, but a determined *will* on the subject. Evidently Apollos was disgusted at the part which he had been made to fill at Corinth, as the rival of St. Paul. Hence it is obvious how innocent he himself was of those dissensions which had formed the subject of the first four chapters.—The words: *with the brethren*, refer again to the three deputies from Corinth (ver. 17); Apollos would have required to join them on their return to Greece. If so, they were not, as has been thought, the bearers of our letter (see the subscription in the T. R.). For it was intended to reach Corinth before Timothy's arrival (vers. 10 and 11 and iv. 17 seq.), and the deputies were not to leave Ephesus until after Timothy's return

to Paul.—There follow some general and particular exhortations.

Vers. 13–18: *Last recommendations.*

Vers. 13, 14. "Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men, be strong. 14. Let all your things be done in charity."—Does St. Paul mean, as Hofmann thinks, that the Corinthians should do among themselves what they would have Apollos to come and do among them? No such reference seems to me to be indicated. The apostle is preparing to close; comp. 2 Cor. xii. 11. The terms are taken from the position of an army ready for battle. And first there must be *watching*, putting itself on guard against surprises by the enemy. The Corinthians were sunk in carnal security, and exposed to all the seductions which arise from it. They were above all prone to the abuse of Christian liberty; comp. vi. 12 seq., x. 12–14, etc.—Then, *to stand firm in the faith;* to strengthen themselves in their spiritual position to hold their ground against the enemy. The point in question is undoubtedly faith in the atonement by the cross of Christ (chap. i.), and faith in the resurrection with all its moral consequences (chap. xv.). The Christian who holds to his faith is like a soldier who does not leave the ranks, however sorely pressed by the enemy; it is the opposite of what is called in Greek λειποταξία. —*To act like men* and *to be strong* are two phrases which refer to the right mode of fighting; the former to *courage*, energy — the subjective disposition; the latter to real *force* due to Divine aid — the objective state. The ἀνδρίζεσθαι is opposed to cowardice,

effeminacy; the κραταιοῦσθαι to the weakness which may sometimes accompany courage. The Corinthians lacked energy when they accepted invitations to idolatrous feasts; compare Paul's conduct, ix. 27. They were wanting in spiritual power when they did nothing in the case of the incestuous person (chap. v.). — But energy and power should be directed by *charity*. Here we have to think of the divisions (chaps. i.–iv.) and of the vain and egotistical use of spiritual gifts (chaps. xii.–xiv.); comp. chap. xiii.—There follows a more special recommendation in regard to the respect and deference due to the devoted members of the Church who give themselves to its service.

Vers. 15, 16. "I beseech you, brethren: Ye know the house of Stephanas, that it is[1] the first-fruits of Achaia, and that they have addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints. 16. That ye submit yourselves unto such, and to every one that helpeth with us, and laboureth."—The most natural construction is not to make ver. 16 the object of παρακαλῶ: "I exhort you to submit yourselves," but to take this verb in the absolute sense: "I have an exhortation to address to you." The ἵνα of ver. 16 will specify the contents of this exhortation. In the interval there is indicated the motive which justifies this request: *Ye know* . . . For the ὅτι, *that*, comp. i. 4, 5. *Stephanas* and *his house* had been, according to i. 16, baptized by Paul himself; which seems to prove that their conversion took place before the arrival of Silas and Timothy at Corinth; the fact agrees with the title "*first-fruits* of Achaia," which is given them here.—On this ground

[1] C D E F G It.: εἰσιν (*are*), instead of ἐστι (*is*).

alone they are worthy of respect; but they possess another: namely, the earnestness with which they *have devoted themselves to the service of the Church.* There is nothing here to indicate an ecclesiastical office strictly so called. The phrase: τάσσειν ἑαυτόν, frequent in classic Greek, rather denotes a voluntary consecration. The reference doubtless is to their readiness to care for the poor and the sick and the afflicted; to charge themselves with the business of the Church, deputations, journeys, paying for them personally (ἑαυτούς, *themselves*), as the delegates at present with the apostle had done. Hofmann thought that the *ministry of the* saints here denoted the collection for the Church of Jerusalem (vers. 1–4); comp. Rom. xv. 31; 2 Cor. ix. 12. But the context does not lead to this special sense.

Ver. 16. This respectful deference ought to be extended to every one who voluntarily makes himself like those of whom Paul has just spoken; their fellow-labourer by working for the good of the Church. There is an evident correspondence between the two verbs ὑποτάσσεσθαι and ἔταξαν of ver. 15. The σύν, *with*, in συνεργοῦντι, *who acts with*, cannot signify: acting with God, or with Paul, or with the Corinthians, but only: with *them that are such*, τοῖς τοιούτοις. The term κοπιᾶν, *to labour*, relates to the varied works in the kingdom of God, and contains the accessory idea of painful labour; comp. Gal. iv. 11; Rom. xvi. 6. It is plain from this exhortation that the Corinthians were naturally prone to be lacking in submission and respect to those whom their age, experience, and services naturally pointed out for the veneration of the flock.

The same defect appears from the letter which Clement of Rome was called forty years later to address to this Church.

Vers. 17, 18. "I am glad of the coming of Stephanas and Fortunatus and Achaicus: for that which was lacking on your part they have supplied, 18. for they have refreshed my spirit and yours: therefore acknowledge ye them that are such." — Paul here extends to the two other members of the deputation what he had just said of the first. *Fortunatus* is probably the same person who was afterwards the bearer of the letter of Clement of Rome (c. 65). *Achaicus* is unknown. As slaves often bore the name of the country of their birth, Edwards thinks that this last was one of Chloe's slaves (i. 11). Weizsäcker[1] supposes that both were slaves of Stephanas himself. The second supposition is at least more probable than the first. The expression: ὑστέρημα ὑμῶν, literally: *your shortcoming*, denotes the blank felt by Paul from the absence of the Corinthians, and the impossibility of communicating directly with them. The three deputies have filled this void, because it seemed to him as if in these three men he had the whole Church; comp. Phil. ii. 30. The γάρ, *for*, ver. 18, shows that this verse should explain the preceding expression. They have dissipated the uneasiness which filled the apostle's heart in regard to the Corinthians. By telling him of the love of the Church, and perhaps showing him many things in a less distressing light than he supposed, they have given him real comfort; they have consoled him, not merely in his human

[1] *Das apostolische Zeitalter*, 1886, p. 632.

sensibilities—this would require ψυχή, *soul*,—but even in his inmost being, his πνεῦμα, *spirit*, the organ of his relations to God.—And it is not only *he* whom they have thus comforted; but also the Corinthians themselves. By adding to: *my spirit*, the words: *and yours*, the apostle transports himself to the time when the deputies, returned to Corinth, will give account to the congregation of their conferences with Paul, and when the Church also in turn will find in this communication that spiritual tranquillizing which it needs. Now such services should be acknowledged, for it is not every one who could refresh a Paul and a Church of Corinth. Hence the exhortation which closes this paragraph: "Acknowledge the work of such men, and what is due to them." What exquisite delicacy is stamped on every line!

Vers. 19–24: *Salutations.*

First, those of the Churches of Asia; then the special salutations of Aquila, and of the portion of the Church which assembles under his roof; thereafter those of the whole Church; finally, that of Paul.

Vers. 19, 20. "The Churches of Asia salute you. Aquila and Priscilla[1] salute you much in the Lord, with the Church that is in their house. 20. All the brethren greet you. Greet ye one another with an holy kiss."—*Asia* denotes the province of that name, proconsular Asia which embraced the whole south-west region of Asia Minor and even Phrygia. The apostle no doubt frequently saw at Ephesus representatives

[1] ℵ B M P read Πρισκα (*Prisca*), while T. R. with A C D E F G K L Syr. reads Πρισκιλλα (*Priscilla*).

of the numerous Churches founded in those parts; or he even visited them himself; comp. Acts xx. 25. He might thus have been really charged by them with these salutations. It may be assumed that among them were those of Colosse, Hierapolis, and Laodicea.

The special salutation of *Aquila* and *Priscilla* is easily explained if we bear in mind that they had previously been settled with Paul at Corinth, and that they had assisted in founding the two Churches of Corinth and Ephesus. The *Church* assembled in their house undoubtedly comprehended not only their own family and workmen, but also all those Christians of Ephesus who had their central place of worship in this house. The κατά is distributive, and indicates that there were other houses at Ephesus where the Christians who dwelt in other quarters of the city met together. There must thus have been various places of assembling in the great cities such as Ephesus, Corinth, or Rome. There is no certain example of the existence of special buildings devoted to Christian worship within the territory of the Roman Empire before the third century (Edwards).

The third salutation is addressed by *all the brethren*, members of the Church of Ephesus. One feels in reading such salutations, that the history of nations is coming to an end, and that of a new nation of a wholly different kind is beginning.

This manifestation of love, on the part of the other Churches, should rekindle brotherly love among all the members of the Church which is its object; and this fire of charity which glows in their hearts should show itself outwardly in the *brotherly kiss*, according to the

usage received among the first Christians. In the time of Justin this rite was celebrated between prayer and the Holy Supper. It is said that the president of the assembly kissed the nearest brother, and so in order, while the women on their side did the same. In this case we have to imagine the ceremony taking place at the moment when the congregation finished the reading of this letter. It is a commission, as it were, which the apostle gives them one to another.

Vers. 21, 22. "The salutation of me, Paul, with mine own hand. 22. If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ,[1] let him be anathema! Maranatha."—Paul, according to ancient custom, dictated his letters; but we see from 2 Thess. iii. 17 that he added the salutation and signature with his own hand, no doubt to guarantee their authenticity. This precaution was even then necessary, as is proved by the case to which he alludes, 2 Thess. ii. 2.—But in such a salutation there is implicitly contained a benediction; and here the apostle feels himself suddenly arrested. Can he really bless all the readers of his letter? Are there not some among them whom he is rather obliged to curse? He had more than once stigmatized the want of love as the radical cause of the disorders and vices which stained this Church (viii. 1–3, xi. 23–26, and chap. xiii.). Now all lack of love to the brethren betrays lack of love to the Lord Himself. More than that, he had once (xii. 3) been obliged to refer to persons who said: *Jesus accursed!* and that while

[1] ℵ A B C M read simply τον κυριον (*the Lord*); T. R. with D E F G K L P adds Ιησουν Χριστον (*Jesus Christ*); Tert. Ιησουν (*Jesus*) only. Besides K P Syr^{sch} read ημων (*our*) after κυριον.

pretending to be organs of the Spirit of God. A burden weighs on his heart as he utters the prayer which should close his letter, and by a sudden impulse of the Spirit he gives vent to the feeling of indignation which fills him at the thought of such Christians: "If there is one among you who . . ." As every hearer listened to this εἴ τίς, *if any man*, he was called to ask himself, like the apostles at the Holy Table: "Is it I?" The more so because the conjunction εἰ implies the reality of the case. The term φιλεῖν, *to cherish*, has a shade of greater tenderness and more of a certain familiarity in it than ἀγαπᾶν, *to love*, which rather implies a feeling of veneration. It is an affection of a personal, cordial nature, which the apostle requires, that of friend for friend. The negative οὐ denotes more than the simple absence of affection; it includes the idea of the feeling opposed to love, positive antipathy. In the Alex., the object is τὸν κύριον, *the Lord;* the other two families, with the *Itala* and the *Peschito*, add the name *Jesus Christ*, and it must be confessed that the term φιλεῖν naturally calls for the name of the person who is to be the object of such an attachment. We have so often found the Alex. documents faulty, through the negligence of the copyist or otherwise, that we do not hesitate here again to give the preference to the received reading. Tertullian simply read Ἰησοῦν, *Jesus*.—As to the word ἀνάθεμα, an offering devoted to destruction, see on xii. 3. It is evident that the term cannot here, any more than elsewhere, denote ecclesiastical excommunication. — The word *Maranatha* belongs to the Aramaic language spoken in Palestine at that period. It is usually regarded as

compounded of the two words *Mar*, *Lord*, with the suffix *an*, *our*, and *atha*, the perfect of the verb *to come:* and hence the meaning: "Our Lord has come." The perfect *has come* may, in this case, be regarded as referring to the first coming of the Messiah; so Chrysostom and others. But it is impossible to establish a suitable relation between this first coming and the punishment of unfaithful Christians. Or *has come* may be taken as a prophetic perfect: "The Lord is present, ready to visit with a curse the man who, while professing to believe in Him, does not love Him." This is the sense taken by Meyer, Beet, etc.; comp. Phil. iv. 5: "The Lord is at hand." Edwards regards it at the same time as an echo of those discourses in tongues which celebrated in enthusiastic tones the near coming of Christ. But the use of the verb in the perfect to denote a future event, outside of prophecy strictly so called, is far from natural. How can we avoid recalling here the similar saying which closes the book of the Revelation: "Come, Lord Jesus!" and asking if such is not the meaning of the word *Maranatha?* Bickel has proved[1] that the word can perfectly well be resolved into *Marana*, *our Lord*, and *tha* (the imperative of *atha*, in Western Aramaic), *come!* This formula would thus be exactly the same as that of which we have the Greek translation in the Apocalypse. It is perfectly in place here: the apostle appeals to the coming of Him who will purify His Church. But why reproduce this formula in Aramaic in a Greek Epistle addressed

[1] *Zeitschrift für cathol. Theol.*, viii. 43. Professor Kautzsch admits that no grammatical objection can be taken to this explanation.

to Greeks? The term has been taken as a mysterious watchword common among Christians; or it has been thought that Paul wished thereby to give more solemnity to his threat. Finally, Hofmann thinks that when they heard this Aramaic expression, St. Paul's Palestinian adversaries must immediately have understood that it was addressed to them.[1] To these suppositions, all equally improbable, I may be allowed to add another which will perhaps have no more success than its predecessors. To the signature written with his own hand, did not Paul add the impression of the seal which he was in the habit of using? And did not this seal bear this prayer as a device in the Aramaic tongue: "Come, Lord Jesus!" In the copies of the letter, since the seal could not be reproduced, the copyists at least preserved the device.—It is remarkable that, in the *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles*, this word *Maranatha* is used at the end of the Liturgy of the Holy Supper (c. 10), and immediately after the words: "If any man is not holy, let him repent!" Then follows: "*Maranatha, amen!*" But it is impossible to draw any inference from this passage for any of the interpretations which we have indicated.—The apostle cannot take leave of the Church under the impression of a threatening; the following verses are connected with the salutations of ver. 21.

Vers. 23, 24. "The grace of the Lord Jesus[2] be with you! 24. My love is with you all in Christ Jesus."[3]—

[1] This critic himself explains Maranatha according to Ps. xvi. 2: *Adonaï* (*Mar*) *anetha*, *Thou art the Lord* [Marg. R.V.].

[2] ℵ B omit Χριστος, which is read by all the other documents.

[3] B F M omit αμην (*amen*), which is the reading of the *Sinaïticus* and the other Mjj.—ℵ A B C add: *To the Corinthians*, 1st. D^b: *was written*

Paul appeals to that invisible power of grace which alone can render effectual the prayers contained in the ἀσπασμός of ver. 21. We must evidently understand in ver. 23 ἤτω or ἔστω, *may it be*, and in ver. 24 ἐστί, *is*.—In no other Epistle does the apostle, after desiring the grace of the Lord for the Church, again bring in his own person. But with him there is no stereotyped form. The form is always the immediate creation of the feeling or thought. He had addressed the Christians of Corinth in rebukes and warnings of such severity that he feels the need of assuring them once more, at the close, of *his love*, and his love for them *all*. Whatever they may have been toward him, he remains their apostle, not the apostle of some only, as of those who say: "I am of Paul," but of all.—The last word: *in Christ Jesus*, reminds them once more who He is whose love has enkindled his toward them, and ought constantly to revive theirs.

from Philippi of Macedonia. K L: *was written from Philippi by Stephanas Fortunatus and Achaicus.* T. R. the same, adding: *and Timothy.* P: *was written from Ephesus.*

CONCLUSIONS.

I.

In regard to the Historical Result.

Having closed the study of this writing, the question arises, What was the impression it produced in the Church assembled to hear the reading of it? Did it exercise a tranquillizing effect on those restless and insubordinate spirits, or was it the spark which kindled the revolt so long fomented, and the mutterings of which we have detected at every step in this letter? The Second Epistle, as well as the manifold circumstances which it assumes, answer the question only too clearly. Paul's adversaries took occasion from not a few declarations contained in our Epistle to excite the animosity of the Church. The news brought by Timothy were in the last degree distressing. Contrary to the plan indicated in chap. xvi., Paul determined, to all appearance, to go back to his first purpose and to repair immediately to Corinth, perhaps in company with the three deputies. The times which followed must have been the most painful in the apostle's whole career. During this second stay which he made at Corinth, he was subjected to treatment so offensive, that he was obliged to leave the city and return to

Macedonia, leaving the Church in a condition which filled his heart with grief and anguish. It was then he wrote the letter watered with his tears, which has not been preserved to us, but which he mentions twice in 2 Corinthians (ii. 3, 4 and vii. 8–10). Titus was the bearer of this letter, intermediate between our First and Second. He succeeded, with the help of this Epistle, in bringing back the Church to a better state, and in obtaining satisfaction for the apostle who had been so grievously offended. Paul, while awaiting the result of this negotiation, returned to Ephesus. It was not till then that the tumult of Demetrius took place, in consequence of which he finally left Asia Minor. He went to Macedonia under the burden of the painful impressions which he describes in the beginning of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (i. 8, 9, ii. 12, 13). There he found Titus, who brought him the good news of the return of the Church to its apostle. Then at last he was able to promise the Corinthians his long-announced sojourn, but not without directing one more last decisive attack against those of his adversaries who had not consented to lay down their arms or to quit the field.[1] Such was the object of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, and the task of Titus, who was the bearer of it. But all this required much time and retarded the close of Paul's labours in the East, so that it was not till the winter of 58–59 that he could carry out his long-formed plan of staying some months at Corinth.

[1] In this exposition I am almost completely at one with Weizsäcker, *Apost. Zeitalt.*, pp. 303–305.

II.

In regard to Ecclesiastical Offices.

The idea has often been expressed that the First Epistle to the Corinthians does not assume the existence of any regular ecclesiastical office in this Church; and appearances are in favour of the opinion, but only appearances. It cannot possibly be supposed that the ministry of elders or presbyters,[1] which we find existing in the Church of Jerusalem (Acts xi. 38, xv. 22, xxi. 18), and which Paul and Barnabas had established at the date of their first mission in the Churches of Asia Minor (Acts xiv. 23), had not been likewise instituted by the apostle in the Churches of Greece which he found in the course of his second mission. If he had not kept up this ministry once established, how should we find it again at Ephesus (Acts xx. 17) and even in Greece, at Philippi (Phil. i. 1)? We may therefore look upon it as certain, that when in the

[1] I shall not here enter on the study of the arguments stated by Hatch and Harnack, against the generally admitted identity of the πρεσβύτεροι and the ἐπίσκοποι in the apostolic Church. The question does not come under that which I have to treat. Suffice it to say, that it seems to me much easier on the understanding of their identity to explain the one or two expressions of the apostolic Fathers which are made a ground for combating it, than to explain on the understanding of their duality the New Testament passages on which the opinion hitherto held is based. Compare especially Acts xx. 17 (πρεσβυτέρους) and ver. 28 (ἐπισκόπους); Acts xiv. 23 (πρεσβυτέρους) and Phil i. 1 (ἐπισκόπους); Titus i. 5 (πρεσβυτέρους) and ver. 7 (τὸν ἐπίσκοπον); 1 Pet. v. 1 (πρεσβυτέρους) and ver. 2 (ἐπισκοποῦντες).—The arguments advanced by Weizsäcker (*Apost. Zeitalter*, pp. 637–640) against the identity of the two titles, *elders* and *bishops*, are by no means decisive. What they tend to prove, namely, that the bishops formed a select committee taken from among the presbyters, seems to me to have no real support except in the monarchical episcopate of the second century or of the end of the first, of which the *Angel* of the Church, in the Apocalypse, is the first manifestation.

first of his letters to the Church of Thessalonica Paul speaks of: "Them that labour in the Church, who are over it in the Lord, and who admonish it" (chap. v. 12), he thus designates the elders set over it. How should the Church of Corinth, founded immediately after that of Thessalonica, not have possessed the same ministry? The appearance to the contrary arises solely from the fact that in chaps. xi.-xiv., where Paul is labouring to regulate questions of worship, he deals only with the immediate manifestations of the Holy Spirit, in the forms of prophecy, speaking in tongues, and teaching. Now these gifts were not bound to an ecclesiastical office; and therefore, when settling the mode of their exercise, he does not speak of the regular ministries established at Corinth. But this does not imply that these offices did not exist. He alludes to them in some passages; thus in ver. 5 of chap. xii.: "There are diversities of *ministrations* and one Lord." These words, contrasted as they are with the preceding: "There are diversities of *gifts*, but the same Spirit," can apply only to regular offices. These offices we find indicated in ver. 28, in a list of the spiritual activities in which Paul combines both ministries (the apostles, for example) and gifts (the prophets, for example). These are the two ministries denoted by the terms *helps* and *governments*, that is to say, the diaconate and presbyterate. The existence of the diaconate, as an office, at this period, appears distinctly, notwithstanding all that Weizsäcker may say, from the title *deaconess* given to Phœbe, Rom. xvi. 1.[1] This ministry was

[1] Weizsäcker (pp. 632–633) explains the expression relative to Phœbe, Rom. xvi. 1, in this sense; that, as she bestowed care on Paul and many

the renewal, in a different form, of the office which had been established in special circumstances at Jerusalem, Acts vi. It is obvious from Phil. i. 1: "Paul and Timothy, servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints which are in Christ Jesus at Philippi, *with the bishops and deacons*," that these were in the apostle's eyes the two ministries which constituted a true Christian community. It is impossible to suppose that he did not establish them as soon as he found it possible in a Church like that of Corinth. It will be remembered that Cenchrea, to which Phœbe belonged (Rom. xvi. 1), was the port of Corinth.—This result comes out still more clearly from the pastoral Epistles written at a later period. In them the apostle gives positive directions to his two apostolical helpers with a view to the establishment and maintenance of the presbyterate; comp. 1 Tim. iii. 1–7 and Titus i. 5–9. As to the diaconate, about which he expresses himself at length 1 Tim. iii. 8–13, he does not speak to Titus, probably because this ministry was not yet necessary in the recently founded Churches of Crete. So in chap. xiv. of the Acts, where the installation of presbyters in the Churches of Lycaonia is related, there is not yet any mention of the office of deacons.

It should be remarked, however, that the office of presbyter, as it then existed, did not yet embrace the ministry of preaching. This task was left, as we see in the letters to the Thessalonians and the Corinthians, to the free action of the Spirit in the different forms in

others, she also aided the Church itself, at Cenchrea, by spontaneous services. This is to do violence to Paul's words grammatically and logically.

which it then appeared. It is not till later, till the date to which the pastoral Epistles bring us, that we decidedly find the tendency to combine the ministry of teaching with the presbyterate. "The bishop" (the presbyter, chap. i. 7-9), says Paul in his Epistle to Titus, "must be able to exhort the flock in the sound doctrine, and to convict gainsayers." According to 1 Tim. iii. 2, the bishop should be a man apt to teach (διδακτικός). It was this combination which, becoming more and more firmly established, gradually led to the monarchical episcopate which forms the salient feature of the ecclesiastical constitution of the second century. In proportion as the free gifts of the Spirit, which had provided for the edification of the Churches at the beginning, diminished, the regular ministry whose functions were at first chiefly administrative, felt obliged to devote itself more and more to teaching.

To sum up then: the following, if we are not mistaken, was the course of events. At the time when the Church was founded, by the great manifestation of Pentecost, the free outburst of the Spirit took effect in all believers; and the same fact was witnessed in the house of Cornelius (Acts x. 44–46), at Ephesus (Acts xix. 6), and doubtless on many other occasions. Besides the inspired utterance due to this immediate operation of the Spirit, the apostolate alone represented at that first period the element of regular office. But soon the presbyterate, with its humble functions, essentially practical and foreign to worship properly so called, became necessary. We find it as well in the Jewish-Christian Church at Jerusalem and elsewhere (James v. 14), as in the Churches of Gentile origin.

Within the latter also free gifts were not slow in appearing; but to begin with, in Thessalonica, for example, in a less brilliant fashion, and one which seems rather to have excited a sort of distrust; for the apostle is obliged to take these extraordinary manifestations under his protection: "Quench not the Spirit; despise not prophesyings" (1 Thess. v. 19, 20). —In the following Epistle, that to the Galatians, we find a solitary, but still indistinct, trace of the influence exercised by the gifts of the Spirit, iii. 5: "He that supplieth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles among you." It is a little later at Corinth that we behold, as in a magnificent spring-time, the full efflorescence of spiritual gifts. Paul reckons them to the number of twelve. Most remarkable among them are the gifts of tongues and of prophecy. They are the two principal agents in the edification of the Church, in its assemblies for worship, to such an extent, that they threaten to take the place of the other gifts, such as teaching, and that the exercise of offices, though existing, seems totally annulled.—At the slightly later date of the Epistle to the Romans, this extraordinary phase seems already over and gone. Paul enumerates only seven gifts, xii. 6-8; and speaking in tongues is not even mentioned. The gifts indicated have a calmer and more practical character; they are, after prophecy, which occupies the first rank (for the apostolate, see ver. 3), the functions of teaching, exhortation, helps; offices strictly so called are also spoken of (διακονία, ver. 7).—In the Epistle which follows, that to the Ephesians, Paul mentions only four functions named to serve as a permanent basis for the development of

the Church (iv. 11) : apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers. Of these four forms of action, the second only, prophecy, belongs, strictly speaking, to the category of gifts. The evangelists or missionaries, such as Titus and Timothy, really hold an office to which they have been consecrated by the laying on of hands (2 Tim. i. 6 ; 1 Tim. iv. 14). Pastors are the presbyters ; this clearly appears from Acts xx. 28 where Paul says to the presbyters of Ephesus : " Take heed to yourselves, and to all the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you bishops, to *feed* the Church of the Lord ; " and from the First Epistle of Peter : " The presbyters among you I exhort, who am a fellow-presbyter : *Feed* the flock of God which is among you " (vers. 1, 2). We thus see that their functions were not purely administrative, but that they had also a spiritual side, the care of individual souls. As to the teachers, finally, they are, by the very form of expression (one article for the two substantives), more or less identified with the pastors. Teaching, no doubt, is a gift, but a gift which tends to pass over into an office by uniting with the presbyterate. — The subsequent Epistle also, that to the Philippians, says not a single word either of the gift of tongues or of prophecy. Bishops and deacons alone are designated ; they are named along with Paul, *the apostle*, and Timothy, *the evangelist* (i. 1).—In the Pastorals, finally, we have pointed out the ever more and more distinct evidences of the fact, that teaching tended to become the regular function of the presbyters.

This succession of phases, established by the series

of Paul's Epistles, is instructive. It shows us that there was not in the primitive Church any one mode of procedure, a permanent type of constitution, and that in particular the state of the Church of Corinth, at the time when Paul wrote the First Epistle, had an exceptional character, and should not be regarded as forming a law for all periods of the Church, as seems to be thought by certain Christians of our day, who reject the idea of office as applied to the Church. After that phase, in which immediate spiritual gifts seemed for a time to absorb all ecclesiastical activity, offices reappeared, and partially attracting the gifts to them, especially that of teaching, became, agreeably to the apostle's injunctions, the essential agencies in maintaining and developing the Church. The state of the Corinthian Church, as we find it in our First Epistle, was only a passing phase in the history of the primitive Church.

III.

In regard to Criticism of the Text.

It has been calculated that in the New Testament in general one word in ten is subject to variation. By counting the variants, which I have mentioned in the notes in our Epistle, we come to a smaller proportion. Out of the 6934 words which it contains, I have indicated 372 variants, which gives the proportion of 1 variant to about 18 words. It is true that I have only indicated those which were worth the trouble. The general meaning of the apostolic text is therefore

as certain as the direction of a curve in which seventeen points are known in eighteen, or at least nine points in ten.

When we study these 372 variants more closely, we find three principal types in the transmission of the text:

1. The type followed by the text of the four oldest Uncials, ℵ A B C. This text seems to have been the one which was copied in Egypt; it may be called *Alexandrine.* It is on it that the Egyptian translations and the quotations of the Fathers of the Egyptian Church are based.

2. The type which is traced in the four somewhat less ancient manuscripts, D E F G. It is the one which was copied in the Churches of the West; it is accompanied in the manuscripts by a Latin translation. It is called *Greco-Latin* or *Western.* It is likewise found in the ancient Latin translation, the *Itala,* and in the Fathers of the Western Church.

3. The type which appears in the latest Uncials, K L P. Their text seems to be the one which was transmitted in the Churches of Syria, and which passed thence to all the Churches of the Byzantine Empire. It is called *Syriac* or *Byzantine.* It is found pretty frequently in the Syriac translation, the *Peschito,* and in the Fathers of the Church of Syria, such as Chrysostom and Theodoret.

These three forms of the text are found distinctly separated only in three cases in our Epistle: vii. 31, ix. 10 (excepting P), xiv. 37.

But two of them are frequently found united in opposition to the third, and that with the three possible combinations:

The Alexandrine and Greco-Latin texts opposed to the Byzantine: 89 times.

The Alexandrine and Byzantine texts opposed to the Greco-Latin: 44 times.

The Greco-Latin and Byzantine texts opposed to the Alexandrine: 48 times.

But these three groups only appear completely formed and marked off from one another in their mutual opposition in the following proportion:

Complete Alexandrine and Greco-Latin groups against the complete Byzantine: 16 times.

Complete Alexandrine and Byzantine groups against the complete Greco-Latin: 27 times.

Complete Greco-Latin and Byzantine groups against the complete Alexandrine: 13 times.

As to the two most ancient and important manuscripts, the following is the state of things:

ℵ stands alone 3 times; besides, 4 times with A alone; 2 times with P alone; 2 times with L alone; 1 time with D alone.

The same text agrees 4 times with the Greco-Latins alone; with the Byzantines alone, 2 times.

B stands alone 10 times; besides, 2 times with D alone, with P alone, and with L alone; 1 time with A alone.

The same text agrees 13 times with the Greco-Latins alone (besides 3 times with F G alone), and 6 times with the Byzantines alone.

ℵ and B agree 10 times; they are found opposed to one another 79 times.

The received text agrees almost always, in case of variation, with one or two Byzantines or with the

three Byzantines united; very rarely with one or other of the two other texts, or with the two united; 5 times it is supported only by Cursives, 2 times it is even destitute of all support in the documents (vi. 14, xv. 33).

To this statistical statement, which, in view of the very frequent variety of groupings, can only be approximately exact, we should add, as the result of our exegesis, an attempt to appreciate the relative value of the texts, remembering, however, that a large number of cases of variation remain undecided.

ℵ seems to me mistaken in the 3 cases in which it stands alone.

In the 6 cases in which it agrees with Greco-Latins alone, it is mistaken 3 times; it has appeared to me exact in 1 case in which it agrees with the Greco-Latins and the Byzantines (xi. 17).

B, in the 10 cases in which it stands alone, has been found 1 time exact, 7 times mistaken.

In the 13 cases in which it agrees with Greco-Latins alone, it has the true text 3 times (i. 1, i. 2, xiv. 38); 3 times it is mistaken.

In the 6 cases in which it agrees with Byzantines only, they have the true text 3 times (i. 28, xv. 49, 51); their text is 1 time mistaken (vii. 7).

In 1 case in which it agrees with the Greco-Latins and the Byzantines against the Alexandrines (v. 2), it has the true text.

Out of 6 cases in which ℵ B stand alone, they have the true text 1 time, and are mistaken 2 times.

In 2 cases in which both alone agree with the Greco-Latins (xv. 10) or with the Byz. (xiv. 15), they have the true text.

Of the 48 cases in which the Alexandrine text is wholly or in part opposed to the other two, there were 10 in which it had the true text, 7 in which it was mistaken.

Of the 44 cases in which the Greco-Latin text is wholly or in part opposed to the two others, it was found to have the true text once, but that is an extremely important case (ix. 10), and to be mistaken 32 times.

Of the 89 cases in which the Byzantine stands alone, it has appeared to me to give the true text 9 times.

The received text, either apart from the others, or in combination with them, seems to me to have in all 79 mistakes; its reading seems to be preferable to that of the Alexandrines 20 times; 7 times it agrees with B, and, with it, has the advantage over the reading of the other Alexandrines.

The best way of deriving instruction from the comparison of the texts in this Epistle will be to repeat the most important of the variants, and to state in each case what the authorities are which support the reading which seems to deserve the preference.

There are twenty-seven:

I. 2. position of ηγιασμενοις, .	*Right:* B Greco-Lat. It.; *Wrong:* ℵ A Byz. Pesch.
I. 22. σημειον, ...	*Right:* All the Mjj. (excepting L); *Wrong:* T. R. with L and Mnn.
I. 30. position of ημιν, . .	*Right:* All the Mjj. (excepting L); *Wrong:* T. R. with L Pesch. Mnn.
II. 1. μαρτυριον, ...	*Right:* B Greco-Lat. Byz. Itala; *Wrong:* ℵ A C Pesch. Cop.
III. 1. σαρκινοις, ...	*Right:* Alex. D; *Wrong:* Other Greco-Lat. Byz.
III. 4. ανθρωποι, ...	*Right:* All the Mjj. (excepting L P); *Wrong:* T. R. with L P.

IV. 2.	ὁ δε, ...	*Right:* T. R. with E L Mnn.;
		Wrong: Alex. Greco-Lat. other Byz.
IV. 2.	ζητειται, ...	*Right:* B L Pesch. It.; [Lat.
		Wrong: Other Alex. Byz. Greco-
V. 13.	και, ...	*Right:* T. R. with E L Pesch.;
		Wrong: Alex. Greco-Lat. other Byz.
V. 13.	εξαρειτε, ...	*Right:* T. R. with E L;
		Wrong: All the rest.
VI. 20.	και εν . . . θεου, . .	*Right:* Alex. Greco-Lat.;
		Wrong: T. R. with Byz.
VII. 29.	. . . . .	*Right:* T. R. with E K L;
		Wrong: Alex. Greco-Lat.
VIII. 7.	συνηθεια, ...	*Right:* ℵ A B P Cop.; [It. Pesch.
		Wrong: T. R. with Greco-Lat. Byz.
IX. 10.	. . . . .	*Right:* D F G It.;
		Wrong: Alex. Byz.
XI. 17.	παραγγελλων . . . επαινω,	*Right:* ℵ Greco-Lat. Byz.;
		Wrong: Other Alex. D Pesch.
XII. 3.	Ιησους, ...	*Right:* Alex. Pesch.;
		Wrong: Greco-Lat. Byz.
XII. 3.	Κυριος Ιησους, . . .	*Right:* Alex. Pesch.;
		Wrong: Greco-Lat. Byz.
XIII. 3.	καυθησωμαι (—σωμαι), .	*Right:* Greco-Lat. Byz.;
		Wrong: ℵ A B.
XIV. 37.	εντολαι, ...	Doubtful.
XIV. 38.	αγνοειτω, ...	*Right:* B Byz. Pesch.;
		Wrong: ℵ A Greco-Lat.
XV. 24.	παραδιδω, . . .	*Right:* Alex. Greco-Lat.;
		Wrong: T. R. with K L It.
XV. 44.	ει, ...	*Right:* T. R. with E K L Pesch.;
		Wrong: Alex. Greco-Lat.
XV. 44.	εστι, ...	*Right:* T. R. with K L Pesch.;
		Wrong: Alex. Greco-Lat.
XV. 44.	σωμα, ...	*Right:* T. R. with K L Pesch.;
		Wrong: Alex. Greco-Lat. [Lat.;
XV. 47.	κυριος, ...	*Right:* Alex. (excepting A) Greco-
		Wrong: A Byz. [Fathers;
XV. 49.	Φορεσομεν, . . .	*Right:* T. R. with B some Mnn.
		Wrong: Other Alex. Greco-Lat.
		Byz. It. Cop. Or. [Mnn. Cop.;
XV. 51.	ου κοιμηθησομεθα . .	*Right:* T. R. with B Byz. Pesch.
		Wrong: Other Alex. Greco-Lat.

To what result does this table bring us? Unless the exegesis on which it rests is destitute of accuracy, we must conclude that the truth of a reading cannot be

established from the external authorities which favour it. For we find each of these authorities supporting sometimes the true, sometimes the false reading. It may be said (approximately, considering the very frequent transposition of the elements which constitute the three principal groups), that the Alex. are right 6 times, wrong 11 times; the Greco-Latins are right 7 times, wrong 11 times; the Byzantines are right 10 times, wrong 10 times. A striking feature is, that in the 6 cases in which B diverges from the other Alex. to combine either with the Byzantines (iv. 1, xiv. 38, xv. 49, xv. 51), or with the Greco-Latins (i. 2), or with the Byzantines and Greco-Latins together (ii. 1), the true reading is in every instance on its side. ℵ plays a much less important part; it diverges only 3 times from the other Alexandrines; 1 time (xiv. 38) combining with A and with the Greco-Latins (wrong reading); 1 time (i. 2) agreeing with A and the Byz. (wrong reading); 1 time (xi. 17) coinciding with the Byz. and Greco-Latin (true text).

No positive rule which we might be inclined to take from these 27 particular instances, certainly the most important in the Epistle, would be other than arbitrary. But the negative consequences are evident. The first is the absolute erroneousness of the method which claims to decide between variants by means of external authorities alone. The second, which completes the first, is the erroneousness of holding by any one of the three types of text, the Alexandrine, for example, to the extent of taking almost no account of the Greco-Latin text, and absolutely none of the Byzantine text, as is done by Hort and Westcott. It is, I think, very

unfortunate that in the revision of the English translation of the New Testament this system has been usually followed by the Committee. It would be greatly to be regretted if in the new edition of Ostervald, which is preparing under the authority of the official Synod of the Reformed Church of France, the authority of this Alexandrine text were also accepted without sufficient check. How can a voice on the subject be reasonably refused to the two other texts, when their superiority is attested in so many particular instances by the evidence of exegesis?

As to the Byzantine text, in particular, it cannot reasonably be supposed that there was not a separate and independent transmission of the apostolic text in the countries of Syria and Cilicia, where the first Churches of Greek origin were founded, quite as much as in Egypt and in the Churches of the West. And how can it be held that men like Chrysostom and Theodoret would have blindly adopted a text arbitrarily constructed a few decades of years before the date when they composed their commentaries! I cannot therefore help giving my entire assent to the opinion of Principal Brown of Aberdeen,[1] in the extremely accurate and learned criticism which he has given of the system followed by the two critics I have just named, in connection with the following passages in which the superiority systematically ascribed to the Alexandrines completely breaks down: 1 Cor. xv. 49; Mark xi. 3; Matt. xxvii. 49; Heb. iv. 2; Matt. xix. 16, 17; John i. 18; Eph. i. 15; Luke xiv. 44;

[1] *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, 1886. "The Revised Text of the Greek Testament."

Acts xii. 25; Rev. xv. 6. In all these cases Dr. Brown justifies the old reading to a demonstration, and shows the impossibility, and, more than once, even the absurdity, of the Alexandrine text. When authorities are so often demonstrated to be fallible taken separately, it is impossible by adding them to one another to arrive at certainty. The means at the disposal of external criticism may lead to a greater or less degree of probability. But it is only by discovering the writer's thought, by means of the context, that we can put our finger with certainty on the terms by which he really expressed it. It will be said that this is a vicious circle, for it is only by means of the terms themselves that we penetrate to the thought. But this circle is far from being vicious; it meets us in every study; it is the condition of progress in all the branches of human knowledge. In every domain, scientific procedure consists in passing and repassing from the idea to the facts, and from the facts to the idea, until the real fact appears fully illumined by the true idea.

IV.

In regard to the Epistolary Work of the Apostle.

St. Paul's literary career, though purely epistolary, at least so far as we know, embraces many varieties. The manifold relations in which he lived, as an apostle and a man, have left their varied impress on his different writings. In the Epistles to the Romans

and the Ephesians he discovers the gift of calm and consecutive teaching; as we read them we feel constrained at every line to claim for him the title of *Doctor Seraphicus*, invented to characterize one of the great divines of the Middle Ages. In the letters to the Galatians and the Colossians his ability as a polemic shines; and, if one dared invent an epithet, there might be given him, on the ground of these two writings, the title of *Doctor Elenchicus*, by way of eminence. In the Epistles to the Thessalonians what especially stands out is his gift of prophecy; the final future, in its two aspects, the dark and the luminous, lies open to the view of the apostle in the light of the Spirit. In the Pastoral Epistles we recognise the man endowed with the gift of ecclesiastical government, the "Kirchenfürst,"[1] as Schleiermacher would say. When he addresses the Church of Philippi, we discover in him the loving and loved father who exhorts and thanks his fondly cherished family. In the lines written to Philemon we hear, so to speak, the affectionate voice of Paul the brother. Finally, in the Epistles to the Corinthians, it is his gift for the care of souls which strikes us, it is the ποιμήν, the pastor, whom we admire. The object is to bring back an erring flock, whom seducers have alienated from him; it concerns him to resolve a multitude of practical difficulties which have arisen in the life of the Church. In the former of these letters, the apostle is self-restrained; he calmly discusses the questions proposed; he gives solutions full of wisdom, and fitted to guide us even in our day in analogous cases. In the latter, his emotion breaks out; he

[1] Church-Primate.—Tr.

labours, on the one hand, to draw the bond more closely which unites him to the faithful portion; on the other, to isolate and remove the rebellious spirits. He thus reconquers this important part of his domain, which for a brief period threatened to escape him.

These two Epistles are the monument of the hottest conflict, but also of the greatest victory, in the whole career of St. Paul.

OBSERVATION.

The author of the brochure quoted vol. i. p. 357 is not M. Jean Monod, Professor at Montauban, but the Rev. Jean-Adolphe Monod.

END OF VOLUME II.

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